



Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGan CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar Diamond Book Binding How






078714

Sook Verification 2023-25

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri : ६३.५०) CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



ya Samar Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXVI No. 1

Jenuary-March 1980

NEHRU AND HIS CRITICS: AN ASSESSMENT
—M. Chalapathi Rau

NON-ALIGNMENT: THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN PERSPECTIVE

—M.S. Rajan

DETERMINANTS OF INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA

—Pramod Kumar Mishra

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MIGRATORY LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA
—Harjinder Singh



INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

## Signs of change behind this symbol







Changes in technology reflecting changes in industrial patterns. Nothing remains static behind this symbol. The thinking process goes on generating vast resources of technical know-how and manufacturing skill.

It started in 1938 when two engineers manufactured dairy equipment for the first time in India. Today we are over 10,000 people involved in manufacturing plant and equipment for every major industry from dairy to nuclear power.

Tomorrow we'll be vastly different from what we are today. Because things are never static behind this symbol. The thinking process goes on. The pool of technical resources grows, lending new dimensions to our capability of manufacturing equipment for every vital industry.

#### **LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED**

Where technology moves with time P.O. Box 278, Bombay 400 038 Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGar

# INDIA 078714 QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXVI No. 1

January-March 1980

#### EDITORIAL BOARD

R.S. ARORA

J.S. BAINS

M.S. RAJAN (Managing Editor)

BADR-UD-DIN TYABJI

FRANK THAKURDAS

VANITA RAY (Assistant Editor)



INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

## INDIA QUARTERLY

#### A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

#### CONTENTS COPYRIGHT

CINDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Annual Subscription: Rs. 40:00 Single Copy: Rs. 11.00

All correspondence relating to contributions, review of books and reproduction/translation of contributions published in the journal should be addressed to the Managing Editor; correspondence relating to advertisements and distribution of the journal should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary. Both the Editorial and the publication offices are located at the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi-110001.

### India Quarterly & Foreign Affairs Reports (Monthly) (BACK ISSUES)

Some back issues of the above journals are available. For particulars of availability and price, please write to the Assistant Secretary.

#### Better Books Unlimited

CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, TRIVANDRUM

POVERTY, UNEMPLOY-MENT AND DEVELOP-MENT POLICY

Rs. 20.00 235 pages;

This case study of selected issues with reference to Kerala, prepared by the Centre for Development Studies at Trivandrum. was commissioned by the United Nations Secretariat. It is based on the findings of field work and surveys, and examines tentatively the factors determining food intake in agrarian societies and allied problems.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

290 pages; Rs. 75.00

N.K. SARKAR (GENERAL EDITOR) Six internationally acclaimed economists discuss the role of foreign private investment in the economic development of Asia, with special reference to the south and south-east Asian countries. Emphasis has been laid on US and Japanese direct investments abroad, especially in developing ECAFE countries. The concluding chapter on 'Basic Policy Issues and Recommendations', written by UN experts, also will be of interest to laymen and policy-makers alike.

D.S. GANGULY

REGIONAL ECONOMY OF WEST BENGAL

326 pages; Rs. 80.00

First prepared as a report on a research project approved by the Planning Commission in 1972, this volume examines in great detail the regional economy of the 'developed' region of the state with data and analysis not published before. Directed by one of our eminent economists, it is an invaluable source of information and guidance for those concerned with Indian economics.

Orient Longman Limited

BOMBAY BANGALORE

MADRAS

HYDERABAD

NEW DELHI PATNA

## Central Bank's Family Welfare Plans

## Extra income every month without work or worry

MONTHLY INTEREST DEPOSIT SCHEME

Deposit Rs. 1,000/- or more for 12 months and over—get interest in cash every month—extra money to meet extra expenses. Interest ranges from 7% to 10% p.a. for 12 to 120 months.



## Save right at home without stepping out. CENTRAL'S MINI DEPOSIT SCHEME

You can open an account with as little as Re.1/and thereafter save any amount in multiples of 50 paise for 36 months or 60 months. Our Authorised Collection Agent will come to your doorstep at your convenience to collect your deposit. Interest at 6% and 7% p.a.




#### Gift a future to your young ones

MONEY MULTIPLIER DEPOSIT SCHEME

Deposit Rs. 100/- or multiple of it for 12 to 120 months. Your deposit becomes more than double in 8, months and becomes more than 2½ times in 120 months. Take care of your family's future requirements. Interest from 7% to 10%.p.a. compounded quarterly



#### A little means a lot RECURRING DEPOSIT SCHEME



The ideal scheme for salaried people. Save as little as Rs. 5/- or its multiples every month for any period from 12 to 120 months. See your money grow with interest. Interest at 7% to 10% p.a. compounded quarterly.

## And that's not all

You have Central's QUARTERLY INTEREST DEPOSIT SCHEME to take care of your 'extra' expenses. And HOME SAVINGS SAFE ACCOUNT to save when you can, withdraw when yon need.

Come. Open an account at your nearest Central Bank branch. Watch your plans take concrete shape.

atral Bank of India

Gau

live

Cho

regu


the

Sec

larg

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar





CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

### PALLAV TALK AND HOW TO USE I

DYENCITEMENT





80.4888

#### AFTER TITO WHAT?

K. KRISHNA MOORTHY

The book examines the domestic and foreign policies of Yugoslavia against the background of decentralization of the economic system, Worker's Councils and "self-management", the nationalities problem, the changing relations with the Soviet Union, and non-aligned approach. It discusses the various ideological and personality changes that have occurred during the eleven party congresses, the role of the army and the succession problem. It also examines the applicability of the 'Yugoslav model' to other countries and the feasibility of the present political and administrative system after Tito. The book provides deep insights into the possible trends in Yugoslavia and the likely impact of developments in Yugoslavia for Europe and the world in the post-Tito period.

June 1980 200 pages Rs. 60

#### EEC AND THE THIRD WORLD

Edited by K.B. LALL and H.S. CHOPRA

This inter-disciplinary study by leading European and Indian specialists and senior officials of India and the EEC makes an in-depth analysis of EEC's economic and political relations with Africa, ASEAN, Latin America, and West Asia. It examines EEC's keen interest in China and discusses China's attitude towards Euro-communism. Other issues covered include EEC's economic priorities and its relations with India, Western Europe's arms trade, transfer of technology, etc. The book highlights the divergent approaches of the EEC and the Third World towards contemporary issues in the context of the New International Economic Order. It also discusses the lessons of European integration for the developing world and assesses future prospects.

September 1980 ca. 500 pages ca. Rs. 130

#### **DETENTE IN EUROPE: Implications for Asia**

R.K. JAIN

Examines three phases of Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; West German rapprochement with East Europe; Albanian, Chinese and Romanian attitudes, question of reduction of forces in Central Europe, the nature and scope of detente in Europe, problems and prospects of European security, and implications of detente in Europe for the Third World.

1977 344 pages Rs. 65

#### GERMAN POLITICAL IDEALISM

FRANK THAKURDAS

This book traces the development of German political idealism. It analyses the social and political philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel and makes a critical appraisal of their perception of metaphysical, moral, and ethical problems. It examines Marx's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and highlights the differences between the world-views of these two great masters of political thought and their divergent ways of interpreting historical reality.

March 1980 376 pages Rs. 110

#### Radiant Publishers

E-155 KALKAJI, NEW DELHI-110019

d

d

ty

ns est ed ns he er-

es,

in

and neir of of ori-

### INDIA QUARTERLY

#### A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXVI	January-March	1980		No. 1	
NEHRU AND HIS CRITICS:  By M. Chalapathi Rau				1	
Non-Alignment: The D PRACTICE IN PERSPECTIVE By M.S. Rajan		THEORY AND		43	
DETERMINANTS OF INTRA-R By Pramod Kumar Mis	EGIONAL RELATIONS I	N SOUTH ASIA		68	
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS CONTROL AFRICA  By Harjinder Singh	of Migratory Labo	OUR IN SOUTH			
NOT	TES AND COMMI	ENTS			
Public Attitudes to the By Kurt Waldheim	UNITED NATIONS	••		100	
Economic Development of By Ezat Mossallanejad	DF IRAN : A COMMEN	NT		105	
BOOK REVIEWS					
Democracy in India—A Ro By D.P. Mishra	eview Article			108	
India		. 0 201		112	
A.B. SHAH, Ed.: The Sociation: Essays in Honour Naik	l Context of Educa- r of Professor J.P.	—K.L. Shr	imali	•	

ALFRED DE SOUZA: The Politics of Change and Leadership Development: The New Leaders in India and Africa	—C.P. Bhambhri	
V.T. KRISHNAMACHARI and S. VENU: Planning in India: Theory and Practice	—Tarlok Singh	
M.S. BALA: Disciplinary Action in Industry Including Banking Industry	—O.P. Arya	
S.P. MATHUR: Economics of Small Scale Industries	—Bepin Bihari	
S.L.N. SIMHA: Credit Management: (Planning, Appraisal and Supervision)	—M.L. Bery	
VINAYASHIL GAUTAM: Enterprise and Society: A Study of Some Aspects of Entrepreneur- ship and Management in India	—Madhuri Sheth	
V.R. PANCHAMUKHI: Trade Policies of India: A Quantitative Analysis	—S.K. Das	
S.N. MISHRA: Politics and Leadership in Municipal Government	—Abhijit Datta	
Other Countries	127	
DEVENDRA KAUSHIK: China: An Ideological Puzzle	—P.K.S. Namboodiri	
* LEO GOODSTADT: China's Watergate: Political and Economic Conflicts, 1969-1977	—Manoranjan Mohanty	
zulfikar ali bhutto: "If I Am Assassinated"	—P.B. Sinha	
P.S. BHOOSHAN: The Development Experience of Nepal	—Navin Chandra Joshi	
Indian Books of the Quarter	132	

THE INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, the publisher of the journal, is a non-government, non-profit and non-party organisation. It was founded in 1943 to encourage and facilitate the objective study of Indian and international affairs. The Council, as such, does not express any opinion on any aspects of Indian and International Affairs. The opinions expressed in this journal are, therefore, those of the respective authors and reviewers, not of the Council.

THE EDITOR welcomes short comments on the views expressed by the contributors in the journal. The comments should normally be not more than 1,000 words in length and should generally limit themselves to the issues raised in each contribution. The Editor will try to make a selection out of these comments for publication in the journal.

27

nty

shi

132

to a state of the state of the state of the state of

#### NEHRU AND HIS CRITICS: AN ASSESSMENT

By CHALAPATHI RAU\*

THE great importance of the role of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India for nearly seventeen years, as much in the development of Independent India as in Indian history, is obvious. This has been acknowledged in various books, essays and articles that have been written about him, both adulatory and critical. He had had enough of adulation and he did not mind criticism while he was alive and would probably not have minded it after his death; he only wanted criticism to be fair, relevant and expressed with a historical sense and in dignified language. However bitter the criticism, he had to take note of it. Whatever the praise or criticism, particularly after his death, it would be of value only if it was expressed with as much objectivity as possible.

The credit and praise that have been Nehru's due are not more important than the criticism. For, while he will continue to be praised and criticized as long as he is remembered, it is to the extent that we can meet criticism that his name can survive. In this article, an attempt is made to consider the basic criticisms to which he and his policies have been subjected and seek to assess how much of it is valid. No effort is made to dismiss criticism merely because it is criticism. Nor is an effort made to explain away any criticism. Criticism is either answered where it has seemed to be beside the point, unfair or irrelevant, or the other side stated without vehemence or any strain on sense. Such a review might be useful, at least to sum up whatever the case against Nehru is according to his critics.

Nehru's critics have been both foreign and Indian. The foreign critics are few, and while a few like Michael Brecher have been fair, friendly and sympathetic to him, they have not written on him and his role in domestic politics. The foreign critics range from the urbane and cynical Walter Crocker, a former Australian High Commissioner, to the polite and ironical British newspaperman, Neville Maxwell. The Indian critics, naturally, are far more numerous; several of them were opposed to him in public life and have left their criticisms on record. The most important of them are C. Rajagopalachari, Acharya Kripalani, Jayaprakash Narayan, M.N. Roy, Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh, D.P. Mishra, Sampurnanand, Dr. Khare, and Sardar Patel too, in a sense. The others include teachers of history, former civil servants and journalists. To these may be added the recent critical writings on Nehru during the January 1980 Lok Sabha Elections. All these and more recent critical writings have been assessed.

<sup>\*</sup>Mr. Chalapathi Rau was Editor of *National Herald* (Lucknow and Delhi) between 1946-78. He is presently Chairman, Executive Council, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

b

S

Nehru has been criticized for almost all the major issues with which he dealt and for all the major policies which he enunciated or with which he had been associated. These policies may be summed up as secularism, planned development and socialism, science and technology, industrialization, and non-alignment. These have been recurring themes, and to them have been added under some head or other questions concerning Kashmir, China, Korea, the Congo, Vietnam, Laos and so on. The internal affairs of the Congress Party have also been a large theme. Critics have dealt with almost every important event in Nehru's life, particularly his life as Prime Minister, and what are known as his blind-spots, ranging from Krishna Menon to Sheikh Abdullah. If an eminent person's whole life is considered vulnerable to criticism, even his valets are his critics, and no man is a hero to his valet. Maulana Azad, a close associate, was also Nehru's critic.

The present writer has read all the main publications critical of Nehru and has analyzed the more important among them to make the article as compact and self-contained as possible. It is not an attempt at collectively reviewing books which have been reviewed singly, or an attempt at criticism of criticism, but an attempt to present criticism as a whole against the perspective of Nehru's life, policies and achievements. It might serve a useful purpose if misunderstanding is cleared, if any, or a set of facts and arguments presented against another set of facts and arguments, so that as long as Nehru is relevant and discussed and evaluated, the whole debate on either side may be easily available. This evaluation is *not* an apology for Nehru or anything he said or did, but is done in an historical spirit, when both praise and criticism have tended to become blurred, with the consequences of Nehru becoming mixed with the consequences of Gandhi, with the consequences of Indira Gandhi also being added to them.

There is, besides, the Gandhi-Nehru antinomy. The attempt to make of it an antithesis is unnecessary, though not as polemical as pitting Gandhi against Nehru or Nehru against Gandhi. Gandhi and Nehru seem to go together; while Nehru was a product of the Gandhi age, there was much debate between Gandhi and Nehru in Gandhi's life-time, and a synthesis emerged. While Nehru was being criticized for following Gandhi, even when rebelling against him, there has been a greater tendency for those known as Gandhians not only to deny to Nehru the qualities which Gandhi attributed to him but to attribute to him much which is considered un-Gandhian. The criticism of the Gandhians has also to be considered seriously, although some may think that Nehru was the greatest Gandhian of them all.

#### WESTERNERS EVALUATE NEHRU

Among distinguished foreign writers, apart from statesmen, who took a friendly view of Nehru, in some cases a warm view, were Toynbee, Vincent Shean, Dorothy Norman, Norman Cousins and Michael Brecher. The last mentioned wrote a full-length biography after considerable research and

U

ne

ad

be

n,

ve

a,

he

st

er,

to

le

et.

nd

ict ng

ti-

ve

if

ed

is

be

he

sm

ng

ra

it

lhi

go

ch sis

en

as

ed

he

gh

a

ent

he

nd

interviewing and with much sympathy and some understanding. But, as in the case of biographies entirely from the outside, and with no relation between the biographee and the biographer except interviews, Brecher showed two limitations. He did not entirely understand the Indian and Congress background, and he says almost everything about Nehru without saying anything in particular, with the result that Nehru as a whole does not emerge in his biography. Besides, the biography ends with 1956, the year when Nehru's fame was at its zenith. Brecher does not make his sources reliable by referring to interviews with persons who wish to remain unknown, and he was writing in Nehru's life-time and with the help of his secretaries. This does not ensure objectivity or reliability.

Foreign observers watching Nehru from diplomatic nearness and necessity were Chester Bowles,4 John K. Galbraith5 and Walter Crocker.6 Bowles is frankly and warmly friendly and Galbraith, far more urbane and intellectually detached, is also friendly, even though he was diplomatically assigned to India in the critical days of China's attack. For deep and abiding criticism, in spite of an air of detachment and a dry, polished prose, one can rely on Crocker, an Australian with a kangaroo kick who was twice in India. He had the advantage of securing a foreword from the disarmed Toynbee who says: "Mr. Crocker presents the image of a man who is always great, even when he is falling tragically below his own high standards, and on Goa, for instance, Mr. Crocker's judgement is severe...." When Toynbee adds: "...the most illuuminating of all documents is first-hand knowledge," he falls from his own standards. He could not claim first-hand knowledge of all the civilizations whose decline and fall he described, and the first-hand knowledge of a High Commissioner who, in two brief periods, could see a Prime Minister only rarely cannot be first-hand. Much depends on how much the knowledge is backed by insight and freedom from prejudice or by diplomatic gossip.

#### Walter Crocker's Abiding Criticism

Crocker begins disarmingly: "Nehru, India itself, is big enough for the warts not to be left out of the picture." Big or not, Nehru would agree with Cromwell on what a portrait should be, but Crocker is not painting a portrait with a portrait-painter's interest or intensity. Crocker shows enough evidence of an amateur orientalist and tries to trace the background of Hindu myth and religion, Hindu deceit and untruthfulness, colour prejudice in India, and profoundly pronounces that nationalism is negative, bad for India, good probably for a near continent like Australia. This leads to the theme that "in the last year of his Prime Ministership, Nehru was cornered and maimed by Indian nationalism."

Any Prime Minister is vulnerable to criticism and Crocker prepares for the attack: "Nehru did not begin his new career auspiciously. Shortly after he took office, one of the more pessimistic predictions of British officials came

N

S

true: the Indian continent did not hold together." Crocker is not able to see the sequence of developments and the contribution of British rulers and bureaucracy to the Partition. He is thus neither a historian nor a biographer. The result of his slipshod approach can only be a slapdash portrait. The secular state, modernization, the status of women and outcastes, industrialization, socialism, planning and parliamentary democracy are said to be Nehru's absorption; however, Crocker's enumeration does not follow correct priorities.

Crocker calls Nehru "a man of volte face" and adds, "this seems to be true as regards particulars and perhaps as regards a few big things." For most Westerners in general, Nehru's emphasis on industrialization and planning was wrong; they would like India to remain a pastoral paradise, with an unchanging culture, including customs in which they find the oldworld charm which their countries have lost beyond reach. In other words, India should be static, not dynamic. But Crocker admits that what was remarkable about Nehru "has been his consistency above all as regards economic and social policy." In spite of this concession, Crocker looks for the warts. "This politician work made ever heavier demands on his time; and it also had a good deal to do with his supporting, or conniving at, ministers who were notoriously corrupt and at times got near to gangsterism."

As regards economic development, as with most other Western critics, Crocker believed that agriculture was far more important than industry. "The Five-Year Plans reflect the urban mind," is the keynote of his criticism. Crocker again says: "...agriculture, though given thousands of pages, millions of words and various huge schemes, such as Community Development or Grow More Food Campaign, was not given enough effective action." He wondered as to why thought and money was being spent on plans for a people's car and India-made jet planes and so on. Most Australians are ranch-bound. "Since 80 per cent of Indians live in villages and depend, directly or indirectly, on agriculture, the case for basing the whole planning effort on the villages, and for building up from that base, instead of on heavy industry and the like was overwhelming. This is what Gandhi would have done," says Crocker naively.9 Even an agricultural economist wholly devoted to agriculture would not agree with Crocker that planning could be done only on the base of agriculture. But he thinks mechanization and industrialization are planning failures. Yet he says: "Among other things, it should have been explained to the people why controls were unavoidable as some undoubtedly are—and why consumer goods should be sacrificed in the interest of future well-being." Crocker's confusion seems to have been complete.

Crocker made this prophecy: "It is hard to escape the fear that the main

<sup>\*</sup>Sometimes, I referred to Nehru cases of corruption in high places. Every time he would ask me: "Have you got the evidence?" The lack of processed evidence and settled procedures were a handicap in the early years of power.

achievement in Nehru's economic and social philosophy will turn out to be social disruption." So far, the prophecy has not been fulfilled. The criticism of planning and its priorities can be dealt with when we come to Indian critics of Nehru. It is enough to deal with Crocker's criticism to the extent that it follows the Western model and its commendation of a pastoral, neo-Platonic type of planning for India. Crocker does not like even the idea of co-operative farming. The enthusiasm for it means to him, "Russian type collective farms." Crocker in fact, has a broader criticism of Nehru to offer-Nehru, he says, was surrounded by sycophants and gave too many interviews, with the result that his administrative work suffered from defective judgement of men and sometimes of things. Crocker forgets Nehru's contribution to the freedom struggle, the Indian situation, and that Nehru was himself warts and all, and that the Indian people loved him for what he was and would not have liked him to be somebody else. Finally, Crocker says Nehru did not step down, as Kemal Ataturk and Smuts did. Why he did not or could not, Crocker does not examine. He was an observer, not interested in India, a critic with no responsibility.

An Australian High Commissioner would be expected to be more interested in foreign policy, and for Crocker, the denigration of the domestic policies are a preparation for denigrating the foreign policy. "The Gandhi doctrine of soul force came to count for little. Krishna Menon, not Gandhi, became the symbol of Indian foreign policy," says Crocker, as if he was solely devoted to souls. Non-alignment, love of peace, attachment to freedom and independence of outlook, were a projection of Gandhi into international affairs, and Nehru was the maker of policy, not Krishna Menon. To put Krishna Menon against Gandhi is contrary to facts. In contradiction to what he said, Crocker adds that the Indian armed forces came to take up a sizable proportion of the Indian budget, even before the Chinese attack in 1962. Crocker has forgotten Pakistan's offensive postures against Kashmir and US military aid to Pakistan. At least, he cannot say that Krishna Menon neglected India's defence before the Chinese attack, though Krishna Menon's is a bogey which he wants to demolish repeatedly.

On Kashmir, Crocker's view is coloured by his views on Pakistan. As he sees the alternative,10 Muslims had to go or a civil war had to be fought and the British had no kind of responsibility towards Partition. To follow the routine view which is a personal view of history, he refers to "Nehru's gaffe at a Press Conference," which was supposed to have decided, or enabled Jinnah to repudiate the Constituent Assembly.\* The truth about Partition to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

LU

to ers a sh

utlcy ot

be or

nd se,

ldds,

vas rds

for ne;

at, ng-

cs, ry.

m. ges, op-

n."

ra are

nd,

ing

on

uld olly

be

ind

gs, 9—

ced

ave"

ain

uld

ires

<sup>\*</sup>The National Herald on 1 July 1946, wrote editorially: "Constituent Assemblies have a way of developing character and devising a technique of their own. Our Constituent Assembly may gather round it such a force of popular opinion that it may react quite powerfully, if its will is thwarted. History furnishes the example of a mighty government tumbling at the first summoning of a States General. This government is not stronger than that of the Bourbons". Nehru was in Lucknow, read the editorial in proof and approved it. It was on these lines that he later spoke at the Press Conference.

Crocker is that "the British had no blame for it. The blame was religious hatred." He ignores the continued encouragement Britain had given to Muslim separatism and does not even examine how Jinnah aroused political hatred on the basis of religious hatred. For him, the indefinite postponement or non-fulfilment of plebiscite was due not to Pakistan's refusal to fulfil the conditions for it and US military aid but to "splitting hairs and trailing red herrings." Much of history can be dismissed this way.

Crocker's view of India's relations with China is cock-eyed, if not crooked. He sums up the Western position: "The theme song in 1950-58 of three thousand years of unbroken peace between the two Asian brothers had been a manifestation of Indian nationalism in its racial or anti-European form as well as nonsense." It is probably difficult for a developing continental country like Australia to understand what is nationalism or its manifestations. About "anti-colonialism", 11 Crocker only refers to Nehru's "emotional involvement in anti-colonialism." It is possible only for kangaroos to be free from emotions in such matters. About Goa, Crocker seems to be an emotionally involved imperialist.12 "This was aggression. And the aggression was without provocation.... Nehru remains charged with Machiavellianism. He can be acquitted of hypocrisy. But he cannot be acquitted of failure... He never walked firmly again." These are devastating judgements born of prejudice, not of any detachment. The charge that Nehru failed by the test of his own high standards cannot be sustained. For fourteen long years, he had waited patiently for Portugal to withdraw from Goa and had watched Goan patriots suffer immensely. He had never pledged himself not to liberate Goa. If under extreme provocation, he allowed Goa's liberation, his critics were sanctimonious-not he. The Crockers have not had a word to say against Portuguese colonialism and atrocities.

Finally, Crocker pays this grudging tribute to Nehru: "Nehru might have made misjudgements, even grave misjudgements; he might have been insufficiently in control; he might have destroyed much. But nothing can destroy his distinction." He does not mind Nehru, but he rejects his policies, Nehru without his policies was not much, and Crocker's effort seems to be to destroy those policies by denigrating both him and them. Crocker exemplifies the general Western criticism.

#### EASTERN SCHOOL OF CRITICISM

It would be useful to deal with what may be called the Eastern school of criticism-Communist, Russian, Chinese-and this includes criticism from the Indian Communists too.

Marxists and the Soviet Union had considerable sympathy for India's struggle for freedom. After Independence, however, there was a note of scepticism and criticism. To them, India's independence looked a gift from Britain and India's further evolution seemed to depend on Britain's tutelage.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

U

IS CO

al

nt

ie

d

1.

ee

n

n

al

1-

)-

0

e

le

h

e

g

ıt

1.

W

er

ie

ne

d

re

y

y

of

n

of

India's freedom was enmeshed in a tangled growth of constitutional problems, and Partition did not seem to conform to any known pattern of independence. For years after the end of the War, the Cold War complexion of world politics made Britain an accomplice of the United States and till an Indian Constitution was drafted and the Commonwealth connexion properly explained and understood, everything seemed to show that India was in the Anglo-US camp. It was after the development of non-alignment and extension of its area, the pursuit of an independent course at the United Nations and the emphasis on industrialization and self-reliance that the Soviet Union and China took note of the independent strain in Indian policies and stopped criticism of Nehru and his policies. This however was only until the Chinese attack in 1962.

Nehru's visit in 1955 to the Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia, apart from flying visits to Czechoslovakia and Austria, brought India and the Soviet Union, besides the Soviet bloc, closer together. Since then, there has been no worthwhile criticism of Nehru and the whole direction of Indian development seems to have been to the liking of the Soviets. Apart from a long debate, which bewildered and confused them, Indian Communists had been busy disputing the interpretation of an article in the Cominform journal. But after the repeated exchange visits of Indian and Soviet leaders, there was no basic criticism of Nehru, and large parts of the Communist Party settled down to parliamentarianism after the Extraordinary Session of the Congress Party which met in Amritsar in 1958. The split in the party later over general and ideological matters also did not introduce any new criticism of Nehru, though some ideologues stuck to their Marxist moorings and criticized Nehru from various angles. Criticism of Nehru was muted; he was eluding his Communist critics, with increasing understanding with the Soviet Union. The Communist line was a changing line, the absorption being mainly inner-party discussions, though the split revealed differences in the attitude to the Congress Government. There are no texts relevant to our examination except on the varying bourgeois character of Nehru and other Congressmen.

#### Soviet Academician Yudin's Constructive Criticism

The main extant criticism of Nehru and his Socialism from the Soviet side is an article by academician Yudin which was brought to notice in 1961 by Sampurnanand in a collection of studies on Socialism. This interesting collection includes mainly Sampurnanand's views, but among the appendices are an article by Sampurnanand on "Congress Ideology and Programme," first published in the AICC Economic Review of 1 August 1958, an article by Nehru on "The Basic Approach", published in the same journal on 15 August 1958, Yudin's critique of both articles, published in the World Marxist Review of December 1958, and Sampurnanand's concluding article responding to Yudin under the heading "The Problem

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

of Ideology and the Communist Approach to it."

Yudin does not attack Nehru frontally; he acknowledges Nehru's progressive role and Nehru is accepted as a good student of Marxism. It is in applying Marxism to Indian conditions that Nehru inevitably has to acknowledge the Indian background, remember that the Russian Revolution cannot be duplicated, and question the rigid applicability of some Marxist doctrines to Indian Socialism. In spite of the differences between them, Nehru and Sampurnanand accept the limitations of a mere materialist interpretation on application, and this is the main disagreement between Yudin and them. Yudin defends the basic doctrines of Marxism in the Soviet context. This dispute on the universality of any doctrine will persist, and there may be a Soviet view and an Indian view of Marxism and its applicability from the practical, if not the doctrinal, point of view.

#### Nehru's Socialism Fabian?

There has been criticism from Indian Marxists. Bipan Chandra<sup>14</sup> takes up the Marxist point of view and says that Nehru's presidential address to the Lucknow session of the Congress (in 1936) "was both the high watermark and the swan-song of his radicalism." Later, according to Bipan Chandra, "he gave up the right to change the basic strategy of the Indian struggle for freedom and was absorbed by the P.C.P.\* pattern." But Bipan Chandra does not analyze or explain the supposed anti-climax. The essence of the argument is that Nehru did not become a Marxist. "From now on, the chief role of masses was to listen to his speeches." His ideology was not Marxism but a mild form of Fabianism, is the conclusion. Bipan Chandra does not examine why all this happened, if it happened. "Why did all this happen," as the writer himself asks, and goes on to answer: "It is always difficult to explain changes in the life history of an individual. Many factors, forces and events went into the making of the post-Lucknow Nehru." Bipan Chandra, however, does not examine this. If this was one of Nehru's failures, it amounts to saying that he failed to do what other Marxists failed to do and are even now failing to do except to write essays on Marxism, not even on Marxism in Indian conditions.

Bipan Chandra finally sums up his case, again not explaining the failure of other Marxists, by referring to the "capitalist strategy of nursing Nehru, opposing him, and above all, of supporting the Right wing in the Congress.... By 1947, the capitalist class was ready to accept him as the Prime Minister of independent India and to co-operate with him in the task of building up its economy along the capitalist path." It may be convenient to avoid referring to Gandhi and Sardar Patel in this connexion and damn all planned development under Nehru as a contrivance of capitalists. But the failure of Marxist-based parties to strike at capitalists and capitalism shows

<sup>\*</sup>P.C.P. stands for "Pressure Colonized Pressure" pattern.

Ù

n

f

e

1

that the whole country had to grow into Socialism from the climate of capitalism and free enterprise, and there is ample evidence of Nehru not belonging either to the capitalists or to capitalism. His annual addresses to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Industry and Commerce are a part of the evidence, his planning ideas are another. Footnote 132 to Bipan Chandra's article gives away his case.

#### NON-MARXISTS CENSURE NEHRU'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Among the non-Marxist Indian critics, speaking from indigenous inspiration, Rajagopalachari, better known as Rajaji, deserves the place of honour. In the freedom struggle, Rajaji and Nehru had been no-changers, although of different temperaments and outlooks. When Rajaji was a conformist, Nehru was a dissenter; when Nehru was a conformist, Rajaji was a dissenter, as on the attitute to the war effort. In government, they established close friendship and paid each other warm tributes. It was only after Rajaji had left the Central Government that he developed into an increasingly vehement critic. Rajaji's critical assessment is compiled in four volumes,15 though he wrote much else in Swarajya and later assumed enormous proportions as an unceasing critic, a kind of rishi, whose wisdom and prophetic insight generations of conservatives can be expected to cherish. The sum-total of his assessment of Nehru amounts to censure of centralism, of state control, of the corruption that controls the public sector, of the public sector, of authoritarianism and of the snuffing out of the freedoms. He was often a severe critic, but less personal than other Indian critics. The chief shortcoming of his criticism was that he seemed to equate free markets with freedom.\*

Acharya Kripalani's criticism of Nehru was more consistent, at least from the time of the formation of the KMP Party and then the Praja Socialist Party, following his defeat by Purushottam Das Tandon for Congress Presidentship. The criticism increasingly became acerbic. It was not so syllogistic as Rajaji's, but at the time of the Chinese attack in 1962, it became almost personal. After Sucheta Kripalani's involvement in UP politics, Kripalani's position was that of an independent, though Mrs. Kripalani belonged to the Congress. As a critic of Krishna Menon, Kripalani was ranged against Nehru too. In spite of their earlier comradeship and Nehru's chivalrous nature where Kripalani's personal affairs were concerned, the estrangement between Nehru and Kripalani was complete. In the last phase however, Kripalani was more and more isolated and did not have the

<sup>\*</sup>In a 1964 visit to Madras, I called on Rajaji and, as usual, he was kind and courteous to one who had been not only his consistent admirer but consistent critic. I told him that, while I agreed with most of his criticism, of the administration, I could not understand what alternative his Swatantra Party was suggesting for the building of the economy of the country. He agreed and admitted they had no alternative. The Government had all the facts; they did not have any CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

religious group which Rajaji had gathered round him.

As against Kripalani's views of Nehru, Jayaprakash Narayan's were more diffuse and scattered because he had fraternal relations with Nehru and he could not wholly repudiate Nehru or assert himself. His outlook was also changing; from Socialism to Sarvodaya, from admiration for Vinoba's Bhoodan to appreciation of President Ayub Khan's basic democracy. The basic differences between Nehru and Jayaprakash Narayan, in spite of identity of outlook, can be noted in the formal correspondence they had in 1952 over Nehru's invitation to Jayaprakash Narayan and his party to join the Government. Jayaprakash Narayan laid down some conditions. First, the Constitution had to be amended, though later Socialists were to criticize some of the amendments made in the same direction. Everyone knew that if the Congress Socialists had not boycotted the Constituent Assembly, they could have shaped the Constitution according to their desire, at least in some respects, and also the Congress, particularly after the death of Sardar Patel, for whom Dr. Lohia and other Socialist leaders had great admiration.\* Secondly, Jayaprakash Narayan recommended nationalization of banking and insurance. Banking and insurance were nationalized later, but Nehru could not accept it as a condition. If the Socialists had joined the Government, they could have done this and more, and though there were reactionary elements in the Congress, the Socialists could have been helped by Nehru to lead the Government.\*\* It was the diehardism of Dr. Lohia and his group that prevented any rapprochement between Nehru and the Socialists at that time, while Jayaprakash Narayan was in and out of politics and made his own experiments with truth for which he had time.

#### M.N. Roy and Ideological Differences

One of the more formidable critics of Nehru was M.N. Roy. 16 Nehru had a friendly interest in Roy as a thinker and writer of distinction, but later with Roy's inclination for co-operation with Britain and intense cerebration, Nehru looked upon him as an academic, arm-chair politician. The small book which Roy wrote on Nehru in 1945 was an angry book, even abusive with a touch of malice. The main theme was that Nehru would become a National Socialist. Nehru had provided provocation by saying: "I do not like M.N. Roy's politics, but there are some good ideas in the People's Plan of Economic Development." That is a typical Nehru pronouncement, says Roy, emphatic but thoughtless, dogmatic and nonsensical. Roy's small

\*Dr. Lohia sometimes told me that Nehru was a clever Brahmin who made the stupid non-Brahmin, Patel, take all the blame.

<sup>\*\*</sup>I asked Nehru frequently why he did not leave the Congress and lead the Socialists, as they wanted. His answer was that he would be happy if the Socialists became strong but (as it was, he had nothing to lead and the strength they would gain would be his own strength), why should he then give up the Congress, a more powerful instrument?

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Handwar

book is full of polemics and harsh words. The politics which Roy defended are not the politics which Nehru had in mind. Roy saw a contradiction in Nehru's patronising attitude to the People's Plan and dislike of the sponsors of the Plan and added that Nehru "has a glad eye also for the Bombay Plan," which is not true.\* Roy's points then are that the Interim Government would contain Dalal, which it did not, that the Congress foolishly rejected the August Offer and the Cripps Proposals, that Nehru was eager to accept the Wavell Plan. Roy believed that the Nehrus were arrogant, but does not examine objectively why the Cripps Proposals were rejected. For him, the inadequacy of the Cripps Proposals was only a pretext. If Nehru refers to "progressive socialism," that is also a sin in Roy's view, though Nehru's phrase is only a passing reference.

At a Press conference, Nehru once said: "India will have to decide whether it will be a democratic modern country, or an undemocratic medieval one." Roy's logic lead him to say that "Nehru is popular among Congressmen with modern outlook because his demagogy rationalises Gandhi's irrationalism" and that "none can deny that Nehru stands for medievalism." Nehru's progressive Socialism is hardly distinguishable from Hitler's National Socialism, says Roy, adding: "Physician, heal thyself." In practice, Nehru would subordinate Socialism to nationalism, "Communism as such is no great force in India at present," says Nehru, and angered Roy by his statement. But is it a force even now? If Gandhi was the prophet of nationalism, Nehru was of National Socialism, says Roy. He even suggests that Nehru supported the sabotage movement as a part of the Quit India movement; this is not correct. Nehru's subsequent attitude to NATO and to the German Democratic Republic negatives Roy's premature criticism of Nehru's attitude to Fascism in Europe. Roy was out of date even in his lifetime.

Roy died in 1954 and did not have some of the best years of Nehru's life before him. In an article written at the time of the Congress crisis of 1951,<sup>17</sup> Roy brought up to date his earlier theme that Nehru would be a National Socialist. He elevated to a philosophy what D.P. Mishra and others said crudely. "He has contempt for the weak, because he is a weak character; the weakness is hidden to himself by an exaggerated belief in his strongwill and hardness, and rationalized, when it can no longer be hidden, by the dogma that the mind is a slave to the heart." Again, he says: "Personal attachment to Gandhi precludes his moving in the direction of genuine political greatness and creative leadership.... Nehru found his God in Gandhi and dedicated his life to rationalizing the latter's medieval ideals and obscurantist ideas.... After Gandhi's death, Nehru could have recovered his soul, could he resist the lure of power? The lure of power, however, can result from a strong sense of responsibility. It has been so in the case

<sup>\*</sup>The Peoples Plan was M.N. Roy's plan, while the Bombay Plan was drafted by a group of industrialists.

of Nehru. Nevertheless, it has done him more harm than to others." The logic is not clear, although Roy was correct about Nehru's sense of responsibility. In carrying his logic to an absurd length, Roy arrives at other truths.

"The people's tribune has not succeeded as a statesman... He has failed as a diplomat, being too honest to be one... The tragedy of Nehru is all the greater because he could be the real leader, if he had a stronger character... The vicissitudes of party politics and the lure of power have strangled a good man who could shine more brilliantly as a poet or an actor... The lure of greatness has made the world poorer by one good man potentially possessed of creative talent." It is difficult to say if Roy's assessment would have been different if he had lived longer and witnessed Nehru's career after 1954, but he resiles from his earlier position.

In the same book, Philip Spratt, <sup>18</sup> a friend of Roy, adds a kind of post-script: "It turned out that the new theory involved much of the theoretical basis of Roy's attack on Nehru. It also appeared, when Nehru became Prime Minister, that Roy had greatly misjudged his character. He proved to be a skilful, political manager, and though ready enough to compromise, he showed an entirely unexpected determination in pursuing his main political purposes. Moreover, these purposes had something in common with Roy's ideas." This is just. Nehru could not have been other than what he was. But he was loved and followed for what he was, and there was no need for him to be otherwise.

#### Lohia's Personalized Criticism

Rammanohar Lohia, keenly intellectual, assertive, egotistical and conceited, evaluated Nehru with a bitterness which bordered on the side of vulgarity. Whether he wrote with historical or political motive, whether it was necessary to use such abusive language, devoid of any style, to make his points clear, it is for his admirers to consider.

In Rs. 25,000 A Day, 19 consisting of correspondence and comments which appeared in Mankind, a journal published from Hyderabad and whose Chief Editor Lohia was, there is not much light on the expenditure of the then Prime Minister, Nehru. The sidelight on Nehru's ancestry, whatever its motivation, is beside the point. The ultimate point of criticism was what was spent on security. The expenditure may have been high or low, but it becomes clear from the discussion that if enough care had not been taken on Nehru's security, about which he was indifferent, what had happened to Gandhi may have happened to him. The whole controversy was underlined by some malice and meanness, though Lohia constantly tried to explain the motives behind his motiveless malignity.\* From the subsequent discus-

<sup>\*</sup>The day after Gandhi's death, Lohia spent mostly with the writer in Lucknow. When pressed why he had become so critical of Nehru, he could only say that he had no respect for a man who had let down his (Nehru's) friend, Chiang Kai-shek!

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

sions in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, nothing emerged.

Lohia's Guilty Men of India's Partition20 is his review of Maulana Azad's India Wins Freedom, an intensely personal account, critical of Azad, Patel, Nehru and even Gandhi, the Jan Sangh and the Communists. The central argument is clouded by polemics and there are too many personal diversions. Lohia says: "I have read Maulana Azad's book in discontinuous stretches but in its entirety;" it deals with the subject in discontinuous stretches. The responsibility for Partition has been extensively discussed, and the general conclusion is that it was essentially because of the British Government's encouragement to separatism and the Muslim League, with its emphasis on the two-nation theory. If the Congress was guilty, it was because it had to accept the logic of its own acceptance of the right of selfdetermination and accede to the demand of unwilling elements to secede. It could have fought the British or the Muslim League, it could not fight both. Patel, Nehru or Azad could not wait for freedom indefinitely, and Gandhi, who was opposed to Partition, did not oppose it in the way that he should have.

The style which Lohia has adopted to make his points betrayed the state of his mind. "Lest history should attach to Lady Mountbatten the importance that contemporary gossip does, it would be wise to recall an almost similar role that was ascribed to Madam Chiang Kai-shek. The madam from China had in fact roused Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of that time, to the mild wail that she was interested too much in her boy friend's eye-lashes to care for him. There had been earlier periods, when Nehru had befriended more plebian and more revolutionary women, the Ellen Wilkinsons of India and Britain. I am certain that if Mrs. Khrushchev were available and if she was pleasant and sociable, Nehru would run after her in the same way as he has run after those other women...." This would seem a sign of a deplorable outlook on the part of a leader of far less stature; from Lohia it is laughable and seems depraved.

Lohia however, does not stop easily. He further states: "Mr. Nehru has used Lady Mountbatten for his political purposes. It may be well to supplement this estimate of this situation with its counterpart that Lady Mountbatten and her lord have similarly used Mr. Nehru for their political purposes. A certain amount of tenderness naturally creeps into all such relationships of political advantage. Whether there has ever been anything more than tenderness is a fit subject alone for researchists of a distant future...." Lohia's views on love and women are widely known, but it is difficult to agree with him on such a low level. The primary causes of Partition get lost in such vulgar personal attack. With indulgence in such ribaldry, Lohia forfeits any right to be taken seriously. Partition could not have been possible, if any person or set of persons alone wanted it.\* Lohia's

<sup>\*</sup>Lohia's outlook was well illustrated in a talk I had with him in 1962 at the Okhla Rest House. He recommended to me that I should have three strings to my bow—Ram, politics and Paris—and he luridly explained what he meant by Paris.

inferiority complex, which he has tried to conceal by affecting a superiority complex, has accentuated his intellectual and emotional handicaps.

#### Differences with Patel Exaggerated

Sardar Patel should be regarded more as a comrade than as a critic of Nehru. While in his life-time, the differences of outlook between them were exaggerated by their sets of followers into a conflict of wills, after his death. he has been pitted as an antithesis to Nehru even by Socialists who have known his opposition to Socialism. If any evidence of Patel's basic attitude to Nehru is required, it can be found in his affectionate tribute to Nehru in the Nehru Sixtieth Birthday volume published in 1949. Nehru and Patel were complementary to each other and understood their roles as such. It would be useful now, after the passage of thirty years, to take an objective and historical view. In the Patel correspondence which has been published in many volumes, there has been no such view. In the first volume, supposed to throw new light on Kashmir,21 there is no such light. Durga Das as editor, in his own peculiar subjective style, says in his commentary: "Nehru was often carried away by his idealism. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a cabinet colleague and once Prime Minister of Kashmir, saw everything but was helpless. The Sardar had no illusions. The significance of the correspondence lies in proving through subsequent events how right Patel was in his assessment of Abdullah and of the events then taking shape." The advocates of what they think was Patel's policy was to use greater force in Kashmir, act in disregard of the United Nations and impose Hinduism on the Valley. A policy based on Fascist methods could not have succeeded. Criticism of Nehru and Abdullah does not include criticism of the Maharajah's vacillating attitude, and in the light of the present position of Abdullah, much of the evaluation of him seems to have been wrong. There are many trivialities in the correspondence, starting with a telegram to Patel from the General Secretary of the Jammu Hindu Mahasabha.

In a letter dated 8 October 1947, Patel wrote to Nehru: "I do not think that anything which could have been done for Kashmir has been left undone by me; nor am I aware of any difference between you and me on matters of policy relating to Kashmir." There is nothing to show in the correspondence that Patel opposed references to the people of the state on accession or reference to the Security Council. This issue comes up again when we deal

Meher Chand Mahajan, who was Prime Minister of Kashmir for a brief but crucial period and later became Chief Justice of India, supplements Patel and Durga Das in his memoirs. He says: "The late Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry, had a draft of the proposed terms of a settlement. One was release of prisoners on both sides. To this, nobody had any objection. Another term was that a plebiscite would be held to ascertain the views of the people of Kashmir on the question of

accession. I objected to this. I suggested that if the holding of the plebiscite meant a vote on the issue of accession by the state legislature or the electors of the legislature, I would have no objection to such a course. If, however, plebiscite meant a vote on the issue by adult franchise, I strongly objected thereto, because with a mass of illiterate people, such a course had no meaning... Most likely at the suggestion of Lord Mountbatten, Pandit Jawaharlal thought this was a reasonable condition... A dictionary was sent for. It defined plebiscite as a means of deciding a public question but not necessarily by popular voting. On this, we agreed to the proposal. Sardar Patel thought that a plebiscite would never be held."\* Later, Mahajan says: "I must record and pay my tribute to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India."

#### The Role of the President and Prime Minister

1

Rajendra Prasad and Nehru had been close colleagues in the Congress for many years and were to work together as the President and the Prime Minister of the young Republic of India for its first ten years. There was no antagonism as such between them, but they had differences in outlook, which had been pronounced sometimes in the Congress and were to become pronounced on some matters in office, though never degenerating into a conflict, which would have been bad and even dangerous in those early years when a new Constitution had to be worked successfully. Apart from his pronounced views expressed even in Nehru's lifetime, Rajendra Prasad's admirers took up his side openly and became Nehru's critics. About Rajendra Prasad's abilities, which he carried lightly, nobody had any doubt, and Nehru at one time called him the "greatest gentleman." But he could not sympathize with what he thought were Rajendra Prasad's feudal and old-fashioned outlook, attachment to orthodox ways, belief in astrology and his conservative views.

Rajendra Prasad has not openly expressed his views on his differences with Nehru as Prime Minister in his autobiography, but Handa his biographer, and his admirers like Munshi have done it. Despite these differences, he cannot be classed as one of Nehru's critics, but he held critical views and these have to be taken into account. The most important of these differences is on the President's powers. In November 1960, when he was called on to lay the foundation of the Indian Law Institute, Rajendra Prasad said:

The question which I should like to be studied and investigated is the extent to which and the matters in respect of which, if any, the

<sup>\*</sup>Sometime in 1949, I asked Nehru in Lucknow whether, while everyone seemed to be regretting the reference to the Security Council, he had any regrets, and he replied: "Of course, I regret it more than any one else does."

powers and functions of the President differ from those of the sovereign of Great Britain. Further, it may also be considered if the procedure by which the President is elected and is liable to be removed and impeached introduces any difference, constitutionally speaking, between the President and the British monarch. Generally what are the points in respect of which the powers and functions of the two are the same and what are the points, if any, and the extent to which they differ...

The rest of the speech was mainly an elaboration of these points. The speech, according to Handa, was generally blacked out in the Press, and further that, "according to reports," Nehru used his influence to see that it was not fully reported. This is partisanship. Nehru never did anything mean of that kind, and then Rajendra Prasad was no potential rival to be afraid of.

As President of the Constituent Assembly, Rajendra Prasad himself had stated in the debate on Article 75 of the Constitution:

We had to reconcile the position of an elected President with an elected legislature and, in doing so, we have adopted more or less the position of the British monarch for the President. This may or may not be satisfactory. Some people think too much power has been given to the President; others think that the President, being an elected President, should have even more powers than are given to him... But, although the President is elected by the electoral college consisting of both the Central and the state legislatures, it is well that his position is that of a constitutional President...

These thoughts were probably uppermost in his mind when in 1960 he addressed the Indian Law Institute.

It seems that Rajendra Prasad expressed his doubts about the constitutional position of the President as early as 1 March 1950 in a note to Nehru. He said: "It is therefore necessary to clarify whether the President can exercise the function of giving assent to legislation independently and, if so, in what kind of bills passed by Parliament and bills passed by a state legislature." Nehru referred the note to the Attorney-General, M.C. Setalvad, and he answered with a "no" to Rajendra Prasad's assumption that, according to the Constitution there could be a situation or situations in which of his ministers. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar also was of the same opinion. but he was a political lawyer.

Apart from the controversy of lay or expert views, the issue arose in an acute form during the 1967 Presidential elections following Radhakrishnan's retirement. Koka Subba Rao, who resigned from the position of Chief Justice declared he stood by the letter of the Constitution, while Dr. Zakir Hussain declared himself in favour of both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution.

NEHRU AND HIS CRITICS: AN ASSESSMENT

If an election could decide such an issue, it was decided in favour of the view that the President was a constitutional head. If there was any doubt about the position, the issue was forced once again and decided in the contest between V.V. Giri and Sanjeeva Reddy in 1969. If anything has been added in more recent times, it is that the President has the initiative in rare cases, when there is some doubt, about who should be called upon to form a Government. It can be said that Sanjeeva Reddy acted cautiously, correctly and constitutionally in recent changes of Government. Nehru held the President's position to be very high, and that the latter had the right to advise, to warn and be consulted. Nehru observed this rule punctiliously and there were occasions of great affection and warmth between him and Rajendra Prasad.

It is usually forgotten that the President cannot obviously act on his own, because he has to find political support of the parties in the legislature for his actions. He cannot be expected to fight elections or manipulate and lead parties. Sanjeeva Reddy had the necessary political support in Parliament, when, recently, he was threatened with impeachment. The whole corpus of British parliamentary practice could not possibly be written into the Constitution, but unless the spirit of basic British parallels and precedents is observed, the machinery of parliamentary democracy is bound to break down. This was what Nehru was insisting on, and what Rajendra Prasad realized, and did not allow himself to be tempted by Munshi and other exponents of an "independent" President.

There were specific instances when Rajendra Prasad and Nehru differed, ranging from the appointment of Governors to the passing of the Hindu Code Bill. Rajendra Prasad felt that a defeated candidate like Giri should not be appointed Governor, but Nehru had equally good, if not better, reasons for making use of the experience of such men as Governors, though not as ministers. On the Hindu Code Bill, Nehru felt that reform had long been overdue and that the Hindu community was largely in favour of it, while Rajendra Prasad insisted initially on technical consultation with the people. The President also noted the ever increasing distance from Gandhian standards, but he could not suggest a workable scheme of inquiry into corruption, and Nehru could not accept untested ad hoc proposals. If Rajendra Prasad felt very sad that he could not do anything for continuance of Gandhian standards, he should have realized that there could be nothing like a Gandhi as President or Prime Minister and stepped down from office. There was no constitutional deadlock, and even the differences on constitutional matters arose from the conflict of outlooks and of temperaments. Parliament, at any rate, reflected the people's will and

K.M. Munshi was strident in his utterances, more and more adventurous in his spirit. In his major English publications, he wrote as if he was the main Constitution-maker, a little Napoleon of non-violence who followed the Mahatma after some inner struggles, and fought Secularism and Socialism as far as he could whether as Garchard Minister or as Governor of UP

n d

e

U

n

y

1-

le

d it in f. d

d n sie t,

ane

ie

ito
it
d,
te

d, dh

n. n, n

's ce in

temper better.

under Nehru, even after the death of Sardar Patel, with whom he had been close, since the days of Bardoli.

Difference of Outlook: Morarji Desai

This should be the appropriate place to deal with Morarji Desai's criticism23 of Nehru amounting to contempt. His is a highly moral attitude, and while demonstrating his greatness in small matters like smoking, drinking and spinning, he has not proved it in a big way. About Nehru's demise. he says: "Jawaharlalji had desired that his ashes should be spread all over India from aeroplanes after his funeral. This was an extraordinary wish. It was obvious that this wish was a result of his ambition to acquire a reputation of being the greatest man in the world." To many others, such a conclusion would not be obvious. Nehru was not a fool; he was a historicalminded person, who could not have thought of becoming the greatest man in the world, and even if he wanted to, he was intelligent enough to know that getting his ashes strewn all over India was no way of establishing his greatness. But these observations are an indication of Desai's smallmindedness. Similarly, he describes Lal Bahadur Shastri's resignation from Railway-Ministership and the joining hands with Kamaraj as a sign of ambition. Desai, of course, did not believe in Kamaraj and his consensus, which is understandable.

In another chapter, "Jawaharlal Nehru: In my view," Desai says: "Often, his anger was assumed. Jawaharlal trusted very few people.... He trusted no person for more than two or three years. Krishna Menon was the solitary exception." He sums up: "I learnt by experience that he assessed people very well and the way he described their characteristics convinced me that he was a very good judge of people. The way he described Krishna Menon's personality to me,\* his intelligence and methods of work could not be improved upon by anybody, in my view. I realized after going to Delhi that he believed in Machiavellian tactics and made use of some individuals to create differences among people." Desai may be right in saying that Nehru was not a fool or in suggesting that he practised some statecraft. This was the minimum he allowed himself; without it, he could not have lasted as Prime Minister for seventeen years. But to suggest that he was Machiavellian in any sense only shows that Desai has not read Machiavelli and did not understand him and that he did not forgive Nehru for being intelligent.

Desai betrays his prejudices further: "I felt that his only and overpowering ambition was to attain the stature of the greatest man of the world. Sometimes I got an impression that he aspired even to being considered greater than Mahatma Gandhi. He, therefore, never, patterned himself on Mahatma Gandhi... he did not hesitate to use political manoeuvre to fulfil his great

<sup>\*</sup>Nehru's assessment of Krishna Menon never varied. As early as 1946, he described him to me as he did later to Morarji Desai or Mrs. Pandit,

een

RAU

ai's ide. nkise, ver ish. ıta-

calnan OW his allom

clu-

of en-

en, no ary ple he n's

be hat to hru vas

as ian not

ing neter ma.

eat.

n to

\*Nehru often referred to Desai's limitations to me. Once, in 1958, he said: "Our friend, Morarji Desai, is supposed to be dedicated to total prohibition. But he does not mind throwing a big party [in London] in honour of G.D. Birla, where liquor flows."

ambition." Again: "Jawaharlal used to be taken in by the flattery of those whom he utilized." This is a way of saying that Desai did not like Nehru's popularity among the people, who showed great affection for him, even if some of them may have flattered him. When Desai refers to Nehru's "prejudice", he refers to Nehru's prejudice in favour of Secularism, Socialism and so on; Nehru was more keenly aware of Desai's prejudices in favour of capitalism and bigotry.\* Desai, who claims to be a man of God, also dismissed Nehru as no man of God, though whoever knew Nehru or read him deeply, understood his deep commitment to spirituality and moral values. Desai's final fling is also meaningless: "Jawaharlal was a thinker, but he could not associate others with his thinking. I believe it was because of this that he could not sometimes translate his thoughts into action." Nehru as a man of thought and as a man of action is known enough and is being studied. It is Desai as a man of thought and of action that is now the subject of debate.

### Charan Singh's Economic Philosophy

Charan Singh is a more serious and consistent critic of Nehru than any of his other Indian critics. Politically, he may have proved to be a leader of a limited vision and the way he became a caretaker-Prime Minister and remained as one for some months did not indicate weight, wisdom or foresight. In foreign affairs, he has been vague and fairly ignorant. But in the economic field, he has been consistent, and, though his economic wisdom may have been limited by his political understanding, he had had an opportunity to present his economic philosophy on an all-India scale as Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister. He has however, tried to use Gandhi's name more than is justified. Above all, his comparatively clean personal record has entitled him to a hearing.

Charan Singh's economic philosophy is contained mainly in four publications. He was actively interested in Zamindari abolition; in a book published in 1947,24 he said: "The two main problems which face India today are: industrialization of the country and reorganisation of its agriculture. The co-ordination of small, medium and big industries inter se and their correlation to agriculture are other problems which call for application of constructive statesmanship and all that is best in our leadership." Peasant proprietorship is the only remedy, he said, and has throughout maintained that theme consistently alongwith regulation of the size of holdings and other measures. "Our aim should, therefore, be to set up a comprehensive co-operative organization of independent peasant producers, to perform a function which can be done satisfactorily only on a fairly large scale and to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

carry on subsidiary industry, and not to establish big undertakings which is unnecessary in agriculture," he said. This has been the core of his agricultural philosophy, but it cannot be the whole of economic philosophy, not to speak of social philosophy, for a vast country like India. From the very beginning, he has insisted on the superiority of small-scale industry, because according to him, big industry is often a target for aerial bombing. He further argues that the state should demarcate the sphere of large industry and restrict its operation. The limitations of his outlook were obvious even in 1947, considering the need for large-scale social and economic transformation.

By 1956, Charan Singh became more uncompromising on the issue of co-operative farming. Co-operative farming was being widely talked about, and soon the Second Plan discussions showed a bias towards industrialization; it finally included three steel plants. In a Foreword to Charan Singh's book<sup>25</sup> opposing co-operative farming, Sampurnanand, then Chief Minister of UP, cautiously said: "There are many who believe that our salvation lies in large-scale farming. What they say cannot be lightly brushed aside. There are obvious advantages in large-scale farming. The experience of countries like the United States bears this out.... After the Revolution, Russia also went in for large-scale farming.... This is not to say that Charan Singh is against co-operation in general or co-operation in agriculture." One chapter of Charan Singh's book is on the impracticability of large-scale farming; he then argues in the name of democracy, that co-operative farming is unnecessary.

Later, in 1964, Charan Singh enlarged this thesis to cover India's poverty and its solution.26 Population control was recommended as one of the remedies. Nehru had talked of peasant proprietorship and service cooperatives, and even Charan Singh recalls Nehru as saying as early as 1942: "Gandhiji has, I think, done a great service to India by his emphasis on village industry... Any system which involves the wastage of our labour power, or which throws people out of employment is bad..." There can be many other quotations from Nehru which disprove Charan Singh's increasingly insistent charge that Nehru did not realize the importance of the

It was as a member of the Government in 1978,27 that Charan Singh expounded the Janata Government's policy. Dealing with an alternative strategy, he stated: "If the country has to be served, the Nehruvian strategy will have to be replaced by the Gandhian approach. That is, we shall have to return to Gandhi for redemption. His thought has immense relevance not only to India 1977 but to India 2000. India made a great mistake in 1947 in entirely abandoning the Gandhian path and in adopting a Westernised, centralized, trickle-down-from-the-top model that persists till today. Perhaps, the solution to India's problem lies in finding a suitable blend of the two models. Gandhian thought does not preclude large-scale or machine enterprise from which modern society cannot altogether be divorced. But it would CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridward.

NEHRU AND HIS CRITICS: AN ASSESSMENT

AU

h is

iral

to ery

use

He

stry

ven

ins-

of

out,

iza-

gh's

ster

ion

ide.

on,

ran

e."

cale

tive

erty

the

co-

42:

on

our

can

gh's

the

igh

ive

egy

e to

not

947

ed,

ps,

WO

er-

uld

of

maximise production and organisation on a widely decentralized basis and utilize local endowments and talents." Charan Singh uses words loosely. He refers to Nehruvian strategy and Gandhian approach and path. It would be fair both to Gandhi and Nehru to acknowledge that Gandhi did not deal with the affairs of a modern nation-state and he had no need to have a strategy. He indicated the approach. When Charan Singh advocates a blend of the two a odels, he acknowledges the correctness of what broadly Nehru tried to do, and Nehru discussed this blend with Gandhi himself.

By not projecting his loyalty to Gandhi politically, Charan Singh could only become a caretaker Prime Minister and that too for five months. In the elections, he was voted out. He could, therefore, plan only on paper, and the one budget of prejudices which he presented was disastrous. What are, in any case, his remedies? The essential faults of Indian planning, even according to him, had been only allocation of financial outlays between agriculture and industry and "introduction, rather the multiplication," of the big machine. The main remedies then can only be revision of allocations which planning envisages, and exclusion of foreign capital and foreign technology, which, if made an absolute rule, could be disastrous. Charan Singh would, however, insist that neglect of agriculture is, so to say, the original sin of the planners. While this cannot be proved, Charan Singh is not ambitious enough to improve agriculture. He does not support sufficient land reforms to follow up the abolition of Zamindari. The second mistake of planners, according to him, is that we "set our sights too high." Ultimately, he concludes, "The real choice in our country is not so much between large and small-scale industry as between power-driven industry (large or small) on the one hand and cottage industry on the other." It is a prescription for ancient India or for a Platonic paradise!

In view of the frequent misrepresentation of Nehru's stand on economic development, it would be useful to recall, apart from what he said at other times, his address at the opening of the Khadi exhibition at the Tripuri (MP) 1938 Congress: "I call myself a Socialist and as such I do believe that largescale industries have a place in this country. Anything that increased the material well-being of the country is bound to have repercussions on the people. But we shall never be able to move the India of the rural masses through multiplication of big factories. It can only be reached through Khadi and village industries." On the First Plan, he said in the Lok Sabha while setting out the perspective: "What makes the Plan complicated is that we have to deal with not measurable things like steel and cement but with 360 million human beings; each of whom is different from the other. All the statisticians and economists in the world cannot say what a multitude of individuals will or will not feel or do. The method of trial and error is the only one open to us. I have no doubt that when the time comes for a second five-year plan, we shall be in a far better position and on firmer ground, because we will have gone through the process of thinking and planning and benefiting from its consequences."

Let us also look at the Plans in Nehru's time. The First Plan accepted the projects for which preparations had been made. The stress was on agriculture and the public outlay was Rs. 4,000 crores in 1950; agriculture had to receive priority, for the British had done little to raise agricultural production, and extension of irrigation facilities was urgently needed. Industrialization remained an aim and was reserved for the next stage. This may not have been correct as an economic philosophy, but in allocation of the resources, agriculture received first priority. Good monsoons helped the achievement of the food targets, and the experience of the First Plan, though it was modest and did not impose strains on the people, led to confidence. It was valuable experience of planning itself. The Second Plan represented a serious effort at planning and corresponded to China's First Plan. It was industry's turn to receive priority and Plan provisions envisaged three steel plants. It was no sudden social urge in Nehru; he had formulated plans long ago and needed only the support of experts and psychological preparedness on the part of the Congress Party and the country. The targets had to be raised, the imbalance in the economy had to be rectified, and while private enterprise had its place, its limits had to be demarcated. The resolution adopted at the Avadi session of the Congress (1955) on a socialistic objective started a parallel process. Nehru had always emphasized how India had missed the Industrial Revolution and had to make up for much lost time.

Charan Singh and his genre of critics have objected not only to the socialist direction but to the three steel plants. However, but for this emphasis on heavy industry at the time, India may have lost wholly in subsequent armed conflicts with its neighbours. The Second Plan was the first step towards total planning, but under the Plan, the principal targets even under agriculture were an over-all increase of 28 per cent in production, including 25 per cent in foodgrains. The Community Development programme was to be extended to all areas of rural India. The emphasis of the First Plan had to be on agriculture, irrigation, power and transport and the aim was to create the base for more rapid economic and industrial advance in the future. It also had revolutionary features; the reform of an antiquated land system which inhibited agricultural production, the setting up of a nationwide agricultural extension service as part of a comprehensive Community Development programme, re-vitalization of the co-operative movement, extension of irrigation and power facilities on a large scale, strengthening and improving the administrative structure, and establishment of a number of specialized institutions for providing credit to agriculture and industry, for developing small-scale industries and for giving special assistance to backward sections of the population. Charan Singh could not have quarrelled —and did not—with this opening of the perspective of planning.

The Third Plan sought to give a more precise content to the idea of planning and to the social objectives of the Constitution. In its preparation, there was more consultation, more discussion, and more of participation at lower levels than there had been before. The Plan represented the first

Ù

e

e

d

n

f

st

e

d

·t

e

e

t

a

n

d

g

0

d

3

phase in a scheme of long-term development extending over the next fifteen years or so. This perspective planning was intended to provide a general design of development for the country's natural resources, agricultural and industrial advance, change in the social structure and an integrated scheme of regional and national development. The long-term aim was to make the economy self-reliant and self-generating. The chapter on the "Objectives of Planned Development" is an essay on Indian planning and an essay on Indian Socialism.\* As a first step, the Plan was to provide for the basic necessities, "in particular, for food, work, opportunity in education, reasonable conditions of health and sanitation, improvement in conditions of housing and a minimum level of income..." Its principal aims were the achievement of self-sufficiency in foodgrains and increased agricultural production.

The impression sought to be created then and later was that the growth rate of the Indian economy had been very much lower than that stipulated in the Five Year Plans. This was believed to be due mainly to the large share of heavy industry and the preponderance of projects which took a long time to complete and did not add significantly to current output, and because of inadequate investment in agriculture and consumer goods industries. This line of argument however had no basis. It is not necessary for heavy industry projects to take much longer to mature than investment in other sectors. There was, on the other hand, under-utilization of irrigation facilities and unused capacity in a number of consumer goods industries like cotton textiles. The growth rate was not sufficient, but was much higher than the rate recorded earlier under British administration. It would not be correct to say that agriculture in India was stagnant and nothing much happened in Nehru's time. It would also not be correct to say that if only the investment allocation for agriculture had been increased, there would have been significant increase in output. Progress had not been insignificant, though inadequate to sustain the much higher rates of overall economic growth. Even in China, the rate of growth of agricultural production had not been higher than in India. Where China and Japan had done better than India was in the yield per acre.

To raise the productivity of land, it was necessary to have not only more inputs, like labour and fertiliser, but incentives to make these inputs profitable and a reformed system of land tenures. All the land legislation that had been undertaken in India did not bring about the total abolition of tenancy and attainment of the goal of land to the tiller; a large portion of cultivated land was still under tenancy, some forms of tenancy had been driven underground and there were oppressive crop-sharing arrangements. This was not the fault of Nehru, but of state governments, in which the Charan Singhs had a large share. Besides, only one-third of the cultivated

<sup>\*</sup>T.N. Singh and other members of the Planning Commission told me that Nehru had written it. It sums up his thinking and bears the imprint of his style.

NI

be

do

W

a

B

W

is

th

n

pe er

po

of

m

01

th

fr

ai

M

ru

na

gı hi

al

na

n

ar

CC

e)

P

It

land in India had either dependable rainfall or irrigation facilities. The land tenure problem was undermined because of the domination of landed-interests in the Congress Party, and these included big Jat land-owners. A more than technocratic approach was necessary if inputs like water and fertilizer, made available at high costs, were to produce the results they could produce. The rate of growth to be achieved in agriculture or industry was not much higher than what had been achieved and was not impossible. It should satisfy Charan Singh that on more than one occasion, Nehru emphasized that large-scale production and small-scale production had to go together. They had to balance, he said again and again, heavy industry, light industry, village industry and cottage industry. Charan Singh has drawn only red herrings.

# D.P. Mishra and the P.D. Tandon Controversy

The most vicious, if not the most important, of the critics of Nehru was D.P. Mishra. He is as personal as Lohia, though less abusive. He has devoted a whole volume of his memoirs to what he calls the Nehru epoch, making a distinction of doubtful validity between the era in which he is living and the epoch.<sup>28</sup> It would be convenient to deal with one volume instead of searching for his scattered views in several volumes. Nehru's "monocracy" (a word unfamiliar to political science but for the invention of which Mishra can take credit, for it expresses his exact meaning) is his main theme. For the early period on Partition, he depends on authorities like V.P. Menon, Durga Das and other miscellaneous journalists, but he is decent enough in rejecting as fiction the Collins-Lapierre story that Nehru and Patel begged Mountbatten to take over the administration, for he thinks that Nehru and Patel would not have whined before Mountbatten. Nehru, he says, had faith even in Muslim League fanatics, and Azad spoke generally for Muslims.

When Mishra says that the Government of India, "in spite of strong opposition by the Mahatma," made the Kashmir reference to the Security Council, he does not cite any supporting evidence and does not spare Sheikh Abdullah, "loyal only to his ambition" to be the "all-surveying monarch of the state." Mishra's theory was that "Hari Singh was subjected to constant humiliation and was ultimately pensioned off." Referring to the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953, he does not consider all factors, and does not know that, if Abdullah thought of independence and discussed it with foreigners like Adlai Stevenson, it was no secret to Nehru.\* Citing Lt. Gen. Kaul's support of raids on Pakistan's bases, leading to an all-out war with Pakistan if necessary, Mishra deplores Nehru's rejection of such a prospect, when military opinion was certain that Pakistani forces could not have

<sup>\*</sup>Nehru told me at that time that Stevenson had not only talked to Abdullah in Srinagar on independence but later reported the talks to Nehru in Delhi.

been wholly driven out of Kashmir without their bases having been raided. Mishra's attack on Nehru was mainly because of Purshottam Das Tandon's election as Congress President, and because of the struggle between the latter and Nehru, in which Mishra was deeply involved and of which he writes with first-hand knowledge and with sufficient bias. To Mishra it was a personal struggle at the end of which Nehru established his monocracy. But to any historical-minded person, it was a struggle, to the extent there was a struggle, over policy and over who should be in charge of it. The issue was whether Tandon and his group including Mishra should control the Congress and run its policy, or that it should be Nehru. Mishra shows not only malice but limited understanding in dealing with the issue as a personal one. The control which Nehru gained over the Congress by the end of 1951 enabled him to win three general elections and pursue his policies till his death in 1964. Tandon, Mishra and their group wanted to run their anti-secular, anti-socialist, pro-American policies, with the help of Nehru as an election agent. The episode was crucial in Congress history. It showed Nehru not only as a leader who was prepared to lead but as a master strategist, who took grave risks and gained control of the Congress organization. Mishra sees it all as manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre.

Describing how he got involved in Tandon's election, Mishra confesses that he was never attracted to Nehru, and that in 1950, he had discussions with Patel on ways of curbing Nehru's vagaries, though not of ousting him from Prime Ministership. When the question of Congress Presidentship arose at the end of Dr. Pattabhi's term, Nehru ruled out Kripalani, says Mishra, and Patel agreed. When Nehru suggested Shankar Rao Deo, Patel ruled him out as intensely regional in his outlook. This brought up the name of Tandon. Nehru expressed "his strong opposition to him on the ground of his identification with Hindu communal interests, his old ways, his rigidity and his fanatical attitude on the language question which would alienate the south."\* Patel advocated Tandon's claims. H.C. Mukherjee's name was also discussed, but Nehru rejected it as he believed that he would not be popular among the delegates. There were further consultations among Congress Working Committee members. Nehru insisted that Tandon was a communalist and objected to the views he expressed at a refugee conference. These, he said, were "intolerant, communal and impractical..." Nehru also maintained that Tandon was a revivalist. Tandon sought to explain his role and Patel defended him. Nehru was firm; he made it clear to Patel that if Tandon became president, "I may find it difficult to continue as a member of the Congress Working Committee or even of the Government." It was suggested that Nehru might take up the presidentship. He declined, as he was Prime Minister, and felt that his threat to resign was being taken

<sup>\*</sup>Tandon earlier fought Rafi Ahmad Kidwai for the UP Congress Presidentship. Then, and in 1950, Nehru told me that he had the highest respect for Tandon's character and integrity but he deeply deplored and rejected his outlook, which was utterly wrong.

lightly by Patel and others. He said: "In the present crisis in Congress history, principles are more important than individuals, and I earnestly trust that it is on the basis of these old principles that all decisions will be taken and the work of the country carried on." Further, Nehru made it clear to Patel that Tandon's election would be a vote of "no confidence" in him by Congressmen, or at any rate by those who voted in the presidential election; "as a result of this, I cannot function in the Congress Working Committee or other executives. As a further consequence, I cannot continue as Prime Minister." On Patel advising him not to do anything in a hurry, he replied that he would look upon Tandon's election "as a public slap on my face and an expression of Congress disapproval of what I stand for."

Nehru had fought his first decisive battle for secularism at the time of the bloody Partition riots by risking his life. He fought his second decisive battle at the time when the refugees from East Pakistan in 1950 excited communal feelings and bred a war-like mood among Congressmen in general. War was however avoided by the signing of the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact which Patel also endorsed. The third decisive battle was with Tandon not only for secularism but for leadership of the Congress. The first General Elections were to be held under the Constitution in 1952 and soon the issue of selecting candidates would arise. Nehru made it clear that this was also a reason for his opposition to Tandon. Tandon was elected and presided over the Nasik session (1950). Nehru refused to be a member of the Working Committee. Tandon nevertheless went ahead and formed a committee consisting mostly of those opposed to Nehru's stand or those who did not understand it. Mishra who was intimately connected with the developments on Tandon's side, discusses at this point in his narrative that the only plausible explanation for Gandhi's choice of Nehru as his successor seemed to be that while Patel controlled the Congress machine and was gifted with qualities which went to make a statesman, in popularity he was no match to Nehru "who had made himself the idol of the people." According to Maniben, Patel's daughter, Gandhi preferred Nehru because he was wellknown outside India and because "he felt that if Nehru was made Prime Minister, he would be prevented from making mischief in the country." After the Nasik session, Patel died. Tandon said he felt orphaned. Mishra took part in the negotiations to get the Working Committee re-constituted. The attempt failed. It is not necessary to recapitulate the details of the affair as it developed; suffice to recall that Kidwai also played a crucial role in opposing Tandon and Nehru insisted on a complete reconstitution of the Working Committee. At a Press Conference, with the Working Committee lined up against him, he declared that he would resign as Prime Minister although the parliamentary party was behind him. This was the ultimate

<sup>\*</sup>I was accompanying Nehru on one of his election tours at his suggestion, and while discussing the possibilities, he was sure of the Congress securing about 350 seats. The

RAU

ry,

t it

ind

tel by

on:

tee

me

ied

nd

he

ve

ed

in

Ali

on

al

ue

SO

ed

ng

ee

ot

ts

i-

e

h

h

a

e

e

e

e

risk he took to fight for his views and for freeing the Congress from the control of Tandon and his clique.

At this time, Mishra made matters worse for Tandon and his cause and for himself by issuing statements which attacked Nehru, especially a strong statement accusing Nehru of Caesarism. He thought Nehru could not win the 1952 elections without every Congressman's co-operation. Nehru believed that his leadership, policies and appeal would win the elections.\* Mishra's statements and manoeuvrings weakened Tandon's base, and Nehru was happy with Mishra's final attack on him.\* Mishra's charges against Nehru became wilder. According to him, Nehru had established his monacracy; he won every general election in his time and shaped his major policies without obstruction. Mishra attacked Nehru all along, and though he had friends to sell him later to Nehru and to Indira Gandhi and was successful he rejoices in what was Nehru's failure in his relations with China. About Nehru's last days again, he cannot help being mean, probably because he is writing after Indira Gandhi's defeat in 1977. He says in one breath that Nehru wanted to live because he had "promises to keep", in another he almost rejoices in a world free of Nehru.

Dr. N.B. Khare, for long a Congressman, and later an ardent follower of the Hindu Mahasabha, a Congress Chief Minister and later anti-Congress member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, was in his later days a consistent critic of the Congress. If D.P. Mishra could come back into the Congress and go out of it, Khare could be said to be steady. After his fall as Congress Chief Minister, he maintained a virulent attack on Gandhi, Nehru, Patel, Azad and others. In his autobiography,<sup>29</sup> he makes fun of Gandhi, saying his premonition of death within twenty-four hours of it was proof of a guilty conscience that he was sacrificing Hindus to Muslims. He attacked Nehru for his utterences against the Hindu Mahasabha and Hindu communalism. He also blamed him for his policies on Nepal, Tibet and on other matters, with more vehemence than knowledge. He held Patel and Nehru guilty of Partition. This question is better argued by Maulana Azad in his *India Wins Freedom*, a bundle of prejudices against Patel, Nehru, the Mountbattens, Krishna Menon and others.

Sampurnanand, a leading Congress Socialist for some time, later Chief Minister of UP and a consistent but not vehement critic of Nehru, is mild and dignified in comparison. His writings are scattered; he expressed himself clearly and would have been taken more seriously than he is but for his dabbling in astrology and other matters, including science-fiction and soil-less cultivation. He found no soul, no philosophy in the Republic, in the Constitution or in the policies of the Government headed by Nehru. He also did not agree with Nehru's idea of secularism, but offered no alternative.

<sup>\*</sup>Nehru who had been tense on earlier occasions smilingly asked me at this time: "How is my friend D.P. Mishra?"

He could not understand non-alignment because it had no relation to some undefined Deity of his conception.

Nehru Lacked Ideolism: Ayub Khan's Critique

It may be appropriate to discuss here Ayub Khan's critique of Nehru.30 Ayub Khan would technically be a foreigner but he can be clubbed more with Nehru's Indian critics than treated as a foreigner. In spite of Nehru's dislike of dictators, specially of the Pakistani President's hectoring tone, they met twice for the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. Ayub Khan says of Nehru in a book which was consumed in his downfall: "I missed the idealism or the starry-eyed thinking which is often attributed to him..." Ayub Khan, and later his admirers both in Pakistan and India, were peeved that Nehru did not accept Ayub Khan's proposal for common defence. Nehru said: "...I do not understand against whom people talk about common defence. Are we to become members of the Baghdad Pact or SEATO or somebody else? ... What does the military pact mean? Does it mean that armies must march over India?..." Ayub Khan's explanation was: "I was neither suggesting any change in the foreign policies of the two countries nor any formal defence arrangements..." The crux of the proposal was that, "once differences between the two nations were dissolved... Indian and Pakistani forces then facing each other would be released to defend their respective territories." Apart from their different outlooks in foreign affairs and persistence of differences between the two nations, Ayub Khan's proposal became meaningless and his subsequent fate deprives his explanation of any value. Then again, Pakistan's aggression of 1965 against India is a contradiction of any claim by Ayub Khan to political and military

Sudhir Ghosh and Durga Das' Writings Assessed

Two books, one by a political butterfly and the other by a journalist of partisan views who cannot claim to have historical insight, may also be noticed here. Sudhir Ghosh<sup>31</sup> was a special envoy for a brief period and is less obnoxious than other special envoys, but he makes pronouncements worthy of far more important persons. On "a revolution that did not come off", he says of Nehru: "He was always ready to support any revolutionary idea. He was at heart a revolutionary who did not have to go through an actual revolution. He took a vicarious pleasure in other people's revolutions and that was the clue to his natural sympathy for the Western Revolution and the Chinese Revolution; although the sensitive man in him was impelled by the cruelties of these revolutions." Ghosh obtained Gandhi's credentials, won the sympathy of members of the Cabinet Mission, went to London as a kind of public relations officer and behaved like a de facto High Commissioner, quarrelled with Krishna Menon, could not win the support

me

LAU

ore l's ne, ub

"I to a, on lk

it n o al

ct

n d n 's a-

a

y

f

s s of Nehru and sided with Patel. He was a meddler with a sense of selfimportance; if he was organizing any revolution anywhere, none would know of it.

Durga Das was an important journalist in some ways, but he himself never claimed to be a historian or scholar. In his autobiography<sup>32</sup> he compares Curzon and Nehru in a far-fetched manner and summarizes his life-time's prejudices against Nehru as man and Prime Minister. It reads like a reporter's fiction—what Radhakrishnan said in private, what someone else said in his bathroom, what a rickshaw-puller and other so-called common men said. Radhakrishnan, according to Durga Das, thought Nehru to be "a good judge of men;" Mrs. Pandit thought "he was not a bad judge of men," and so on. There is no analysis of any kind and Durga Das writes in his own style which betrays a total lack of style. He relies on gossip, not history.

## A Denigratory Survey

Another spaciously planned critical assessment of Nehru came from the husband-and-wife team of Amiya Rao and B.G. Rao.33 They could have been more cultured critics, but they have made their work a mere compilation of criticism of Nehru with superficially sensational chapter headings. A pair of scholars, they should rather have assessed his role in a spirit of detachment. The purpose of their survey, what they call Six Thousand Days, by its proclaimed objective and accomplished purpose, could only have been denigration. The book avowedly seeks to cover certain facts of the seventeen years of Nehru as Prime Minister and deals with his activities in their three broad aspects-national affairs, international affairs and the politics of the Congress Party. Certain facts, yes, but with what activities? "We have used some unpublished correspondence," say the authors, "and certain new facts obtained from some of his surviving friends and colleagues," but which friends and colleagues? "To find out what Nehru means to India (1974)," say the authors again, "we have gone round and talked to a large number of people from various walks of life and different parts of the country," a tall claim which has not been proved.

The authors proclaim: "Many have written on Nehru's great contribution to India's progress and stability; we, while analyzing his long years in office, have emphasized what he did, but need not have done, and have pointed out what he said he would do and could have done, but did not do." This is clever casuistry, but betrays enough of the motivation, when the authors could have done something straightforward and need have done only to point out what Nehru did and could have done better or what he said he would do and mostly did, in spite of the limitations imposed on him by the people and by the party. It would not be unhistorical or unnecessary to point out Nehru's faults or failures, but the book is only full of these. Clarendon is quoted: "All the things of this nature must be submitted, as

fa

e

0

th

tł

si

a

W

C

fc

S

Se

ti

0

W

C

ai

m

lc

a

is

fo

fr

b

C

SI

C

this is, with great deference to the judgement of the equal reader." Nothing of this kind has been done. Clarendon lives; how long has the book of the Raos lived?

The authors have only at the beginning summarized Nehru's achievements and briefly stated his failures. Thereafter, they have bid farewell to this attempt at balance; they devote the rest of the book to his failures. If this was the intention, it could have been proclaimed. In the chapter, "The Hungriest Democracy" the First Plan is blamed for its emphasis on agriculture and the Second Plan is blamed for its three steel plants. The rural scene is surveyed as if with Goldsmith's pathos about "the deserted village", though villages have never been deserted in India. In "For Whom the Bell Tolls," Tibet is discussed as unrealistically as far more important critics did, and with the gloomy premonition of John Donne. Nineteen hundredand fifty-four, say the authors, was an important year for India. That was the year when Nehru signed "the famous Panchsheel agreement and formally recognized the end of Tibet's autonomy; he surrendered India's extraterritorial rights as well." This is a caricature of what happened. China's suzerainty over Tibet could not be denied; when suzerainty becomes sovereignty, can be decided only by the suzerain. Nobody then contended that Tibet was independent; nobody was prepared to fight China over Tibet and India could not. It also could not claim what Imperial Britain had claimed. It is not for those who blamed India for fighting China in 1962 to blame India for not fighting China in 1954. Donne has been misused by many.

In "The Joy of Mediation," the writers suggest that India meddled in Korea. If India felt as a country on friendly terms with China that it could convey its views to the other side which did not recognize China and could help peace in Korea, there was nothing wrong about it. But for the authors "Nehru now felt that he had taken his place among the world leaders" in showing interest in Korea. By 1974, was it not clear that he had taken his place among world leaders, and what had other world leaders accomplished? It is untruthful to say that he wanted to stop "destruction in Korea at any cost." In "Three Thousand Years of China," there is a similar attempt at ridicule: "Nehru's early approach to China had been based on a sentimental foundation and unabashed admiration. Gandhiji, noting this, had teasingly remarked that Nehru's love for China was excelled only by his love for his own country." Why "teasingly"? Americans had loved China for long before the Communist regime. Indians have loved some country or other, and Nehru's love for China was no secret or crime. When the authors say that "just before emplaning for Colombo [in October 1962], Nehru told the Press that he had issued instructions to the army that the intruding Chinese should be thrown out. The statement was one of those numerous thoughtless ones which Nehru made in his long political life and which brought misfortune on the country," they are only repeating what others said, without,

The authors go on merrily without the least attempt at investigation of facts, depending on secondary sources and repeating what others, as light-

hearted, have said. On Nepal they are casual, and, this casual approach is

even more obvious in the case of Kashmir. Nehru threw away opportunities on every occasion, according to them. For Bandung or the Bandung spirit,

they have contempt, forgetting what Nehru said as early as April 1947 at

the Asian Relations Conference. Further, the Raos say, that he remained a

silent spectator of Vietnam's bloody war of independence, without however

analyzing how France rejected the opportunity of dealing with Ho Chi-Minh

when he was in Paris in 1947, and without considering what exactly India

could have done. On this subject, the authors betray considerable sympathy

for Communism and blame Nehru without blaming France or the United

States. In "Flesh of our Flesh" they equate India and Pakistan and do not

seem to understand what exactly plebiscite is or what it is about. "Aspira-

tion without Policy" is an unhappy headline and they have no appreciation of Nehru's policy on Goa. Nehru's foreign policy altogether was "words,

words, words" to them, though this was what the Janata Party inherited and

could not improve upon. In "The Sensation of Swaraj", they deal with corruption in an unspecific manner. "The Slippery Slope" is how the

Congress had gone down, from the Socialist or Praja Socialist point of

view. The authors are angry. The Congress survived so long; they should be

This is a book made from other books, whatever their quality, a book made of quotations or Other Men's Flowers, as Wavell called his anthology of poems. This acknowledgedly betrays the authors' one-sidedness, apart from the use they make of the material they select. The bibliography reveals much, apart from what is used. Among the newspapers consulted is the National Herald, Delhi edition, which started publication in 1968, four years after Nehru's death, not the National Herald, Lucknow, published from 1938 to 1942 and from 1945 through the "Six Thousand Days". The references are mostly to Nehru's critics. The value of such a book need not

of he

AU

its iis is he ri-

al 11 es 1-

ıs y s

lt t

Also to be dismissed is Karaka's book34 which is a mixture of fantasy and

epigrams of the Oxford Union type. It is characteristically frivolous about Nehru; every argument is advanced in his book to prove anything except

how Nehru was a lotus-eater. Such smartness can be summarily rejected.

be discussed further.

angrier that it is still surviving.

CONSTRUCTIVE EVALUATION OF NEHRU'S FOREIGN POLICY

India's foreign policy has been considered to be one of Nehru's major contributions, and it has been opposed, criticized, assessed or praised as such. On the whole, however, in the course of years, it has emerged largely unscent.

unscathed and accepted as the common national policy. In Bimal Prasad's compilation of the papers35 contributed to a seminar held under the auspices of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, more agreement than disagreement

P p

IT

p p

p

C

In

al

fi

fo

h

b

H

h

af

th

W

S

C

Ir

R

m

SC

emerges in the overall assessment. In his inaugural address to the seminar, the Janata Government's Foreign Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, an opponent of Nehru's attitudes in international affairs, said:

When the Janata Government assumed office just over a year ago, we pledged ourselves to a foreign policy based on national consensus within the parameters of a genuine non-alignment.... Yet no country can afford not to take into account the shifting trends and perceptions constantly occurring in our world. It is the interaction between these changes and the socio-economic processes going on imperceptibly in our own country that poses a challenge to our foreign policy as well as perception.... Our response to this challenge must in turn be determined by the overriding consideration of the pursuit of our national interest and the promotion of peace, stability and co-operation in this world....

The word "genuine" was added to non-alignment but, on analysis and in practice, it did not mean much. In the Lok Sabha in a debate on foreign affairs, Nehru had said:

It is completely incorrect to call our policy 'Nehru' policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind busy over the struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today. I come in by the mere accidental fact that during these years I have represented that policy as Foreign Minister. I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy.

In an earlier speech, he had said: "In the ultimate analysis, a Government functions for the good of the country; it governs and no Government dare to do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country." This was not modesty but a correct historical perspective, which was proved correct when the Janata Government was in office. Vajpayee had to follow a largely pro-Arab policy which while in Opposition he had deprecated. Whatever the pro-American leanings of the Congress Government, they were not less friendly to the Soviet Union than the and identity of interest in some that brought the Soviet Union and India close together; Soviet help, particularly in economic matters, did the rest. US policies in countries like Vietnam and attitudes over issues like Kashmir and Bangladesh, Dulles's brinkmanship and Nixon's "tilt" widened the American.

NEHRU AND HIS CRITICS: AN ASSESSMENT

nar. an

RAU

ago, nsus ntry ions hese y in ll as ined rest

d in eign

rect

d....

not dia, ntal ind ices ing am hey

rnent discal in

in the the ers dia

st. nir he ti-

A balanced, though critical, assessment, the most balanced the writer of this article has known, has been made in an introductory essay by M.S. Rajan in a collection of excellent estimates of various aspects of that policy by eleven scholars.36 Rajan appreciates the broad aspects of that policy but makes several critical points which merit attention because of the objectivity with which he makes them. Nehru, according to Rajan, was undoubtedly the architect and spokesman of that policy, but he points out that it is incorrect to say, as some critics do, that that policy was exclusively Nehru's, as Nehru himself said repeatedly. It is from such confused understanding that some of the criticism has arisen. Rajan has also correctly pointed out another type of confusion arising from another kind of mistake. The international context in which India's foreign policy and relations were formulated and implemented during most of Nehru's Prime Ministership was essentially different from that of the post-Nehru period. There was also the domestic context, though it did not change much.

Rajan refers to some of the distinguishing features of the foreign policy of this period. These were tolerance, rejection of isolationism and pursuit of an active role, attachment to the principles of collective security, peaceful co-existence and international co-operation, a mixture of idealism and realism, opposition to the Cold War and non-alignment which was caricatured to mean what it was not and criticized. Rajan sums up India's goals as maintenance of peace and security, self-determination for all colonial peoples, opposition to racialism and all its manifestations, peaceful settlement of disputes, Afro-Asian solidarity for extending freedom and for economic development, unswerving support to the United Nations and its objectives. If there was what some nations or critics thought was a highly moral, even censorious, tone in India's attitudes and statements, it was because Nehru was working under the inspiration of not only Gandhi but of Buddha and Asoka, apart from his own historical understanding. Hardly have Foreign Ministers in history been more knowledgeable and few have understood or taken their responsibilities as seriously. India led at least till the early sixties. If India ceased to play the same important role afterwards, it was because of the changed context of international relations; the Chinese aggression of 1962 and the view the world took of it.

Rajan makes two main critical observations on non-alignment, that it was doctrinaire and that Nehru continued to believe that non-alignment had something to do with morality. Unfortunately, non-alignment created some confusion which was mainly semantic as one of the non-words to which Indians have been partial as a part of their Indo-Anglianism, though the Random House dictionary gives nearly ten pages of non-words. If non-alignment ment was understood as simply independence from the beginning, the critics would have understood it better and Nehru himself would not have seemed so doctrinaire and moral, as Rajan suggests. There seems to be no established evident ed evidence when the word was first used, apart from its substance, which

Si

li

d

P

to

0

CE

as

b

is

fc

S

SC

id

he

m

of

m

L

lo

ir

01

d

was enunciated even from the moment Nehru became External Affairs Minister in the Interim Government in 1946. Yugoslav sources say that Nehru used it first at the Colombo Powers' Summit (1954); Brezhnev suggests that Krishna Menon appropriated some credit to himself for inventing the word, and the first Non-Aligned Summit was held in Belgrade in 1961. The word had not been heard on Nehru's historic tour of the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia in 1955.\*

Rajan also says that Nehru over-emphasized Panch Sheel, peaceful settlement of disputes, and unfortunately surrendered the right to manufacture nuclear weapons. Nehru probably was idealistic or thought he was following in the footsteps of Asoka and dramatically discouraging nuclear weapons-testing and rivalry, but in binding not only his Government and his successor governments in the renunciation of nuclear weapons, he was not only idealistic but realistic. India was not economically and industrially in a position in the foreseeable future to join the nuclear race and continue in it, and this applied even more to the delivery system without which no nuclear weapons could be used. The Indira Gandhi governments have not renounced the right to make nuclear experiments for peaceful purposes, unlike the pretentious renunciation of the Janata Government, and there is no danger of India being annihilated or not being able to make atomic weapons, if wanted, for both peaceful and war-like purposes. In his criticism of some aspects of Nehru's policy, Rajan has kept in mind the limitations of both idealism and realism and shown that Nehru could not implement every aspect of his professed policies. In other words, that he was not perfect or realistic enough; if he had been too much of a realist, Nehru would not have been Nehru. Rajan's aim apparently is the nation's good in the future, not denigration of Nehru and he weighs his words and avoids weightlessness.

Among officials and diplomats who worked closely with Nehru in the Foreign Office, Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary in crucial years, produced a book<sup>37</sup> which is the most objective, most explanatory and is entirely free from overtones. Some broad facts emerge from Dutt's book. Although the final decision on all important matters of policy was Nehru's, he would often consult the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet; in later years, he made it a rule. The first thing Nehru did on arrival about nine in the morning in the Foreign Office was to meet the Secretary-General and the two senior secretaries and discuss secret and confidential telegrams which had arrived overnight; he would give his decisions and leave follow-up action to the secretaries. Dutt appreciates how Nehru, "with his unerring sense of history," saw the establishment of the Communist regime in China as the culmination of a century-old struggle for the independence and self-expression of the Chinese people—Nehru did not allow his friendship for

<sup>\*</sup>The writer was leader of the Press delegation which accompanied Nehru on that tour and was in close touch with him,

fairs that

RAU

hnev r inrade the

ceful

anuwas clear and was ially

inue not not oses,

re is omic cism

nent not ehru

ood and

the iced free the

ars, the

the ich up

ing ina elf-

for

and

Chiang Kai-Shek to influence his judgement on the realities of the Chinese situation.\*

K.P.S. Menon too has written with wit and distinction and Panikkar with

liveliness, knowledge and partisanship raised to the level of history. Among diplomats from public life, Mrs. Pandit carried off with charm, Panikkar with aplomb and Krishna Menon with coruscating pride and prejudice. Panikkar could have been as successful in Washington as he was supposed to be in Peking, and Krishna Menon in his talks with Brecher, not to mention others, takes much credit for the conduct of policy with which he was concerned and for some of its initiatives and formulations. From a careful assessment it appears, that with his undoubted intelligence and capacity for backstage developments, he was responsible for some formulae and lingu istic legerdemain. Nevertheless, if Nehru had not been the constant guide, foreign policy would have been rudderless. T.N. Kaul, a latter-day Foreign Secretary says in one of his recent books:38 "Nehru had great ideas but sometimes he would choose the wrong instruments that did not fit into his ideas. This was, perhaps, Nehru's major weakness."\*\* Even by Kaul's test. he made fewer mistakes than others would have done in a country of so many millions.

Lohia's third book,<sup>39</sup> which merits attention, is a jumble of his ideas of Himalayan strategy and of claims to Mansarovar. Typical of his statements is the one on the Chinese Premier's visit in 1960:<sup>40</sup>

I fear that it is most likely that Mr. Nehru might agree to a settlement during his talks with the Chinese Premier to be held at Delhi shortly, under which India would lose at least half of her border territories under the occupation of Chinese forces... I know the damaging capabilities of Mr. Nehru to commit big blunders... This achievement of Mr. Nehru would be highly played up by the Indian Press as another shining feather in the cap of that man... I am of the view that India's frontier lay 70 miles north of the McMahon Line covering all territory wherein are Manasarovar, Kailash and east-flowing Brahmaputra... India can agree to leave these territories to a free Tibet, but never to China.

Lohia's Himalayan policies were a miscellany of bile and fantasies about lost horizons. He had clung for long to his ideas of equidistance and equal irrelevance and an ill-defined third force, till non-alignment succeeded and overtook them. But at the time of Chou En-lai's visit for talks on the border,

<sup>\*</sup>In Parliament, Nehru said on 17 March 1950 "It is not a question of approving or disapproving; it is a question of recognising a major event of history and of appreciating it and dealing with it."

<sup>\*\*</sup>I once asked Nehru whether Kripalani was right in saying that he (Nehru) quarrelled with his tools, while Gandhi did not. Nehru vehemently said, "I too do not quarrel with my tools," and he was right. For this reason, however, the tools too laid the blame for their mistakes on him.

fi

ir

tl

II

tl

Se

th

0

C

it

of

in

al

n

le

fr

ha

M

N

Sa

te

fc

m

be

ha

PI

Cu

aı

aı

Lohia was one of the leading war-mongers; he said: "During Mr. Chou En-Lai's visit to Delhi, I would not approve of any demonstration to be staged against the Chinese leader who is not coming on his own but as an invited guest of Mr. Nehru. If anyone deserves a black flag demonstration, it is none else but Nehru." On "some aspects of India's China policy," he says: "...India made a full and complete choice, without reservation. It accepted the China of the Communists. Such a full acceptance was contrary to the teachings of history, to the needs of the state and to human welfare. It was also somewhat uncivilized." Again, "the argument centring on vulgarity and ungratefulness is the least important, although it is singularly significant in revealing the mind of the policy-maker. Mr. Chiang Kai-shek was the only statesman in all the world to have come out openly in support of India's freedom, while she was yet struggling. This fact should never have been forgotten." Lohia's chivalry towards men and women notwithstanding, this argument is so absurd that it needs no refutation. The country should be thankful that he had nothing to do with the shaping or conduct of its foreign policy.

China's attack on India in 1962 has been considered the greatest setback to Nehru by his critics. This clouded or coloured their judgement on other episodes in his life. If his career till then had seemed an unbroken success, the Chinese episode was regarded a failure, colossal enough to cancel any success. If Nehru had taken pride in the success of the foreign policy he had formulated for the country, the set back in NEFA was evidence of the failure of not only his foreign policy but of his domestic policy. No viable alternatives have been suggested till now, and even the Janata Government, having amidst them consistently vociferous critics of Nehru, had to continue with that policy which had served the country well under the Congress. No new postures towards China were adopted and the critics who disagreed vehemently with Nehru in 1962 are now prepared to admit that he was right and they were wrong.\*

The lines of criticism on China have been different and even conflicting. Nehru has been blamed for being naive, for putting too much faith in China, in spite of warnings, for trusting Krishna Menon<sup>41</sup> and others, for being too non-aligned or not genuinely non-aligned and pro-Soviet, for not taking Western help in time, for having neglected defence, for favouring Lt. Gen. Kaul, and so on. There has also been a somewhat ghoulish delight in the supposed failure of non-alignment and criticism of Nehru for having "surrendered" Tibet and for not being aware of the Chinese danger,\*\*

\*I have met such critics and heard their confession; since they are still active in public life, their names have not been mentioned.

<sup>\*\*</sup>The charge of unawareness cannot be sustained. I was a member of the Government's Goodwill Mission to China in 1952. To an inner circle of the delegation, Nehru explained how there was an implicit conflict between China and India through Southeast Asia, how make a stand and fight over it. There are others who could speak of his awareness.

and for taking Western help at last. In foreign policy, the wisdom of

hou ) be s an ion, ' he

RAU

ı. It rary fare. on

arly shek port ever not-

The g or

back ther cess. any y he

e of No ernd to

the who that

ing. ina, eing cing jen.

the ving Γ,\*\*

life.

ent's ined how ve to

Palmerston's dictum that there are no eternal enemies or eternal friends and only a country's interests are eternal has been widely accepted. The United States and China are friends now, and almost all Indian parties would like the border differences with China to be settled peacefully; which was not the stand of some non-Congress parties and even of all Congressmen in 1962. The perspective has been restored partly, though not Neville Maxwell, correspondent of The Times of London for sometime

including 1962, set out a new perspective in his book42 which suggested that the brief Sino-India war had been fought unnecessarily, at least by India. He wrote with an air of detachment and has done more research than others. The central theme, however, seems to be based on assumptions. The case of the Chinese side is not known so far and Maxwell too has not seen any Chinese documents. He is in the realm of history when he examines the validity of the McMahon Line, from the Tibetan and Chinese points of view. But when he considers the developments preceding the 1962 military conflict, he seems to be on his own, relying on surmises, and on the conflict itself, he seems to be satisfied by a surreptitious glimpse of the Henderson Brookes' Report on the causes of the Indian military failure. There is enough of contradiction in the accounts given by Indian commanders from which intelligent but uncertain inferences can be drawn.

The impression created by Maxwell's account is that China was almost always reasonable, that the Indian leaders were either unreasonable or not so reasonable, that where conflict could have been avoided, Indian leaders forced it, and that where China created openings for withdrawal from the brink, it was the Indian leaders that chose brinkmanship. This has made a case for Chinese reasonableness which is not at all tenable. Maxwell does not attack Nehru much except for his insistence that it was Nehru's statement on his way to Colombo in October 1962, when he had said he had ordered Indian forces to throw out the Chinese from Indian territory that precipitated the Chinese incursion. There is not enough support for this contention. The total evidence shows that the Chinese had already moved a large number of troops to the Indian border, and this could have been only for offensive, not for defensive, purposes, for India could not have hoped to take the offensive on higher elevations. Maxwell serves the purpose of equating China with India, damning Indian policy, and particularly cularly blaming Krishna Menon and Lt. Gen. Kaul. This has emboldened Indian critics to reinforce their criticism, though Maxwell is not the final authority on such matters.

The China story may not yet have been fully told. Nehru's own version is still locked up in the archives; so is the version of G. Parthasarathi, India's ambassador in Peking during the crucial period. Lt. Gen. Kaul has defended himself.43 Apart from his own defence, Kaul's remarks are inconsequential except that he too says that Nehru had his blind spots, and he is severely critical of Gen. Chaudhri. Brigadier Dalvi, who had to bear the brunt of the Chinese attack at Dhola, defends himself,<sup>44</sup> but does not explain why his brigade could not move to better positions and why he allowed himself to be captured. Lt.-Gen. Sen, who was in charge of the Eastern Command, always urging action, critical of the divisional commander, Maj.-Gen. Niranjan Prasad, who was ultimately removed, and of the corps commander, Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh, who was shifted, has left his own account.<sup>45</sup> The reminiscences of Johri, who was additional political officer in Bomdila, give some sidelights.<sup>46</sup> The accounts of journalists have little value. S.S. Khera, then Defence Secretary, has thrown light on the state of the defence forces,<sup>47</sup> which were not well served by political masters and higher commanders. This is however, a personal account. There could be no doubt that Krishna Menon treated commanders as he had treated Indian delegates to the United Nations General Assembly, when he led delegations. Only Gen. Thimayya could stand up to him.

The latest book<sup>48</sup> on the China War, by Lt. Col. Saigal, is probably more revealing than any of the other books. The total impression of all the books is that Saigal is right in suggesting that the war was not fought on the Indian side. Dalvi's account of the initial debacle at Dhola is not a sufficient explanation. The divisional commander, Niranjan Prasad, was dithering, at least according to the repeated accounts of Lt. Gen. Sen. Niranjan Prasad was removed, to be later rewarded with a command on the western front against Pakistan in the war of 1965. His replacement, Maj. Gen. Pathania, in spite of his decorations, did not fight at all at Sela, and the division partly disappeared and partly retreated to Bomdila. There is yet no sufficient explanation of Pathania's failure. Henderson-Brookes could have explained the panic at Sela. At least, Saigal does. The total impression is that the Indian troops could have fought much better, probably would have fought effectively, but did not fight at all, because of the failure of commanders.

The war was not forced on the Chinese by the Indians, or on the Indian armed forces by the Indian Government. It does not seem correct to say that political decisions were forced on the commanders. Churchill, who has been often accused of interfering with his army commanders and has convicted himself, also never interfered with military operations. Military decisions had been left by Churchill to the military; within the broad framework of policy, Nehru took similar decisions. When Nehru made his statement on his way to Colombo, he had military advice behind him. Mullick, Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, who need not be believed on all counts because of his admiration for Nehru, can be trusted on this count; He maintained that, the military disaster was not due to political interference. He is more reliable than other commentators.

Among these commentators, the only serious one is K. Subrahmanyam<sup>50</sup> of the Defence Ministry, who for some time was head of the Institute for

Defence Studies. He says:

RAU

nt of

why

nself

land,

Gen.

nder,

The

dila, S.S.

fence

com-

oubt

gates

Only

more

ooks the

cient

g, at

rasad front

ania, artly

cient

ained

idian

ctive-

idian

o say

who

and

ions.

road

le his

him.

on all

ount,

nter-

am<sup>50</sup>

e for

History will record that Nehru's perception of India's problems of security was accurate. The policies he pursued were also perhaps the best under the circumstances. But he failed partly in their implementation and partly for reasons which could never have been anticipated, such as the local command failure in the 1962 war. If we take into account the magnitude of the crisis that India faced, it would seem that Nehru pulled her through it at a relatively low cost.

If this is so, Subrahmanyam seems to be wrong in the impression he gives in the opening paragraph of his essay that the 1962 happenings were such a blow to Nehru that "he probably never really recovered from it;" when he thinks we were in an area where a large number of myths had developed and where correct and full information is difficult to come by, and the records of the period have not yet been made available. The opening paragraphs had to be probably dramatic, though the conclusion does not support it. Nehru had physically suffered from an illness earlier in 1962 and, though the Chinese attack was a blow to his faith and hope, he recovered soon from it and was more alert and vigorous than his colleagues in Parliament or outside.\*

#### NEHRU'S CONTRIBUTION

Nehru was open to criticism; as Prime Minister, he was particularly vulnerable. He was both a person and Prime Minister; Nehru as a person is inseparable from his policies. Those who have praised him for what he was and denigrated his policies are as wrong as those who have denigrated both him and his policies. It is not ultimately by the rose in his buttonhole, the charm and elegance of his manner or even his humanism that he will be remembered. Nor can he be dismissed because of what are known as his blind spots. Rather, questions should be asked: What did he do with his opportunities? What did he contribute not only as a freedom fighter (though this is often forgotten) but as a nation-builder? What were the policies he pursued and established? And What has survived of whatever he did?

This kind of assessment has been rare. No less than Cromwell, Nehru may have desired to be portrayed, warts and all, but most of the criticism he attracted is a kind of collection of warts, leaving out the rest of the body, and this has been useless even for purposes of display. The severest test to which he had been put was to be rejected wholly or partly by a government of his critics, like the Janata Party Government, but much of what he had done stood and not only his foreign policy, which was almost wholly emulated. The essence of Nehru's contribution to nation-building has been

<sup>\*</sup>I was repeatedly a witness to it and have written about it at length elsewhere.

secularism, democracy, planned development and non-alignment. These have remained identifiable, because they remain relevant. Nehru came alive again before the recent elections in which he became one of the issues. if not the essential issue, because Charan Singh had to acknowledge his contribution when forced by his allies—the old Congressmen—in spite of challenging his economic policies. In a way, Nehru's policies were broadly endorsed in the elections, and he remains as relevant as ever.

The nation state of India can rest only on the base of Secularism. After Partition, religious bigotry gained such ascendancy that, apart from Gandhi. Nehru had to emphasize Secularism, not only because of the millions of Muslims left behind in India (in spite of the creation of a separate state of Pakistan) but because no state could be possible on any other basis in a country of so many religions and communities. India's culture is as composite as it ever was, and by insisting that Indian nationhood is many-stranded, Nehru made the Indian state viable and invested it with a permanent personality. Nehru's contribution to the development of Democracy is equally clear. He was the finest parliamentarian of the day, and he not only established the democratic process by propagating the temper of discussion but made Parliament ascendant by showing it unfailing respect. This Democracy is certainly not complete or perfect, but he taught the people the habit of believing that it is only Democracy that can correct its mistakes and improve its precedures. The hugeness of the electorates and the expensiveness of elections have become a source of corruption, and though like Gandhi, he thought loudly of indirect elections, there is need for further thinking and finding a solution to the problem.

Nehru believed that both Democracy and Socialism were inevitable in the conditions of the country. He did not think that any sectarian Socialism would suit Indian conditions or that Socialism would come about overnight. It had to be an open movement, broad-based and would depend on the mobilization of social forces. Planned development in which he had believed from the days of the freedom struggle, seemed to be the best method and he worked hard, in spite of stiff opposition, to make this possible. By this, he showed that planning in Indian conditions meant Socialism and that it inevitably meant that the democratic process and the socialist process should, and could, go together.

Non-alignment is a negative name for a negative aspect of policy, although it has gradually come to mean the whole gamut of foreign policy. In essence, it meant an independent policy, with India free to judge any developments on merits without being tied to any bloc. But in the process, with its commitment to peace, collective security, anti-colonialism and demand for a share in development, it came to be identified with countries with a similar outlook and policies, and this did not make non-alignment one-sided. Close bilateral relations with the Soviet Union or Soviet help for heavy industry and selfreliance, or even the Indo-Soviet Treaty, have not affected Indian independence. It is not India's fault if the United States unfortunately was on the

RAÜ

lese ime ues.

pite ere

lhi, of of 1 a

site ed, ent

aly on his

ces he

gh er

in m ıt.

ed 1d

SS h

ts t-·e

ıl

his

fter

is

ole

he

s, it

e,

k

e

wrong side in Korea, Vietnam, the Indian Ocean question, or even in Kashmir. The policies which Nehru established have stood the test of time.

It would not be claiming too much to say that Nehru laid the foundations of our Secularism, Democracy, planned development and Socialism, and foreign policy. Nothing has yet shaken these foundations. It is clear that whatever his limitations, Nehru showed consistency of vision and that if India remains true to his vision it would not be lost. It is possible to build further on the foundations and, though much of modern India is a memorial to him, India has still to go a long way; but he has taught it to go its way with courage and vision. It cannot be contended by anybody that Nehru was a perfect man or a perfect Prime Minister. Such men or Prime Ministers, as Lord Rosebery said in the case of Pitt the Younger, would be monsters. not men. It is possible to improve on Nehru only by recognizing Nehru. No such man has ever been wholly a success or a failure in history, but as long as India lives, he will live. The following lines describe the enigma that Nehru remains for his critics:

Others abide our question: Thou art free, We ask and ask: Thou smilest and art still, Out-topping knowledge. (Mathew Arnold).

January 1980.

#### NOTES

1 Vincent Shean, Nehru, The Years of Power (London, 1960).

2 Dorothy Norman, Nehru: The First Sixty Years (2 vols.), (London, 1965).

3 Michael Brecher, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Political Biography, (London, 1959).

4 Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (London, 1954). 5 John K. Galbraith, An Ambassador's Journal, (London, 1969).

6 Walter Crocker, Nehru, A Contemporary's Estimate (London, 1966). With a foreword by Arnold Toynbee.

7 Ibid. Chapter IV, as Prime Minister, page 69.

8 Ibid., page 72. 9 Ibid., page 77.

10 Ibid. page 20.

11 Ibid., page 110. 12 Ibid., page 119.

13 Sampurnanand, Indian Socialism (Bombay, 1961).

14 Bipan Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India (Delhi, 1979).

15 C. Rajagopalachari, Satyameva Jayate (four volumes). (Madras, 1961).

16 M.N. Roy, Jawaharlal Nehru (Delhi, October, 1945). 17 M.N. Roy, "Jawaharlal Nehru, An Enigma or a Tragedy?" In A.B. Shah, Ed. Jawaharlal Nehru—a Critical Tribute (Bombay, 1965), pp. 37-41.

18 P. Spratt, "Roy and Nehru", Ibid., pp. 42-47.

19 Rammanohar Lohia, Rs. 25,000 A Day (Hyderabad, 1965). 20 Rammanohar Lohia, Rs. 25,000 A Day (Hyderabad, 1970).
Rammanohar Lohia, Guilty Men of India's Partition (Hyderabad 1970).

- 21 Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50, Vol. I, New Light on Kashmir Ed. by Durga Das. (Ahmedabad, 1971).
- 22 Mehar Chand Mahajan, Looking Back, Autobiography (Delhi, 1963).
- 23 Morarji Desai, The Story of My Life Vol. II, (Delhi, 1977).
- 24 Charan Singh, Abolition of Zamindari, Two Alternatives (Allahabad, 1947).
- Whither Cooperative Farming? (or author's essay), 1956. 25 Charan Singh, Foreword by Sampurnanand.
- 26 Charan Singh, India's Poverty and the Solution, (First published under the title, Joint Farming X-rayed 1950), (Bombay, 1964).
- 27 Charan Singh, India's Economic Policy (Delhi, 1978).
- 28 D.P. Mishra, Living an Era, Vol. II, The Nehru Epoch-from Democracy to Monocracy (Delhi, 1978).
- 29 N.B. Khare, My Political Memoirs or Autobiography (Nagpur, 1970).
- 30 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, A Political Autobiography (Oxford. 1967).
- 31 Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhi's Emmissary (Calcutta, 1967).
- 32 Durga Das, From Curzon to Nehru (London 1969).
- 33 Amiya Rao and B.G. Rao, Six Thousand Days (Delhi, 1974).
- 34 D.F. Karaka, The Lotus Eater from Kashmir (London, 1953).
- 35 Bimal Prasad, Ed. India's Foreign Policy, Studies in Continuity and Change (New Delhi, 1979).
- 36 M.S. Rajan, Ed. India's Foreign Relations During the Nehru Era: Some Studies (New Delhi, 1976).
- 37 Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta, 1977).
- 38 T.N. Kaul, Indian, China and Indo-China (New Delhi, 1980).
- 39 Rammanohar Lohia, India, China and Northern Frontiers (Hyderabad 1963).
- 40 Ibid., p. 176.
- 41 Michael Brecher, Indian and World Politics (London, 1968).
- 42 Neville Maxwell, India's China War (Bombay, 1971).
- 43 B.M. Kaul, The Untold Story (New York, 1967).
- 44 J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder (Bombay, 1969).
- 45 L.P. Sen, Slender was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation, 1947-48, (Bombay 1969).
- 46 Sita Ram Johri, Chinese Invasion of NEFA (Lucknow, 1968).
- 47 S.S. Khera, Defence Problem (Delhi, 1968).
- 48 J.R. Saigal, The Unfought War of 1962: The NEFA Debacle (Delhi, 1979).
- 49 B.N. Mullick, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal (Delhi, 1971).
- 50 K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962". In B.R. Nanda, Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years (Delhi, 1976).

LIATI

Das.

956.

oint

racy

ord,

New

New

nda,

# NON-ALIGNMENT: THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN PERSPECTIVE\*

By M.S. RAJAN\*\*

A CONTINUING (and perhaps the least solvable) problem in the study and understanding of international relations is the unbridgeable gap between the policy and practice of states, as well as between the theory of international organizations and international movements. Often, what states do or say is different (in varying degrees) from what they stand for, by policy or principle proclaimed earlier. Likewise, international organizations and international movements do not exactly function according to the respective letter of their charter or constitution. The practice of international movements also does not always accord with the objectives for which they were started.

This is not to say that the theory and practice in respect of all the three are invariably in conflict, or that there are no adequate reasons for the departure of their practices from the theory, constitution or objectives according to which they were expected to function. Nor does it mean that the practice is always retrogressive. In many cases, it might well be that the practice is far in advance of the policy, constitution, or objectives made many years ago in a different context or situation; in other words, the practice, although departing from the letter of the law, might well be a progressive step in terms of the spirit of the law. It could also be that the practice is not indicated in the original policy/constitution or objectives, but is nevertheless not in contradiction to them.

How then does one decide as to whether a certain practice which is a departure from the theory is healthy or otherwise? There seems to be no simple, objective, procedure or norm which can prove of help in deciding the issue. One seemingly satisfactory procedure is to go by the decision of the majority of members or, as is the fashion these days, by consensus. But the community of nations does not function according to the norms of democracy; in fact, from the controversies in and about the United Nations on some current international problems, one can readily see that this is no sure method of deciding whether or not a departure is necessarily or always healthy.

An intractable reason for this situation is the glaring fact that international society (and therefore, international relations) is dynamic and any charter, constitution or objective may get out of date the moment it is

\*\*Dr. Rajan is Professor of International Organization at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and Managing Editor of this journal.

<sup>\*</sup>This is substantially the text of a paper submitted to the International Conference on the Non-aligned Movement, held by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, between 24-26 January 1980.

agreed upon. No charter/constitution can, and does, anticipate the changing circumstances and situations likely to arise even in the forseeable, let alone remote, future. But, then, any organization or movem nt brought into existence by an agreement or charter cannot ignore the changing circumstances and situations and insist on taking decisions on the basis of the earlier agreements or charter; if at all they should do so (which itself is unlikely) the organization or movement would become increasingly irrelevant and wither away. Therefore, in order to be continuingly relevant to the changed and changing situations, the organization/movement has to perform a difficult exercise: of balancing carefully between the dual tight ropes of the constitution/charter/objectives on the one hand, and the changing needs of international society, as also demands of member states, on the other. In this difficult exercise, naturally, an organization or movement can rarely please everybody. There would always be critics of its omissions and commissions. But the more pertinent question is whether the organization/ movement can survive criticism from within and continue to serve members to the degree that they collectively need or expect it to serve.

In the light of this perspective, it would be useful to see as to how the movement of non-alignment has functioned during the last two decades of its existence. What is the nature and extent of the gap between the theory and the practice of the movement? To what extent is this gap (which has invited a great deal of criticism from members and non-members, and, in recent years, from the news media too), justified, both in terms of the original objectives of the movement and the changing needs of members and the international community? And finally, what is the relevance of non-alignment and, therefore, the movement, to the current and forseeable future of international relations?

There exists today a paradoxical situation with respect to the movement of non-alignment. On the one hand, its membership has steadily increased from 25-plus at the first Belgrade Conference (1961) to 93-plus at the recent (September 1979) Sixth Conference at Havana; on the other hand, with increasing membership has also come considerable disenchantment, if not decreasing faith, in the policy and the movement among some members. The policy and movement also enjoys less credibility today outside the member governments—among the public, intellectuals and news media. The main reason for this seems to be the widening gap between the theory of non-alignment and the persistently proclaimed objectives, on the one movement, on the other.

One needs to be concerned with the increasing gulf between theory and practice only if, like the present writer, one believes that non-alignment has continuing validity in the present and forseeable future. For, unless the in line with the theory as possible, the future of the policy as closely might well be in jeopardy.

NON-ALIGNMENT: THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

AN

ng ne

ito

m-

he

is

nt

he

m

es

ng

he

an

nd

n/

rs

10 es

ry

as

in

al

e

of

ıt

d

e

3.

e

y

# LACK OF DEFINITION AND DISCRIMINATION IN MEMBERSHIP

One possible source of this gap between theory and practice (and the consequent disenchantment with the movement) is the absence of an authorized definition of what non-alignment stands for. Even after six Summits (and numerous other mini conferences) the movement is unable or unwilling to define the policy of non-alignment. Surprisingly, the issue of definition was not even considered at the first (Belgrade) Conference in 1961. The Third (Lusaka) Summit declared the "aims of non-alignment", but these merely sound like a summary of the Purposes of the United Nations (Art. 1 of the UN Charter), with the characteristically distinguishing features of non-alignment tucked in somewhere in between. The Summit Communique also declared categorically: "What is needed is not re-definition [when there was no definition!] of non-alignment, but a re-dedication by all non-aligned nations to its central aims and objectives." A Libyan proposal at the Fourth Summit Conference (Algiers, 1973) for a new or stricter interpretation was not pressed for a decision—presumably because of lack of agreement, or discouragement by some members for fear of dividing the membership over the question. Indeed, a similar Burmese proposal at the recent Havana Summit was ignored by the participants.

All that we have officially to go by is a five-point criteria laid down by a 21-nation Preparatory Committee (held in Cairo in June 1961) as a basis for extending invitations to the Belgrade Conference.3 But even an inferential definition of the policy based on these criteria does not make much sense. Thus, under the criteria, a country need not necessarily have an "an independent policy;" it is enough if it could show "a trend in favour of such a policy." It should have "consistently" supported the movement for national independence; the extent and nature of support is, however, left undefined, so that one cannot say with any certainty that all the states that claim to be non-aligned do in fact fulfil this criterion. This is not also an exclusive criterion, since many aligned nations (e.g., Pakistan until September 1979, Thailand and the Philippines) do qualify under it. The third criterion does not absolutely exclude members of a military alliance; it only states ambiguously that a state should not be a member of any multilateral military alliance "concluded in the context of great power conflicts." This latter qualifying clause might well nullify the inhibition in the former clause.

It is thus that some of the aligned countries have been treated in the past as "invited guests" or "observers" (e.g., Pakistan, Australia, Philippines, Portugal, Spain and Romania) at the non-aligned conferences. On what evidence was it decided that any or all of these states were eligible even for less than regular membership? Could their mere interest in being associated with the movement be treated as adequate even for this limited purpose? Could it not be that some of these states were/are mere Trojan Horses in the non-aligned movement? One does not, and probably cannot, know.

Similar is the case about the fourth and fifth criteria—that if a state has a

bilateral military agreement with a Great Power or membership in a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact "should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;" if it has conceded military bases to a foreign Power, "the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts." But, Syria, Iraq and Egypt have had at one time (or still have) military aid agreements of a sort with the Soviet Union. Morocco, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Malta have had (or still have) Western military bases; when Malta was admitted at the Algerian Summit meeting in 1973, it had a NATO base, but the Conference let itself be persuaded that the base was vital to Malta for economic reasons and that it would be removed by March 1979 (and it was). Cuba, Jamaica and Trinidad/Tobago, are members of the Organization of American States (OAS) which is a kind of political alliance. Chad, Central African Republic and Congo (Brazzaville) and Gabon are members of France's multilateral military arrangements of the Defence Council of Equatorial Africa. Malaysia has a defence treaty with the United Kingdom, and Singapore (which was until 1965 part of the Federation of Malaysia) still co-operates with the other parties in terms of that treaty. Indeed, according to one assessment, at the Belgrade Conference, one-sixth of the participants, and at the Cairo and Lusaka Conferences, one-third of the participants, have had some sort of military links with a Great Power. When this is viewed in the light of close economic links that many non-aligned nations have with some Great Power or the other and the dependence of almost all of them on supply of military stores by one or the other of the Great Powers, it is clear that the distinction between those aligned formally and openly and those remaining non-aligned gets considerably blurred.

Since there was no official definition of non-alignment and the criteria for invitations remained vague and ambiguous, one would have expected that, at least in practice, the successive non-aligned Summit conferences would have been doubly careful in scrutinizing the eligibility of membership.4 But this has not happened, and at every major non-aligned conference, there have been squabbles about the continuance of some old, or the admission of some new, members.5 The conferences—in particular the leading members—have succumbed to various kinds of pressures and taken ad hoc decisions without realizing the long-term significance of the criteria regarding individual membership. One of these, obviously, is the exhilaration about expanding membership—the tacit eagerness to welcome all and sundry for the sake of increasing the membership—a desire to demonstrate to the domestic and extra-domestic critics the continuing validity and popularity of the policy of non-alignment, without realizing the long-term counterproductiveness of such indiscriminate expansion. For, it is these indiscriminate admissions that have presently brought about considerable ridicule to the non-aligned movement. The pressure for Romania being admitted as a "guest" to the Colombo Summit (1976) and efforts of some Arab States and Yugoslavia to invite Pakistan even before it withdrew (in 1979) from the

nal led ses the

JAN

at iet ive he ce

ns ca an an e's ial

nd ill ng ts, ts,

edve m is se

10 ιt, ld

re n g C g ıt

e y e d

1

S

e

CENTO, are some examples of such hasty action. That some eligible states were not invited and that some of those invited to the Summit conferences have declined the invitation, is yet another piece of evidence of the lack of discrimination and care in sending out invitations.

A second possible pressure is the ideological sympathy of the existing members of the movement towards an applicant or invitee. Apparently, some existing members who feel sympathetic or friendly towards some potential applicants for membership think that they are doing a service to the movement by pressing for the membership of a friendly aligned country which desires to unhitch itself from a bloc (e.g., the Yugoslav interest in wanting to bring in Romania into the non-aligned group). Such a desire is treated by the existing members as not only a compliment to the movement of non-alignment but also as a source of discomfiture to the group with which the potential applicant is aligned. Perhaps, there is also the hope (at least. wishful thinking) that this is one way of breaking a bloc gradually. These feelings on the part of the potential applicant and the persuading member might well be sincere; on the other hand, there is also no way of ascertaining whether or not the potential member is only a Trojan Horse of the bloc to which it belongs. These suspicions are not hypothetical. From time to time, some member or the other, overtly sympathetic to some one bloc, takes positions in international (including non-aligned) forums which appear to be a kind of special pleading for that Super Power and the bloc it heads. The controversy since the July 1978 Non-aligned (Belgrade) Conference of Foreign Ministers which exploded at the recent Havana Summit about the Soviet Union/Socialist countries being "natural allies" of the non-aligned movement is a good illustration.6 But, in the past, there have been similar controversies arising out of the blind defence of a policy/action of the United States (e.g., in Vietnam War) by some of the members of the non-aligned

An aspect of non-alignment that does often confuse its critics and warps their judgement is that it straddles ideological groups—the Socialist and the "free world". A Communist state (Yugoslavia) is a founder-member of the movement. Since then, three other admittedly Communist states-Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam—have joined it. There are also some other member states which have ostentatiously close and friendly relations with the Socialist bloc of nations. But equally, many other members have close economic and/or military relations with the Western bloc of countries (e.g., India, Egypt and Sri Lanka), and some of them even proclaim openly their adherence to the "free market" (or capitalistic or mixed) economy. Such countries, however, also maintain close relations with the opposite ideological group. But in neither case are these states aligned politically and/or militarily with either of the Cold War blocs. And since the friendship with both blocs remains a continuing factor in their respective foreign relations, one cannot altogether prevent them from being influenced by this consideration in their stand on the new applicants for membership. Only, they should not, (and

C

W

ge

n

01

h

W

0

(e

re

C

m

ai

C

SI

n

n

b

often do not), let such considerations prevail over the decisively more important factor of their independence from alignment, politically and military with either of the Cold War blocs.

Possibly, one other source of pressure is the sentiment of Asian-African-Latin American solidarity, or the empathy for Third World countries. Pan-Islamic feelings could also be a similar source. When such sentiments govern the policy or attitude of a member-state—in other words. when concern for the integrity of the policy of non-alignment is not the sole and decisive determinant—quite naturally, the quality of membership gets devalued. Thus, many African and some Asian members have got into the movement for no better reason than the fact that they are Asian and African states. Apparently, every African state was considered eligible for membership of the non-aligned group, since as members of the OAU and ipso facto, they all subscribed to the policy of non-alignment. But, how many of them are in fact sincerely committed to non-alignment? For instance, all African states were invited to the Second (Cairo, 1964) Summit, although not everyone of them claimed to be non-aligned. As a recent writer has put it, "Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arab nationalism, and to an extent the weak Pan-Asian sentiment, have been merged into non-alignment."8 While these sentiments are in themselves perfectly natural, it is certainly questionable whether these alone, or decisively, should have pursuaded those that are genuinely non-aligned to have admitted such countries into the movement, without ascertaining either their desire for membership or the viability of their independence.

So far as Third World solidarity is concerned, the question arises in respect of many of the Third World countries as to whether and to what extent, they are genuinely independent. For, if the essence of non-alignment is the ability to exercise a reasonable degree of independence of policy and action in world affairs, the state concerned must have adequate indigenous economic and military resources, and technology (if not also sufficiently large territory and population) for sustaining them in its external relations. By any reasonable criteria, many of the Third World states which are formally independent are not at all economically or security-wise viable except on borrowed strength—usually from one or more developed states, including either of the two Super Powers. One is not even certain (and there is no way of ascertaining in many cases) as to which of them has indeed the will to be independent and to resist pressures against it. How then could such states be genuinely independent and thereby qualify to be genuinely non-aligned? Therefore, if such states are treated as eligible for membership of the non-aligned group ipso facto because of their being developing Third World states, would it not devalue (has it not devalued) non-alignment? However, such a question has not been asked of such states and the pressure for solidarity with Third World/developing states does not apparently encourage anybody to ask such a question either. This is so despite the fact that the quality of non-alignment, and the membership of the non-aligned

ore and

JAN

ianorld uch rds,

the ship nto and

for and low ice,

igh put eak

nile onhat ve-

ity in at

ent nd us tly ns.

re ole es, nd ed

ıld ely ip rd

t? re 14

ct

ed

conferences, is widely known to have suffered because many of the Third World countries do not possess the requisite economic and military bases for genuine independence, and thus cannot effectively exercise the will to be non-aligned. It has, in turn, only invited cynicism and ridicule from critics outside the group.

Of course, all these states are members of the United Nations (which is based on "sovereign equality") and membership of the Organization has now become (or is treated as) a badge of sovereignty. But, it is also a well-known fact that many members do not satisfy the rigorous application of the criteria of membership laid down in Article 4 of the UN Charter (especially the criterion of ability to carry out the obligations under the Charter). At best, they only meet the formally legal and constitutional requirements of states—not the substance of independence and equality. Since the 1960s, the principle of universality seems to be the more decisive consideration in the admission of the new members, rather than the fulfilment of the criteria expressly provided in the UN Charter. The non-aligned movement appears to be influenced by the same consideration.

Non-alignment is a policy and posture of universal relevance, validity and applicability. There is, therefore, little justification for making states members of the movement on any ideological, geographical or economic considerations and preferences. Perhaps, it is because of the prevalence of such preferences in the past that many potential applicants from among non-bloc states in Latin America, the Caribbean area and Europe have not, so far, shown much enthusiasm for joining the movement.9 On the other hand, it seems that these preferences have necessarily prevailed because of the absence of a definition of non-alignment.

And now, the first alarm signal of the coming danger has been sounded by Burma, a founder-member of the non-aligned movement. Its Foreign Minister announced at the 34th UN General Assembly session meeting on 29th September 1979 that Burma had withdrawn from the movement because the last Havana Summit (which he had personally attended) had ignored the Burmese proposal that the movement dissolve itself and set up a committee to define anew the movement's principles (in accordance with the original principles evolved at Belgrade) and the qualifications for membership. Apparently, he had made the proposal in the context of the Cuban stand that the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries were "natural allies" of the non-aligned movement which (partly because Cuba was the host country and would ipso facto remain the spokesman of the movement until the next Summit Conference) had raised some apprehensions among many members that the movement might be going off the straight path of non-alignment.

Leo Mates, the distinguished Yugoslav diplomat/author has made a virtue of the absence of a single, authorised, definition of non-alignment. Says he:

It is not unreasonable to say that there are as many definitions of

N

in

za m

in

re

CC

ga

T

01

th

CO B

to

th

of

th

m

fc

aj

le

e

m

st

n

C

(2

(8

non-alignment as there are non-aligned countries and possibly even more....

He adds: (somewhat self-contradictorily):

In a certain sense, it can be said that the policy of non-alignment has permanently been undergoing definition, re-examination and criticism, while resisting arbitrary assessments.... All this is understandable, since the movement of the non-aligned countries is something new in international relations, not only because of a common platform, but also because of the form of co-operation among a large number of generally dissimilar countries.

The traditional criterion of a common stand on a concrete platform or situation on the basis of a community of political interest, he believes, is not applicable to non-alignment.<sup>10</sup>

The easiest way of rebutting this explanation is to point out that the membership of the United Nations is far more diverse than the non-aligned movement—and yet the Preamble and Purposes (Art. 1) were considered essential to be incorporated in the Charter. Secondly, precisely because non-alignment is a new foreign policy choice, and a fortiori, a definition of the policy, was/is called for; in its absence, the new policy is likely to be (and, in fact, has been) misunderstood and misinterpreted in terms of the traditional choices, as is the case, for instance, in respect of non-alignment vis-a-vis neutrality or isolationism. And surely, the movement of non-alignment (as the one of alignment) is based on "a community of political interest;" only, the traditional choices are based on the promotion of narrow, and its allies only, while non-alignment goes above or beyond these considerations to promote the widest and the most general interests of the

Another Yugoslav writer has made a seemingly persuasive case (in order to accommodate the new category of "invited members" created at the Colombo (1976) Summit for the "evolution of the criteria of non-alignment since they were first formulated in June 1961. He suggests that the criteria of membership is precise and at the same time permits flexibility of application (thereby "precluding the danger of exclusivity"), that the movement should make a distinction between subjective factors which indicate that a objectively it is still bound to particular bloc structures" (which it cannot for the time being and alone of its own free will, get away from) and encourage an exclusive grouping. He believes that such an evolution of the criteria would help to make non-alignment "more outward looking, more democratic and, thereby, more effective too..."

even

AJAN

has ism. able,

new orm, er of

or 1 s, is

the ned ered ause tion to

the nent onical

OW, wer rese the

der the ent ria

caent t a le,

or ge ng

ria 0-

This is apparently a case of special pleading on behalf of the particular instance of Romania which does not justify ex post facto and wider rationalization. It simply ignores the widespread criticism within and without the movement about the ambiguousness of the original criteria, their devaluation in the course of practical application, as also the persistent demand for redefining them.

In the writer's view, the absence of a clear, official, definition of what constitutes non-alignment is a major, and continuing, source of the wide gap between the theory of the policy and the practice of the movement. This definition should have been laid down early in the movement and could have been revised, if necessary, as and when the conditions and facts of international life changed (as when the Cold War became less cold and there was detente between the Cold War blocs). It is true that the geo-political conditions of even the early members of the movement (say, at the 1961 Belgrade Summit) and, therefore, their respective national interests, varied too widely to permit any precise definition of the policy, but one tends to think that even a broad statement of the essential and distinguishing feature of non-alignment would have served as a touchstone of the do's and don'ts of the existing members and those who aspired for membership of the movement. By avoiding persistently a collective effort at definition, presumably for fear of dividing the existing membership and discouraging potential applicants for membership, the movement has created for itself more problems than would have been the case otherwise. Partly for this reason, some existing members are perennially at loggerheads with each other in the movement. Both for this reason and other self-serving purposes, the aligned states too (and critics among them) are continually attacking the non-aligned movement. And we are, in fact, witnessing a situation where non-alignment can mean all things to all men, and its very integrity and innovativeness (as a new and different foreign policy choice) are under constant challenge. More seriously, there is the evident danger of some of the existing members (admitted earlier indiscriminately) now seeking to determine a definition of non-alignment—an instance of the tail wagging the dog! Perhaps, this is part of the significance of the move to proclaim the Soviet Union/Socialist States as the "natural allies" of the non-aligned movement.

Of course, the mere existence of an authorized definition of "nonalignment" ipso facto would not have prevented the widening gap between the proclaimed definition and actual practice. As noted in the introductory remarks, there would necessarily be a gap between the practice of an organization zation or movement and its objectives, but then, there would be a set of norms with which the practice can be intermittently compared and the unhealthy departures challenged on the basis of the norms. If there are no norms—in this case, if there is no definition, or if the qualifications of eligibility are ambiguous or imprecise—how can one firmly challenge an

unhealthy departure from the norms/definition?

N

fic

SI

C

p

C

of

m

aı

sh

T

of

re

h

tc

CC

gr

rig

de

th

de

CC

al

sh

SC

is

re

CC

ar

If

W

to

p th

a

tŀ ir

ri

C

p

# INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NON-ALIGNMENT?

India, which pioneered the policy of non-alignment, and Indian official spokesmen (specially Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru himself) were never tired of emphasizing and clarifying in the Cold War years that non-alignment did not represent a "third force" or seek to create a third camp (or bloc) of nations, as alleged by some Western critics of India's policy. Nehru once described the idea of a "third force" or "third Power" in a military sense as "absurd".12 This was also the stand of many other non-aligned states in the early 1960s.13 It was largely for this reason that India was initially unenthusiastic about the idea of holding the first Belgrade Conference,14 for. it feared that the Conference might initiate institutionalization of the policy of non-alignment which would be contrary to its very logic. The essence of non-alignment being opposition to the existence of the two Cold War blocs and bloc politics in international relations, any institutionalization of the policy could mean, or could result in, organizing a third camp or bloc; at least, it might have that consequence. Obviously, if the existence of two Cold War blocs was harmful to the community of nations (as non-aligned countries believe), the organizing, in effect, of a third bloc of nations would be both illogical and harmful to the conduct of international relations. Formation of a Third bloc (as in the case of the existing Cold War blocs) would also result in the hegemony of some one member over others. Not only would this inevitably infringe the independence of the other members of the bloc, but it would also be contrary to the very basis of non-alignment.

Nevertheless, starting with the Belgrade Conference, the policy of nonalignment seems to have gradually, almost imperceptibly, got institutionalized, so that, today members of the non-aligned movement, in effect, appear to function in the United Nations and outside as though they constitute a Third Camp or bloc of nations. 15 Members of the movement now meet periodically in Summit Conferences—six of these having been held so far, the last at Havana in September 1979, with the seventh one scheduled to be held in Baghdad in 1982. There are then the periodical conferences of Foreign Ministers, of Permanent Representatives at the United Nations and other Conferences at the official level. The Chairman of the Summit-level conference (the President, Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister) of the host country remains the official spokesman of the movement until the next conference. Either of them specially go to the UN General Assembly meeting of the year of the Conference to report to it the decisions of the previous Summit Conference. Since the third (Lusaka) Conference, a permanent executive committee—initially called the "Standing Committee" and now the "Co-ordinating Bureau for the Movement"—has come into existence. The Bureau, now expanded from 25 to 36 members elected by the Summit Conferences seeks to maintain continuity between Conferences, to oversee the implementation of the decisions and programmes of the Conferences, to prepare for the next Summit Conference and, in general,

ficial ever nent

JAN

of once se as in unfor,

olicy ence War tion loc;

two ned ould ons.

Not pers ent. onnal-

ear e a eet ar,

led ces ns vel he

he a e"

to he es, he

act as a co-ordinating mechanism of all members. What is even more significant, the Bureau has been authorized "to consider international problems, special crises situation, or a matter of immediate concern to the non-aligned countries. It may recommend appropriate action as necessary...."18 The periodical meetings of the Bureau are aided by the government of the hostcountry of the last Summit Conference and, in effect, serves as a secretariat of the movement to oversee/co-ordinate routine collaboration among the member states of the movement. More than the periodical conferences, it is this Co-ordinating Bureau which has institutionalized non-alignment to an extraordinary degree.17 There are then, different categories of membership—(full) Members, Observers, Guests—each with different privileges. Thus, the non-aligned conferences are in the process of acquiring the features of an international organization and the members in effect try to function regularly as an ad hoc group within the United Nations and outside—without however, formally entering into any treaty or agreement committing them to any legal obligation.

All this means that, in effect after 1961, the non-aligned nations have been, contrary to the policy, organizing themselves into a sort of identifiable group—if not a bloc like the Cold War blocs with all their characteristic rigidity—although the theory of non-alignment ipso facto precluded any such development. Thus, the fears of Indian spokesman have come true, despite their opposition to institutionalization of the policy of non-alignment and despite their own membership of the group. The idea that some Arab states could (and did) propose the expulsion/suspension of Egypt from the non-aligned group, is evidently rooted in the assumption that the group is, or should be, a closed and rigidly-operating bloc in which there is not much scope for freedom of policy and action for individual members even on issues other than the East-West issues. While it is now too late to deplore or restrain this development, one can at least underline its possible harmful consequences.

To the extent the movement of non-alignment is acquiring the features of an identifiable group functioning as such in international relations, it is not—and cannot be—very different or better than the erstwhile Cold War blocs. If the existence of the blocs (and the bloc politics) in the Cold War years was (as the non-aligned nations were then wont to say) immensely harmful to the community of nations, how can it be otherwise today, even in the present context of detente which is different from the Cold War only in that there is "controlled confrontation with varying degrees of tension, frequency and violence," as Leo Mates has forthrightly put it. 19 The fact that unlike the Cold War blocs, the non-aligned movement does not pose a threat to international peace is not enough to justify the latter emerging as yet another command the military might or the crusading fervour of the Cold War blocs, secondly, they are organizing themselves into a separate group only in a period of detente between the Cold War blocs. As such, they do not pose a

u

0

n

e

d

g

ai

aı

0

n

u

W

as

de

m

in

q

sa

ef

m

ar ha

p

e)

Ir

Ir

0

m

C

0

a

ir

C

b

SI

e

ri

a

d

military or ideological threat to the aligned nations, as the Cold War blocs did to the non-aligned in the 1950s. But the very organization of a separate group based on the particular interest of that group seems to be an unhealthy development. One can understand the logic of regional groupings based primarily on geographical contiguity (e.g., OAS, OAU, ASEAN) or functional groups (e.g., OPEC, and the many international groups dealing with various metals and food articles like tea, coffee, cashew, cardamom) meant to promote a common group interest. But a world-wide grouping of nations based on a common ideology of a kind claiming universal validity (like communism and "free world") does not seem conducive to healthy international relations. A grouping of nations of this kind would necessarily provoke suspicions (if not antagonism) of states which are outside the group and would thus subvert friendly relations among the nations of the world. The theory of non-alignment, which is ostensibly based on friendly feelings towards all nations including the aligned, tends to be negated in practice by the organization of a group of nations into a bloc.

It seems that the non-aligned states are imperceptibly sliding into a dilemma of sorts: if they continue to seek greater effectiveness of co-operation between and among themselves, they would have to resort to increasing institutionalization of the movement; if, on the other hand, they let the present trends of gradual institutionalized co-operation continue, they might end up in creating a third bloc of non-alignment. It is time the movement takes stock of the situation before actually being impaled on the two horns of the dilemma.

## THE QUESTION OF UNITY/SOLIDARITY

The incipient institutionalization of non-alignment naturally raises the question of unity in the movement which intermittently creates a controversy around the movement. Should there be unity? Unity on what? At what price? What are the sanctions for enforcing unity? These are some questions that need answers.

The essence of non-alignment being the exercise of independent judgement in foreign policy and international relations, it is, and ought to be alone, the basis of unity in the non-aligned movement. However, during the last made numerous pronouncements on every conceivable aspect of international affairs. The stand of the individual countries are determined, alignment. The collective stand of the non-aligned countries on concrete also be determined only by the fact of their being non-aligned—because denominator among all of them. However, having come together at periodical conferences, the non-aligned countries discuss and proclaim

olocs

AJAN

arate althy ased onal

ious t to ions

(like nterarily oup

orld. ings e by

to a tion sing the

they ovetwo

the ersy hat ons

ent ne, last vely ter-

ied, onete uld

use 1011 at

aim

their views on all major international problems and situations, not all of which are concerned with East-West relations. The cumulative, albeit unintended, result of these pronouncements (which in turn are the result of compromises among differing approaches and stands) is that in the minds of many members at least, the distinction between the stance determined only by non-alignment on East-West relations and that on other issues determined by compromises on differing (if not conflicting) national interests, gets blurred—although the resulting positions are very general and vague and do not satisfy every member—with those who are more concerned and affected being the least satisfied of all. Now, the continuing retention of this sharp distinction is very important for the integrity of the policy of non-alignment and the unity of the movement itself; as, otherwise, the unity of the movement based on collective stand on issues other than East-West problems/situation is likely to be-and has been, in fact-misconstrued as unity rooted in non-alignment on East-West issues. This is, the present writer believes, what happened when recently some Arab states thoughtlessly demanded the suspension/expulsion of Egypt from the non-aligned movement, because the latter signed a separate peace treaty with Israel, contrary in spirit to the collective stand of the non-aligned states on the Arab-Israeli question. Fortunately, the majority of the member states of the movement saw the clear distinction between the two different bases of unity and, in effect, scotched the proposal of the Arab states against continued Egyptian membership and, thus, protected the integrity of the policy of non-alignment and the unity of the movement based on it. But it seems unlikely that one has heard the last of such divisive moves in the movement and therefore potentiality of such divisions remain so.

After all, in the past also there have been somewhat similar divisions, although they did not lead to any serious move to enforce unity. A good example of this is the fact that many non-aligned states either did not support India or were neutral in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, when India, a leading member of the movement, felt aggrieved by the aggression of an aligned state.20 What is more, six of the non-aligned countries which met in a conference at Colombo in December 1962 in an effort to end the conflict, made proposals that neither pronounced a judgement on the merits of the border dispute, nor deferred to the Indian stand (although India did accept the proposals). The point is that these six non-aligned states were, in effect, "non-aligned" in the dispute/conflict between a leading non-aligned country and a leading aligned country. While India was deeply distressed by this, it could not do—and did not do—anything about it and simply swallowed the disappointment. The other non-aligned countries which, in effect, mediated between India and China, cannot be blamed for this—for, rightly, the border conflict had little to do with the policy of non-alignment as such. Both India and the other non-aligned countries thereby acted with discretion and circumspection in not bringing into the situation the issue of non-alignment or the membership of the non-aligned movement.

NO

be

ali

let

By

app

nai

to 1

alig

of f

for

mo

alli

con

(viz

We

to \

app

We

stat

cou

allia

Wa

late

alig

state

Col

men

cata

kno Cert

colo Poli

latte

that

grou

parti

some issue

, Poli

of s

F

It is only by such judiciousness that the integrity of the policy of non-alignment and the unity of the movement could be safeguarded. For, non-alignment does not—ought not to—mean co-ordination of the foreign policies of the non-aligned—that would be the very negation of the basis of the policy. V.K. Krishna Menon once said aptly: "I say that a non-aligned nation must be non-aligned with the non-aligned ... otherwise, where is independence?" The unity of the non-aligned movement should be—and can only be—based on non-alignment on East-West issues, and not other issues which the non-aligned countries individually or collectively are concerned about for reasons of their respective national or group interest. If any unity is insisted upon on the latter issues, it would only destroy the integrity of the policy of non-alignment and thereby eventually the unity of the movement itself.

Once the members of the non-aligned movement are clearly and firmly agreed on non-alignment—and non-alignment alone—being the foundation of the unity of their movement, there can be no objection to their cooperation on other matters of common interest, such as promotion of self-determination of colonial peoples, racial equality, economic development, non-aligned newspool, strengthening the United Nations-in all of which they are already engaged-provided, however, the structure of co-operation built on these other matters is not mistaken for the foundation itself. Indeed, co-operation in some of these matters could reinforce the foundation of non-alignment to a considerable degree. This is particularly true of economic co-operation between and among the non-aligned countries. After all, mere political independence, without economic independence, cannot sustain their stance of non-alignment. Ever since the "Lusaka Declaration" (1970) on economic co-operation between and among the non-aligned countries, successive non-aligned conferences have emphasized the importance of the subject, but very little progress seems to have been made in this direction. This is a pity, because such intra-group co-operation could help reinforce their policy of non-alignment and, in turn, the movement of non-alignment. The policy guidelines laid down by the recently-held Havana Summit to reinforce collective self-reliance among the non-aligned and developing countries are promising and constructive, especially in the context of the discussion on co-operation between the OPEC and non-OPEC group of countries. But, in view of past experience, one is not quite certain how soon or how effectively these guidelines would be followed by members of the movement.

One can make a similar point in respect of the objective of the non-aligned movement to strengthen the United Nations. This item (with slight variations) has been on the agenda of successive non-aligned Summit conferences where effusive and vociferous support has been expressed for aligned caucus group meets periodically at the United Nations for discussion of matters of common concern and interest. All this is very important,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

RAJAN

non-For, reign basis igned ere is -and other are

erest. the the unity rmly ation

CO-

1 of elopall e of tion the arly ries.

nce, aka the zed een ion

veeld ned the PEC ain

ed ght nit for n-

ers

on nt,

because there is, or should be, an integral relationship between the nonaligned movement and the United Nations, for, the Organization is (by the letter of the UN Charter at least) a forum par excellence for the non-aligned. By its very name, by its Purposes, and now by its universality, it is the most appropriate forum for achieving the fundamental objective of non-alignment, namely, to abolish blocs and bloc politics. And yet, can one say that support to the Organization by the non-aligned states is any better than that of the aligned, or that this support has attained a primacy in the considerations of foreign policy and relations of the former?

A recent empirical study of the role of non-aligned states, while groping for a theory of non-alignment, has arrived at the absurd conclusion that the movement of non-aligned states is a "new form of alliance"—non-military alliance of states committed to anti-colonialism.<sup>22</sup> The author arrives at this conclusion after rejecting, what he calls, "the Neo-Marxist approach" (viz., that most of the non-aligned Third World states being bound to the West by a complex network of economic [and political?] links are subject to Western political control) and the traditional international relations theory approach (viz., that each of these states has a degree of alignment with the West depending upon the government's perception of what best served that state's interests). "Despite the origin of the word," he says, "the non-aligned could not be described either as a group of states that had refused to join alliances or as a group that was distinguished by non-involvement in Cold War disputes. All that remained was a refusal to take membership of multilateral, Cold War, military alliances. In other respects, some of the nonaligned were fully committed to the East and some to the West."23

The central issue that initially brought about the division of the community of states into the aligned and non-aligned was the bipolarization of many states between the United States and the Soviet Union and the state of Cold War prevailing between them. This is not to say either that non-alignment was solely due to the bipolarization and the Cold War, or that it would not have come about but for them. The Cold War was, at best, a catalyst in the post-war situation which would have, inevitably, lead to non-alignment.24 It has now been replaced by a controlled confrontation, known as detente, which still keeps the two groups of nations divided. Certainly, non-alignment did not originate in, or is not based on, anticolonialism, as the critic avers.25 On the contrary, non-alignment, as a policy of governments, predates anti-colonialism, and, in any case, the latter has latter has never been the characteristically distinguishing feature of the policy of governments which claim to be non-aligned. It is, in fact, a stand that the policy of governments which claim to be non-aligned. It is, in fact, a stand that the non-aligned shared with many aligned nations of both Cold War groups. Excepting that the Cold War today is less cold and there exists a partial data. partial detente between the two blocs (with certain consequential changes, e.g., non-rigidity of inter-bloc and intra-bloc relations, the dismantling of some foreign and central consequents. some foreign military bases, alliances and pacts like seato and cento), the issues dividing the dividing the seaton and cento). issues dividing the aligned from the non-aligned have not ceased to be relevant

(at least they are not irrelevant) in current international relations. As long as this continues to be the case, there is no need to search for a new theory of non-alignment. It is only because the critic has made a contrived effort to search for a "new theory" that he has come up with an absurd one—namely, that it is an alliance of anti-colonial states (why not also anti-racist?) The fact of the matter is, opposition to colonialism is no longer relevant to alignment or non-alignment, since many states in the aligned, and all states in the non-aligned, groups are opposed to it. Like the other related issue. namely, support to racial equality, this is not a divisive issue between the two groups. The simple reason for this is that these are (as stated earlier) perepheral, not integral, to the policy of non-alignment. Many divisive issues (not only the residual Cold War) still keep the groups apart, although detente has made the inter-group relations much less hostile (and intra-group differences much more tolerated) than they were during the Cold War years.26 Of course, partly because of the changes in the relations between the Cold War and East-West groupings, the attitude of the non-aligned group towards (and role with respect to) the two blocs has also changed in some respects.27 For, non-alignment is a dynamic policy and retains its continuing relevance in world affairs by adapting itself to the changing international context and the needs of the non-aligned community of nations. However, the question of unity of non-aligned nations founded on, and limited to, East-West issues between the Cold War blocs remains as valid today as during the Cold War years. The different degrees of closeness to the bloc countries in the era of detente are determined by the nature and extent of relations on other issues-such as common approaches towards colonialism, racialism, economic assistance for the development of the Third World states, support to the United Nations, supply of military stores. But none of these affect the basic relationship of non-alignment with either or both the Super Powers.

The changes in the functioning of the international community that have come about as a result of detente (or, are believed to come under the rubric of detente) do not, in the writer's view, make any difference to the basis of unity of the non-aligned movement. For, the brand of detente that of, and have been urging for the last three decades. It has certainly brought Powers (mainly towards each other) that still head the old Cold War blocs; and these are largely limited to them. They have not conferred on the international community in general whatever little benefits they have on inter-bloc the process of detente is presently in a serious state of stagnation—being limited to bloc interests. "It is precisely here that the great possibilities and responsibilities of the policy of non-alignment lie." 28

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

pe sys all blo oft na po int

on

vei

NO

alig traceve wan not

the

mo

vio from I divi wer evio

wer a po

amo mil nov Mir pea

nor

non sett pres

tow

RAJAN

long heory ort to mely, ) The ent to

states issue. n the rlier) issues lough

group War ween igned nged ns its nging y of

d on, is as eness and ards

the ores. ither

that the the that

ived ight iper ocs;

termit,

oloc

ing and

## DISPUTES AMONG NON-ALIGNED NATIONS

The theory of non-alignment calls for abstention from power politics, for peaceful co-existence of nations of differing ideologies, political and social systems, and for active international co-operation between and among all nations. It is by definition opposed to everything that the Cold War and bloc politics stood for, which necessarily provoked international tensions, often ending up in international disputes and situations endangering international peace and security. Non-alignment is meant to replace power politics with "adjustment politics," to project an alternative model of international relations and behaviour to that of the traditional model based on power and the desire to increase it, which in the nuclear age threatens the very survival of mankind.

But having rejected the traditional power model by opting for nonalignment, many of the non-aligned states seem actually to practice the traditional power model in international relations—and what is appalling even with respect to fellow non-aligned states. There have been far too many wars and conflicts between and among the non-aligned nations which are not only contrary to the theory of non-alignment, but which have also corroded considerably faith in the non-aligned movement. What is more, these disputes and conflicts have also vindicated the view of the critics of the movement among aligned countries (especially in the West) that the behaviour of the non-aligned nations, even among themselves, is no departure from the traditional behaviour of states towards each other.

In the early years of the movement of non-alignment, the recurring divisions, conflicts and disputes between and among the non-aligned states were lightly dismissed (as the present writer himself did a decade ago)29 as evidence of the non-aligned states not forming a bloc, that these divisions were inherent in the policy of non-alignment itself, which stood for taking a position on the merits of a case and not toeing the line of any major Power

But one can no longer maintain this position, in view of the eruption of far too many cases of disputes and conflicts between and among the non-aligned nations in recent years. There have even been armed conflicts among some non-aligned nations with the aid and even assistance of foreign military forces from a fellow non-aligned country (Cuba). The situation has now become so grave that the July 1978 (Belgrade) Conference of Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries have had to devise a procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes between and among the non-aligned countries—namely, the offer of good offices of informal ad hoc groups of non-aligned countries (when the parties to a dispute so request) for help in settling a dispute. (This, however, is no innovation on the procedures already prescribed in the UN Charter).

The point is that, in far too many cases, the attitude of non-aligned states towards each other has been no different from those of the aligned with

NO

C

ble

ye

lat

col

rel

rec

the

pro

eve

alig

the

me

sus

of t

and

goo

non

Sup

Sup

past

alle

Col

had

with

issue

nati

inte

of c

one

non.

from

of n

noti

Supe

man

Supe

"bi-;

the f

none Si

muc

them

B

respect to disputes and conflict situations; they seem to follow the traditional pattern of power politics and thereby negate a distinguishing characteristic of non-alignment as a new and more wholesome foreign policy choice.

The recent demand of many Arab states to remove/suspend Egypt from membership of the non-aligned movement raises some new issues concerning the relevance of disputes among members to the movement. It is bad enough that members of the movement should be divided among themselves from time to time as a result of bilateral disputes. That some of them should join hands against a fellow member-in this case, a foundation memberand demand its expulsion/suspension on the ground that it had acted contrary to the stand of the Summit conferences over the Arab-Israeli conflict, by signing unilaterally a separate peace treaty with Israel, is doubly wrong, For, the dispute between some of the Arab states and Egypt on the latter signing a separate peace treaty is extraneous to the non-aligned movement, in the sense that while the non-aligned conferences have taken a position on the solution of the conflict, that position (or disagreement with it) is not integral to the policy of non-alignment and, therefore, to the movement. Therefore, departure from questions in international relations, unrelated to the relations between the Cold War blocs or the two Super Powers, should not bring into question the non-alignment of any member or its membership of the movement. The mixing up of the essence of the policy of non-alignment with the attitude of member states (or the collective stand of the movement itself) on concrete problems/situation in international relations has been for many years a standing source of confusion, misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the nature and scope of the policy itself, as the present writer pointed out a decade ago.30 Unless members bear in mind this simple distinction between the policy of non-alignment and the stand of members on other questions/issues, they would not only be doing injustice to the integrity of the policy but also to the unity of the non-aligned movement itself. It was, therefore, very judicious of the Havana Summit to have, in effect, ignored the demand of the Arab states.

Apart from the disputes and conflicts between and among non-aligned countries being contrary to the theory of non-alignment, they also encourage the intervention of foreign Powers in the internal affairs of states—to which the non-aligned Summit have been consistently opposed. Thus, Marshal Tito warned the Havana Summit that conflict between non-aligned countries "would not only open the door to foreign interference" but "also impede our efforts to create new democratic international relations." The result of these continuing disputes and conflicts would be reinforcement of the traditional feudalistic hierarchy of the existing multi-state system.

## THE QUESTION OF EQUIDISTANCE

One of the continuing controversies in the movement of non-alignment is the permissible nature and extent of relations with either or both the

RAJAN

tional eristic loice. from rning ough from lould ber trary t, by rong. latter nent, n on s not

rship ment ment n for misesent mple

nent.

lated

ould

bers the nent e, in

gned rage hich shal tries pede

sult the

ient the

Cold War blocs and the Super Powers which head them—although these blocs no longer function with the rigidity characteristic of the Cold War years. Apart from prohibiting political/military alliances, bilateral or multilateral, with the Super Powers "concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts," the non-aligned nations are taken to be free to regulate their relations with them. Naturally, these relations are determined by the differing requirements of a state's national interests which are in turn, determined by the economic and military needs and security considerations, by geographical proximity or otherwise, the Cold War pressures of one of the blocs, and even historical relationships. But, the over-riding consideration of nonalignment does fix the limits of closeness in the relations with either of the Super Powers; in other words, short of military and/or political alignments, close and cordial relations are permissible—at least they are not suspect among the non-aligned countries themselves. The nature and extent of friendly relations and close co-operation between non-aligned countries and either of the Super Powers are inevitably left undefined, subject to the good sense and discriminating judgement of each non-aligned state.

But then, because of the compelling needs specified above, some of the non-aligned states have inevitably gravitated towards one or the other of the Super Powers. The notional "distance" between a non-aligned state and a Super Power naturally varies enormously from state to state. While, in the past, aligned states and critics from those states used to make persistent allegations about a non-aligned state being too close to one or the other Cold War blocs (e.g., that India and Egypt, the latter until March 1976, had compromised their non-alignment by virtue of their treaties of friendship with the Soviet Union), for many years and until recently, this was not an issue between and among non-aligned countries themselves. The non-aligned nations were not only deeply sceptical of such criticism coming from interested parties, but took a reasonable and tolerant attitude to the degree of closeness of the relations between fellow non-aligned countries and one or the other of the Cold War blocs. Some supporters and critics of non-alignment erroneously tried to extrapolate the notion of equidistance from the principle of classical neutrality into the altogether different policy of non-alignment and suggested that non-aligned states should follow a notionally middle path, convincingly equidistant, in their relations with the Super Powers and the Cold War blocs they lead. If a non-aligned nation managed to establish equally close and cordial relations between the two Super Powers—as India has often managed to do—it was characterized as "bi-alignment", and this was not always meant to be a compliment. Or, as the former Prime Minister of India, Morarji Desai, once remarked, non-alignment alignment stood for "alignment with all"—in other words alignment with

Since the advent of detente between the Cold War blocs, there has been uch less and orities from among much less criticism from the aligned countries (and critics from among them) of the discountries advent of detente between the Coid war of the mon-aligned them) of the degree of close relations maintained by some of the non-aligned

nations with the opposite bloc; both of them having come out publicly with statements pledging respect for non-alignment, they are quite tolerant (if not indifferent) to these tendencies of the non-aligned countries.

Unfortunately, however, the role of some of the non-aligned countries, in particular that of Cuba in African affairs, has revived this controversy—not just among the Western nations and critics, but also among the non-aligned states themselves. Cuba's propagation of the view that the Soviet Union/Socialist states are the "natural allies" of the non-aligned movement has accentuated the controversy regarding the nature and degree of equidistance that a country which claims to be non-aligned should maintain with one of the Cold War leaders. The recently-held Havana Summit ignored this plea of the host country, possibly because for every Castro, there are in the movement many Titos and Nyereres who are opposed to such radical propositions. In a forthright speech at the Havana Conference, indirectly opposing the Cuban stand, President Julius Nyerere is reported to have said: "I am not quite sure that this movement has no permanent enemies and permanent friends, let alone natural ones, but I am sure it has permanent interests."

There is, however, a feeling among some critics (especially the news media) that substantially the Summit has veered to the Cuban stand by incorporating in the Havana Declaration an exaggerated and unbalanced criticism of the West. The columnist of a leading Indian daily, for example, boldly proclaimed the "End of Equidistance." Since Cuba will have, as Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau, a major hand in directing the movement of non-alignment until the next Summit in Baghdad in 1982, one needs to reserve one's judgement on the direction of the movement until then. But, it is reasonably certain that the Cuban stand will wither away in view of the powerful verbal bashing it received at the Havana Summit.

Apart from the Cuban role, one reason why the controversy received so much attention is probably the fact that since the Cold War years of the 1950s, the Soviet Union has attained some parity with the United States as a successfully challenged the earlier predominance of the latter in certain the extent this is true, one can dismiss Western anxieties and criticism as Soviet assistance and influence as balancing those of the United States which of the non-aligned movement. It is also not inconceivable that the potential of the countries which were determined to remain non-aligned to retain their and how long an even balance will be struck between the influence of the two Super Powers.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

ecc alig blo and rac rad this

to

alig

but

exp

NC

are

suf

the

exag who Sup of s ness goes

Sun

to th

it h

T

the a these particular supply bloc be c case, To c

of eq stand peop of sta bloc on w

align jibes motiv Th AJAN

with it (if

sy\_ nonoviet ment

equiwith ored

dical ectly

mies rma-

news 1 by nced

, as the

nent ther

d so the as a

tain To n as

hich nent itial ome

heir tent

the

tries,

re in have

iple, 982,

/ana

has

ome

The non-aligned countries cannot, however, avoid such intermittent,

There is no doubt, however, that because most of the non-aligned nations are former colonies of the Western nations, and many of them continue to suffer from the after-effects of neo-colonialism or economic domination of the Western nations, and the present inequitable international political and economic systems which favour them are largely their creation, the nonaligned nations tend to give the impression of being closer to the Eastern bloc of countries. Often, these countries also support the major national and international objectives of the non-aligned states—self-determination, racial equality, the proposed New International Economic Order, and the radical economic and social transformation of their societies. As long as this remains the situation, most non-aligned nations, and the movement of these nations, would tend (or appear) to be closer to the Eastern bloc than to that of West, without, however, compromising the principle of nonalignment. The question, therefore, is not whether this is a desirable tendency, but whether it can be otherwise, in view of recent historical memories and experiences and the present facts of international relations remaining as they are. Unsympathetic critics of the non-alignment movement will necessarily exaggerate the closeness of some of the members of the movement (based wholly on considerations other than Cold War politics) to one or the other Super Power. This is probably a relic of the erstwhile Cold War attitude of such critics. But, it seems fairly certain that to the extent that such closeness of individual members based on ideological or Cold War considerations goes too far in one direction or the other, the collective judgement of the Summit conferences can be depended upon to pull up the delinquent members to the straight and notionally equidistant path that they need to follow—as it happened at the Havana Summit with respect to Cuba.

There is one further issue which is often obfuscated by those who criticize the actions/policies of non-aligned countries. Because of their non-alignment, these states naturally take a position on the merits (as they see them) of a particular dispute or situation in international relations, resulting in their support for one bloc (or Power) or the other on one issue, and another bloc (Power) on a different one. In other words, on one issue, they tend to be closer to one and, on another, closer to the other. When such is the case, there can be no question of equidistance between the two blocs (Powers). To criticize either position (on the ground that it does not fit into the theory of equidistance) is untenable and a misrepresentation of what non-alignment stands for. Certainly, on some questions (e.g., self-determination for colonial peoples), the non-aligned nations (because most of them are former colonies of states within the Western bloc) are almost always closer to the Socialist bloc and away from (if not against) the Western bloc. But such a position on what is a non-Cold War issue, has no relevance to alignment or non-alignment. The journalistic alignment, and a fortiori to the theory of equidistance. The journalistic jibes about a certain position being pro-East or anti-West are plainly

motivated, criticism because they are active players in the game of world politics—not mere spectators or umpires, as they are erroneously thought to be, or, as the critics of non-alignment would like them to be. They actively participate in the solution of international problems and situations to promote not only their legitimate national interests but also those of the international community. If in doing so, they are more often on the side of one bloc and not the other, it is because of the nature and merits of the issues—for, some times, the merits are on one side, and at others, on the other side—and not because of their sympathy or antipathy to one or the other. If, for fear or displeasure of some bloc (Power) that it might not be able to remain equidistant, a non-aligned country declines to take a position, that would be acting contrary to the spirit of non-alignment, if not imperceptibly sliding into a policy of isolationism.

In a way, the theory of equidistance projects and promotes a bloc mentality—as though the world community should be concerned *only* with inter-bloc relations and problems, as though international affairs had to be looked at only through their narrow and coloured giasses. The fact of the matter is that non-aligned countries are primarily concerned with problems, issues and situations affecting the general welfare of the international community. In the process of tackling these, they have also to deal with interbloc relations or general international problems affected by these relations. The theory of equidistance seems to have been upheld some times merely in order to transfer bloc rivalries and bloc outlook into the vortex of general international relations. The fact, however, is that unlike the aligned states, the non-aligned as such cannot have any enemies; if they are not present friends, they can only be potential friends.

An old and rather jaundiced view of the relations between the non-aligned and the aligned-indeed, a Cold War relic which still prevails in the era of detente—is that the non-aligned merely seek to play one bloc (or Power) against another and exploit to their selfish advantage the differences between the Cold War blocs (and Powers). These critics find the evidence for this view in the familiar phenomena of non-aligned countries often going along the stand of one bloc (or Power) or the other on specific international issues, resulting in the non-aligned intermittently voting in international forums with one bloc (or Power) or the other, without any consistency (as seen by the critics). The truth of the matter, however, is precisely the opposite. The consistency in the voting pattern of the aligned, irrespective of the merits of a case, was (and sometimes still is) the base of the international politics of the Cold War era, when solidarity with the bloc to which one belonged was a decisively more important consideration than the merits of the case. Seen thus, the so-called "inconsistency" of the non-aligned is, in fact, not only virtuous in itself (because it is quite consistent with the self-chosen policy of non-alignment) but also conducive to healthy international relations. One consequence of this "inconsistency" is that no non-aligned country can ever be exactly equidistant between the two Cold War blocs

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

oce fai po alig

be

alig

NO

(0

se

for nati wor non simp stre or e supp dend Suez men

is the nation

of a

com

of Y

1 See

p. 4 3 For P. 1 4 For

> app of Jun

NON-ALIGNMENT: THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

World ght to ctively

RAJAN

or the ot be sition, mper-

bloc with to be of the lems, ional intertions. ely in neral tates,

gned ra of wer) ween this long sues, rums n by The

esent

litics case. not

osen onal gned

ns to of the e side of the n the

erits nged

plocs

(or Powers) except on strictly Cold War issues; it cannot always follow the seemingly virtuous middle path. Of course, some non-aligned countries could unscrupulously play up the two blocs (Powers), one against the other, and extract some advantage or benefit for oneself; this possibility is inherent in the situation. But this has not happened generally; when it has happened occasionally, it is, or could be recognized as such and condemned. It is not fair to blame the policy of non-alignment as such for these stray, albeit potential, occurrences. If, as the theory of non-alignment holds, nonalignment is a departure from the traditional play of international politics of power, the occasional, individual, strayings of the non-aligned states into the game of power politics should be treated as aberrations, and not be held out against the integrity and wholesomeness of the policy of nonalignment itself.

Sometimes, a non-aligned state is facetiously or sincerely complimented for its alleged ability to derive an advantage in furtherance of its legitimate national interest by playing up one bloc (Power) against another-in other words, for its strength or influence to make a bloc (Power) to do as it (the non-aligned state) desired. This is a plainly undeserved compliment for the simple reason that none of the non-aligned states has the economic/military strength (or influence in international relations) to make either of the military or economic giants to do as it desires or pleases. If either of the blocs (Powers) supported, or gave assistance to, a non-aligned country, it is sheer coincidence of their mutual interests on the specific issue or occasion (e.g., the Suez conflict of 1956-57, colonial and racial questions, economic development of the developing countries). Mere assistance or support to the cause of a non-aligned country by an aligned state does not necessarily, or always, compromise the non-alignment of a state. As the demonstrative examples of Yugoslavia, India and Egypt have shown convincingly, what is crucial is the will to maintain one's independence of policy and action in international affairs, despite such assistance, and not the mere receipt of aid/ assistance from either or both the camps of the Cold War.

#### NOTES

3 For text of the criteria, see Arab Observer (Cairo), 18 June, 1961, p. 8, or Rajan, n. 1, p. 10.

<sup>1</sup> See M.S. Rajan, Non-Alignment, India and the Future (Mysore, India, 1970).
2 See Dogument, Non-Alignment, India and the Future (Mysore, India, 1978). 2 See Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-1978 (Belgrade, 1978), p. 45.

<sup>4</sup> For a contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of application in the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and flexible of the contrary view which maintains that the criteria are both precise and the contrary view which maintains the contrary view which we can be contrary view where view which we can be contrary view which we can be application in the changing international context, see Ranko Petkovic, "Evolution of the Criteria as Name of the Criteria as N of the Criteria of Non-alignment," Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), 20th June, 1977, pp. 11-12 and 37-40.

NO

19

20

21 (

22 5

23 ]

24 1

> r h

> I

t

27 C

28 F

29 S

30 S

31 7

32 T

5 For an account of the squabbles on invitations to the first (Belgrade, 1961) and second (Cairo, 1964) conferences, see G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-alignment (London,

1966), pp. 287-9, 375-7.

6 This phrase in the preliminary draft declaration, circulated much in advance by Cuba to the members of the movement, was replaced in the revised draft actually submitted to the Havana Summit by the phrase "other peace and progress-loving forces." (But this did not seem to have made any difference to the critics of Cuba). See Julius Nyerere's comment quoted later on p. 62. In the final Declaration, the phrase became "other peace, freedom and justice-loving democratic and progressive states and forces" whose co-operation for achieving the goals of the non-aligned nations was acknowledged,

7 The "principles" of the OAU include "affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to blocs." It seems after the establishment of the OAU, some of the African states expressly repudiated non-alignment. See Jansen, n. 5, p. 377. A special resolution of the Second (Cairo, 1964) Summit conference stated that the establishment of the OAU was "the triumph of the policy of non-alignment and the fundamental values laid down by this policy." It also decided to "co-ordinate and concert their efforts" with

those of the OAU.

8 Peter Willetts, The Non-Alignment Movement (Bombay, London, New York, 1978), p. 16. For a book-length study of this phenomenon, see Jansen, n. 5.

- 9 It is possible there are many other reasons for this. For instance, in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba's membership of the movement discouraged some of the Latin American and Caribbean states because of Cuba's conflict-situation with the United States. Similarly, the nature of Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union might have discouraged many European "neutrals" from joining the movement, lest it invited the Soviet Union's displeasure.
- 10 Leo Mates, Non-Alignment: Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade), 1972, pp. 80-81.
- 11 See Petkovic, n. 4.
- 12 See Rajan, n. 1, p. 17.
- 13 See for instance, the speech of the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Prime Minister of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) at the Belgrade Conference. The Conference of Heads of States of Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961. (Hereafter cited as Belgrade Conference Report), pp. 88, et seq.

14 See Jansen, n. 5, p. 281. Willetts' explanation on this issue is a plain distortion. See

Willetts, n. 8, pp. 10-11.

- 15 There have been from time to time, allegations from ill-informed or ill-disposed critics that the non-aligned nations have organized (or are operating as) a third bloc merely because of some restrictions on membership or efforts to promote co-operation between and among the non-aligned states. But this is not correct. See Leo Mates, n. 10, pp. 77-8.
- 16 From text of the Fifth (Colombo) Summit Conference decision, see source cited at n. 2, pp. 210-11.
- 17 See also Willetts, n. 8, pp 41-43 for other institutional mechanisms devised by the movement for promoting/supervising extensive economic (and some political) activity. It seems that a tentative suggestion that a permanent secretariat be set up after the first Belgrade Summit Conference was rejected by an overwhelming majority. See Mates, n. 10, p. 221. The Lusaka (1970) Conference also discussed proposals for establishing some form of permanent organisation; the only result was that President Kaunda was requested to maintain contacts with members.
- 18 Leo Mates argues, however, that because of opposition to the idea of converting the nonaligned movement into a bloc, the non-aligned countries have opted for the less formal framework of periodical meetings for discussion of major international issues. Thereby, the members of a large of the members of the membe the members of a bloc. Mates, n. 10, p. 221. This view seems now somewhat dated. following observation in the Political Declaration of the Colombo Summit (1976) seems, however, unobjectionable: "The solidarity of the non-aligned and the growing

econd ndon,

AJAN

ıba to to the is did nment edom

on for t with frican lution of the es laid ' with

1978), Iemiserican

Simiiraged nion's

81.

Ceylon tes of cited

n. See critics nerely tween 77-8. t n. 2,

y the tivity. e first lates, ishing a was non-

ormal ereby, ose of . The eems, owing

co-operation among them constitute an essential contribution to the evolution of a new international order founded on national independence and international co-operation based on equality, mutual trust and justice." See source cited at n. 2, p. 180.

19 Leo Mates, n. 10, p. 338.

20 According to Jansen (n. 5, pp. 326-7), only 13 of the 24 states which attended the Belgrade Conference supported the Indian stand.

21 Cited in Michael Brecher, Indian and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (London, 1968), p. 13.

22 See Willetts, n. 8, pp. 209-234.

23 Ibid., p. 233.

24 For an elaborate analysis of this thesis, see Leo Mates, n. 10, Chap. 1.

25 Willetts, n. 8, pp. 25-8.

26 The fact that non-aligned states do not always demonstrate solidarity on East-West relations, (especially since detente) is no evidence for the conclusion that non-alignment has ceased to be relevant in East-West relations, as implied by Willetts, n.8, p. 192. It is relevant only in strictly Cold War and East-West issues, not on the whole gamut of these relations which encompass many other, perepheral, matters.

27 On this point, see Leo Mates, n. 10, Chap. 6.

28 Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 5 September, 1979.

29 See Rajan, n. 1, pp. 83-4.

30 See Rajan, n. 1, pp. 15-16.

31 Times of India (New Delhi), 5 September 1979.

32 Times of India, 7 September, 1979.

# DETERMINANTS OF INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA

By PRAMOD KUMAR MISHRA\*

There have been several attempts by scholars to study the impact of domestic and external milieus in the foreign policy behaviour of states in different regions of the world. In this context, the most searching and exploratory points have been raised by the Rosenau School, while developing a scientific basis of the foreign policy behaviour of modern states. However, their attempts to explore the intrastructural linkages in international relations have not sorted out all the problems relating to the external behaviour of states. Nevertheless, it is not intended here to underestimate their multi-dimensional emphasis that political analysis would be greatly facilitated if propositions that link the stability, functioning of institutions and goals of national political systems to variables in their external environments could be systematically developed.

In this paper, an attempt will be made to delineate the impact of domestic and external factors in the shaping of foreign policies of the South Asian nations in general and on the emerging trends of intra-regional relations in particular. The domestic factors which otherwise can be termed as the "push factors," will be analyzed under the following subheadings, viz. colonial legacy, the problem of immigrants, religion and language. Under the external factors, which are otherwise known as the "pull factors," an attempt will be made to look at the basic goals and interests of major global Powers in the South Asian region. Particularly, it will investigate the points of convergence and divergence in the South Asian policies of Great Powers like the United States, Soviet Union and China.

## DOMESTIC FACTORS

Colonial Legacy

Almost all the South Asian nations like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka had to experience the rigours of British colonialism. In their search for alternate markets for their industrial products, the British not only brought the entire Indian sub-continent under their political and administrative control, but also in that process, had a complete monopoly on its economy. More or less the economy of South Asia became an appendage of the British economy. Even the peripheral land-locked states like Afghanistan and Nepal, which apparently enjoyed a certain amount of political

DE

cert
the
bas
cold
Ban
Sim
of r
at p
the
Sou
subs

fruit
A
bitte
natio
peno
in iso
intra
regio
quito
regio
of th

cour

prov

the in Ho on the realist virtue of co why

Sugg

of ce today to in a size intra

while

coun

<sup>\*</sup>Mr. Mishra is Lecturer in Political Science at the Ram Lal Anand College, Delhi University, Delhi. At present, he is a Teacher-Fellow in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

autonomy, were heavily dependent on the British imperial Power for their economic survival, because their lifeline was controlled by the latter.

Moreover, because of common historical and geographical considerations, certain exportable commodities were produced in one particular country of the region and the economies of the respective nations of South Asia were basically complementary in nature. To cite a single instance, in the precolonial era, jute was produced in abundance in the-then East Bengal (now Bangladesh) while most of the jute mills were located in West Bengal (India). Similarly, the area which now constitutes Pakistan was the major producer of raw cotton, but most of the cotton mills were located in areas which are at present part of India. But with the liquidation of the British Empire and the ensuing bitterness between the ruling elites of the two major states of South Asia, the process of complementarity was reversed. Pakistan with no substantial resources of coal and iron, in place of exporting from India at a cheaper rate and lesser freight charges, decided to procure them from distant countries at a higher cost. Similarly, because of Pakistan's complacency in providing transit facilities, the age-old Indo-Afghan trade in dry fruits, fresh fruits, rice and other items, has naturally suffered a setback.

A major offshoot of British imperialism in South Asia was the growing bitterness and distrust between the core-nation India and other peripheral nations, especially Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Therefore, with independence most of these nations planned their economies and trade patterns in isolation from one another. Because of such an unnatural diversion of the intra-regional trade in South Asia, the external economic relations of the regional states have become more or less competitive at the global level and quite negligible at the regional level. While looking at the statistics of intra-regional trade in South Asia, which comes down to less than one per cent of the entire foreign trade of the region, one cannot resist the temptation of suggesting that the negative role played by British imperialism has retarded the intra-regional trade in this region.<sup>4</sup>

However, even if one admits the negative impact of British imperialism on the new patterns of regional co-operation in the economic field, on a realistic analysis, this cannot and need not remain a trend for the future. By virtue of the fact that many of the South Asian states are common producers of certain exportable items like tea, jute, and cotton, there is no reason why there should not be increasing co-operation at the international level while marketing their products. Moreover, the complementary nature of certain trade items, as it used to exist in the colonial era, still holds good to import coal and iron ores from India. In return, that country can export intra-regional co-operation depends to a great extent upon the political countries.

act of our of ching while odern ges in to the underwould ing of

their

mestic Asian ations as the , viz. Under "a an dobal points owers

and their only ninin its dage

Delhi ional

tical

## The Problem of Immigrants

The other socio-economic factor which has proved to be a major variable in the intra-regional relations in South Asia, is the process of immigration by the people of one country to another during the heyday of British rule in search of better living conditions. Moreover, with the departure of the British, when the sub-continent was partitioned, millions of people belonging to the Hindu and Muslim communities, were uprooted from their hearths and had to be rehabilitated either in India or Pakistan. The Herculean task of resettling such a vast multitude of human beings and the recovery of claims made by refugees from both countries resulted in a lot of misunderstanding and mutual discord between India and Pakistan. Primarily speaking, the intra-regional relations in South Asia are largely determined by the attitude of both India and Pakistan towards each other and their stand on major regional and international issues.

In addition to the mounting intra-regional tension caused by lakhs of refugees, was the issue of Indian plantation workers. During the colonial era, a large number of Indian workers moved to the neighbouring countries, Burma and Sri Lanka, to serve in British-owned industries and plantations. They did not face many difficulties during that time by virtue of the fact that almost all the countries of the region were British colonies and there were hardly any restrictions on free movement within the British Empire. These immigrant Indians having improved their lot by hard work did not like to return to their homeland even after the withdrawal of the British colonial Power and the granting of formal independence to its colonies. But they soon became eyesores to the new indigenous leaders in both Sri Lanka and Burma. They called for the repatriation of these peoples of Indian origin on the plea that their national economies could not afford to absorb so many aliens. On the other hand, India, with its mounting pressure of population and poor state of economy, could not afford to take back all these people. The argument put forward by the Government of India was that almost all these Indians had emigrated during the British rule and had seltled abroad for several generations. Naturally this problem became a major bottleneck between the major South Asian nations and other peripheral ones like Sri Lanka and Burma. Therefore it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the problems connected with the refugees and immigrants, became a negative factor in any major attempt for regional integration in South Asia.

## Role of Religion

Along with the socio-economic factors, as already mentioned earlier, the socio-cultural factors like religion and language, play no less an important role in the shaping of intra-regional relations in South Asia. South Asia is a unique region in the sense that it provides a platform for a wide variety of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

inv hav poi tow of

and

pla

mu ruli

DE

rel

den pat div can leve reli

one

ists

Sou

V

religas ana affa the relig

S

it is serv The and Isla con with role

agai T Whi nati

inte con riot ISHRA

riable ration ule in ritish, to the s and

claims nding g, the titude major

isk of

hs of lonial itries, tions. e fact there npire. d not

ritish onies. h Sri les of rd to

ssure ck all was and came other

and ional

e an

, the rtant is a ty of

religions and languages. Several religions and languages in the region invariably cut across the territorial boundaries of the nation-states. They have therefore, naturally become important factors in the shaping of foreign policies of the respective states and especially in projecting their outlook towards their South Asian neighbours.<sup>5</sup> Let us then look at the relevance of religion and language in the intra-regional relations in South Asia.

It is common knowledge that the people in the Indian sub-continent and its adjacent areas are basically religious by temperament. Religion plays a prominent role in their political life also. Even if its impact is felt much more at the domestic level, the foreign policy formulations by the ruling elites is also heavily loaded with religious sentiments. There is no denying the fact that the "strikingly different social values, institutions and patterns of behaviour" of different nations in South Asia are rooted in their diverse religious traditions.6 Besides, what is equally striking is that one can trace religious pluralism both at the regional as well as at the national level. The net result is that the religious majority in one nation becomes a religious minority in the neighbouring one. So, logically, the ruling elites in one nation feel concerned for the socio-political status of their fellow-religionists across the border.

While analyzing the relevance of religion in the intra-regional relations in South Asia, its three aspects have been focused.7 These are as follows: (i) religion as a great ideal; (ii) religion as a national identity and (iii) religion as a communal irritant. Broadly speaking, one cannot dispute such an analysis. As a matter of fact a great amount of tension in the intra-regional affairs of South Asia has occurred because of the lack of realization on the part of the ruling elites, especially in Pakistan and Bangladesh, that religion is a great ideal.

So far as the second aspect, religion as a national symbol is concerned, it is clear that Pakistan and Bangladesh have taken it to the extreme. Islam serves as a sort of national identity for the ruling elites of both these states. The Pakistanis in their overzealous interpretation of the two-nation theory and Pan-Islamism have gone out of the way to cultivate the friendship of the Islamic countries in West Asia and South East Asia. But as a matter of contrast, so far as Pakistan's relations with other nations of South Asia with the exception of India, is concerned, Islamic ideology hardly plays any role. On the other hand, the ruling elites in Islamabad have left no stone unturned to realign as many peripheral nations in South Asia as possible

against India. In that respect, they are guided by utilitarian considerations. The third aspect, religion as a communal irritant, is perhaps more relevant while looking at the neighbourhood diplomacy of the major South Asian nation (India) with its peripheral neighbours and vice versa. Whenever a communal riot occurs in one of these nations, its impact is felt beyond the international international boundaries. The Pakistanis or Bangladeshis feel greatly concerned whenever there is any large-scale killing of Muslims in a communal in India. riot in India. Similarly the ruling elites in India project a sort of moral responsibility to protect the interest of the Hindu minority in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Even at times some stray cases of anti-Hindu agitation in Sri Lanka have had their simultaneous reaction in India.

In a nutshell, while summing up the relevance of religion in the intraregional relations in South Asia, the following scenario emerges. Instead of playing a unifying role in this region, its role has been primarily destructive; instead of drawing the people of neighbouring nations together, it has taken them apart by fomenting tension and antagonism. But that is mainly due to the narrow and chauvinistic interpretation of religion by most of the leaders of the region. Even India with its cherished ideals of Secularism, has not been upto the mark, especially when one looks at the frequent helplessness of the government to give protection to the religious minorities.

### Role of Language

The relevance of language in the intra-regional relations in South Asia lies in the fact that two major states (India and Pakistan) are essentially multilingual. Besides, a number of languages are either spoken or understood in more than one country in the region. For instance, Urdu is spoken by a large number of North Indians and by a considerable number of people in South India especially in the areas of the old princely state of Hyderabad. In Pakistan it is recognized as the official language. Bengali is the official language of Bangladesh and is one of the regional languages in India. Nepali, the official language of Nepal, is largely spoken in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal in India. Tamil, one of the regional languages in India, has been recognized also in Sri Lanka as a second language. So, on the whole, one notices a unique feature in this region, where international boundaries do not necessarily coincide with the linguistic boundaries. Moreover, one hardly notices the co-relation of any religion to a particular linguistic group.8

Because of the colonial legacy, the elites in South Asia speak or understand English. However English has been replaced by a native language for all official purposes in a number of states in the region. However, a few of them have retained English as an alternate official language.

Because of the overlapping of some languages in the South Asian states, one often notices concern of the leaders of one nation for the recognition and upliftment of a particular language in the neighbouring country, provided that it is also largely spoken or used as an official language in their own country. To cite the case of Pakistan, because of the fact that Urdu has been recognized as its official language, its ruling elites have always supported any move for its upliftment in India. Again, mainly because Bengali is spoken by a large segment of the Indian population, its leaders used to support the people of East Bengal, in undivided Pakistan, in their movement for the official recognition of Bengali as a national language.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

by dis Sri and ren

pro

eve

DE

syr

interior pull whi

Lat

bas

can

Wor ana wou K

cati

ofte prov far emp buff for

Chi inte

min Sou pos Any

easi

stan

SHRA

itratead arily ther, at is

ls of

t the

ious

Asia ially tood by a le in bad.

has nole, aries one istic

icial

pali,

and r all hem

ites, tion ided own peen

rted
i is
to
nent

Although the Government of India has not expressed any overt sympathy on the status and grievances of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, by and large, the people of Tamilnadu have been largely concerned at the discrimination and unfair treatment meted out to the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. The process of granting Sri Lankan citizenship to some of them and repatriating the rest to India, has been unfortunately very slow and has remained a major bottleneck in Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

Another instance of language playing a negative role in the intra-regional relations in South Asia can be noted in Nepal's special concern for the protection of Nepali language in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal, even though it falls within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of India.

All the above mentioned examples are likely to intervene indirectly in the internal affairs of a neighbour. And obviously it has left a negative impact in the intra-regional relations in South Asia. However, such a negative pull can be converted into a positive force, provided the leaders of the region, while looking back to a common linguistic culture, can join hands in certain co-operative ventures. One can trace similar interaction between some of the Latin American countries with some of the nations of Western Europe based on identity of language. Such a cultural affinity based on language cannot of course be treated as a universal principle.

## EXTERNAL FACTORS SHAPING FOREIGN POLICIES

National interest has different connotations in different nations of the world. However, without entering into that controversy, for the present analysis "the protection of territorial integrity and political independence," would be taken as the criteria.

Keeping such a broad perspective in mind, when one looks at the application of the concept of national interest by the leaders of South Asia, one often comes across some local variations. To the Indians, it means the provision of "an economic and secular base to her infant democracy." As far as the Pakistanis are concerned, the Islamic ideology has got to be emphasized for the defence of its national interest. For the land-locked buffer state of Nepal, it is not only linked with unrestricted transit facility for its economic development but also to the defence of its political sovereignty by maintaining the so-called equidistance between India and interest to assert its identity in the periphery of a big neighbour with whom Keepin

Keeping such diverse national interpretations on national interest in mind, it becomes easier for an analyst to look at the mutual behaviour of South Asian states towards one another. A broader analysis can be Any divergence in their common outlook on the region and the world at large. easily focused.

PRAMOD KUMAR MISHRA

DI

of ha

lev

W

to

AI

the

as

in

on

it

rel

are

str

usi

WI

reg

SO

tica

alte

the

any

dis

cer

it s

po

pai

wh

and

ger

wh

inf

car

COI

So,

pol

are

Ing

ide

top

1

I

## Major Global Powers' Involvement in South Asia

As has been emphasized earlier, while looking at the mutual behaviour of South Asian states towards one another, the influence of the so-called "intrusive system" cannot be ignored. In fact its role is more or less complementary to those of the socio-economic and socio-cultural linkages.

A study of the role of the major global Powers, which are otherwise treated as intrusive Powers, is necessary to understand the four pattern variables, as identified by Cantori. These are cohesion, communication, level of power and structure of relations.<sup>11</sup>

In reference to the first variable, it has been suggested that it is rather difficult on the part of the external Powers to create social cohesion. As a matter of fact, such a situation is generally dependent on three major factors, i.e., timing, local conditions and the degree of primacy of the concerned global Power. A comparative analysis of five loosely identified subordinate systems indicates that the Spanish and the Portugese, as colonizers, were quite successful in stimulating social cohesion in the Latin American region. On the other hand, in Southeast Asia, especially in the mainland, the major global Powers have used the existing atomism and have failed to promote cohesive elements.

Now, while keeping such an observation in mind, if one looks at the South Asian region, even though it was almost entirely colonized by Britain, because of a keen competition amongst major global Powers to increase their spheres of influence, cohesion in a literal sense hardly exists. On the other hand, the region continues to remain tense and volatile. Therefore, one more or less tends to agree with Cantori's proposition that where a single Power is dominant within a region, cohesion can be encouraged; where the Super Powers are competing for their spheres of influence in a particular region, their effect upon cohesion is largely negative.

While looking at the second variable, communication, one is again confronted with contrasting scenarios among different regions. For instance, almost all aspects of communication in Western Europe is controlled by the United States as an intrusive Power. On the other hand, as Cantroi rightly perceives, in the West Asian and Southeast Asian regions, because of keen rivalries amongst the major global Powers and partly because of a retarded economic growth, there is hardly any region-wise communication network. South Asia more or less falls into the latter category.

As regards the third variable, the level of power, it is again proposed that it is easier for the "intrusive Powers" to raise the level of military and motivational elements, than to raise the material elements of power. However, it must be emphasized that over-zealous participation of an external global Power in raising the military capability of a weak and volatile region, can be counter-productive in the long-run. To cite a single instance from the South Asian region, Pakistan has received substantial support in terms of strategic weapons from the United States and China. But as a consequence

SHRA

iour alled less ages. wise ttern

tion,

diffiatter i.e., lobal tems quite gion. najor mote

outh itain, rease 1 the fore, ere a iged; in a

igain ance, y the ghtly keen rded ork.

osed and er.12 ernal zion, a the is of

ence

of that, rather than introduce a healthy political climate in South Asia, it has brought about a lot of tension and instability.

Structure of relations, as the last variable, is more or less analogous to level of power. It has been observed that in case of the Southeast Asian and West Asian regions, the primary effect of the intrusive Powers has been to exacerbate conflict, whereas in the case of Western Europe and Latin America, the dominant influence by United States has so far proliferated the means of co-operation. South Asia generally fits into the second scenario, as the involvement of major global Powers has further accentuated conflicts

Although Cantori's theorization on the impact of "intrusive Powers" on several regions of the world may not always be accepted in entirety, it certainly deserves the attention of scholars working on international relations. One of his propositions suggests that the "intrusive Powers" are relatively weak in their ability to alter social cohesion and only slightly stronger with respect to economic cohesion.13 Their major efforts are usually most effective in building political and organizational cohesion. While looking at the South Asian region, there is hardly any problem as regards the applicability of the earlier part of the above proposition. But so far as the effect of major global Powers on the organizational and political cohesion of the above-mentioned region is concerned, one finds an altogether different scenario. It is hereby suggested that global Powers by their meddling and muddling in the affairs of South Asia, have rather stalled any move for organizational and political cohesion.

His second proposition that when nation-states in a subordinate system distinctively lack internal communication, intrusive Powers tend to concentrate on the domestic arena and support a few regional projects. However, it sounds inappropriate in case of South Asia, as in this region, with a very poor state of internal communication, the major Powers have extensively participated in either the internal communication process or in any worthwhile regional venture. Although China has got involved in both Pakistan and Nepal in building highways in some of the sensitive areas, it has been generally motivated by its desire to browbeat India, a regional Power.

In the next proposition, it is suggested that in terms of level of power, when "intrusive Powers" are in competition, military aid and motivational influence tend to have more political relevance. Although such a scenario can be envisaged in several regions of the world, in the South Asian subcontinent, there is hardly any possibility of one external Power dominating. So, naturally, military aid by the external Powers instead of solving any

political crises within the region, has a tendency to accentuate them. In his final proposition, Cantori rightly believes that intrusive Powers are often as important in limiting conflict and even, on occasion, encouraging co-operations and even of the fails to ing co-operation as they are in intensifying strife. 14 However, he fails to identify the different responses in the developed and the developing regions towards the interest responses in the developed and the developing regions towards the involvement of major global Powers in their affairs. Moreover

D

th

m

th

Pa

the

ma

pa bil

ke

cas

po

sta

OVO

of

em

obj

cap

Co

teri

tha

wit

its

Gu

tha

is a

nat

the

bein

Asi

cial

the

1gn

the

has

Poli

mai

of ,

cris

F

I

S

he does not take into account such a situation, when the major global Powers have a tacit understanding not to go beyond a particular point while interfering in a regional dispute.

Although one comes across a few attempts by scholars and journalists on the role of major global Powers in the affairs of the South Asian region, these do not present an all-comprehensive and balanced picture. Their generalisations are at best value-loaded and inconclusive. While taking into account the domestic milieu in South Asia and the interplay of global Powers in different regions, the following broad generalisations emerge. These could be tested in the light of the present socio-economic and political climate in South Asia. The major global Powers, for the purpose of our enquiry, are the United States, Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Until the liquidation of British imperialism in the sub-continent, this region was largely under the sphere of influence of one major global Power. But soon after Britain's loss of major Power status and it's formal declaration of granting Independence to the region, the rivalries of the United States, Soviet Union and Communist China to make their presence in the region became evident. In other words, there was a competition to increase their spheres of influence in South Asia.

As a corollary to the first, the factors responsible for the involvement of major global Powers in South Asia are mainly as follows: narrow and intense nationalism, urgent need for economic development, domestic instability in the South Asian periphery, and common suspicions of the peripheral nations against any hegemony by the core nation—India.

Another basic objective of the major global Powers has been to perpetuate their national interests, which is largely determined by their security perceptions. Their commitment to a particular ideology has receded to the background while trying to increase their sphere of influence in this region.

Fourth, the major interests of the outside global Powers in South Asia converge at certain points and diverge at others. These interests, as aptly described by an analyst, <sup>16</sup> are "crisis-management by which any conflagration in the region would be prevented from escalation, low-profile presence and assurance that none of them [global powers] assumed a hegemonistic stature in South Asia and no regional Power becomes dominant."

Finally, as a result of major involvement of global Powers in the intraregional relations in South Asia, the regional actors have very limited options at the regional and international levels. In fact, their degree of manoeuvrability and freedom of choice are limited to the extent they are dependent on the external Powers, both economically and politically.

While keeping such a broad scenario in mind as regards the circumstances for the intrusion of major global Powers, their common motivations, aggregate interests and their overall impact in the affairs of the South Asian region, let us proceed to look at the objective and interest of each of the major global Powers.

DETERMINANTS OF INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA

United States and South Asia

Although the Americans had shown certain awareness and sympathy for the freedom movement in the Indian sub-continent, their direct involvement in the affairs of South Asia is of comparatively recent origin. With the partition of the sub-continent into two separate states of India and Pakistan, there developed a lot of mutual conflict and disharmony between the two. Pakistan, much weaker than India in terms of size and resources, made frantic attempts from the very beginning to maintain a sort of powerparity with India. So, in its search for powerful allies, it signed several bilateral and multilateral agreements with the United States. The latter, by keeping in tune with its global policy of supporting the weaker side in case of a regional dispute, decided to back the Pakistanis in their offensive postures against India. Only recently, both the Americans and the Pakistanis have realized the futility of such alliances.

Without going into the details of American policy towards South Asia over the last two decades, we would identify the basic objectives and interests of the former in its involvement with South Asia. As has already been emphasized earlier, US objectives in South Asia are subservient to its global objectives. These can be summed up as follows: increasing the military capability, strengthening the military alliances, countering the spread of Communist movement and finally, its opening to Communist China. In terms of real performance to fulfil the above objectives, it can be submitted that although America succeeded partly, by and large, it has been disillusioned with the new international trends in this region and elsewhere.

Secondly, United States' interests in South Asia are largely because of its location in the vicinity of two strategic regions of the world-the Gulf and Southeast Asia. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that the United States, because of its secondary interests in South Asia, is at best "sitting on the fence as an interested observer, but with little incli-

Thirdly, although the Indian Ocean is strategically not so important as the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, the fact remains that it (Indian Ocean) being located near two strategic areas like the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the United States has shown increasing interest in this region, especially decided states has shown increasing interest in this region, and cially during the last decade. South Asia, where a number of riperian and the hinterland states of the Indian Ocean region are located, cannot be ignored by the Americans in their overall global strategy. 19

Fourthly, in the light of new political developments in South Asia, since the emergence of Bangladesh on the geographical map of the world, there has apparently been some re-evaluation in the United States' South Asian policy. Since the military strongpolicy. Since the overthrow and hanging of Bhutto by the military strongman, Zia-ul Haq in Pakistan, that country has been experiencing a period political man Pakistan, that country has been experiencing a period of political uncertainties. India, however, despite its occasional domestic crises has emerged as a major regional Power in this part of the world and

king obal erge. oliti-

SHRA

obal

oint

ilists gion,

heir

se of ublic

this

wer. laranited the ease

it of and estic the

uate cepack-4sia

ptly graence istic

traited of of are

ices greian the

DE

the

Ch

bec

As

dis

Inc

is t

not

of

Ind

cou

den

ope

pos

Asi

tecl

Eve

to p

cap

Chi

P

intr

larg

to c

fiftie

But

and

harr

Indi

their

Pak

ship

Asia

cour

tiali

guer

Sout

eye-

and

to p

F

has been recognized by the major global Powers as a "New Influential".20 The United States has naturally noted this perceptive change in the political horizon of South Asia and has shown increasing awareness for a basic change in its list of new priority areas. It is being noticed by the major world Powers that India is already playing a pivotal role in any major North-South dialogue as an emergent leader of the 'Group of 77'. Besides, India serves as an adviser on tactics and is a source of economic assistance for the oil-importing Third World countries.

Finally, India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 and the increasing rumours about Pakistan manufacturing the first Islamic bomb, have naturally alerted the major global Powers. In fact, the United States has already started putting economic and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan in order to discourage its nuclear programme. President Carter has unsuccessfully tried to persuade India to be a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Now with India and Pakistan as potential nuclear Powers in this region, the United States, as a major global Power, cannot afford to be a disinterested observer. As has been rightly suggested by an American scholar, while no vital US interests in the narrow sense are at stake in South Asia, a low-profile policy for this region could be seriously detrimental to a wide range of American goals and policies at the global level.

## Soviet Union and South Asia

Ever since the liquidation of British colonialism in the sub-continent, The Soviet Union has treated this region as strategically and politically quite important. Therefore, it took no time for the leaders of Moscow to reverse their Stalinist policy of isolation. Soviet Union was directly involved in the intra-regional affairs in South Asia in the mid-fifties and this reached its high watermark in the Tashkent Declaration of 1966. Incidentally, on the one hand, it had a growing rivalry with the United States at the global level, and an ideological dispute with Communist China. On the other hand, on the South Asian platform, one notices the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir and India's growing enmity with China. Naturally such an interplay of global and regional factors brought Soviet Union closer to India. However, the Soviets could not afford to ignore their basic interests in other parts of South Asia and sometimes provided them with sizable economic and technical aid. However Soviet Union never tilted the balance against India and clearly recognized its potentiality as a natural leader of the emergent Third World nations. So, India, and more recently Afghanistan, after the violent overthrow of Daud, have been the major beneficiaries of Soviet economic, technical and military aid. While keeping in mind such fundamental realities and growing Soviet involvement in the region, one can look at the basic objectives and interests of the latter in South

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

SHRA

al",20 itical basic najor najor sides, tance

asing have s has istan un-Nonclear

nnot y an e are ously obal

ient, uite erse d in hed

on bal ther ver ter-

her mic inst

an, ies ind

on,

dia.

the

1th

A major objective of the Soviet Union has always been to check not only the involvement of the United States, but also the growing influence of China, 22 as such a situation could jeopardize its own security. Secondly because of its geographical location in the vicinity both of China and South Asia, it cannot always afford to remain a silent observer in any regional dispute. Naturally, it has often taken sides in the bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan. Another basic geo-strategic interest of the Soviet Union is that, being largely a land-based country, it needs more outside channels not only for its national security, but also to meet the growing demands

of its expanding economy. So, it urgently needs alternative openings to the Indian Ocean and through it to other prominent oceans.23 South Asia could serve as an outlet for the Soviets to the outside world. The growing demands of its merchant navy would certainly be benefited by such a new opening.

Finally, because of its own economic prosperity, the Soviet Union is in a position to provide major assistance to the developing nations of South Asia. In fact, it is already doing so by providing economic assistance and technical knowhow to a number of projects undertaken by these nations. Even in terms of military hardware and strategic weapons, it is in a position to provide substantial help. All these factors have increased the bargaining capacity of the Soviets in this part of the world.

## China and South Asia

People's China is the third major global Power directly involved in the intraregional affairs in South Asia. When Indo-Pak hostilities started on a large scale soon after partition, the Communist leadership in China decided to capitalize on the differences. However, in the initial phase, until the midfifties, they were too cautious to take sides in such bilateral dissensions. But as the ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and China widened and New Delhi came closer to Moscow, the Chinese decided to inject disharmony into the sub-continent.24 While intensifying its border clashes with India, China decided to support the peripheral nations of South Asia in their bilateral disputes with India. However, with the dismemberment of Pakistan and the wider recognition of India as a regional Power, the leadership in Peking restrained itself in taking sides in a bilateral dispute in South Asia and gave the green signal for normalisation of relations with the core country of the region. 25 Even at present, the Chinese have enough potentiality to 1. tiality to disturb the peace and harmony in the region by inciting insurgent guerilla activities in the respective countries and in provoking the smaller South Asian With such a bird's-South Asian nations against their bigger neighbour. With such a bird's-eye-view of Olivina against their bigger neighbour. eye-view of China's growing concern in South Asia, its major objective

and vital interests in the region would have to be identified.

China being region, it China being a peripheral Power to the South Asian region, it is anxious play a Levillet Union, its major to play a key role and is trying to outmanoeuvre the Soviet Union, its major

DE

Na

its

Al

in

of

tio

pu

the

and

sta

ecc

ren

Ne

Ind

ear

Por

con

bee

B

tic :

Hov

soci

elite

thei

nati

Sou

nati

min

on

regi

fact

the

enjo

outs

scho

pher

outs

regi

S

rival. In pursuance of that objective, it has unhesitatingly collaborated with the United States which is also eager to play a crucial role in this region. Besides, Peking has three fundamental interests in the region and in pursuance of these, it has geared up its diplomatic activities.

China's vital interest is the security of its southern boundary. The Himalayan range which serves as the northern border of the South Asian states, is equally important in any strategic calculation of China. Therefore it maintains a ground force of five to six divisions, backed by a network of air bases in Tibet. On the other side of its border, India has deployed an equally formidable force. In pursuance of its security interest, China has projected itself as a dependable ally of Pakistan and has already constructed an all-weather road linking the Sinkiang province with Gilgit in the area of Kashmir, occupied by Pakistan. It can be utilized for military purposes by China for the defence of its Southern frontier. The ruling elite in Islamabad, obsessed with the idea of browbeating New Delhi, has made all-out efforts to invite the Chinese presence and interference in this region. There is an unfounded belief in the minds of the Pakistanis that the Chinese support is the essential guarantee for their national defence vis-a-vis India.26 China and Pakistan have therefore supported each other in the international forums. Besides, there has been growing contact between these two nations in the political, economic and military fields. With the separation of Pakistan's former eastern wing, even if one notices some perceptive changes in Peking's South Asian policy, Islamabad still holds a key position in China's security calculations. In fact, as rightly analyzed by a British scholar,27 the Indo-Pak War of 1971 and the subsequent moves by the major global Powers "clearly revealed the nature and extent of Chinese interest in the region."

China's second basic interest is the search for an outlet to the outside world. Because of its growing hostility with the Soviet Union, it can only hope to widen its contact with other nations in its eastern and southern the Second World War. At the moment, China operates air services to the Middle East and Europe over the territory of Pakistan and Kashmir. The all-weather road between China and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, as mentioned earlier, has made the Indian Ocean accessible to the former. The recent efforts by China to build bridges of understanding with the states of the Gulf through the good offices of Pakistan, have been motivated to counter the Soviet presence.<sup>28</sup>

The search for leadership in the developing world is another aim of China. As all the nations of South Asia belong to this category, Peking obviously likes to cultivate cordial ties with them. In its quest for leadership, the Communist regime in China has encouraged liberation struggles and guerilla activities in different parts of the world. Keeping in tune with such a global objective, it has supported insurgent movements in India and Nepal. It has even provided necessary training and weapons to a group of Mizo and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

ISHRA

pur-. The Asian hereby a a has erest. ready Gilgit litary g elite made egion.

tions Pakiges in on in ritish y the inese

ninese

dia.26

tional

itside only thern aring vices mir.

r, as mer. the tiva-

nina. usly the rilla

obal . It and

with gion.

Naga rebels. It has also inspired the Naxalite movement in India. However its claim for leadership has lost its appeal because of its policy of duplicity. Although it has supported liberation struggles in various parts of the world, in its own neighbourhood, it did not favour the freedom fight of the people of Bangladesh. In its own country, it has suppressed the freedom and aspiration of the Tibetan people. So, the strategies followed by the Chinese, in pursuance of its basic objectives and interests, have not always been uniform.

Because of China's growing interests and involvement in South Asia, the nations of the region have not been able to join hands in any worthwhile and co-operative venture. The nuisance value of China's presence always stalls such a move. Being a major supplier of sophisticated weapons and economic aid to Pakistan, its relationship with India has more or less remained unsure. Moreover, because of its "carrot and stick" policy in Nepal, the ruling elites in Kathmandu have gone ahead to project an anti-Indian image in their foreign policy. Moreover, as already emphasized earlier, because of China's presence in this region, the other two global Powers have naturally joined the race and thereby converted the subcontinent into a hot-bed of big Power rivalries. The regional actors have been mere pawns in such a power game.

#### AN ASSESSMENT

By way of conclusion one may say that both the external and the domestic factors play their usual role in the South Asian intra-regional relations. However the domestic factors, as identified through socio-economic and socio-cultural linkages, play a comparatively more predominant role. The elites who are associated with the decision-making in foreign policy for their respective countries, being the byproducts of their own societies, naturally carry all the predilections associated, with it. As most of the South Asian nations are ascriptive, most of their regional policies are naturally influenced by their religious and linguistic traditions. The majorityminority character based on religion and language which is a major variable on the South Asian scene, preoccupies major attention in any intra-

The external factors play only a complementary role to the domestic factors. Inspite of heavy economic dependence of the regional nations on the major global Powers, because of close rivalries among them, the former enjoy a lot of leverage in their external policies relating to the region and

South Asia, is yet to be recognized as an international sub-system by scholars. As there is hardly any co-ordination between the core and periphery in the phery in this region, most of the South Asian nations interact with the outside world more often than in comparison with nations within the region. In outside world more often than in comparison with nations within the region. In other words, intra-regional interaction is in a stage of infancy.

#### NOTES

1 See James N. Rosenau, "Political Science in a Shrinking World", and for a particular reference to the developing world, Michael O'Leary, "Linkages between Domestic and International Politics in Under-developed Nations" in Rosenau Ed. Linkage Politics (New York, 1969), pp. 2-7.

2 The "push" factors are those forces which ultimately draw the nations of a region

together.

3 The "pull" factors are those which alienate the regional actors from one another.

4 Devi Dutt paints a rather gloomy picture of the prospects of regional co-operation in South Asia because of the legacy of British imperialism. He poses a question as follows: "With different states struggling at different levels of growth and with several external forces, political, ideological and economic-pulling them apart in different directions, what kind of stability or equilibrium can be realized?" He emphasizes several built-in defects, mostly those relating to the structure of the economy of the respective countries, which have stood in the way of regional economic co-operation. See Devi Dutt, Ed., The Himalayan Subcontinent (New Delhi, 1972), pp. xx-xxi.

5 It has been rightly emphasized by some observers that sovereignty in the international political system certainly overrides socio-cultural loyalties, but in case of the constituent states of South Asia, the socio-cultural forces affect their behaviour as sovereign Powers to a very large extent, especially in the intra-regional sphere. See Mathur, etc. in S.P. Varma and K.P. Mishra, Ed., Foreign Policies in South Asia (Jaipur, 1969), pp. 91-105,

6 For details see Donald Eugene Smith Ed., South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton, 1966) pp. 21-2.

7 Mathur etc. in Varma and Misra Ed., n. 5, p. 95-6.

8 Ibid., p. 97.

9 The late Jawaharlal Nehru gave two interpretations to the concept of national interest. The first one relates to a rather narrow national interest, and most people see it that way. The second one being a long term view of national interest, may lead to the conclusion that a country's national interest is served by extending the hand of friendship to other nations, and by world peace. See Michael Brecher, New States of Asia (London, 1961), p. 204. See also for a wider assessment of national interest, A. Appadorai in Varma and Mishra, n. 5, p. 18.

10 The "intrusive system" normally indicated the politically significant involvement of major external Powers in the international relations of a subordinate system. Politically significant involvement primarily denotes the following: (i) participation of external Powers in the regional balance of power by virtue of their possession of a colony; (ii) transfer of economic and military aid which in place of being confined to commercial objectives is often attached with a 'political string' and (iii) military alliance, troop commitment or any agreement which cause the external Power to undertake military intervention. See for details, Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems," International Studies Quarterly Detroit, Michigan (Special issue on International Subsystems), Vol. 13, No. 14, December 1969, pp. 376-8.

11 See ibid., pp. 376-8.

12 Citing the case of Western Europe as one extreme, Cantori rightly suggests that under the impact of American assistance by such means as the Marshall Plan and NATO, the intrusive Power participation is almost complete during the post-war period. On the other hand, as he adds, in all other identified regions of the world, the effects of intrusive Power participation have been less consistent and the objectives have been more complex. See ibid. If one looks at the South Asian region, Cantori's later generalisation becomes more or less applicable.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

15 2 S t

DET

E g d p

p

(1 16 S 17 II it S

(1 18 Se 19 T.

ar

A

L

la th ha ra to

20 D in Br To

21 R 22 W

> rig rei Pe

K. 23 Ar ou ba

M

is 24 En of tai

of 25 A ac

26 Fo V.) 27 Jac

28 V.

str Pa

int D. icular c and olitics

SHRA

egion

ration on as everal ferent everal

ective Devi tional tituent

owers n S.P. 1-105. ceton.

terest. t way. lusion other 1961),

/arma ent of tically ternal y; (ii) ercial

troop ilitary tional tudies 1. 13,

under O, the n the rusive more ation

15 Zafar Imam in his attempt to analyze the interplay of global Powers in the affairs of South and Southeast Asia has confused a number of issue areas and has wrongly assumed that China is mainly responsible for bringing the situation of tri-polarity in this region. But one is in agreement with his presentation that the states of the region being motivated by a sense of intense nationalism, try to promote their national interests and this process generally comes into conflict with the institutionalization of major outside Powers. For details see Zafar Imam, World Powers in South & South East Asia (New Delhi, 1975) pp. 217-8. See also Devi Dutt Ed., The Himalayan Sub-continent (New Delhi, 1972), p. xxvi and M.L. Chopra, "South Asia and its Strategic Environment" in U.S.I. Journal (New Delhi), July-September 1977, pp. 205-6.

16 See Chopra n. 15, p. 205-6.

17 In the observation of a British scholar, United States interests being oceanic and global, its policy towards the sub-continent cannot be merely "whimsical or spontaneous." See Robert Jackson, "The Great Powers and the Indian Sub-continent", International Affairs (R.I.I.A., London), January, 1973, pp. 37-9. See also for a similar assessment, Leo E. Rose, "The Super Powers in South Asia: A Geo-strategic Analysis" in Orbis (Pennsylvania), Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer, 1978, p. 395.

18 See Chopra, n. 15, p. 205.

19 The United States calculations for South Asia are summed up by an Indian observer in an exaggerated manner: "South Asia is a soft belly of the Eurasian land mass. Its heartland is accessible from its two adjacent waters, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal to the submarine-based international missiles. Very close to the Southern tip of South Asia, has come about the US Diego Garcia base, a cornerstone of American nuclear deterrance. South Asia is also a link in US global strategy... Pakistan is well located in regard to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean oil lanes." See Ibid.

20 Dieter Braun perceives that the Americans have started taking more than "a superficial interest in creating a working relationship free from past encumbrances." See Diteer Braun, "Changes in South Asian Intra-regional and External relationship", World

Today (London), No. 10, 1978, p. 398. See also Rose, n. 17, p. 400.

21 Rose, n. 17, p. 400.

22 While keeping in mind such a basic objective of the Soviet Union, an Indian observer rightly comments that the perspective for Soviet policies in the near future in this region, remains that of a highly competitive relationship with both the United States and the Peoples Republic of China. See V.P. Dutt, "Super Powers Interests in South Asia" in K. Subramaniam, Ed. Self-Reliance and National Resiliance (New Delh, 1975), p. 74.

23 An Indian observer while justifying the need for the Soviet Union to search for new outlets for its economic prosperity and defence requirements, writes "A powerful fleet backed by burgeoning merchant shipping, has widened Soviet security horizons and Moscow has declared that the sea route through the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans

is necessary for its national security." See Chopra, n. 15, p. 203. 24 Emphasizing on the disastrous effects of Chinese meddling in the intra-regional affairs of this care is interested in mainof this area, a keener observer points out that as long "as China is interested in maintaining discounties of the base a great deal taining disequilibrium and disharmony in the South Asian region, she has a great deal

of nuisance value." See S.P. Varma in Varma and Misra n. 5, p. 11.

25 A German scholar rightly feels that China is seriously viewing India as an independent actor in According According to the According According According to the According According to the According According to the According actor in Asia and is no longer simply a "stooge of Moscow". See Braun, n. 20, p. 398. For details as and is no longer simply a "stooge of Moscow". See Braun, n. 15, p. 203, 26 For details as regards China's security interests in South Asia, see Chopra, n. 15, p. 203, V.P. Dutt in Subramaniam, n. 22, p. 35.

27 Jackson, n. 17, p. 43.

28 V.P. Dutt rightly points out that Peking looks at Pakistan in the context of the emerging struggle in the Context of the emerging struggle in the Gulf area. However, in the light of recent domestic upheavals in Iran and Pakistan, his prediction. Pakistan, his prediction of a China-Pakistan-Iran axis in order to counterbalance Soviet intrusion in the Counterbalance Soviet See Dutt in Subramaniam, intrusion in the area seems to be a remote possibility. See Dutt in Subramaniam, 1, 22, p. 68

ECC

1

pre

nee

and

a s

thro

mei

a ye

for

shil The

of o

was

high

also

was

wor

vast

Con

regu

labo

"if

of t

to lo

ther

tion

fron

mak

som

Was

dist: Afri

not

com

area

Min

So, ensu

T

# ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MIGRATORY LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA

By HARJINDER SINGH\*

THE migratory labour system is perhaps the most important distinguishing feature of the South African economy and is fundamentally evil in its operation. Under this system, workers oscillate between their rural homes and urban places of work in White areas and as such it has not only affected the political and economic life of the entire African population but also exacted a high price.

The concept of migratory labour in South Africa is of course not unique and it has occurred in many countries all over the world. In the early stages of development, when the traditional rural economy cannot absorb a growing agricultural population on the limited amount of land, migration of potential male workers to developing urban areas takes place.<sup>2</sup> But there is only an initial period of migration of labour which finally gives way to permanent urbanization. What is peculiar to South Africa is that African workers who migrate cannot make their permanent homes in places of their work. They merely work for a limited period of time and return to their tribal homes. In this way, African workers have to oscillate between homelands and places of work in White areas.

This system is the outcome of a deliberate policy of the South African Government which makes it possible to reconcile two inherently contradictory goals. The implementation of the apartheid policy requires the geographical division of the country among various racial groups. The White regime believes that every race has its unique culture and contact between various races might result in contaminating the purity of racial culture; each race must be allowed to develop along its own lines and kept separate from one another. Whites should live in 'White areas' and Africans in their African 'homelands'. If on the other hand Africans were not allowed to live in White areas, it would be difficult to get an adequate supply of cheap African labour force to run the White economy. The two goals are obviously contradictory. But the Government has resolved this contradiction by forcing African people to live in homelands and allow them to enter 'White areas' for limited periods, only for work. The United Nations Unit on Apartheid describes the system as follows:<sup>3</sup>

The migratory labour system has become an integral part of the South African social, economic and political system. It makes it possible to reconcile the twin policy objectives of meeting the demands of the White controlled economy for cheap labour, while at the same time

<sup>\*</sup>Dr. Singh is Lecturer in Economics, Department of African Studies, University of Delhi, Delhi.

keeping to a minimum the number of Africans in 'White areas' which constitute 87 per cent of the territory of South Africa.

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The migratory labour system is a product of the White man's efforts to press Africans into employment. In the early days of colonisation, the need was for farm workers; then came the need for labour in diamond and gold mines and, finally, in all sectors of the economy.4 In order to get a sufficient supply of African labour force, the state first acted directly through laws enacted and second, used its repressive apparatus to implement these laws. For example, in Natal in 1850, a 'hut tax' of seven shillings a year was imposed on Africans who had either to sell their cattle or work for White farmers to pay this amount. Later, this tax was raised to eleven shillings in order to force other male Africans to work for White farmers. The need for more African labour increased further with the discovery of diamonds in the Kimberley district. The "closed compound system" was also introduced which confined African workers within the bounds of high-fenced barracks. This was essential to keep a check on them. They were also made subject to the Master and Servant Law and their average wage was only 2s. 6d. per day.

The discovery of gold mines further aggravated the shortage of African workers. At that time, the main effort of the White man was to create a vast reservoir of cheap African labour. On the recommendations of the Commission of Labour appointed in 1893 to suggest ways for getting a regular supply of African labour, Cecil Rhodes—the father of the migratory labour system, introduced the Glen Grey Act in 1884. He explained that "if you are one who really likes the natives, you must make them worthy of the country they live in, or else they are certain, by an inexorable law, to lose their country. You will certainly not make them worthy if you allow them to sit in idleness and if you do not train them in the arts of civilisation,"5 This Act introduced a labour tax in order to "remove [Natives] from that life of sloth and laziness, teach them the dignity of labour and make them contribute to the prosperity of the State, and make them give some return for our wise and good government." Every male African who was not employed by a White man or who had not worked outside his district description. district during the previous twelve months, had to pay a tax of ten shillings. Africans were supposed to make the payment in cash, which anyhow was not available to them in their rural economy. In this way, they were in fact, compelled to accept the alternative of taking up employment in 'White areas'

The initial measures taken up through laws were not completely successful. So, a Native Labour Department was set up in 1893 with the object of ensuring are 1896 the Chamber of ensuring an adequate supply of African labour. In 1896, the Chamber of Mines establish the Rand Native Mines established its own recruitment agency, called the Rand Native

uishy evil rural only lation

nique

stages

growon of there ay to frican their their ome-

ontras the The ntact racial kept icans not

frican

1pply goals ntrathem tions

outh sible is of time

Delhi,

EC

th

ed

G

W

ar

res

Ba

As

fac

jol

ha

on

be

sep

lat

lat

eco

to

are

Rh

are

bu

ava

Af

cas

Af

Af

see

Co

Bo

M;

M

SI

RI

In

Labour Association, for recruiting Africans at very low wages. This Association was able to recruit about 99,000 African workers. These laws, together with recruitment methods, "saw the establishment of a migrant labour pattern with workers housed in vast compounds."

With the discovery of more mines, the existing available supply of cheap labour was not enough to meet the growing demand. In 1903, a Labour Commission reported a shortage of 129,000 African workers. But it was clear at that time that a higher standard of living for Whites could be provided only if enough cheap non-White labour was available to do the hard work of digging out the gold and diamonds. Initially, the British Government did not accept a proposal of mining companies to import Chinese labour. But when there was pressure from all the miners, it was finally decided to import Chinese labour on fixed terms. In 1904, the first batch of Chinese began to arrive. But soon these Chinese discovered that life in the gold mines was not conducive to them. They alleged that they were ill-treated and that promises of higher wages had not been kept. When there was criticism from various institutions and organizations, the Government announced its plan to repatriate them and by 1910 almost all Chinese workers had left South Africa.

The mining sector was once again thrown back on the resources of cheap African labour and it was now necessary to evolve new methods for getting a regular supply of African workers. The Government introduced two important Acts; in 1909, the Vagrancy Act was initiated under which vagrancy was made an offence. All Africans living in a particular area without working with White persons, were declared vagrants. To prove that one was not a vagrant, one had to produce a pass which could be obtained only by entering into a written contract with a White employer. Secondly, the Native Land Act was passed in 1913, making a provision for African areas. Only 13 per cent of the total land was assigned to 70 per cent of African population. This naturally forced Africans to live in overcrowded reserves. With less land and more population, Africans were forced to leave the reserves and work in the White economy.9

However, this measure also did not help create an adequate supply of labour force for the White economy. In 1922 the Government imposed a poll tax of £ 1 a year on all African males between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five. The purpose of this tax was that "in the past, difficulty was experienced in obtaining a sufficient supply of labour for the industries of this country. The native in the Tribal Reserve, accustomed to a subsistence economy... felt no urge to go out to labour.... The European Governments, wanting labour for their industries, decided to bring pressure to bear on the native to force him to come out to work, and did this by imposing taxation." In 1959, this tax was raised to £ 1.15s for those earning £11.13s 4d per month. With this, African women also became liable to pay the tax. This move was, of course, not entirely directed to maintain the flow of migrant labour; it was also in pursuance of the National Party's policy

SINGH

Asso. gether abour

cheap abour it was ild be do the British mport it was e first d that t they

When

overn-

hinese cheap etting d two rancy rking not a tering Land 3 per ation.

h less s and oly of sed a n and was. ies of tence vern-

bear osing 1.13s

tax. w of olicy

that Africans should be made to contribute more towards the cost of African education and the national purse.11

In order to extend the existing migratory labour system, the South African Government has now granted "independence" to these African homelands. When all African homelands attain "independence", Africans in White areas would become migrants who would look to their ancestoral tribal reserves as their homelands. But these "independent" territories called Bantustans would become more dependent on the South African economy. As we know, Transkei attained "independence" in 1976 and its economy faced more economic problems than ever before. Transkei can provide jobs for less than 25 per cent of its population. The remaining 75 per cent have to seek work outside as migratory workers. The United Nations Unit on Apartheid correctly notes: "In theory, the Bantustans are supposed to become viable and independent states where the African will enjoy his separate freedom. In practice, the homelands are little more than a chain of labour reservoirs to which the 'white' areas will send requisition orders for labour."12 The economies of these homelands cannot support the entire economically active population and most of the male workers would have to go to 'White areas' for jobs.

At present, there are also a large number of foreign African migrants who are recruited from neighbouring countries like Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Malawi and Botswana. About 65 per cent of migrant workers are from outside South Africa. The wages paid to them are no doubt meagre, but they are in cash which is extremely difficult to earn elsewhere. The available information concerning the recruitment and treatment of foreign African workers is rather fragmentary and not always very recent. In any case, foreign African workers suffer from all the inequalities to which local Africans are subjected. They are also denied permanent residence in South Africa and they cannot bring their families.13

The extent to which labour migration takes place in South Africa can be seen from Table I. Of the 580,000 Africans reported as gainfully employed

TABLE 1

Country	ATRICAN WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA		
Botswana	Number	Country	Number
Malawi Mozambique Swaziland Rhodesia	31,000 131,000 121,000 10,000 6,000	Lesotho Other countries South Africa	131,000 10,000 140,000

United Nations: Objective Justice, United Nations Office of Public Information, New York, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1977/78, p. 39.

in 1973, about 440,000 were from neighbouring countries and remaining 140,000 were from South Africa. Since the mining industry has its foundations in the migratory labour system, it recruits about three-fourths of the migratory labour. Next to mining comes agriculture which absorbs about 15 per cent. These workers are housed in single compounds, some of which have upto 7,000 occupants, the number of persons per room varying between 12 and 90. The older compounds which house about 70 per cent of the African workers do not even have beds.

#### GROWTH FACTOR

It has been powerfully argued that the pattern of oscillations is a growthencouraging factor; it enables the economy to grow with a labour force that is much cheaper. According to the Report of the Dutch Reformed Church, South Africa's pace of progress is partly due to the existence of the migratory labour system. 15 The workers can live on a lower wage than would be possible if they were allowed to live in towns with their families. Migrant labour also helps in widening the cash economy by including those areas that would otherwise remain isolated for longer.16 Further, it is argued, that the problem of unemployment is not very serious under such a system. The Labour Bureau also makes it possible to ensure that workers are directed to those areas where work is available for them. Then again, the mobility that is made possible by the migratory system is helpful not only for purposes of economic growth, but also ensures that there is a minimum of regional unemployment.17 It also introduces the African worker to the 'Western labour' system, brings him into contact with the ways of life which he must learn if he is to find his place in the modern world.

The most powerful argument in favour of the migratory labour system is that without influx control, the towns of South Africa would be swamped by people pouring in from the country and this would only make matters worse by creating vast urban slums. The advantage of the system is that Africans which would otherwise be disorganized. In support of this argument, it is said that in Johannesburg during the Second World War, people them. This created a number of problems. Further, it is said that the confined to South Africa. In China, for example, "draconian measures" were taken during the 1950's to control the movement of labour. Similarly known to go into a particular area, warn the people that they must return to the land, and then set fire to their shanties. In the confine to the land, and then set fire to their shanties.

Migrant labour also releases the pressure on African homelands and makes it possible for the State Government to apply a planned scheme of enlightenment and a progressive agricultural system in the homelands

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

som latic men tion disr invo migr it w Som

back

ECO!

A no c rapi of g capi grow the c ed a due has

in the basi people imputhar and has an

T

indu

of S
pop
and
inco
whe

196 Workhol

car

mo

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MIGRATORY LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA

something which would otherwise be impossible because of over population.20 Further, a pattern of migratory labour system which enables men to work in towns without being completely uprooted from the traditional way of life, is according to the proponents of this argument, a less disrupting way of developing an economy than would be a method which involved workers moving with their families to a new place. Most of the migrants would even prefer to come to towns without their families, because it would not provide the best environment for bringing up their children. Some people who live in towns with their families often send their children back to the country to be educated.21

#### MISLEADING PICTURE

All these arguments have many flaws and weaknesses. South Africa is no doubt officially classified as a developed economy. It has developed more rapidly than any other country in the continent of Africa; the annual rate of growth between 1946 and 1966 was more than 8 per cent. The real per capita income increased at a rate of 3 per cent per annum. These rates of growth are undoubtedly high by any standards. Between 1967 and 1972 the economy registered even higher rates of growth. The total output increased at an average rate of nearly 10 per cent.22 In the last few years, however, due to economic recession that has hit the whole world, the rate of growth has been around 4 per cent.

The South African economy has also been moving rapidly towards industrialization. This is indicated by the changes that have taken place in the economic structure since 1940. Until then, South Africa was having basically a colonial-type of economy. Agriculture was the mainstay of the people and most of its output was exported to Britain. In recent years, the importance of agriculture has declined sharply and its contribution is less than 10 per cent to the Gross Domestic Product. The share of manufacturing and construction has however increased to 23 per cent; South Africa now has a large number of modern and sophisticated industries and it has become an important industrial Power.23

Industrialization has of course brought enormous benefits to the people of South Africa, but this is only to the Whites—a small section of the total population. To the African population, it has brought increasing hardship and poverty. South Africa is not one nation but two. The distribution of income in the world. where it is south Africa is not one nation but two. The world where it is no other country in the world where it is so acutely unequal. The Africans, constituting 68 per cent of the popular. the population, receive less than 20 per cent of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly, and the population of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average monthly are also as a second of the income.<sup>24</sup> The average mon monthly per capita income of Africans ranged from 2.3 to 3.9 Rands in 1967. The 1967. The monthly income of an average household of seven members would be would be approximately 21 Rands, whereas the poverty datum of a house-hold was an analysis and betailed surveys hold was calculated to be about 54 Rands per month. Detailed surveys carried out in two homelands have revealed that about 88 per cent of the

ning

INGH

ndaf the bout

hich ween f the

wthforce

rmed ce of than ilies.

hose gued, tem. are

, the only num

r to flife

stem ped tters that

it of rguople date

the eans res"

arly een urn

and e of Ishouseholds had an income below the Poverty Datum Level.25

Due to the low level of income, malnutrition is very common and infant mortality is also very high. In the Transkei homeland, it has been calculated that about 40 per cent of African children die before reaching the age of ten.28 Agriculture is the main occupation of Africans living in the homelands and there has been no increase in productivity over the past twenty years. According to the Tomlinson Commission's Report on "Socio-Economic Development" published in 1955, the average size of farm units in homelands is so small that they could carry only 51 per cent of the population then recorded. In other words, for efficient farming, it would be necessary to remove about half the population from land and absorb them in other economic activities. But up to the present, the number of families is increasing rather than decreasing.27

It is true that migrant workers are earning and contributing to the total income of their homelands. For the homelands as a whole, for 1967 it has been estimated that migrant income exceeded the Gross Domestic Product by 31 per cent. In the case of Transkei which has now become an independent homeland, migrant workers contributed about 60 per cent to the Transkei income. The position of other homelands is indicated below.

TABLE II GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND MIGRANT INCOME IN 1967 (in Million Rands)

Homelands	GDP	Migrant Income
Transkei Ciskei Bophutha-Tswana Lebowa Gazankulu Vhavenda Swazi Kwazula Basotho Qwaqwa	68.4 13.7 22.6 24.1 5.9 5.9 2.6 50.3 0.6	76.0 18.5 26.1 35.9 12.9 11.3 3.0 70.1 0.6

J.A. Lombard and P.J. Vande Merwe, Finance & Trade Review, Pretoria, June, 1972, Quoted in Third World, (London) Special Issue, "South Africa's Bantustans", June 1973, p. 25.

hor the also sys

ECC

1

Go

hor

sup

g0

WO.

the

the

dec

of

Soi

it is effic rati

Wa

mo

T not hig

are sup kee nes

the Was to dro

ind ear In

inc

or

per am

> has this

ger

Th

SINGH

infant ulated age of homewenty Sociounits of the would bsorb ber of

e total it has roduct depento the ٧.

come

oria, ica's

This is undoubtedly a result of the apartheid policy of the South African Government. When sufficient job opportunities are not available in the homelands and at the same time the traditional rural economy can no longer support a large number of inhabitants, there is no other way left except to go out in 'White areas' for jobs. At present, a large number of Transkeian workers are working as migrant labour in 'White areas'. As a result of this, the total income increased by 343 per cent between 1960 and 1973. But the proportion of that income generated in Transkei itself is steadily declining. In 1960 the Gross Domestic Product accounted for 44 per cent of the Gross National Product and it decreased to 26 per cent in 1973.28 Some of the jobs have been of course created on the border areas of the homelands, i.e., about 7000 jobs during the 1960's. But only a fraction of these are inside the homelands. Incomes earned by workers in these jobs also becomes part of the migrant income. On the other hand, this migratory system has an adverse effect on the economies of the homelands. Since most of the economically active male population is absent from their homes, it is difficult for other family members to perform all agricultural operations efficiently. Consequently, economic conditions in these homelands is deteriorating further.29

Wage Gap

The worst aspect of the migratory system is its effect on wages which are not only low but the gap between White and African workers is also very high. An argument put forward to explain low African wages is that wages are determined according to the demand and supply of workers. Since the supply of African workers is greater than the demand, it is reasonable to keep the wages for African workers low. This argument is based on "selfishness, callousness and inhumanity."30 If we analyze the cash wage bill of the mining industry, the position would be clearer. In 1936, the wage bill was 31 per cent of the total revenue of the mining industry. This had fallen to 28 per cent in 1969. But over the same period, the African wage bill dropped from 13 per cent to 9 per cent, while the wage bill for White workers increased from 18 per cent to 19 per cent. The profit earned by the mining industry also shows that wages are very low. In 1971, the mining industry earned about R 212 million as profits and this increased to R 548 million in 1972. The wage bill for African workers, however, has remained more or less constant; it was only R 95 million. The profit has increased by 63 per cent in just one year. This profit increase was more than double the total amount spent on African wages.32

Consequently, the gap between the wages of White and African workers has been steadily increasing. In 1889, that ratio stood at 7:1 and by 1946 this has: this has increased to 12:1. Despite the events of the 1960's which led to a general round to 20:1 by 1969. general re-appraisal of African wages, the gap increased to 20:1 by 1969. The wage The wage gap between White and African workers in some of the sectors is indicated below.

TABLE III

## WAGES PAID TO WHITE AND AFRICAN WORKERS IN DIFFERENT SECTORS IN 1969-70

## (R per Month)

Sector	White Workers	African Workers
Mining	341	19
Construction	326	49
Manufacturing	315	52
Public Services	293	52

I. Horner, "Black Pay and Productivity in South Africa," p. 3. Quoted in J. Bloch, The Legislative Frame-work of Collective Bargaining in South Africa, United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, New York, May 1978, p. 14.

In addition to this discrimination of cash wages, White workers are also given other benefits. For example, the White mine workers get paid leave, whereas African workers do not. African workers are also excluded from the pension fund. The overtime rates are also discriminatory; the White worker is paid double time, while the African is paid only a time and a half. Taking all this into account, the African miners' wages in 1969 were no higher, and possibly even lower, than they had been in 1911, while the White miners' wages increased by 70 per cent over the same period. 33

One of the important reasons for this wage gap is that powerful White trade unions have managed to protect their immediate material security needs, while African workers remained unorganized. That is why in 1920 when the cost of living rose by 50 per cent, White trade unions were able to negotiate wage increases to balance this increase in the cost of living. But African miners without organised trade unions were unable to fight for these benefits. Until very recently, it was even illegal for African workers to take part in strikes for whatever reasons; the penalty for doing so was a fine of R 600 or three years' imprisonment or both. The African Mine Workers' Union was formed only in 1946 and even though wage demands were made they were not met. The Union called for immediate steps to provide adequate and suitable food for the workers in accordance with the new world principles for an improved standard of living. After the rejection of this demand,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

the in b min inci

stri

ECC

how Afr "The labor empright that

of A

R 1: T larg sation mig

proj supj orga

mal

mer

Fan

I

Wh pro from Am their to

tha Go con it c

pol in cor SINGH

DRS

ers

ted in South 1978,

also leave, from White ind a were

e the d.33 Vhite urity

1920 ole to But these

take . fine kers' nade

uate inciand,

the Union called a general strike in 1946, but this strike also did not succeed the officer about any improvement in wages. On the other hand, the White miners have always seen steady increases in their wage levels—the last increase being R 80-R100 per month which was granted in 1973.34

In 1973 the law was, of course, amended allowing Africans the right to strike, but under restrictive conditions. "Legally sanctioned" strikes were however, almost impossible and the right to strike was not granted to Africans employed by a local government or a supplier of public utilities. "The effect of the monopolization of skilled jobs by Whites, the forced labour system brought about indirectly by various laws, massive unemployment of unskilled workers and the denial of effective bargaining right to Africans has led to huge wage differentials.... It should be noted that the wage gap has widened since 1970. Almost all Africans earn wages below the Poverty Datum Line which is regarded as the minimum subsistence level. In 1975 a countrywide survey showed that 63.5 per cent of African households had less than R 80 per month on which to live; 25.4 per cent between R 80-149, and only 11.1 per cent more than R 150."35

The low wages paid to African workers are also responsible for attracting large foreign investment in South Africa. "In the early years of industrialisation in South Africa, it should be noted, the super-exploitation of African migrant labour [through the granting of less than subsistence wages] enabled the capitalist sector to 'secure an increased rate of surplus value,' thereby making the South African economy extremely attractive to foreign investment."36 Even at present, trade and investment with South Africa are profitable due to South Africa's cheap labour policy, "thanks to the bloody suppression of the Black South African workers and their trade union organisations."

## Family Break-up

In human terms, the cost of the migratory labour system is enormous. White miners have adopted the "compound system" for solving the housing problem of African workers. Married men live in bachelors' quarters away from their wives and families for at least 11 months in a year. The Anglo-American Corporation in 1949 decided to provide family life for some of their African employees in the new mines. But that attempt was contrary to the government's policy and the Minister of Native Affairs declared that "the Corporation would not be allowed to proceed with its plans." The Government's attitude, he said, had the full backing of all the other mining companies who did not want to disturb the migratory system. [He] made it clear that "migratory labour is an essential constituent of National Party policy and would be sustained.... The migratory labour system... has been in force of mine labour is in force for generations. Everyone knows that as far as mine labour is concerned, it is the best and probably even the only practicable, workable system. My contention is that the strengthening of this system and the expansion of the system to most other spheres of labour would be in the interest of the Bantus."38

Under the "compound system," mine owners can check the African trade unions. Being compounded migrants, they are isolated from the influence of trade unions. This system has been condemned by all objective investigators due to its many serious defects. Since most of the time African male workers are away from their families, they cannot influence their growing children or lead a normal family life. Women in the rural areas are forced to cope single-handedly with the upbringing of their children who grow up hardly knowing their fathers. These women and children are left insecure. The consequences of this are illegitimacy, adultery, etc. In Cape Town, there are a total of more than fifty thousand workers living as single men in the compounds. Their wives cannot even visit these places.

Further, the wives of migrant workers are often unable to get work to contribute to the family income. Also, it is they and the children who have to perform all the agricultural operations. The result is that agricultural production is falling in these homelands and "the migrant worker can develop no sense of loyalty, either to his family, to his work or to his employers."

### Vicious Circle

In short, the African labour force today is composed of persons who are neither workers nor peasants. They have one foot in the homelands and the other in the towns. According to the United Nations Unit on Apartheid, "this helps to perpetuate poverty. Workers who have to shuttle back and forth between town and country do not stay long enough in one job to acquire more than basic training. The average length of service of migrant labourers in one job is seldom longer than 4 years, and under the 1968 Bantu Labour Regulations, no African becoming a contract worker after these regulations appeared may enter into a contract for longer than 12 months. Employers do not consider it worthwhile to give workers more than a bare minimum training, if these workers have to leave their employment to return to their rural 'homes' before their increased productivity could compensate the company for providing more advanced training. Employers are discouraged from investing in their migrant labour force. Thus, the migrant workers remain ill-trained and live out their lives in poverty." This is according to the United Nations Unit on Apartheid, "a vicious circle. The work force is unstable and ill-trained and wages are low. The reserves get poorer as their population, which they cannot support, increases. Thus, more Africans have to leave to find work as migrants in the towns. The reserves get poorer still as they export their male manpower, while these workers are relegated to the lowest paid jobs in the White industries. The White get richer as industries expand, while the wages of the

unsl majo dise

ECO!

In f supr tory more "a c saril land sicks

Th

Afric

denice produced by a basic leave most again

Fu

less of affect to the own Precionsta of the denice country mark

Itilies a a vita econ Afric for h nent

settle

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MIGRATORY LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA

nd the in the

SINGH

frican m the jective frican growforced ow up ecure. there in the

ork to have ıltural r can to his

o are d the theid, and ob to grant 1968

after in 12 more ploy-

tivity ning. orce. s in l, "a

are ort, ts in

dusthe

wer,

unskilled migrant labourers remain low. Migrant labour is, therefore, a major cause of continuing African poverty, of malnutrition disease."41

This does not mean that the White economy would remain unaffected. In fact, the sufferings of Africans, would also affect adversely the White supremacy. In 1965, the Dutch Reformed Church called the labour migratory system a cancer in the life of the African population. Pointing out the moral implications and alarming effects of this system, it emphasized that "a cancer which rages thus in the life of the African population must necessarily affect the whole social and religious life of all the races in our fatherland. By virtue of God's law, the White will not remain untouched by the sickness which is ravaging the moral life of the African."42

This would also have an adverse effect on the White economy of South Africa. The migrant labour system implies that South Africa's economy is denied those benefits of specialization which are so important in modern production. Instead of having a working population growing in skill, specialized abilities and adapted to specific tasks, producers would be burdened by a high labour turn over which elsewhere has long been recognized as a basic cause of inefficiency and industrial unrest.43 When native workers leave their work for some months every year for visiting their homelands, most of them fail to secure the same job on their return. They have to begin again with a consequent loss of efficiency and skill.

Further, the impoverished conditions of the African population means less demand for goods produced by the economy. This would also adversely affect the industrial expansion of the South African economy. According to the United Nations, "South Africa today is a formidable Power in its own right. It is successfully industrialised and its White citizens are wealthy, Precisely that success, however, may prove a source of serious economic instability in the not too distant future. For the impoverished conditions of the mass of the population means that South African industry will be denied the domestic markets which have been essential to growth in other countries. There are signs that the economy is already finding the domestic market too confining."44

## ELIMINATION OF MIGRANTS

It is now a confirmed fact that the system of migratory labour in South Africa lies at the very heart of its socio-economic structure. Migrant labour has made a vital contribution to the South African economy and at the same time the economies of homelands have become closely bound up with that of South Africa. In consequence, it is said, that if South Africa decided to prohibit African workers to enter the country, it would have disastrous implications for homelands. If, on the other hand, South Africa decided to absorb permanently all Ac. nently all African workers who could find jobs and bring their families to settle in toward workers who could find jobs and bring their families to settle in towns, the implications would have been quite different<sup>45</sup> because a high proportion of the male population would not be available for national development at home. But these are two extreme cases, and South Africa cannot afford to implement either of them. The exploitation of cheap labour is the basis upon which the economic development and, in fact, the wealth of that country has grown and it cannot even think of stopping Africans entering. At the same time, it is contrary to the apartheid policy of the Government to absorb Africans permanently in 'White areas'. Against this background, the suggestion of Dr. Wilson, that the South African Government should accept workers of all races in the cities as permanent, coupled with the right to have their families with them at their place of work, has no relevance. Under present circumstances, it is impossible to move the Government and the White electorate to accept African workers as permanent settlers in 'White areas.'46

However, he has proposed five steps for improving the status of migrant labour. These are, limitations on African wages imposed by the maximum permissible average must be removed; the colour bar, both as a conventional ratio-requirement and in the legal form of job reservation, must be abolished; legal barriers against the development of a stabilized urban labour force must be withdrawn; trade union legislation must be widened so as to include Black mine-workers; the educational structure of the country must be altered, so that it does not discriminate against those who are not White. 47 All these are, of course, short-term measures, but they will certainly give some satisfaction to African workers.

In continuation of these proposals, the Conference on Migratory Labour in South Africa organized by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, from 4 to 7 April 1978 in Lusaka, also unanimously adopted a Charter of Rights for migrant workers. The Charter set out several important rights:48 all workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions of their own choice, participate in collective bargaining on equal terms with all other workers regardless of race, sex, political affiliation or religion; shall not be required to carry a pass; they shall have the right to be accommodated near their place of work with their families; they shall have the right to work, choose their occupations and change from one employer to another; they shall have the right to equal pay for equal work; all women workers shall have the right to participate in all sectors of the economy without discrimination in respect of wages, training, and job allocation. As a step towards implementing the decision of the Conference, it was also agreed to form a Southern African Labour Committee composed of "representatives of supplier states and of workers' organisations in Southern Africa."

Even if the Charter of Rights were to be accepted by the South African Government, it would not help much in solving the basic problems of migrant workers. In fact, these rights would further increase the dependence of African workers and the homelands on South Africa. Fluctuations in the economy of South Africa would have a direct effect on these homelands

throu it is c would work succe be co now happ Unite in So

ECON

elimin Lu labou was a to eli probastrate the c

Th

and pecono the econo of this home with possil If the object can be

migra

Augu

1 Rep Soci Afri Ne 2 E.A

196 3 Afri 4 Ale 5 Qu

6 As

tional

SINGH

Africa abour vealth icans of the st this

vernupled t, has e the erma-

grant mum nvenist be ırban

dened f the who y will

bour ssion pted pornions erms

gion; come the

loyer men omy

ican s of ence

the

I. As also d of hern

inds

through migrant labour. In an article written by the Editor of the Economist, itis clearly stated that the South African economy as a result of disinvestment would almost cripple Mozambique, which sends more than 100,000 migrant workers to the South African gold mines every year. If boycott campaigns succeed, hundreds and thousands of Africans within South Africa would be condemned to rural unemployment in their homelands. Many African now working in industry would lose their jobs. 45 In fact, this is going to happen in the near future as a result of various resolutions passed by the United Nations requesting member countries to discourage investment in South Africa.

The ultimate long-term solution to this pressing problem lies in the final elimination of the migrant labour system in South Africa. At the conference in Lusaka, it was promised "to strive for the abolition of the migratory labour system practised in South Africa" and pending its elimination, it was agreed to present this Charter of Rights. Now, the real question is how to eliminate this migratory labour system in South Africa? The answer probably lies first of all in being clear about the causes of this system. A strategy for the elimination of migrant labour would therefore be to remove the causes of migrant labour.

Migration takes place for various reasons, but the economic causes of migration, as our analysis shows, are over-population, low productivity and poverty of the homelands. In other words, it means that due to the economic backwardness of these homelands, it is not possible to absorb all the economically active population. So, the decisive factor for the elimination of this oppressive system would be the development of the economies of homelands. The ability to absorb the now migrant workers would increase with the development of their economies, and consequently it would be possible for them to finally withdraw the labour force from South Africa. If the dependence of the homelands on migration is to be removed, this objective must be pursued. 50 This approach will of course take time and it can be achieved only through long-term developmental efforts. But it is the only way to eliminate the migratory labour system in South Africa.

August 1979.

#### NOTES

2 E.A.G. Robinson, Ed. Economic Development for Africa South of Sahara, (London, 1964), p. 206 3 African Labour in South Africa, n. 1, p. 1.

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Economic Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid
Society 1972 Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society, 1973. Quoted in United Nations Unit on Apartheid, African Labour in South Africa, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Notes and Documents, New York, August, 1974, p. 1.

Alex Hepple, South Africa, n. 1, p. 1.

Quoted in Happle 5 Quoted in Hepple, n. 4, p. 197. 6 African Labour in South Africa, n. 1, p. 4.

ECON

44 Se

45 Fr

46 Jo

47 AJ

48 Q1

49 Q1

50 So

res

of

7 Ibid., p. 4.

8 Hepple, n. 4, p. 200.

- 9 N.N. Franklin, Economics in South Africa, (London, 1954) p. 117.
- 10 Hepple, n. 4, p. 198.
- 11 Ibid., p. 199.
- 12 United Nations, Bantustans in South Africa, UN Publication (New York, 1970), p. 23.
- 13 United Nations Unit on Apartheid, South Africa: The Two Faces of Migration, A Report by the International Labour Office, New York, August, 1974, p. 13.
- 14 It is estimated that there are about one million migrant workers in South Africa, legally and illegally. United Nations: Objective Justice, United Nations Office of Public Information, New York, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1977-78, p. 35.
- 15 "Dutch Reformed Church: The System of Migratory Labour in South Africa" The South African Outlook, (Cape Town), January 1966, Vol. 96, No. 1136, p. 5.
- 16 Francis Wilson, "Migrant Labour: Pros and Cons", South African Outlook, January February 1973, p. 21.
- 17 Ibid., p. 21.
- 18 Ibid. p. 20.
- 19 Ibid., p. 20.
- 20 "Dutch Reformed Church: The System of Migratory Labour in South Africa", n. 15, pp. 6-7.
- 21 Francis Wilson, n. 16, p. 20.
- 22 Sean Gervasi: "Apartheid. South Africa's Barrier in Continued Economic Growth", Objectives Justice, United Nations Office of Public Information, Vol. 2, No. 4, October November/December, 1970, p. 16.
- 23 Ibid., p. 16.
- 24 Ibid., p. 17.
- 25 Johann Maree, "Bantustan Economies", Third World, Special Issue, (London), Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1973, p. 27.
- 26 Ibid., p. 27.
- 27 Ibid., p. 29.
- 28 "Transkeis' Myth of Independence", Sechaba, Official organ of the African National Congress South Africa, Vol. 10, Fourth Quarter, 1976, p. 3.
- 29 Johann Maree, n. 25, p. 27.
- 30 African Labour in South Africa, n. 1, p. 8.
- 31 Ibid., p. 6.
- 32 Financial Mail, (Johannesburg), 9 February 1973, quoted in African Labour in South Africa, n. 1, p. 9.
- 33 Financial Mail, (Johannesburg), 10 May, 1968, quoted in African Labour in South Africa,
- 34 African Labour in South Africa, n. 1, p. 6.
- 35 Jonathan Bloch, The Legislative Framework of Collective Bargaining in South Africa. United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, May 1978, p. 10.
- 36 "Multinational Corporations and the Perpetuation of Apartheid. Sechaba, African National Congress of South Africa, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 50.
- 37 Ibid., p. 46.
- 38 Quoted in Alex Hepple, n. 4, p. 204.
- 39 African Labour in South Africa, n. 1, p. 2.
- 40 Memorandum on the Pass Laws and Influx Control, 1971 quoted in African Labout
- 41 African Labour in South Africa, n. 1, pp. 2-3.
- 42 Dutch Reformed Church: The System of Migratory Labour in South Africa", n. 15,
- 43 Johann Maree, "The Cancer of Migrant Labour", South African Outlook, May 1973, p. 81

# ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MIGRATORY LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA

44 Sean Gervasi, n. 22, p. 18.

44 Sean South Africa; "Migrant Labour in South Africa", quoted in South Africa: Two Faces

of Migration, n. 13, p. 17.

46 Johann Maree, n. 43, p. 83.

47 African Labour in South Africa, n. 1, p. 9.

41 African Labour", Sechaba, Official Organ of the African National Congress South Africa, Fourth Quarter 1978, Vol. 12, p. 54.

49 Quoted in "On Disinvestment", Sechaba, Fourth Quarter February 1979, p. 25.

50 South Africa: The Two Faces of Migration, n. 13, p. 17.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

p. 23. Report

INGH

legally Infor-

" The

nuary

n. 15,

owth", tober/

Vol. 2,

itional

South

Ifrica,

Africa.

frican

about ,

1. 15,

1973,

## NOTES AND COMMENTS

## PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE UNITED NATIONS\*

To the work of the United Nations oscillate between extravagant expectations and undue apathy. In the social and economic spheres, of course, the assistance programmes of the United Nations system are valued by the developing countries. In the political area, however, there is little balanced appraisal of the potentialities and limitations of the World Organization, of its achievements or failures. In moments of crisis and apprehension, a certain expectancy is aroused and people turn to the United Nations to see how it will manage to defuse a conflict. Moreover, when governments are faced with problems whose burden is too great for them to bear, they bring them to the appropriate organ of the United Nations. But these intermittent exhibitions of interest do not dispel the lingering impression that the United Nations is either ineffective in situations of stress and tension or at best exerts a peripheral influence on them.

This impression fails to take into account the reality behind the apparent setbacks of the World Organization in achieving the broad aim of stability and equilibrium in the world order. The reality is not any defect in the structure or machinery of the United Nations. It consists of the attitudes and policies of governments and their inability or unwillingness to rise above narrow, often transitory, nationalistic aims. The United Nations, after all, works through governments which act on what they perceive as their national interest. We have to face the fact that these perceptions are not always objectively based. Sometimes, there occurs a falsification of national interest. Internal instability, passions, fears and suspicions or the desire to avenge the injustices of the past—any of these psychological factors can make a government misconceive the long-term or true interest of the nation it represents. Once the misconception takes root, national honour is deemed to be involved. There has been no war and no conflict short of war in which one or the other party has not based its undertaking on an erroneous reading of its national interest. Even when such a misapprehension is avoided, governments involved in contentious international issues work under pressures which make it very hard for them to imagine the possibilities of a new approach or to consider the benefits that could be derived from a basic change of attitude. They are so preoccupied with the negative and destructive interplay of forces that any adjustment in it which would make it positive and constructive appears to be beyond their imagination. When antagonists are engaged in a conflict, they need a dispassionate third voice to tell them how much more they could achieve together in peace.

The United Nations can, and does, supply this voice. But it can be decisive

only
the !
whice
the
resp
of d
bilit
vativ

of g diffe arre: Di

man

inter

in th

role
resul
outc
worl
and
to a

W

of im the v conn Prior clash commits re Ther

Whe of time catic of the

Peac Th relat

pens the c

undo

<sup>\*</sup>Extracts from an address by Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, on 22 January 1980.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

only if it is reinforced by the leaders of thought and public opinion around only it it is said earlier that the United Nations works through governments the globe. I said earlier that the United Nations works through governments which represent sovereign states. As such, the United Nations is part of the diplomatic world which tends to be tied down to fixed patterns and responses. The academic community, and those who have had experience of dealing with international issues but do not bear governmental responsibilities, should not suffer from this limitation. They can generate the innovative energy which needs to be employed if the world community is to break through complex and long-standing problems. Of equal importance, in the current world situation, is their ability to create that infra-structure of genuine communication, at the moral and intellectual level, between different societies and cultures which is absolutely necessary if we are to arrest a steady erosion of confidence in international relations.

During the time I have been holding my present office, I have stressed the necessity of public support for the endeavours of the United Nations on many occasions. Every development which threatens the maintenance of international peace and security strengthens this emphasis. The supportive role of public opinion which I have in mind does not imply that any lack of results at the United Nations should be condoned or regarded as a natural outcome. On the contrary, what it would mean is that people around the world should be encouraged to understand what it is that often hampers, and sometimes totally frustrates, the efforts of the World Organization to achieve the solution of international problems.

We have been brought face to face with the reality that we live in a world of immense cultural diversity as much as grave economic disparities. Though the values of peace and justice are common to all societies, what these values connote in concrete political or economic contexts is understood differently. Priorities and perceptions vary between one society and another; aspirations clash. Even the notions of right and wrong are not uniform. Behind the common acceptance of an agreed text, like the United Nations Charter or its related instruments, divergences in interpretations are thinly concealed. There are occasions when one reaches in vain for a shared mode of thinking by which these gulfs could be bridged and a meeting of minds achieved. When issues arise which relate to justice or human rights, this lack of understanding becomes glaringly apparent. Governments are sometimes at odds with one another because there is insufficient communication. cation between them. Situations are recurrent where lack of knowledge of the other party leads to misunderstandings which can imperil world

The traditional channels of communication between states are diplomatic relations and participation in international conferences. These are indispensable of situations in pensable, of course, but we have come across a number of situations in the contemporary to the contemporar the contemporary age where they no longer suffice for bringing about better understanding. The missing elements can be supplied by contacts between peoples in The missing elements can be supplied by contacts between the peoples involved which would foster the comprehension of different

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

tudes agant es, of alued little Orgaehenations

vern-

bear,

these

ession

s and parent bility n the tudes o rise tions,

otions ation ns or ogical terest ional nflict

rceive

aking misional agine ld be

with in it their dis-

lieve isive

ions.

NOT

prol

to i

grav

enco

ever

erup

of t

not

man

anni

may

very

We

will

prop

be b

Nati

wha

in al

prot

ficat

I sha

stab

requ

of h

syste

Unit

glob

zatio has

be co

goal

goal

TH

dow

Orga

Prin

stage

cred

expe

sour

righ

TI

view-points. To establish such contacts would not be a political undertaking, in the narrow sense of the term. It would require an appreciation of different cultures with a scrupulous avoidance of assuming the superiority of one over another. It is when we are able to discern the roots of a people's attitude that we can understand the force of their urges and compulsions. Without this discernment, little persuasion can be exercised towards the modification of these attitudes to the degree that is necessary for maintaining and strengthening peace. The reality of a people's concerns has to be recognized before the fact can be effectively brought home that there is a large area of compatible interests between nations which can be promoted by co-operation, and not by confrontation. We have to admit the validity of different world-views, rooted in different cultures, or arising from different kinds of economies, before we can bring about a clear perception of their points of convergence in promoting peace, international justice and equal opportunities of development for all nations. The mass media can play a very useful role in this process, but they need to be fed by the most informed and intelligent opinion that societies can muster. The coming into play of such intelligent opinion, yielding a rational comprehension of international situations, is of crucial importance if civility between nations transcending their mutual differences is to be durably established. This civility is a prerequisite for that firm adherence to basic norms of international conduct which is an inescapable requirement of peace.

These are some aspects of the current undertaking of peace which, I feel, public opinion needs to focus upon in order to strengthen the United Nations. They are related to the broad nature of the present age which also needs to be kept in mind if the efforts of the World Organization are to be judged in a country to be judged in a country to be judged.

to be judged in a correct perspective.

We are living in a time of upheavals. Most of the upheavals are caused by certain grave contradictions in the current development of international affairs. There exists a full knowledge of the catastrophic dangers of the arms race; yet, the race proceeds unabated. Nations strive to bring about a just distribution of their wealth internally; yet, grave inequalities are allowed to persist in the global society. De-colonization has been one of the momentous achievements of the world community; yet, the majority of nations are still bound to an economic order which keeps them in conditions of dependence. All societies affirm their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person; yet, massive violations of human rights continue to occur.

It is the effort to overcome these contradictions that constitutes the essence of the mission of peace at the present historical stage. This effort must be prompted by a vision trained towards the future. It must also seek to achieve clarity in formulating the objectives of the world community. And these objectives must be credible. Nations need to identify their shared interests and appreciate the equal benefits which they would derive from the peaceful adjustment of their mutual differences and the solution of their common

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

ideron of

IONS

ority ple's ions. s the ining

o be ere is oted lidity

erent their equal play

most ming on of tions

This nter-

feel, nited hich are

d by onal the pout

sare e of ority ndi-

orth e to

nce t be' ieve

ests eful

1ese

1011

problems. To desire this is not to desire the impossible.

I have said enough about the difficulties of the international situation to indicate a view which is far from complacent. Yet, despite the many grave problems which continue to press upon us, we have to persevere in encouraging the growth of new attitudes which may influence the course of events. These attitudes of restraint and realism are often eclipsed by the eruption of passions or dogmatism, as we are witnessing in different parts of the world. But one has reason to hope that these positive attitudes will not disappear altogether. If they did, we would be confronted with unmanageable chaos and the danger of a general confrontation which would annihilate human civilization. The process of debate at the United Nations may often appear fruitless and exhausting, yet, more often than not, its very continuance testifies to a desire to bring about some kind of consensus. We have continuously to strengthen these positive elements, so that they will prevail over the negative elements of polemics and competition in propaganda. Only thus can a better accommodation of different view-points be brought about.

The major unsolved problems which are on the agenda of the United Nations are, of course, varied in their origin or character. But, taken together, what they convey is that peace has many dimensions and it must be realized in all of them, if it is to be dependable. The creative process, no matter how protracted, that is going on at the United Nations consists of a steady clarification of these dimensions—not in utopian, but rather in practical terms. I shall give two examples. It is realized now, as it never was before, that a stable world order implies a global economic system that can meet the requirements of interdependence. It has also become clear that the protection of human rights is not a matter of idealism but of the viability of political systems or regimes. This larger understanding which has replaced a restricted notion of peace has been a product of much thought and labour at the United Nations. All distractions notwithstanding, the determination of global objectives by the United Nations signifies the birth of a global civili-2ation which has no precedent in history. The technological revolution has brought a world society into being. However, this society needs to be cemented, and its internal divisions narrowed, by a conscious pursuit of goals important for all the peoples of the world. The identification of these goals is the first part of their pursuit.

The Charter of the United Nations and its related instruments have laid down virtually all the requirements of peace. In the early years of the World Organization, there was a tendency to express the understanding of the Principles of the Charter in utopian terms. Though understandable at that stage of the World's political evolution, this tendency caused an erosion of experiences of the world's political evolution, this tendency caused and a weakening of the Organization's appeal. After the sobering experiences of the last three decades, we have no right to suppose that all sources of the last three decades, we have no right to supplied to expect the last three decades, we have no right to supplied the last three decades, we have no right to supplie that the cost of right to expect that nations have learnt, or are learning, that the cost of violent strife to their existence and progress is far heavier than any sacrifice involved in peaceful adjustment. To abandon this expectation would be to capitulate before despair and turn the whole endeavour of peace into a hypocritical pretense. While an abstract idealism is of little avail in the actual task of bringing about the resolution of disputes, an attitude of hopelessness can be far more disastrous. Whether at the United Nations or in the different national capitals across the globe, there is a need to avoid both these extremes. This can be done by keeping the truth steadily in our view that, while the destructive tendencies of human nature are a reality. so are the more benign and constructive urges that have enabled individuals to live and build together in society. Tolerance, compassion, forgiveness of wrongs and generosity are not superhuman virtues. Far less so is the instinct of self-preservation or a concern with the future. These qualities are practised and exhibited every day in social life. There is nothing inherent in the human situation which should preclude their exercise at the international level. Once they begin to be deployed in increasing measure in the global society, statesmanship will prevail and peace can reign over the earth.

mists analy of ececond

> of prod prod polit carri conc wher close

> > Th

In

the sin Ir in Ir has to a ISI scomp Fran Iran appl

unfir that extra Be natio Inve

8000

of to Fore cour US cons

\*R.L Apr

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN—A COMMENT

SNC

fice

e to

0 a

the

pe-

r in

oid

our

lity,

uals

ness the

are

rent

iter-

the

the

THE regrettable tendency in bourgeois "social science" to divorce "Economics" from "Sociology" and "Politics" has driven some economists to confine themselves to more or less "pure" and isolated economic analysis. Such attitude stands in the way of a comprehensive investigation of economic problems which are many-sided and inter-related. If we treat economics as the science of production, then we cannot ignore the various conditions under which production is carried on.

In the article by Dr. Chawla,\* the author has given priority to the survey of production, without paying due attention to the social conditions of production, and with no consideration at all for the historical, social, and political causes of the present condition under which production is being carried out. Therefore, his survey reflects an experiment in empiricism with conclusions that will satisfy a pragmatist. This becomes quite obvious when we review the last paragraph of the article in which the author calls for closer trade relations between Iran and India.

The author has discussed in detail the advantages and disadvantages of the strategy of Import-Substitution-Industrialization (ISI). But, there is no reference about the framework within which ISI is being implemented in Iran. The periphery-centre relations in international imperialist network has been totally forgotten by the author.

As it is well-known, since August 1953, Iran has been totally reduced to a peripheral state, dependent on imperialism—especially US imperialism. ISI strategy is being mainly applied by multinational companies. These companies which are based mainly in the United States and in Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany and Japan also aim not to develop Iran's economy, but to increase their own profits. They invest money and apply ISI to serve either the requirements of a small local market for luxury goods or the requirements of international markets for raw materials and unfinished products. The process of exploitation intensifies when we regard that the multinationals import considerable amount of capital goods for the extraction of mineral resources and for the operation of their factories.

Before the exit of the Shah, there were about 600 American multinationals active in almost the entire economic sphere of Iranian society. Investment turnover for some of these corporations exceeded 60 per cent foreign Capital" facilitated the export of profits to the metropolitan US monopoly capital and also because the Shah was mainly a puppet of consolidated in Iran with the help of US monopolies. Therefore, any blind analysis of economic conditions without taking political aspects into

April-June 1979, pp. 163-178.

consideration is insufficient and will not serve any scientific purpose. Even today, the causal relation between economic recession and political disorder has to be taken into account, because this has led to the development of a vicious circle in Iran's economy. This important fact is not at all recognized by the author.

It should also be noted that in his analysis, the author has found ISI

It should also be noted that in his analysis, the author has found ISI strategy unsuitable for Iran's economy. But he has hardly gone further to suggest any practical alternative.

There are some people who argue in favour of the replacement of ISI strategy by export-oriented industrialization. According to them, by applying the latter, the country can utilize the already-gained high comparative advantage in the export sector and expand it. In this case, saving foreign exchange is possible and the country will be able to exchange exported products with "low-priced" imported goods. But, in Iran, because of the fact that it is an oil-based economy and that there is a non-elastic infrastructure as well as limitations in the export sector, this alternative is not easily feasible.

Reliance on oil as the basic factor for the economy, and concentration on petro-chemicals and other oil products, may be regarded as a short-run alternative. But this suggestion can also be challenged by the fact that, by assuming a proven deposit of oil (63 billion barrels in 1977) and oil production (5.5 million barrels per day in 1977) constant—although both are variables—we can estimate that oil reserves will be depleted in Iran within 27 years. Then, what is to be done at that time? How is it possible to import without a source of export?

These facts lead us to think more seriously about the improvement of the agricultural potential as a substitute for oil. But here also some other serious limitations would arise—the shortage of rainfall, the nature of land ownership, the lower technology in agriculture, etc. The shortage of energy may also raise another serious constraint in the next 30 years. Therefore, the improvement of electrification as a source of energy for the future should also be given immediate priority.

Harmonization of all these, and creation of a sound economic basis, needs a centrally-planned economy. This necessity is well illustrated by the author: "A more diversified economy can remove the various pitfalls of such a situation, yet it should be stressed that unless a proper centralized planning agency becomes effectively operative to integrate the various sectors of the economy, no long-term concrete solution would emerge." With due acknowledgement to the author's view, I would like to add two important points in this connexion.

Firstly, in most cases, economic development in backward countries necessitates non-economic measures, i.e., first and foremost, the mobilization of the masses for the Herculean task of social reconstruction. At the same time, it should be noted that, the "centralized planning agency" would definitely be inefficient without having at its disposal a faithful cadre who

are Se ecor A c enslithe eat m

A

NOT

deal
that
the i
wou
indu
natio
This
socie
econ
work
flexit
by tl
unsa
main

of the classed zatio life. Econ Fin

This

Ar

The strani

Febru

\*Mr. I

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IMENT

pose.

itical

elop-

ot at

ISI I

er to

f ISI

lying ative

reign

orted

f the

nfra-

s not

n on

-run

that.

l oil

both

Iran

e to

the

ious

ner-

nay

the

uld

sis,

the of

zed

ous e." wo ,

ies on ne

ıld

ho

are ready to devote themselves whole-heartedly for the cause of the people. Secondly, a centrally-planned economy does not necessarily bring economic development and social justice for the majority of the people. A centrally-planned economy as such may be accompanied by overall enslavement of the toiling masses. Therefore, a planned economy, as was the case during Hitler, per se, should not be regarded as the final goal. It is, at most, a measure to fulfil socio-economic targets which are determined by the economic policy of the state.

Apart from the ISI strategy and economic planning which have been dealt with above, there are some other deficiencies in Dr. Chawla's article that should be clarified. The author has explained on page 172 of the journal the impossibility of absorbing output in Iran: "Even assuming that Iran would develop large-scale, capital intensive and technologically advanced industries..., the small size of internal market and highly competitive international market pose serious problems of absorbing such a level of output." This judgement may be valid only under the present framework of Iranian society. But it is erroneous to generalize on the future trends of Iranian economy on the basis of a justification of the present institutional framework. Iran with a population of more than 36 million offers a very good and flexible market for the groups of manufactured products which are required by the lower-income social groups, especially if we take the high level of unsatisfied demands of workers and peasants into consideration. But the main problem is the lack of purchasing power of these deprived classes. This is the gist of the problem. What is the cause? Is there any way out?

Answering these questions needs, of course, a thorough investigation of the social stratification of the society and interrelation between the classes, as well as a deep analysis of the objective condition for the mobilization of the masses in order to change the whole structure of their social life. Therefore, here, there is no clear-cut line between Sociology and Economics. And an economist should know Sociology as well.

Finally, I must acknowledge that in spite of the shortcomings mentioned above, there are quite a few important observations in Dr. Chawla's article. The study will no doubt contribute its share for the understanding of the Iranian economy.

February 1980

EZAT MOSSALLANEJAD\*

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Mr. Ezat Mossallenejad is a PhD. student working on the "Political Economy of Oil in Itan", at the Golden and the College Pune. Itan, at the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune.

### DEMOCRACY IN INDIA

### A Review Article

THE work under review\*, covering the period 1947-58, was originally completed in 1962-63 as a dissertation for a doctoral degree of the University of Poona. As the author mentions in his Preface: "The work has been made entirely new and brought up-to-date by a thorough and radical revision in order to make it more useful for academic and non-academic purposes." (viii) The author has chosen a very broad field for his study and analysis and he tries to examine the environment essential for the viability and stability of parliamentary democracy against the backdrop of the changing social reality of India. The book also attempts to provide a brief history and development of over two hundred political parties in India of all kinds and to classify them into fourteen groups on the basis of their objectives, namely-"the Social-Democratic group, the Socialist group, the Marxian group, the Religio-Centric group, the Secessionist (Autonomy) group, the Princely group, the Feudal group, the Linguistic group, the Social Justice (Denominational) group, the Liberal group, the Legionary (Extremist) group, the Regionalist group, the Tribal group and the Anarchist group." (p. 22).

At the outset, it may be said that it is a scholarly book of a person who has thought deeply on the subject matter and is not afraid to pen his views even on controversial issues in a forthright manner. Admittedly, not all of his conclusions and formulations about Indian polity and society will satisfy everyone, including the present reviewer. Even so, his book stands out as a well-researched and well-thought-out work on party and democracy in India and is a welcome addition to the growing volume of literature in this field. Mention must be made of the fact that works in this area of study have been written mostly by American scholars and it is therefore gratifying to note that, of late, Indian scholars are turning their attention increasingly to studying their own society and its politics.

The author while discussing the role of the Party and the Film on pages 361-65 rightly stresses the fact that the motion picture as an instrument in moulding public opinion has certain obvious advantages over the Press and radio because of its audio-visual appeal. This fact is of greater sociological significance in a country like India which is the world's third largest producer of films. The author has, in this context, made brief comments on the advantages that the ruling Congress Party had enjoyed in the past in projecting its image through the "Indian News Review" which is produced every week by the government-owned Films Division and is invariably shown throughout the country's 4000 or more cinema houses where "in a day on a average 2 to 2½ million people witness the credit side of the

BOOK

[ruling the and like their the shame image]

Th

the f

the o

to p

the I the g light total of In leadi majo amer ment for tl

If th

able"
of pr
mark
the c
provi

ples

the v

acqui Amei where mark

on th

by the

The "No

<sup>\*</sup>S.N. Sadasivan: Party and Democracy in India. Tata McGraw Hill, New Delhi, 1977, Rs. 87.

[ruling] party and the best of its leaders and associates." (p. 364) Perhaps, the author could have thrown some light on the connexion between parties like AIDMK/DMK and the Madras-based film industry and the popularity their leaders have derived, and continue to do so, by their association with the film world. The present Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Shri M.G. Ramachandran's popularity is mostly, if not entirely, the result of his "hero image" through his acting in films. Earlier too, when the author discusses the formation and political base of these parties (on pages 134-142) he misses the opportunity to highlight the significance of DMK party leaders' rise to prominence through their association with the film world.

The author has, occasionally, made sweeping statements like the

following:

ally

the

has

lical

mic

and ility

the

ndia

heir

oup, mv)

the

nary

chist

who

ews

1 of

isfy

out

acy

ure

of

ore

ion

ges

ent

ess

io-

est

nts

ast

oly

a

he

77,

ed '

In India, the aspirations of the masses are frustrated not by the judiciary but by the conflict between the democratic promises and authoritarian preferences of the dominant classes." (p. 427)

If the author had taken care to recall, for instance, the manner in which the Indian judiciary has, in the past, frustrated several attempts made by the government to bring about land reforms through legislation in the light of the "aspirations of the masses," he would have refrained from totally absolving the judiciary from its share of blame in this vital area of Indian economic life. It is instructive to refresh our memory with certain leading cases in this field, such as Golaknath vs. the State of Punjab. By a majority judgement, the Supreme Court held that no law, including an amendment of the Constitution, would be valid if it contravened fundamental rights, no matter if such legislation or amendment had been enacted for the amelioration of the masses and in pursuance of the Directive Principles of State Policy. Earlier, in Bella Banerji's case the Supreme Court took the view that even though the Constitution did not use the word "reasonable" with respect to amount payable as compensation for requisitioning of private property, the state must pay to the expropriated person the full market-price of the property prevailing on the day of the acquisition. Even the constitutional amendment which was adopted in 1955 to expressly provide that the quantum of compensation payable in cases of compulsory acquisition of property for a "public purpose" will not be justiciable (4th Amendment) Amendment) was disregarded by the said Court in the Vajira Vellu case wherein it is less than full wherein it laid down the "obiter" that the law providing less than full market vol. market value will be struck down. In fact, the Court did strike down a law on this care. on this ground in the Metal Corporation Case. In the Bank Nationalisation case also, the doctrine of full-market value as compensation was endorsed by the Court doctrine of full-market value as compensation was endorsed by the Court. Such a doctrine was obviously beneficial to the haves, The than to the have-nots, of Indian society.

The author has freely used expressions like "imposition of Hindi" (p. 138), "Northern domination" (p. 139), as if they were statements of fact. It is

one thing for certain political parties to use these slogans to "create" and "buttress" their political base and popularity in a regional setting, but when one turns to scholarly writings like the present work under review, one expects objectivity and scientific detachment in the handling of such issues which have become so emotion-laden and politically-surcharged in the present volatile Indian political life that a dispassionate and cool analysis of these controversial issues becomes all the more imperative. Students of Indian politics are well aware of the strong impact of the appeal of "caste" "religion" "region" and "language" on the minds of the Indian masses and therefore of the propensity of all political parties to "cash on" these emotive feelings. The DMK and other like minded parties' efforts to use the language controversy must, therefore, be seen in this total context. and their slogans must not be elevated to the level of self-evident truths. Besides, one must also bear in mind that in a bargaining federalism of the Indian variety, several "states" and "regions" such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal and Punjab, because of greater socio-economic and political cohesion and development and a capacity for vigorous articulation of their collective demands, are more able to extract a relatively disproportionate amount of national attention and resources for themselves, while other backward regions and states continue to languish and fall in line with the national policy decisions in the shaping of which their effective participation is, at best, minimal.

The author has succinctly presented the opinion of the English-educated Tamilians that for them "Hindi is not more than an amorphous regional language constituted of several dialects, and "Hindi sentimentalism" is not Indian nationalism. Rich in literature, richer in tradition, their mothertongue, according to them, is the only Indian language that resisted Sanskritization and is superior to Hindi." (p. 222) However, it may not be out of place to comment here that the articulated opinion of Aryavarta looks askance at the charge of "Hindi sentimentalism" as meaningless for the simple reason that the very essence of any nationalism, be it Indian, Chinese, Russian, English, American or Arabic, is its capacity to instil in the hearts and minds of a group of people the common feeling of oneness through a number of factors, such as common attachment towards a geographic area, its history, religion and culture and also language. Can one therefore ever think of English, Russian, Chinese or Arab nationalism without their concomitant attachment to English, Russian, Chinese and Arabic languages respectively? The issue of Hindi language as the lingua franca of India was, and is, inextricably related to the emergence of Indian nationalism in response to its struggle against British imperialism. In short, the struggle for giving it its due place in Indian society was an important aspect of our freedom struggle movement; a point which Mahatma Gandhi and his followers understood and for whose implementation they created a cadre of people to spread this Indian language throughout the sub-continent for the fulfilment and consolidation of Indian nationalism. Also, just as the

spread was ut ture a: charya though purpo of Ind once a again langua

BOOK

Hindi. Here dismis It is e loosely with s forces to gra ask the domin of Ind perceiv society educat langua are det In any on the are alr and its sweep :

On t author cracy c of the ultimat time, b matica! of the ment b

though

More p

the Inc

WS

and but

iew,

uch

ged

cool

ive.

beal

lian on"

s to ext,

ths.

the

ala.

tical

of

por-

hile

line

tive

ited

onal

' is

her-

kri-

t of

oks

the

ese,

arts

ha

rea,

ver

neir

ges

dia

ism

gle our

his

dre for

the

spread of Sanskrit in the past unified this land in thought and action and spread of the great minds of this peninsula to write a common literawas united a common intera-ture and, what is more, made the great acharyas from the South—Sankaracharya, Vallabhacharya and Ramanujacharya—the great builders of Hindu thought and who infused in Hindu ethos their distinctive dynamism and purpose, so also in contemporary India with the successful consummation of Indian nationalism, a day will come—in the not too distant future—when once again the best minds of India, including those from the South, will again be the torch-bearers of Indian thought expressed through an Indian language which is by common acceptance and usage none other than Hindi.

Here, we may take note of the author's warning, that "It is unwise to dismiss the North-South controversy as something non-existent." (p. 222) It is equally unwise to think that the real controversy is between what is loosely referred to as the "North" and the "South" in India. One must with scholarly insight pierce these labels to lay bare the socio-economic forces that are arrayed behind this facade of "North" or "South" in order to grasp the evolving social reality of India. One must in all seriousness ask the question—Does the answer necessarily lie in maintaining the present dominant status of English in India? Is it compatible with the main thrust of Indian nationalism and democracy? One need not be a Lohiayite to perceive that the onward march of the process of democratization of Indian society is thwarted by, inter alia, the entrenched and privileged English educated elites who will stand to lose, should English be replaced by Indian languages in their respective States and by Hindi at the Centre, and hence are determined to wage an unrelenting propaganda barrage for its retention. In any case, the final answer to this and other issues now looming large on the Indian political horizon will be provided by the Indian masses who are already bestirring themselves out of centuries of silence and passivity and its gathering tidal wave is bound sooner or later—sooner than later—to sweep aside the present elite structure of Indian society.

On the nature of parliamentary democracy, the book is replete with the author's perceptive and wise comments, such as: "If majority in demoof the also does not mean majority of the people, it also does not mean majority of the electorate" (p. 4); and a little later his assertion that "The will of the ultimate sovereign has only a narrow scope and if not exercised in the given time by the time, by the given means, in the given manner, it is simply ignored or automatically. matically nullified." Or again, "Democracy is, therefore, not a government of the poor! of the people, not a government of the majority of the people, but a government by the legislature. ment by the leaders of the party which secured the majority in the legislature. More precisely, it is partiocracy." (p. 6) Likewise, the author, while surveying the Indian social bas made a number of the Indian social scene from time immemorial, has made a number of thought-proval: thought-provoking statements, such as the following one:

Freedom, especially social, was never a subject of intellectual interest

and was never considered to be a worthy cause for intellectual action. The saints and seers who with their objects of devotion became centres of popular attraction, forced intellectual power to be wasted in futile religious controversies and remained tacit on the question of social liberty. (p. 480)

And a little further on, the author makes a bold assertion:

Suffering for an ideal was never a part of the Hindu intellectual life and the self-proclaimed custodians of knowledge who developed the art of rapprochement with political authority at the cost of society, only vied with one another to win the favour of the conquerors. So far as their social authority was not questioned, they were prepared to accord full legitimacy and be loyal to any system of government. In other words, they were willing to accept any political slavery provided the social slavery existing in the country was allowed to continue. The traditional divorce between precept and practice and the lack of resolve and boldness to stand up for principles have created an intellectual void which prevents Indian society from imbibing democratic values. (p. 481)

There will be scholars who would want to challenge the above and several other assertions of the author. Also, the full-scale scholarly study covering such wide dimensions which the present work tries to encompass still remains to be written. Perhaps, it will take years of the most careful work by a political scientist who also has an inter-disciplinary insight to understand the totality of Indian socio-political life—its past and present—to come out with a definitive study on this subject. Meanwhile, we have Sadasivan's book—informative, wide-ranging and occasionally prone to "Southern" bias.

Jabalpur

D.P. MISHRA\*

### INDIA

A.B. SHAH, Ed.: J.P. Naik Festschrift Committee: The Social Context of Education: Essays in Honour of Prof. J.P. Naik. Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1978, xxii, 276p., Rs. 75.

THE book under review contains essays presented to Shri J.P. Naik, on the occasion of his seventy-first birthday. The volume contains essays by eminent people who have had long experience in the field of education. The book however lacks homogeneity which could not possibly be maintained since the contributors came from varied disciplines. While some

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

essa are natu N

BOO

a co whice wor desi

Mar

have

natio

Iv new utop

with

Pr

to be He s is ch norn supe have

belie

The entry Shah ideal neces for e:

system A.1 existe high

peop any f siona

and t

to fu

<sup>\*</sup>Mr. Mishra is a former Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.

entres

futile

social

EVIEWS

al life ed the ociety.

So far red to nt. In ovided e. The esolve ectual

alues.

vering mains by a stand come ivan's hern"

HRA\*

ext of thers,

Naik, tains lucay be some essays have been written in praise of Naik, which he richly deserves, others are merely descriptive. There are however a few essays of a theoretical nature which deal with the main theme of the book.

Naik himself has contributed an article which concludes: "I had never realised before that money can do so little really to vitalise education and that what was really needed were two things (1) a sense of commitment, a commitment beyond self, a commitment to great and abiding values which give a meaning to life; and (2) the creative joy of participating in a worthwhile task". (Page 11). While a sense of commitment is highly desirable, Naik knows too well that mere idealism would not lead us far. Many educational institutions which had a team of dedicated workers have withered on account of lack of adequate finances. And if the national system of education is to be vitalised, our teachers must be paid well.

Ivan Illich has no use for modern education. He rejects it and suggests new technology as an alternative to education. (Page 42). He takes an utopian view of society and suggests de-schooling of culture and the social structure. Whatever technology we adopt, no civilization can exist and grow without schooling.

Prof. Gore has made the most pertinent remark in his essay, which needs to be emphasized for the benefit of both educationists and political leaders. He says: "If education communicates altruistic values and life in society is characterised by self-oriented action, or if education verbalises rationalist norms, whereas life in the city is characterized by a wide prevalence of superstitious and credulous action, the social content of education will have to give rise to hypocrisy and cynicism. The young will come to believe that what they are taught is not expected to be practised". (Page 66)

The educational planners who are thinking of putting restrictions on the entry of students to Universities will benefit by the advice given by A.B. Shah in his brilliant essay in which he describes the major features of the ideal national system of education. According to him: "In India it is necessary to reconcile the need for quantitative expansion and the demands for excellence... to limit the expansion of education in the name of standards can only mean a perpetuation of a most obnoxious feature of caste A.B." (Page 137).

A.B. Kamat, writing in the same strain, believes that "there has always existed an elitist channel in our educational system providing prestigious high quality education for the small affluent class in society.... The super people than its counterpart of the pre-independence day. There is hardly sional or service prospects, that is money, career, influence and convenience; pseudo-Westernised norms of high society". (Page 262) If education is an instrument of social change, radical changes will have

to be introduced in our hierarchical educational system which is oriented in favour of the middle and upper classes.

The book makes a valuable addition to educational literature, but its value would have been considerably enhanced if all the essays had concentrated on the theme. I am doubtful whether Naik himself should have contributed to this volume which is written in his honour—or is it because JP was dreaming as a dictator!!! (Page 2)

Considering that the book contains only 271 pages, the price of Rs. 75 is on the high side.

Udaipur.

114

K.L. SHRIMALI

ALFRED DE SOUZA *Ed.*: The Politics of Change and Leadership Development: The New Leaders in India and Africa. Manohar, New Delhi, 1978, xxvii, 290p., Rs. 60.

OLITICAL systems in the Third World are confronted with exogenous and endogenous pressures, and crises of development are deepening. The Third World has to struggle against imperialism and neo-colonial penetrations and establish Socialist societies. This struggle has led to the collapse of many experiments in self-governance and the fabric of political institutions has proved fragile to face external threats and internal social dissatisfaction. The ruling classes in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America propose to stay in authority with the assistance of erstwhile colonial rulers and suppression of mass movements. In such a social context, the role of emerging leadership in the Third World should be examined. Political leadership and correlation of social forces determines the path of development in various societies which are passing through a phase of transition. De Souza has brought a few scholars together in an attempt to understand the phenomena of leadership in Asia and Africa. The common theme of all contributions in this edited volume is: How are the challenges of change being met by leadership in two continents of Asia and Africa? Some important insights into the making of leadership have been provided by Ali Mazrui and Vijay Gupta in their contributions on African leadership.

Mazrui in his writings has been emphasizing the role of education in creating the leadership in Africa which opposed colonial rule; and acted as "followers of the West and leaders of their own societies". Educated elite mobilized masses against imperialism and became responsible for governance after the withdrawal of foreign rulers. Mazrui also draws our attention to the fact that Western education alienated the natives from their culture. But he fails to correlate the role of education in Africa awakening to other social forces and processes at work in Africa. Vijay Gupta has made a contribution on the role of leadership in rural development

BOO

of 7

Tan cou T with Fou lead

Gan the of fu

for 1

the of should A

under Can the 1 in so Th centr

Vijay one a leade prope

Jawa

V.T. I

Plann much and a basic respect alway

to the

tant r

iented

VIEWS

out its oncenl have ecause

Rs. 75

RIMALI

velop-Delhi,

genous ening. olonial to the olitical social a and twhile ntext, nined. path ase of ttempt mmon

lenges frica? ovided frican ion in

icated le for vs our from aken-

acted

Gupta pment

of Tanzania. He has written a critical piece on the "Ujama" experiment in Tanzania which has been sabotaged by bureaucratic elements in that country.

The second part of De Souza's book deals with "leadership in India" with reference to student leadership, tribal leadership and rural leadership. Four contributions on India make specific references to the emergence of leaders around institutions like Panchayats and Student Movements. Gangrade on rural leadership, Troisi on tribal leadership and Karlekar on the student movement bring forth the beliefs of leaders and their style

The last part of the book is policy-oriented, and emphasis is on "training for leadership."

The common focus of the authors is that leaders play a central role in the developing countries and their social background and cultural setting should be analysed.

A question is: Are these leaders autonomous in their role? Can we understand processes of society by analysing the structure of leadership? Can we find out the role of real social forces by focussing our attention on the nature of leadership? Can we isolate leaders from basic social classes in society?

The present volume leaves an impression that the leadership structure is central per se. This is a mythology of the bourgeois social science to which some of the contributors in the present volume are committed. Mazrui, Vijay Gupta, Karlekar, and Gangrade provide significant insights into one aspect of social process, i.e., leadership. However, is the study of leadership relevant without examining the foundations of social and property relations in contemporary societies of Asia and Africa?

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

C.P. BHAMBHRI

V.T. KRISHNAMACHARI AND S. VENU: Planning in India: Theory and Practice. Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1977, ix, 191p., Rs. 15.

HE late V.T. Krishnamachari was associated with India's planning for more than ten years and served as Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission from 1953 to 1960. Planning during this period owed much to his vast administrative and political experience, his commonsense and ability and and ability to find agreed solutions, his commitment, even as a liberal, to basic national objectives as embodied in the Constitution, and the personal respect which it is a sembodied in the Constitution, and the personal chief Ministers of States tespect which leading Ministers at the Centre and Chief Ministers of States always accorded to him. He made a number of vital personal contributions to the developer of the developer which the most important to the developer which the developer which the most important to the developer which the developer which the most important to the developer which the developer which the most important to the developer which the devel to the development of the planning process, among which the most import related to the planning process, among which the most import and agricultural tant related to the evolution of community development and agricultural extension, development of irrigation policy, centre-state co-operation in planning, and reform of administration.

Soon after his official connexion with planning came to an end, "V.T.K.", as he was commonly known, set out his experience of planning and observations of plan implementation in a systematic manner in his Fundamentals of Planning in India (Calcutta, 1962). He viewed the Five-Year Plans as a means of giving effect to the social and economic policies envisaged in the Constitution and presented an assessment of the results of the Plans. In this work, which reviewed the constitutional and historical background, the working of the Planning Commission, development objectives in different sectors, financial resources and economic policies, and the machinery of Government, he also offered some of his own practical suggestions for accelerating the pace of development. As was characteristic of him, V.T. Krishnamachari had his feet firmly on the ground and, without making any pretentious claims, he set out succinctly whatever seemed to him appropriate for the purpose in view.

The present work, claiming to be a revised edition, contains next to nothing of the original. A second edition might have updated the first, reviewed the later experience, and affirmed or modified some of the lessons drawn by VTK. Instead, what this supposed new edition offers is a great deal of second-hand and not-too-well-digested pedantry about macroeconomic models, choice of techniques and growth strategies, with little or no reference to the realities of planning. All that was of value as a contemporary assessment in VTK's own book has been lost, without even a word of remembrance or explanation. The kindest thing S. Venu could have done would have been to retain only his own name and to let the reader interested in the experience of the fifties go back to a library, find the original, read it along with other Plan documents of that period, and draw his own conclusions.

New Delhi

TARLOK SINGH

BO

offi

col

and

tra

by

has

jud

ban

the

Dec

Dec

rele

con

Ind

usef

P.B.

mac

of the

and

way

pers

disc

emb

juris Worl

and last enou

decis

plina Th

Wou

of d

The

to th

of hi

to ca

atten

shee

0

R

T

T

1

]

M.S. BALA: Disciplinary Action in Industry—Including Banking Industry.
Orient Longman Ltd., New Delhi, 1979, x, 196p., Rs. 30.

BOTH the author and the Indian Institute of Personnel Management deserve kudos for bringing out this small but information-packed book about a serious aspect of personnel management, more so now that indiscipline in the manufacturing industry is on the rise in general and in particular in the banking industry. It gives all essential legal information and also various judgements in courts which affect the working of industrial jurisprudence.

Chapters are devoted to standing orders and disciplinary action, misconducts, enquiries and chargesheets, witnesses, punishments, suspension,

offence and simple termination of employment, industrial tribunals, civil courts, industrial disputes, the Sastry Award and the first bipartite settlement and rules regarding transfer.

This is a useful book not only for personnel managers but also for senior trade union officials, as it explains the basic laws and their interpretations by courts including the Supreme Court. The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 has many shortcomings which have been brought out well with the aid of

judgements quoted in relevent paragraphs.

Though provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 apply to the banking industry personnel—particularly Class III and Class IV employees there are two more Acts—the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act 1955, and the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Amendment Act 1957, and Sastry and Desai Awards which are relevant also for the Banking Industry, so far as disciplinary actions are concerned.

There are two useful appendices about redress of grievances in the Banking Industry and Nine Standard Letters. These points are likely to be specifically useful to young personnel managers. Former Chief Justice of India, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar rightly observes in the preface that the author "has made appropriate and adequate use of several relevant judicial decisions of the Supreme Court as well as High Courts and considered them carefully and occasionally commented on them critically but in a constructive way .... "

The main usefulness of this book lies in the fact that even younger personnel managers can turn to it for guidance and avoid pitfalls of hasty disciplinary action, thus saving themselves and their employers unnecessary embarrassments later.

Reading through the book, this reviewer felt that disciplinary industrial jurisprudence requires re-codification in the light of the experience of the working of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and many Supreme Court and High Court judgements, Tribunal Awards and specific experiences of the last 32 years. But unfortunately the author does not ask for it. He is deft enough to wade through the maze of diverse rules, standing orders, court decisions and what have you. Would it not be better if provisions of disciplinary and what have you.

plinary action in industry are freshly and simply codified by Parliament? This is one area on which national focus needs to be concentrated. It would also attract trade union support and simplify the administration of disciplination of disciplina of discipline in industrial establishments including the service industries. The other point is that standing orders, in a language that is comprehensible to them. to them, must be made available to the employees, preferably at the time of hiring them, so that they avoid unnecessary pitfalls and do not fall prey catchy slave to catchy slave the catchy slave the catchy slave to catchy slave the to catchy slogans and radical shibboleths. Unfortunately again, there is no attempt to suggest this procedure which could avoid a lot of enquiry, chargesheeting and disciplinary action.

Our national aim should be to inculcate a sense of greater discipline in

o him ext to e first, essons great пасгоttle or ontemord of

e done

erested

1, read

s own

EVIEWS

ion in

T.K.",

obser-

rentals

s as a

in the

ns. In

nd, the

fferent

ery of ns for

, V.T.

naking

SINGH

dustry.

gement packed w that and in nation ustrial

. misension,

the labour force and to that end an educative campaign to enlighten labour about their rights, responsibilities and conduct could pay rich dividends in reducing the number of cases of indiscipline or misconduct. It is sad that both in our labour laws and interpretations made of those laws by courts and tribunals, the behavioural science approach has been missing. This should be introduced forthwith. Of course, it is no fault of the author of this volume that this approach is missing. But we must nationally campaign for a more sophisticated approach to generate, maintain and advance discipline in our industrial establishments through advanced social-psychological props, rather than through fear of losing one's employment.

This does not mean that indiscipline or threats to law and order and normal working of industrial units should be tolerated or condoned. The main point is to minimise them through a process of psychological impact, material rewards for good work, and an educative process, which enhances a workman's perception of his real interests in maintaining discipline, enhancing output, improving productivity and furthering the collective good of the industrial entity where he or she works.

In sum, it is a good, useful, compact, information-laden book despite the limitations; these limitations are written in our environment, society and in the legal framework in which we operate. It is this framework that also

needs overhauling.

Bombay.

O.P. ARYA

S.P. MATHUR: Economics of Small-Scale Industries. Sundeep Prakashan, Delhi, 1979, iv, 277p., Rs. 80.

for monitoring the progress attained in industrialising rural and dispersed regions of the country. It could even help taking up corrective measures which might be required in order to remove the obstacles confronting their development. As far as theoretical studies are concerned, much work has already been completed and the subject explored in great depth. Very little could be contributed further in this regard. Studies relating to small-scale industries are, therefore, important only for ascertaining operational details on the basis of which the magnitude of progress could be ascertained and a prognosis of their difficulties made, so that right correctives could be applied in time. The scope for such diagnostic studies is very, extensive and they deserve to be encouraged. But, the study under review is very disappointing.

The author has attempted an elaborate intensive study of small-scale units located in Agra district. The region in ancient times had acquired international eminence and repute for its manufacturing excellence; the Moghul capital in the city of Agra was established because of its political, industrial

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

and Agr thre now like mac show

B00

of si takin D with

ship

surv

by 1

pott

acco

A

only
wha
the i
variation
conc
distr

to h very

New

auth It

S.L.N

v 1

facu Pref

been

bour ends that ourts This or of aign ance

IEWS

chot. and The pact, inces line. ctive

and also RYA

spite

han,

ding and ctive rontnuch

epth. g to perad be

tives very. view

units nterghul strial

and commercial importance. The karkhanas or the ancient workshops at Agra produced fine muslins, silk brocades, hand-knitted carpets, goldthreaded textiles, marble products and art metal and leather wares. Even now, Agra is engaged in manufacturing many diversified products. Items like scientific instruments, industrial machinery, power generating sets, machine tools, welding electrodes, glass and potteries, besides world famous shoes, are produced.

An empirical study of various problems arising out of this diversified industrial fabric could indicate the different problems impending the growth of small industries. The author has, however, wasted his energy in under-

taking a study for which he does not seem to be well equipped.

Dr. Mathur has taken a sample of 300 units out of (probably) 45 villages with population ranging from 2500 to 3500. The 300 units surveyed by the author consisted of 169 individual entrepreneurs, 104 working in partnership, 19 in private companies and 8 others. About 19.67 per cent of the units surveyed consisted of casting, diesel and agricultural implements followed by leather and rubber goods amounting to 16.67 per cent; glass-ware, potteries and bangles as well as scientific instruments and chemicals each accounted for 8.67 per cent; 22.53 per cent of the units produced food and sundry items. Any conclusions based on such fragmentary data would not only be erroneous but it may even be misleading. The statistical support for whatever the author has intended to convey is so inconsistent that one gets the impression that the author has made no efforts towards reconciling the various facts that he has used. The statistics given are likely to compel a conclusion that only 10.15 per cent of the total working force in the Agra district are employed. This seems to be a very unrealistic conclusion. The author has also not ventured to offer any preemptive recommendation.

It is however creditable that in spite of the limited resources available to him, he produced a book of this size. The price of the book is certainly very high for the contents.

New Delhi.

BEPIN BIHARI

S.L.N. SIMHA Ed.: Credit Management (Planning, Appraisal and Supervision). Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1978, xxvii, 461p., Rs. 50.

HIS book is a substantially expanded version of earlier volumes and contains papers written by senior executives from banks, and the faculty of the Institute for Financial Management and Research, with a preface by the editor. Basically, this collection of papers appears to have been used in the linstitute for Financial Management and Rosen have While with executive development programmes of IFMR. While multi-faceted credit management is a topic of import, there are

BO

Inc

in (

col

are

bar

pro

asp

sub

thr

diff be i

fac

fac

fina fac

the

not

one

the

to

fina

1

eve

ma

rea

by

Ne

Wit

the

an

1

1

1

I

efforts to cover the wide spectrum of topics with greater focus from the point of view of banks at macro-level.

Various dimensions of planning, appraisal and supervision relating to credit management are dealt with by specialists in the concerned field. In addition, topics on industrial sickness and the role of banks are dealt with and although, this is one of the important dimensions of the current situation, they seem too important to be confined to credit management. Presumably, the editor with the objective of making this book useful to bankers has included these special topics because of the banks' involvement in the rehabilitation of sick units and in providing credit to industries.

Most of the topics under the heading of planning trace the historical perspective to locate changes in patterns and style of credit, control systems etc. The topics dealing with various credit schemes describe the schemes since their operations and traces changes in them. Although, this is useful for a new entrant in a bank and to the students of economics and commerce, it would be of little value to experienced executives in banks. A topic of interest, "Performance Budgeting in Commercial Banks" describes the modus operandi of the budgeting system in a bank. However, the problems and issues in the implementation of the performance budgeting systems in banks do require more focus while dealing with such a topic, which is ignored to a great extent.

The areas dealt with under the rubric of "Appraisal" such as Term-lending by Commercial Banks, Break-Even Analysis and the Lending Banker, describe the subject at a rudimentary level. For instance "Ratio Analysis" and "Funds Flow Statement" or "Working Capital Requirements" are mere repetitions from text books and collection of few facts. The refinements brought about in these areas could have been mentioned. The banks have refined break-even analysis for different types of industries; the funds flow statement is also presented in a summary form, indicating the long-term sources and uses as well as short-term sources and uses to analyze and identify diversion of funds meant for specific use. Further, the ratios have certain conceptual errors which need to be corrected under Indian conditions. The acid-test ratio, for example, deducts inventories from the current assets to provide sharper focus on liquidity. However, one may not forget the fact that, part of the bank loans are against inventories based on certain norms and therefore, one has to truncate that portion of bank loans borrowed against inventory while reducing the current assets. The better way to present this ratio would be : current assets less ill-liquid current assets/ current liabilities less bank loans against inventory. Among the turnover ratios, too, the inventory turnover can be calculated in terms of level of inventory for days rather than the "times" turnover, enabling easy comparison with the Tandon Committee norms. The topic "Tandon Study Group Approach..." briefly describes the group's approach but does not show an illustration for various stages of lending. Also, it would have been useful, if the author had analyzed the stages of implementation of the Tandon

norms in Indian industry. Other topics such as Financing Small-Scale Industries, Agricultural lending by Commercial Banks etc. are descriptive in content and hardly touch upon issues and problems. The statistics given could have been updated.

Follow-up of Bank Credit, Credit Supervision and Credit Inspection are topics of current interest and there are different practices in different banks. The article on Follow-up of Bank Credit is a description of the procedure prescribed by the Tandon Committee and the organisational aspects of reporting system in banks for efficient follow-up of credit is a subject of prime importance.

The last part of the book on Banks and Industrial Sickness containing three articles including one by the editor himself, fails to bring out clearly different factors responsible for this sickness. The reasons for sickness could be internal as well as external to management. While most of the internal factors such as production problems are amenable to control, the external factors such as power failures cannot be controlled. Therefore, any sort of financial analysis based on past results, which are a genesis of numerous factors, cannot be used as a tool for predicting oncoming sickness. Further the conditions in India are so uncertain that any optimum 'Z' value may not be appropriate.

The editor justifiably says in the Preface that this volume is an introductory one on the subject. However, the coverage on each of the topics, which by themselves require a separate volume to be a useful book, makes it useful to the students as a reference book. As far as its utility to bankers and finance executives is concerned, the value of the book is marginal.

The print is clear and legible, barring a few errors (Example: 12.Breakeven Analysis and The Leading Banker).

The editor of the book is an acknowledged expert on the theme of credit management and perhaps the original high expectations of a potential reader are not met because of the differing levels of presentation of subjects by different authors.

Management Development Institute, M.L. Bery

VINAYSHIL GAUTAM: Enterprise and Society: A Study of Some Aspects of Entrepreneurship and Management in India. Concept Publishing Company Delhi, 1979, 118p., Rs. 35.

WITH the imposing image of Western economic growth always looming large, the Indian intelligentsia equates economic development only with the exploitation of resources with the aid of mechanization. Hence the policies of the po the policies followed so far have been based on Western/Eastern European and/or American State of the past for these models, and/or American models of industrial growth. In the past, for these models,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

VIEWS

m the

ng to eld. In t with lation.

nably, s has in the

orical stems hemes

useful nerce, pic of

es the blems stems ich is

ending anker, lysis" ts"are

efinebanks funds -term

and have

tions. irrent forget

ertain owed ay to

ssets/ nover. vel of

ipari-Froup

w an seful,

ndon

BOC

ent

of :

the

tiat

and

and

ma

dim

ma

furt

inn

the

the

latt

trai

mu

beg

son

leve

pov

him

tion

atio

not

clas

acc

is i

clas

Will

per:

For

of 1

Igno

the

0

mer

(E).

in w

nee

C

, We

T

C

I

industrial growth and mechanization were practically synonymous with emphasis on mass production and capital intensity. Western technology and Western economic notions necessitated Western institutional set ups. Result? Increasing unemployment, persistent poverty and imbalances of various sorts. In this perspective, when a student of organizational management looks back at the economic history of our country of the last few hundred years, and more particularly of the last 32 years, he cannot fail to notice the superimposition of work methods and organizational structures which are responsible for a lot of incongruities between the developmental requirements and the social effort in that direction.

Now, however, social analysts have been looking anew at the native variables of economic development. There is a growing realization that effective organization of economic development has to be integrated and gradual. Therefore the developmental strategies have to take account of not only what is given in terms of ecology, sociology and economics which may be grouped under 'heritage', but also how and what changes would be brought about in this 'heritage'. It is in this context that Vinayshil Gautam has undertaken the study of "enterprise and society" to enable us to look into, as he puts it—"some aspects of entrepreneurship and management in India." More specifically, he focusses his attention on the recent shift to the policy of production by masses which is expected to reinforce modes of self-employment by using the entrepreneural accelerator.

Making an assessment of the problems and issues involved in entrepreneural growth, the author observes that past policies and present schemes have encouraged entrepreneurship which has got geared to the structural hierarchy of social relations. The beneficiaries have been only those with social, political and financial influence. The process has encouraged the reproduction of the organizational pattern of commercial agricultural sector with so many middle men sharing in the profits. All in all, therefore, even though the new enterprises succeed in their inception stages, it is the sustenance that becomes their major problem, what with having to compete with marketing techniques and compensation policies of larger concerns.

Gautam maintains that global tools of entrepreneural motivations cannot be expected to have universal efficacy when field experience indicates that entrepreneural ability and possibility are location and culture specific. Gautam bases his observations on the empirical experience of Eastern UP and Western Bihar districts, particularly Bhojpur, Purulia and Agra. He framework where ascribed status and power motive are very dominant factors. In rural areas specially, the decisions of one directly affect the people are keenly aware of their interdependence and penalties for getting out of step. This discourages individual decision-making. Besides, overlapping membership in decision-making networks further complicates the issues of self-employment.

With y and sult? rious ment idred e the vhich

VIEWS

uireative that and nt of hich ould utam look

odes ntreemes tural with the tural

nt in

ft to

fore, s the pete ns. nnot

the nity,

ting ver-

that cific. UP He mic nant,

ates

According to the author, it is therefore obvious that the utilization of entrepreneural potential requires that specific sociology of the application of science and technology must be developed. This sociology must examine the "...ascription achievement principles in role assignment; the differentiated and undifferentiated character of roles; the character of stratification and mobility; the structural incentives and barrier to entrepreneurship; and the role of kinship and other units of social structure in decision

In most entrepreneural development, technology seems to be an important dimension. Here, the author rightly feels that contrary to the requirement, managing innovation has been neglected and invention emphasized. He further feels that, in rural areas it is very necessary to distinguish between innovation that is 'neutral' to scale and social fabric and that which affects the scale of operations and the social structure. The use of fertilizer falls in the first category and mechanization in the second. The adoption of the latter type therefore faces a lot of hurdles. Hence, the prime necessity to train people in managing change and innovation.

Citing the Japanese example, Gautam suggests that money value of labour must be replaced with its intrinsic worth if entrepreneurship is really to begin flourishing. If I may venture to comment, this is a very knotty and somewhat philosophical question to be tackled at the societal and individual level requiring a long-time perspective. In a society such as ours where the power motive is rather strong, even among the well-to-do (as the author himself has observed), such a change would involve cultural and educational issues. Similarly, it is easier said than enforced that, in the implementation of the programme of entrepreneural development care must be taken not to impose norms of behaviour of upper and middle classes to lower classes. Changes in the economic conditions of persons are almost always accompanied by some changes in their social patterns of behaviour. How is it then possible to avoid the adoption of norms of behaviour of upper classes by the lower ones in their upward economic movement?

The author contends that self-employment via entrepreneural development will receive impetus if influential segments of national community are persuaded about their dependence on rural areas. This seems too facile. For, a national policy geared to rural development would involve transfer of resources of various types from urban to rural areas. Apart from the ignorance about the rural-urban interdependence among the mass of people, there is there is a great deal of vested interest in non-transference of resources.

We once again run into the question of changing of values. Gautam's formula ED=F(M x I x E x H), for entrepreneural development (ED), as a function (F), of motivation (M), Incentives (I), expectancy (E), and have (E), and heritage (H) is interesting by way of indicating the multiple ways which the second of the which these factors interact for generating self-employment. The formula needs further exposition and exploration.

One Wishes that the author had put in a little more effort in integrating

124

BOOK REVIEWS

the problems and issues discussed and the conducive organizational designs suggested by him for entrepreneural development.

National Institute for Training in Industrial Engineering, Bombay

S. MADHURI

V.R. PANCHAMUKHI: Trade Policies of India: A Quantitative Analysis, Concept Publishing Company, Delhi, 1978, xiv, 317p., Rs. 70.

VERIFICATION of analytically established hypotheses in the light of factual observations is an essential step towards the development of science. In many social sciences, this step is fraught with various kinds of difficulties, including, among other things, the problems of observability and quantifiability. Economics is rather fortunate in the sense that most of its theoretical propositions yield themselves to rigorous statistical testing procedures. Therefore, the need for quantitative studies, particularly those dealing with economic problems of developing nations, can hardly be overstressed. Given the fact that there are very few quantitative studies on India's trade problems, Panchamukhi's book must be regarded as a sincere attempt at identifying the factors which determined the pattern, composition, directions and other characteristics of our foreign trade activities during the period 1950-70.

There are two stages in Panchamukhi's investigations. In the first stage, he has tried to evaluate the contributions of traditional trade-determining factors, such as factor proportions and technology, as against the role of trade policies in the various aspects of India's foreign trade. Factor proportions analysis is based on two factors, labour and capital. Thus, the relative importance of natural resource endowments in determining trade behaviour has been ignored. Not surprisingly, trade policies are found to have a dominant role. Therefore, in the second stage, a detailed analysis of the performance of India's trade policy system has been made at both micro and macro levels. In many cases, Panchamukhi's studies have revealed the inconsistency between the objectives and formulations of our trade policies.

One of the interesting aspects of Panchamukhi's study is the measurement of different components of India's trade policy system by identifying the suitable proxy variables, such as nominal, implicit, equivalent and effective tariff rates and implicit exchange rates. A commodity-wise trend in each of these proxy variables has been discussed. In the measurement of licensing systems, only the premium rates on imports have been used to measure the degree of intensity of all forms of licensing systems. The data on premium rates are partly collected through personal contact with traders.

In discussing the role of technology in determining trade behaviour, the author has introduced the concept of "technological distance" between exporting and non-exporting firms, which is measured on the basis of production function estimates of the two types of firms. The rank correlation co-efficients between "technological distance" and the parameters of the production functions bring out the importance of the efficiency parameter and factor substitutability (but not returns to scale) in explaining the differential performance of exporting firms. The author has also estimated a generalised model of trade behaviour in which various components of technology, factor endowments, price variables and government policy variables are all put together as determinants of export and import behaviour. Use of combined data of time-series and cross-section of selected developing countries of the ESCAP region has been made. Though the data sources have not been clearly indicated, the information contained here is valuable. However, it is difficult to interpret the results of this study, because of the "mongrel" character of the estimated equations which include jointly determined variables. The author has just ignored the problem of simultaneous equation bias in the estimates.

The chapter on price effects on trade policy is slightly confusing. What the author has really wanted to do is to relate domestic price behaviour to changes in external and internal economic conditions. Definition and estimates of import price multipliers are interesting, but these do not have any place in the subsequent analyses.

The analysis of import licensing and end-use pattern of imports involves the use of stupendous amount of data collected and processed from Daily Lists of the Bombay ports. This type of work needs to be done by the appropriate government agencies on a regular basis. The conclusions of this study should prove to be useful to the Planning Commission and other agencies. The author has also studied the resource allocation effects of trade policies by estimating effective rates of protection and domestic resource costs for the sectors of the Input-Output Table of 1965. This has been followed by a micro-level study of the aluminium industry.

In the context of responsiveness of domestic policies to changes in international environment, the author has made a detailed analysis of the effects of Generalised Scheme of Preferences on export behaviour in India. With all this included in one book, one obviously gets the impression that the coverage is too broad. It would perhaps have been more rewarding if Panchamukhi had done more intensive work on a smaller number of issues. The chapter dealing with such issues as import restrictions versus import misplaced but well-written

An econometric study becomes useful only if it is based on a theoretical model. In some cases, Panchamukhi's estimation results face the problem importance of his contributions is unquestionable. The book should be

'IEWS

signs

HURI

lysis,

light ment cinds oility st of sting

hose overdia's empt irec-

the tage, ning role ctor

the rade d to is of

the cies.

the ctive

sing the

ium

BO

DE

ide:

trag

ted

cha

trie

con

phr

pov

of t

pos

sup

Ma

asse

afte

But

the

Ma

Ma

zati

the ther

eco<sub>1</sub>

forg

the

neig

cula

Pek

"it

obje T othe

Des

fam

T

T

T

I

able to provide inducements to students and researchers interested in the trade problems of developing countries.

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

S.K. DAS

S.N. MISHRA: Politics and Leadership in Municipal Government. Inter-India Publications, Delhi, 1979, 123p., Rs. 40.

TN this book Dr. Mishra seeks to unravel, through survey method techniques, the type of leadership in a typical "medium-sized" city and whether this has any bearing on their performance. The author however, has not quite succeeded in relating the background of the civic leaders to the functioning of the civic body. For this, the author should have identified a few key-decisions of the civic body and traced their origin to the supposed bias of the civic leaders, in terms of their background. Admittedly, this is a difficult task; to mention only a few: (a) not all the elected city fathers are involved in decision-making, (b) unless the linkages of state with city politics are traced, it is difficult to see to what extent the city fathers are autonomous in decision-making, (c) the constraints in terms of state policy and resourceavailability need to be spelt out, (d) the contributions made by the municipal officials, especially the Executive Officer, need to be acknowledged and (e) the hypothesis that the background of the civic leaders is a critical factor in making decisions needs to be established. None of these have been attempted, with the result that while a fairly detailed description of the background of the city fathers covers around 100 pages, the next 8 pages are devoted to their behaviour within the municipal council, leaving the reader to guess about the nature and content of the decisions. Even here, the author indulges in fantasies: (i) the municipal council is supposed to be composed of elected members and officials, (ii) the Chairman as the chief executive functionary is supposed to be neutral, (iii) important party members in the municipal council act as link-men between the state government and the munici-

The author's concept of the Municipal Executive is equally fuzzy: examples—(pp. 50-51)—(i) the Chairman has been compared as being somewhat similar to a Minister and, at the same time, equated with the American Strong Mayor after comparing him with the American City Manager and the English Town Clerk, (ii) the Vice-Chairman has been described as the executive assistant to the Chairman.

Altogether, the book not only fails to fulfil its professed objectives, but also provides ample evidence of loose thinking on municipal politics and administration.

Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi.

ABHIJIT DATTA

VIEWS

n the

DAS

India

thod

and

ever,

o the

ed a

osed

is a

are

litics

10us

rce-

cipal

(e)

ctor

npt-

und

d to

uess

lges

cted

ary

ipal

ici-

zy:

ne-

can

ind

as

out

nd

TA

#### OTHER COUNTRIES

DEVENDRA KAUSHIK: China: An Ideological Puzzle. Sopan Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, vii, 96p., Rs. 30.

CCORDING to the author, the purpose of this small book is "to analyze A and interpret the widely known events" in China "with a view to identifying the factors that have led to this tragedy and also outlining their implications for the rest of the Asian countries, particularly India." The tragedy is the "miscarriage" of the Chinese revolution which "degenerated into a military-bureaucratic dictatorship following a Great-Power chauvinistic course."

In the first Chapter entitled—"Middle Kingdom Hangover", the author tries to trace the genesis and growth of "social chauvinism" in China and comes to the conclusion that "Maoism with all its pseudo-left revolutionary phraseology has only sought to provide an ideological cover to the great power designs of the Peking rulers."

The second Chapter deals with the Commune experiment and the failure of the Great Leap Forward. During the early '60s, Mao consolidated his position in the Army to back up his losing hold on the Party. With the support of his chosen successor, Lin Piao, he used the PLA to purge anti-Mao elements and developed it as an instrument to manipulate power and assert his personal authority.

The next section outlines the course of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. For a time, the Maoist line appeared to be in full command. But, soon, Lin Piao himself revolted against the Great Helmsman. However, the two-line struggle continued this time between the "radicals" headed by Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and the "pragmatists" led by Chou En-lai. After Mao's death, the latter asserted himself.

The last chapter is on the new leadership in Peking and the "four modernizations." The author believes that the Hua-Deng team has hardly abandoned the great power chauvinistic goals set by Mao: "It is only trying to pursue them through less radical and more pragmatic and rational methods of economic management." He examines critically the close alliance China is forging with the West and emphasizes the need for caution and vigil since the tensions generated by the modernisation drive might spill over to China's neighbourhood. In this context, the author warns about such impacts "particularly in the relations with cularly in India which is currently engaged in normalising its relations with Peking." (The book was written in December 1978). He also asserts that "it would be foreign policy "it would be futile to look for a common ground in the foreign policy objectives" of both India and China.

There is bound to be serious disagreement on the above and many similar there is bound to be serious disagreement on the above and many similar other views and assessments of the author which are patently subjective. Despite this evident bias, the book is interesting to those who are not so familiar with the inner politics of the CCP. The author has painstakingly

89

ZU

sta

the

in cha

Ger Pak

In to r

Elec

his

only

justi

for

Bak

sub-

only

the

men

Z.A.

too.

Si

state

bar

cond

attac

Zia-1

and .

threa

It is

Pure Italy

ever

of stalls, general

of M

Grea state

marshalled a wealth of facts in a concise fashion without the familiar verbosity and jargon usually associated with such academic writings. However, the book would have become more commendable to the readers had such simplistic views, as this one, been avoided: "In pursuing the great power nationalist goals, the new leadership in the Ching Nan Hai completely turned its back upon its obligation to world revolutions and proletarian internationalism."

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

P.K.S. NAMBOODIRI

LEO GOODSTADT: China's Watergate: Political and Economic Conflicts, 1969-1977. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, vi, 219p., Rs. 60.

THIS book is a compendium of snapshots that makes nothing but snapshots. The story of the decade of the Cultural Revolution in China is neither told here in the form of a blow-by-blow account leading to the fall of the Gang of Four in October 1976, nor is there a systematic analysis of the issues involved in the intense inner-Party struggle. Some incidents are reported here to invoke some parallel sense of the Watergate scandal, but they mix up primary evidences with unverified rumours so liberally that the reader finds himself only in confusion. There are patches of discussion of some issues which are not pursued logically.

There are a few lurking assumptions which the author carries throughout the book. One is the assumption of a life-long rivalry between Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai. It is possible to draw contrasting portraits of these two leaders in terms of their personality, organizational style and philosophical creations. But there is enormous amount of evidence to show their life-long partnership in leading the Chinese revolution and a profound complementarity between the two. Right upto 1976, the year of their death, this policy lines, as during the early sixties, but the handling of each crisis in the Goodstadt's suggestion that Zhou always represented the Soviet line sounds very much far-fetched.

This hurried commentary on the story of the Gang of Four blurs more issues than providing clues to understanding the debates. Only after the dust of the campaign settled down recently, we are beginning to see more serious discussions on the dimensions of China's development dilemma.

University of Delhi, Delhi.

Manoranjan Mohanty

BOOK REVIEWS

ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO: "If I am Assassinated...," Vikas, New Delhi, 1979, (Third Impression), xxxvi, 234p., Rs. 35.

THIS much-talked-about book under review, consists of two parts—
Introduction and the main text. The main portion for Introduction and the main text. The main portion of the book is the statement by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, submitted to the Supreme Court during the pendency of appeal against his conviction by the Lahore High Court in the Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan murder case, to rebut various charges levelled against him in the "White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977" released by the Martial Law regime in Pakistan on 25 July 1978.

In his 234-page rejoinder, suitably regrouped in 13 chapters, Bhutto tried to refute the charges that he rigged the elections in March 1977, or used the Election Commission and the official machinery to further his as well as his Party's interests, or received huge amounts of money from abroad for his Pakistan People's Party. In his characteristic eloquence, Bhutto not only termed the White Paper as "White Lies" but, probably with some justification, accused Gen. Zia-ul Haq's Government of malafide intentions for having issued this document to damage his and his counsel Yahya Bakhtiar's reputation, thereby prejudicing adversely the outcome of his sub-judice appeal before the Supreme Court. It is difficult to say, looking only from his own side, whether Bhutto has succeeded in his effort, At places, the rejoinder appears difficult to comprehend in the absence of the document which it has aimed to challenge. This much, however, is certain that Z.A. Bhutto's statement failed to save his life. The March 1977 elections, 100, were declared null and void subsequently.

Side by side with his arguments to rebut the White Paper, Z.A. Bhutto's statement contains "an impassioned political manifesto placed before the bar of history." It is here that Bhutto, the politician, distinct from the condemned prisoner, brilliantly expounded his political philosophy. He attacked military take-overs in Pakistan, particularly the one led by Gen. Zia-ul Haq whom Bhutto, with utter contempt, described as "an ungrateful and treacherous man." In a prophetic tone, Bhutto warned that "the greatest threat to the state of the state threat to the unity and progress of the Third World is from coup-gemony". It is this malady, Bhutto noted, which has made Pakistan, "the land of the pure" a " pure", a "coup-istan". Citing examples from the past experiences of Greece, lially, Russia and China, Bhutto came to the logical conclusion that whatof states policy of the armed forces in the initial stages of the formation of states, political power should ultimately reside in the civilian authorities. ltis, however, ironic that Bhutto, who had been an accomplice of the generals earlier, should have wanted "to escape from the lawlessness of Martial I aw", should have wanted "to escape from the lawlessness".

of Martial Law" only when he became a victim of "coup-gemony". Notwithstanding a few appreciative remarks about Nehru, Asoka the Great, and "the noise and chaos of her [India's] democracy," Bhutto, in his statement, came out as an implacable enemy of detente or any rapprochement

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

VIEWS

erbovever, such

ower letely arian

ODIRI

flicts, s. 60.

but

on in ding natic Some rgate 's so ches

hout dong two nical

long plethis ting the ing.

unds ore the

ore ma.

NTY

in Pakistan's relations with India, since, in his view, any idea of partnership with India, even for the purpose of creating a peaceful and cordial atmos. phere by removing suspicions, meant that "the raison d'etre of Pakistan disappears." In this context, it is interesting to note that with reference to the members of Qayyum Muslim League who shared power with the PPP before the 1977 elections, Bhutto stated: "I would retain them in my Government even after winning the elections, provided they did not do the Jagjivan Ram on me." Observers of the South Asian political scene can easily comprehend the full import of this statement.

That the rejoinder is marked by Bhutto's "Messiah complex" is not unexpected. Bhutto believed that he was "a household word in every house and under every roof that leaks in rain." At another place, Bhutto talked of the mission of life. To quote him again "I was born to make a nation, to serve a people to overcome an impending doom... I was born to bring emancipation to the people and honour them with a self-respecting destiny." No doubt, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the most popular leader that Pakistan has produced. But whether Bhutto, who was no less egoist, vindictive, overambitious and indulgent, over estimated himself is still too early to say.

A 28-page-long Introduction by Pran Chopra is at least as informative as the main text. Presenting a thought-provoking, interpretative and critical account of developments in Pakistan, particularly those closely related to Z.A. Bhutto, the Introduction makes the Bhutto rejoinder more intelligible to a lay reader. Errors, like the date of Bhutto's well-known statement that Pakistan would "eat grass to produce the bomb" do not, however, diminish the importance of the Introduction for a better and clearer comprehension of Bhutto's long statement.

In sum, this book is interesting and significant if for no other reason than for being the "dying declaration" straight from the darkness of the death cell of one of the most charismatic, though controversial, political leaders of South Asia during the last two decades.

Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

P.B. SINHA

P.S. BHOOSHAN: The Development Experience of Nepal, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1979, 195p., Rs. 60.

DIVIDED into four sections, the book under review deals with the salient aspects of economic development in Nepal with a major focus on the problem of human settlement. The author's main stance seems to lie in emphasizing the point that the parameter of the gross national product in national economy is not that crucial as is the issue of human settlement which acts not only as the agent of overall development but also reflects the quality of life led by the people.

BOOL

It

in N
betwee
horiz
terai.
region
hither
Valle

No menta to the ments is pro the sy mecha inculca tion of major more c borne view. viabilit An i been a fragme who co with a achieve equity v received now be plannin it could

forth in New D

analysed The t

It would

analysir

BOOK REVIEWS

rtnership atmos. Pakistan erence to the PPP in my t do the cene can

REVIEWS

not unry house talked of ation, to ng emaniny." No istan has ve, overto say. ormative d critical elated to telligible

son than he death 1 leaders

nent that

diminish

ehension

B. SINHA

ublishing

with the or focus ms to lie product ettlement reflects

It is observed that an important dimension to the development problem in Nepal is the highly marked disparity in the different regions. It is so between the vertically divided development regions as also between the horizontally divided natural regions such as the mountains, the hills and the Barring the Kathmandu Valley which is a small pocket, the terai region leads the rest of Nepal in economic development. It is also true that hitherto no other region has received as much attention as the Kathmandu Valley.

No detailed analysis of the achievements and the shortfalls in the implementation of the various Five Year Plans in Nepal has been made. According to the author, the aim of Nepalese planners has been to secure great achievements with the least possible change in the social and political system. "This is probably a requirement of the political and bureaucratic elites who man the system." He goes on to add: "The development was construed as a mechanical process, given the investment funds and not as a value to be inculcated in the population." The author then concludes that in the evolution of the development policy in the last twenty years, Nepal has made a major shift from the pure growth and production-oriented approach to a more distribution and justice-oriented one. This conclusion, however, is not borne out by any factual analysis and seems to be largely an impressionistic view. The author admits that Nepal's economic planning has suffered in its viability due to lack of reliable data and statistics.

An important finding of the author is that so far planning in Nepal has been an exercise of fitting macro-economic theories and models in a highly fragmented economy. Consequently, it often lost sight of the common man who constituted the majority. Development in Nepal came to be equated with attaining physical and financial targets. Even with some progress achieved in building the infrastructure within the country, the question of equity was never raised boldly at any time and the backward groups never received any special assistance. The author concedes that the situation has Now been corrected to some extent by adopting the principle of regional planning and decentralization in decision-making. However, to what extent lecould put the country's economy on an even keel is yet to be seen, felt and

The book is a welcome addition to the existing literature on the subject. lt would have been more useful if the author had concentrated on analysing the issue of human settlement in Nepal, so forth important policy decisions needed to be taken in this respect.

New Delhi.

NAVIN CHANDRA JOSHI

#### INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—MANAGING EDITOR).

ADHAV, Shyam Sunder Manohar. *Pandita Ramabai* (Confessing the faith in India series, 13). Christian Literature Society (on behalf of the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society), Madras. 1979. xi, 242p. Rs. 19.50. Paper.

Life, work and achievements of leading pioneer Christian saint of Maharashtra, who earnestly and ceaselessly worked for freedom and emancipation of women from the cruel bonds imposed by tradition and perpetrated especially upon women of the Hindu community. This study introduces the readers to the literary works of Pandita Ramabai, and the studies done on her life. It contains extracts from *Mukti Prayer Bell*, Vol. 2, no. 1, and her opinion on the translation of Bible into Marathi, expressed through her letters to the Bible society.

BHATIA, H.S. Ed. Martial Law: Theory and Practice. Deep & Deep, New Delhi, 1979, 240p. Rs. 50.

A collection of articles which deal with the origin, history, meaning, significance, legality and scope of martial law. Separate chapters are devoted to the administration of martial law in Pakistan, scope of martial law in English jurisprudence, American administration of martial law; proclamation of martial law in Cuttack, Ghalib's account of military rule in Delhi, and martial law in Punjab in 1919.

BOWES, Pratima. The Hindu Religious Tradition: A Philosophical Approach. Allied, Bombay, 1976. ix, 322p. Rs. 68.

CHANDRA, Jag Parvesh. Verdict On Janata. Metropolitan, New Delhi, 1979. xv, 212p. Rs. 35.

A bunch of meticulously selected pieces from the debates in Parliament, state legislatures, official committees' findings and press reports, attempting to bear out failures of the Janata Party through the analysis of its policies on subjects like treatment of poor and weak sections of the population, handling of foreign affairs, judiciary, corruption etc.

DE SOUZA, Teotonio R. Medieval Goa: A Socio-Economic History. Concept, New Delhi, 1979. 315p. Rs. 65.

A contribution to the literature on Indo-Portuguese historiography.

DESHMUKH, Durgabai. Chintaman and I. Allied, New Delhi, 1980, xi, 121p. Rs. 50.

Book of reminiscences, portrays the way the two personalities, each of whom received the nation's high award of Padma Vibhushan, maintained their distinctive roles both within and outside the house and yet proved to be the most acceptable life partners for each other.

DESHMUKH, Durgabai. The Stone That Speaketh, 2 V. Andhra Mahila Sabha, Hyderabad.

An account of the history, development, achievements of the institution rendering literacy, education, health and other numerous social services from its campuses established at Madras, Hyderabad, Mahboobnagar and Sangareddi. The personalities and their charitable deeds which helped the institutions to grow are also discussed in these volumes. The story covers the period from 1921, the year of establishment of the present institution's predecessor "Balika Hindi Patshala", to the present.

INDIAN

THE EI
319p.
An
a cen
numb
alien
and cen

ESTEVE

Rs. 5

failur alterr JACOB, in Inc the S Ide

his b
JAYAPF
COM
Comr
Sou

equali

of Ba

Some

Indira leader of ex Vindic Danda unveil 3.7.78 Confe

Sabha JHA, Jata Series, Trac materi

Dema

Bihar, report (Home of the Darbh some

of the JOSHIPU XX, 96 KALHAI

Rs. 35 Life years, THE EDITOR Pseud. (i.e. G. Kasturi). Compl. The Hindu Speaks. Interpress, Bombay,

319p. Rs. 75. An anthology of the thoughts of a great national newspaper on men and matters in An anticology (1878-1978). One editorial has been selected for every year of the paper. Major number of the editorials relate to the nationalist movement and its leaders and to the number of the leaders and to the alien rulers and their policies, and some editorials reflect the paper's interest in social and cultural problems.

ESTEVES, Sarto. Prospects of Indian Democracy. Meenakshi, Meerut, 1979. viii, 264p. Rs. 50.

Analyses political and economic consequences of one-party rule and causes of the failure of opposition, and concludes that a viable opposition with a well thought-out alternative to the policies of the ruling party is essential for the survival of democracy. JACOB, Plamthodathil S. The Experiential Response of N.V. Tilak (Confessing the Faith in India series, 14), Christian Literature Society (On behalf of the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society), Madras, 1979. xi, 127p. Rs. 14. Paper.

Ideas of Christian Indian poet of Maharashtra, on acculturation of Christian thought in India, and his contribution of Christian understanding of man in the Indian context. Some of his well known poems are given in translation in the last section, selected from his book Bhakti Niranjana.

JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN'S SEVENTY-SIXTH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION COMMITTEE, Madras. The Quest and the Goal: Philosophy of Jaya Prakash Narayan; Commemoration Volume (1978-79) The author, Madras, 1979. vi, 147p. Rs. 30. Paper. Souvenir throws light on the life of JP, his contributions to the political life of the country, his untiring crusade for ending poverty and corruption, and for achieving equality and freedom, his concept of total revolution and his role in the liberation of Bangladesh. The volume carries the historic correspondence between JP and Smt. Indira Gandhi from 1966 to 1975, and many significant letters between JP and other leaders in India and abroad on many crucial questions. Contributions are in the form of excerpts from the books JP Mission Partly Accomplished by Minoo Masani; JP Vindicated by V. Nargolkar; Total Revolution; articles by J.B. Kripalani, Madhu Dandawate, Mohan Dharia, V.M. Tarkunde, etc., speech by Prabhudas B. Patwari on unveiling the portrait at the Jayaprakash Narayan Library, University of Madras on 3.7.78, and Presidential Address of Dr. Thotappa to the 37th Indian Political Science Conference, Bangalore, 1977. The volume also includes the People's Charter of Demands, presented to the Speaker of Lok Sabha and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha on 6th March 75.

JHA, Jata Shankar. Early Revolutionary Movement in Bihar (1906-1920) (Historical Research Series, xvi), K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1977. v, 280p. Rs. 30.

Traces the history of revolutionary movement in the province with the help of, materials available in the archives of the political department of the Government of Bihar Abetra department of the fortnightly Bihar, Abstract of Police Reports available in the State Archives of Bihar, the fortnightly reports of the Government of Bihar and Orissa, the Green List in the Intelligence Branch (Home Department, Government of West Bengal) containing brief biographical stetch of the Bengal revolutionaries who worked in Bihar, and the Zamindari Records of the Darbhanga Barbhanga Ba Darbhanga Raj, etc. There are two chapters exclusively devoted to brief accounts of some levelustians. some revolutionaries who took an active part in the movement, and the nature of movement respectively. The appendices contain statements of the surviving members

JOSHIPURA, J.M. Realities of Bhagavad Gita. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1980. RS. 35. Paper.
Rs. 35. Promilla. Jagjivan Ram and Power Politics. Allora, New Delhi, 1980, v, 104p.

Life and personality of the leader who has been embroiled in the power game in recent years, as seen through the version expressed in interviews with his wife and senior civil

as well as d of social no claim section of h workers

dia series, Study of htra, who from the the Hindu Ramabai,

ell, Vol. 2,

rough her

elhi, 1979. gnificance, inistration American 's account

xv, 212p. state legi-

h. Allied,

it failures tment of y, corrupew Delhi,

s. 50. received oles both rtners for

derabad. endering es estab ities and in these e present

IND

MU

SI

b

a

R

CI

ai

fe

cr

SI

N

Xi.

A

th

ni

C

XV

Th

in

Th

Cl

pe

R

an

pa

Bu

In

AI

the

als

Wa

TAVA

Wh

exi

TAIN 19

SRIV

SINH

SCOT

SAM

NAF

RAL

servants and politicians of various political parties, associated with him during his long parliamentary career. The book also contains extracts and selections from his speeches, letters and interviews, published on the eve of the mid-term poll, 1980.

KHAN, Mumtaz Ali. Seven Years of Change: A Study of Some Scheduled Castes in Bangalore District (Caste-class series) Christian Literature Society (On behalf of the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society), Madras, 1979. xii, 232p. Rs. 21. Paper.

The study covering a period from 1970-77, enquires into the socio-economic conditions with particular reference to education, land holding, income, indebtedness, habitation, political participation, leadership and inter-caste relations. While assessing the performance of various organizations and schemes for the development of these people and also areas of change and continuity as compared to the conditions in 1970, it identifies the various factors which either hinder or promote changes.

KRISHNA MENON SOCIETY. ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS ON CHINESE AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM: ITS IMPACT ON ASIA AND ASIAN SITUATION AND NON-ALIGNMENT, 1979. *Proceedings* Ed. by Tapan Das (Krishna Menon Society Publications.) New Literature, Delhi, 1979. 122p. Rs. 25.

Opinions of foreign diplomats and eminent Indian participants, on the military, political and ideological implications in the context of fast changing world. It also contains an exposition of the evolution of non-alignment in its historical setting with India's participation in it by P.N. Haksar.

LIMAYE, Madhu. *India and the World*. New Literature, New Delhi, 1979. 58p. Rs. 4. Paper.

Collection of articles, interviews and speeches of the author on India's international relations.

MAHARASHTRA, ARCHIVES (Department of —). The Handbook of the Bombay Archives, Compl. by Sanjiv P. Desai and Ed. by B.G. Kunte. Director of Archives, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1978. vi, 196p. ix, Rs. 9.

It is a successor to "The Handbook of the Bombay Government Records" by A.F. Kindersley, published in 1921 which recorded possessions of the Bombay Archives till 1820 (with a few exceptions). This is limited to the records housed in the Bombay Archives only and brought up-to-date.

MAHARASHTRA, ARCHIVES (Department of), Maratha Rule and Administration In the North (1726-1784 A.D.) (Selections from the Peshwa Daftar (New Series) Hindi sources) Ed. by Raghubir Sinh. Department of Archives, Bombay, 1979. ii, 352p. Rs. Rs. 7.25.

MALAVIYA, H.D. Peking Leadership: Treachery and Betrayal. New Literature, Delhi, 1979. viii, 178p. Rs. 25. Paper.

Discusses Peking's policies in the post-Mao era. The author, a we'l-known parliamen tarian, gives a wealth of information about China's "Big Leap forward" and the so-called "Great Cultural Revolution". While forecasting the future, the author concludes that Marxism will overcome Maoism and other nationalistic and chauvinistic ideas in China and will become the theory guiding the revolutionary socialist transformation of the country.

MENON, K.P.S. A Dictionary of Kathakali. Orient Longman, Bombay, 1979. vi, 80p. Rs. 45.

Appendix gives some themes from the Kathakali plays.

MOHAPATRA, Gopinath. The Land of Visnu: (A Study on Jagannatha Cult). B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1979, xv, 508p. Rs. 150.

The study is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the historical development of the Purusottama or Jagannath (Vishnu) cult, its philosophy and religion and social and cultural significance, origin and philosophy of Jagannath Yatra. The second part provides English translation of *Purusottama Ksetra Mahatmyam*; Ph.D. thesis.

is long

EKAR

eeches, stes in

of the , 232p. condi-

habitaing the people 1970, it

INESE MOITA Menon

nilitary, It also ng with

Rs. 4. national

mbay rchives,

by A.F. rchives lombay

tion In Hindi 2p. Rs.

Delhi,

liamen -called es that China of the

7i, 80p.

). B.R. evelop-

n and second esis.

MURTHI, R.K. Foreigners Who Served India. Allora, New Delhi, 1979. 160p. Rs. 40. Profiles of twenty foreigners who came to India, and took active part in the national struggle for freedom, served to ameliorate condition of the downtrodden and tribals,

brought education and medical relief to the illiterate masses etc. Personalities included are C.F. Andrews, Romain Rolland, A.O. Hume, Sister Nivedita, Mother Teresa etc. NAHAL, Chaman. The English Queens: A Novel. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1979. 168p.

Rs. 45.

RADHAKRISHNAN, S. Nidhis: An Indigenous Financial Institution (Institute for Financial Management and Research Publication, 24). Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1979, vii, 92p. Rs. 20.

Objective study of the origin, growth, working, existing statutory regulations, special features and shortcomings of Nidhis, confined mostly to Tamil Nadu. It also makes critical assessment of the recommendations of the Banking Commission, the James Raj Study Group on Non-Banking Companies and the Sachar Committee regarding the Nidhis.

SAMPATH, M.D. Chittoor Through the Ages. B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1980. xix, 267p. Rs. 150.

Traces the history in all its aspects from the earliest historic times down to 1600 A.D., Appendix contains the texts and summaries of some important inscriptions bearing on the study; Ph.D. thesis.

SCOTT, David C. Ed. Keshub Chunder Sen (Library of Indian Christian Theology, Companion volume series, 1) Christian Literature Society (On behalf of United Theological College, Division of Research and Postgraduate Studies, Bangalore), Madras, 1979, xv, 361p. Rs. 20. Paper.

Under the project of publishing a series of books containing writings on "Christian Theology by Indians of other faiths with implications for indigenous Christian Theology in India", launched by the Division of Research and Post-graduate Studies of United Theological College, this first volume presents ideas and activities of the founder of the Church of the New Dispensation, through his lectures and writings selected from the periodical "The New Dispensation". A short biographical sketch is also included.

SINHA, Shyam Narain. Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi. Chugh, Allahabad, 1980. x, 134p.

Life and achievements of the leader of the Revolt of 1857, based on original records and contemporary accounts. Appendix contains text of treaty between Rao Ram Chand and the British Government dated November 17, 1817 and translation of Khareetas passed between, Maharaja Gangadhar Rao of Jhansi and political agent of Gwalior, Bundelkhand and Rewa, Her Highness Lakshmi Bai and Governor-General of

SRIVASTAVA, M.P. The Indian Mutiny 1857. Chugh, Allahabad, 1979. x, 249p. Rs. 65. Discusses nature, character and contributory factors of the revolt in general and in Allahabad division in particular. An analysis of bio-data of the leaders of the revolt in the Allahabad division in particular. the Allahabad division given in the appendix, attempts to prove that not only loss of their privilege. their privileges was the motivating factor behind their participation in the revolt but also a genuine hostility against the British imperial administration.

TAINSH, A. Ramsay. Why Be Hungry?: The Green Revolution. Esvi International, Madras,

Illustrated handbook suggests solution to the problems of irrigation, fuel, fodder aste of protein Waste of protein and grains, and sanitation, first published in 1970 under the title Varfor TAVAKAR, N.G. The Nagas. Tavkar, Bombay, 1979. 108p. Rs. 25.

Book on serpent cult and serpent worship, explains the various forms and rituals in these evictors are suffered from the results of which these existed in the world, based on the knowledge gathered from the results of explorations and or the world, based on the knowledge during the last 50 years. explorations and excavations and from the books published during the last 50 years.

C

Th

Sta

pa

co

the

Vi

R.

P

Th

for

of

In

W In his

TI

Vc

Ch of sto

In per per rep Ga a c tio

THOMAS, M.M. Response to Tyranny: Writings Between July 1975 and February 1977. Forum for Christian Concern for People's Struggle, New Delhi, 1979. xvi, 127p. Rs. 15. Paper.

Editorials of the author himself in the weekly Guardian of Madras and his writings, mailed to limited number of persons in mimeographed form expressing critical views on the emergency.

TSERING, Nawang. Buddhism in Ladakh: A Study Of the Life and Works Of the Eighteenth Century Ladakhi Saint Scholar. Sterling, New Delhi, 1979. 102p. Rs. 35.

Life and teachings of Grubchen Ngag-dbang Tse-ring based on a printed version of two volumes "The Life and Works of 'Khrul-Zig Nag-dban-Tshe-rin" of Tibetan manuscripts preserved in rDzong-Khul Monastery in Central Zangskar, and which were later published on modern paper in the traditional Tibetan book form. This study also explains the fundamental Buddhist doctrines and practices obtaining in Ladakh in the 18th century.

WEBSTER, John C.B. The Nirankari Sikhs. Macmillan (On behalf of the Christian Institute of Sikh Studies, Batala), New Delhi, 1979, xi, 104p. Rs. 15. Paper.

Origin and history of a distinctive group within Sikhism and clarifies the relationship of the group to the Sant Nirankaris.

R.J. MOORE Churchill, Cripps and India 1939-1945

BHEKAR

ary 1977.

D. Rs. 15.

writings,

cal views

ighteenth

ersion of

Tibetan

hich were tudy also kh in the

Christian

ationship

This is the story of a missed opportunity. In this book, Professor Moore argues that Sir Stafford Cripp's mission to India in 1942 could, if successful, have prevented the ultimate partition of India. Indian participation in a power-sharing executive would have led to co-operation between Hindus and Muslims. The failure of the mission can be attributed to the baleful influence of Churchill, acting in support of the overcautious and often stubborn Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow.

R.J. Moore is Professor of History at the Flinders University of South Australia.

Rs 110

CHARLES R. BOXER Portuguese India in the mid-Seventeenth Century

This book examines three aspects of Portuguese rule in India: Conquest, Navigation and Commerce, during the years 1640-68. The theme derives from the Portuguese claim, first formulated in 1499, that their Crown was 'Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, India, etc.' Yet, as this book shows, Portuguese fortunes in India and elsewhere were at a particularly low ebb during the mid-seventeenth century. Written with characteristic authority and backed by numerous archival sources in Rome. India and Portugal, this book provides most useful insights to the study of Indo-Portuguese history.

Forthcoming c, Rs 15

PARSHOTAM MEHRA The North-Eastern Frontier A Documentary Study of the Internecine Rivalry between India, Tibet and China Volume 2, 1914-54

Volume 1 covered the period from 1906 to 1914. Volume 2 deals with the forty years between the 1914 Simla Conference and the Sino-Indian agreement on the 'Tibet region of China', a period of considerable interest to those concerned with the more recent history of India's north-eastern frontiers. The documents in this volume present a fascinating story of a rapidly changing political milieu. Taken together, both the volumes that comprise The North-Eastern Frontier are likely to become authoritative source-books.

Rs 50

ASHIS NANDY At the Edge of Psychology: Essays on Politics and Culture

In the six essays contained in this book, the author deals with several major issues and personalities of modern India—Rammohun Roy and the abolition of sati: the authoritarian personality and the political system it requires and generates; the social and cultural forces represented by Gandhi and his assassins; concepts of woman and womanhood; Indira Gandhi and his assassins; Gandhi and the culture of Indian politics. At one plane, the essays define the outlines of a cultured. a cultural psychology of Indian politics; at another they define and analyse the contradictions in the h tions in the human personality that concretize the state of politics in a society.

Rs 50



# OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002

BOMBAY

CALCUTTA

**MADRAS** 

CC-0. In Public Domain, Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES...

Like providing medical welfare

We believe commitment to social progress is an important measure of business achievement.

Mahindra and Mahindra Limile

Ba tir

sta

rea Po

of Da tio Th its ma

18

# INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH: SEARCH FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP

by Dr. Mohd. Ayoob, Associate Professor in the School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University

(A Study sponsored by the Indian Council of World Affairs)

The Indo-Pak war of December 1971 and the liberation of Bangladesh form a watershed in the recent history of the sub-continent. These two interrelated events not only undid the "arrangement" of 1947 but also completely restructured the state structure in South Asia. Both in terms of India's security as well as the ideological challenge to India's secularism, this was a far-reaching event. The events of 1971 also had far-reaching impact on the interests and involvement of the Great Powers in the sub-continent.

This study sets out to analyze in detail the painful process of normalization of relations among New Delhi, Islamabad and Dacca from the liberation of Bangladesh to Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh and the Tripartite Agreement of April 1974. This process is not dealt with in a vacuum, but has been put in its appropriate regional and global settings, so that the reader may be made fully aware of domestic and international environments in which these negotiations took place.

186 PP.

Limite

Rs. 30

For enquiries contact:
The Assistant Secretary,
Indian Council of World Affairs,
Sapru House, Barakhamba Road,
New Delhi-110001, India.

#### IDS A JOURNAL

Vol. XII

January-March 1980

No. 3

India's International Relations: A Systems Approach

K. Saigal

Atomic Teeth for Apartheid: South-African Nuclear Programme

C. Raja Mohan

Political Implication of French Military Intervention in Africa: Three Case Studies

Rajen Harshe

Developments in the Gulf: Some Strategic Implications Sreedhar

Political Dynamics of the Island States: A Comparative Urmila Phadnis Study of Sri Lanka and Maldives

#### Quarterly Journal of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi 110001

Annual Subscription: India Rs. 20/-

Overseas \$5/- (Including surface postage)

#### JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Vol. 19, No. 1

January-March 1980

Significance of Direct Elections to the European Parliament, 1979 H.S. Chopra

The Mayaguez Incident: A Study of Crisis Management Jaya Krishna Baral

Okinawa before and since Reversion Lalima Varma

Political Institutions in Saudi Arabia

Gulshan Dhanani

Major Developments in India's Foreign Policy and Relations, July-December

S.D. Muni

NOTES AND MEMORANDA

Soviet Specialists on South Asia

Nisha Sahai

BOOK REVIEWS

The Other Side of Non-Alignment: A Review Article Devendra Kaushik

Other Reviews

BIBLIOGRAPHY

India and World Affairs: An Annual Bibliography, 1978 Neena Kapoor and A.P. Gakhar

PUBLISHERS AND DISTRIBUTORS VIKAS PUBLISHING HOUSE PRIVATE LIMITED Vikas House, 20/4 Industrial Area, Sahibabad, Distt. Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh India ridwar

## **DOCUMENTATION ON ASIA**

Vol. 5.

Prepared under the auspices of the INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS (Ed. by V. Machwe and Ashok Jambhekar).

Asia has been a popular object of study not only in the various countries of the continent but also in the West. The volume of literature published on Asian studies is also quite large and therefore bibliographical control of these is essential to help systematic research and study.

Documentation on Asia, which is an annual publication, attempts to bring together systematically the vast periodical literature on Asian studies. This is the fifth volume in the series covering the year 1964 and arranged in six parts: Asia, East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, West Asia (including Egypt) and Central Asia. The literature surveyed clearly manifests the political, economic and social developments and international relations of Asian countries.

The 'Documentation on Asia' is a unique bibliography because it covers speeches, statements, resolutions, official and non-official reports, etc.

Besides the main part, the bibliography consists of an alphabetical list of sources, documents, an alphabetical subject index, alphabetical author index, who's who in brief and a list of abbreviations used.

This volume will be a valuable acquisition for university and research libraries.

723 pp.

3

Rs. 100/-

\$ 30

For enquiries contact:
The Assistant Secretary,
Indian Council of World Affairs,
Sapru House, Barakhamba Road,
New Delhi-110001, India.

#### Articles from

#### FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPORTS 1979-80

#### 1979

The Role of the Third World in the March Law of the Sea Negotiations B.N. Mehrish The United States and Iran: The April Recent Phase Sreedhar May-June Hanoi and the Major Communist Powers 1973-1978 Pushkar R. Kapoor The Afghan Revolution and After July P.B. Sinha August Constitutional and Political Developments in the Maldives V.H. Coelho September Namibia: Back to Square One S.C. Saxena October The United States and China on a New Course Maya Chadha November Brezhnev's Personality Cult and Collective Leadership Nisha Sahai December The Politics of Foreign Aid: A Case Study of India C.P. Bhambhri 1980 January

The Jewish Factor in US Foreign Policy A.G. Naidu

February The Legality of Interim Seabed Mining
Regimes R.P. Anand

March Gulf States and Revolutionary Iran:

A Study of Mutual Perceptions

A.H.H. Abidi

Annual Subscription: U.S. \$8.00 Rs. 15.00 Single Copy: US \$1.00 Rs. 1.50

#### Orders to:

The Assistant Secretary, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi-110001, India.

# INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

#### JUST PUBLISHED

# "ELECTION IN INDIA SINCE 1952: A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY"

Ed. by N. Datta etc.

000

Rs. 30 Mimeo

Select bibliography lists articles, documents and books. Covers the period from First General Election to Sixth General Elections and also Mid-term Poll 1980. It's Appendix lists select editorials, articles and significant statements of the National leaders, taken from the current Indian (English) Newspapers.

For enquiries please contact:

Assistant Secretary, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, NEW DELHI-110001.

# STATEMENT

about ownership and other particulars about journal INDIA QUARTERLY to be published in the first issue every year

#### (FORM IV)

1. Place of Publication Sapru House, New Delhi-110001.

2. Periodicity of its Publication

Quarterly

3. Printer's Name Nationality Address V.K. Arora
Indian
Printed by Navchetan Press Pvt.
Ltd. at Navjeevan Printers,
1-E/2, Jhandewalan Extension,

New Delhi-110055.

4. Publisher's Name Nationality Address

V.K. Arora Indian Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi-110001.

5. Editor's Name Nationality Address

M.S. Rajan Indian Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi-110001.

6. Name and address of Individuals who own the journal and partners or shareholders holding more than one per cent of the total capital

Indian Council of World Affairs a non-profit institution, registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860.

I, V.K. Arora, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

New Delhi 20 May 1980

Sd/- V.K. ARORA (Signature of Publisher)

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

AMBASSADORS EXCHANGED AFTER THIRTY YEARS:

American Relations 1949-1979. By Dr. D. C. American Relations 1949-1979. AMBASSALO Relations 1949-1979. By Dr. R.S. Arora (Just released)

CONTENTS: Introduction—(i) Recognition Declined (ii) Eisenhower and the 'China CONTENTS. Incomplete of the Sixties (iv) Nixon's Historic Decision (v) Recent Lobby' (iii) Challenges of the Sixties (iv) Nixon's Historic Decision (v) Recent Lobby (iii) Recent Lobby (iii) Political and Economic Developments in China (vi) The Full Circle Constitutional, Political and Economic Developments in China (vi) The Full Circle Constitutional, Observations—Appendixes: (i) China's Legal Code on Joint Ventures (vii) Concluding Observation of Chinese Names of Persons and Plan. (pii) Concluded (pii) Concluded (pii) Concluded (piii) Concluded (piii) Concluded (piii) Romanization of Chinese Names of Persons and Places (Text)—Select Biblio-

"It is not an easy task for any author to weave together events over such a long period of time and to assess their impact on personalities so differing in their upbringing, outlook and traditions as the Americans and Chinese. Arora has done this with commendable craftsmanship in this book. He has depicted all of this on a wider canvas of the world scene.... His analysis of the events leading right up to 1980 is perhaps the best treatment of this

period that has been published."—THE HINDUSTAN TIMES

"Dr. Arora's study is of more than common quality in which the research has been exhaustive, the speculations judicious, and the conclusions convincing.... It is perhaps the first comprehensive original work on the subject covering a long period of three decades by an oriental scholar.

The book should be indispensable to the policy makers and valuable to

the interested laymen."—DEMOCRATIC WORLD

Royal, Rs. 100 (abroad US \$30, or £15)

#### FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES FOR THE SEVENTH LOK SABHA By Dr. R.S. Arora (Just released)

CONTENTS: Introduction—(i) The Sixth Lok Sabha and the Rise and Fall of the Janata Government (ii) The Industrial Policy for the Eighties (iii) The Role of the Public Sector (iv) The Supreme Court and Parliament on Right to Property (v) Re-defining the Raison d'etre of Non-alignment (vi) Concluding Observations-Select Bibliography, Index,

"Dr. Arora's thesis will go far in clearing cobwebs in our minds and seeing more clearly what our objectives should be and how we should go about fulfilling them.... Anyone who wants to be reminded of what in the country needs doing, how and why the Janata Government proved a total flop and the tasks that lie ahead of the new government would do well to read Dr. Arora's well-researched, objective and well-written analysis of recent years."—KHUSHWANT SINGH

"Arora's main concern is redefinition of goals for the future."—ALL INDIA

RADIO

001.

vt.

on,

rs,

01.

۲S,

01.

rs

ed

on

10

"The author's main objective in writing an agenda for the Seventh Lok Sabha is to provide guidelines for the future."—THE TIMES OF INDIA

"Arora has selected the most vital issues and has examined them trenchantly. It is a book meant for a wide readership."—THE HINDUSTANTIMES "Arora analyses the formidable challenges facing the Seventh Lok

Sabha."—MORNING ECHO

"Dr. Arora's book should be read by everyone who has a stake in the Indian parliamentary system—which means everyone."—DEMOCRATIC WORLD "The study should be indispensable for those at home and abroad interest-

ed in the performance of Indian parliamentary institutions."—JANATA "The book is a must, not only for every Parliamentarian in the country, but also for political pundits, scholars and students of politics and political economy."-YOJANA

Demy. 8Vo. Rs. 65, (Abroad: US \$16.50, or £8.50)

Place orders with: DIRECTOR THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS E-316, GREATER KAILASH-I, NEW DELHI-110048.

India's

Nehru A Viev

Perma: larities

West Develo

Africa

Indone

Ethnici Case S

Role o

Culture

Printer

#### INDIA QUARTERLY

#### A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Some significant articles published recently:

India's "Beneficial Bilateralism" in South Asia

S.D. Muni

Nehru and International Political Modernization: A View from the Seventies

A.P. Rana

Permanent Neutrality and Non-Alignment: Simi-

larities and Differences

Hanspeter Neuhold

West European Multinational Corporations in Developing Countries

Africa in the 1980s

G.S. Ramesh

Anirudha Gupta

Indonesia's New Order Under Suharto

Baladas Ghoshal

Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia: A Case Study of Sri Lanka

Urmila Phadnis

Role of the Diplomat in the Decision-Making Process: Some Case Studies

Arun Kumar Banerjee

Culture as an Instrument of Diplomacy

J.N. Dixit


Annual Subscription: Rs. 40.00

Single Copy: Rs. 11.00

Orders to:

The Assistant Secretary, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, NEW DELHI-110 001 India.

Why people trust Godrej more than any other refrigerator.



#### 165 litre

In the Godrej tradition of fine quality, only the Godrej refrigerator has solid steel vitreous enamelled inner walls. They do not scratch, chip or crack like plastic walls do. And they're more hygienic.

Plus other features yet unmatched:

- \* A full depth vegetable tray.
- Two extra wide, extra deep shelves—more storage space, more space between shelves.
- Withstands voltage fluctu-

ations over a wider range.

- \* Largest freezer in its size.
- \* The first with automatic defrosting.

A JC

MICR

THE '

POLI

ECON AN

INDO

\* Efficient after sales service at your doorstep.

Also available 290 litre

**Great things come from** 

GB.3695

# INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXVII No. 3

July-September 1981

MICRO-DEPENDENCY: THE CUBAN FACTOR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

—By Ali A. Mazrui

THE "ISLAMIC BOMB" AND INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY
—By Aswini K. Ray

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN AID TO THE THIRD WORLD: A STRUCTURAL REINTERPRETATION

—By Ashutosh Varshney

AN INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

—By Indra Nath Mukherji

#### NOTES AND COMMENTS

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE

—By P.V. Narasimha Rao

PARTY SYSTEM UNDER SADAT: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY

—By Pradeep Sen



led

ce

ng.

INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Economic prosperity is the harbour light that beckons us. We try to reach it by developing technological expertise and manufacturing skill in every field of engineering.

We launched on this activity way back in 1938 and emerged as pioneers in manufacturing dairy equipment in India. Today, we design, manufacture and instal plant and equipment for every major national project covering vital human needs like food, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertiliser, cement, steel, paper, nuclear, power...

We have even extended the limits of our capabilities to cover space technology in order to support the nation's plans to establish effective satellite communication systems. Right now, we are embarking on a totally different activity—cement manufacture.

Our efforts keep us moving towards a definite harbour—economic prosperity through technological development. All 10,000 of us in the L&T Group are prompted by the same sense of direction And our capabilities are enriched by the experience and know-how of our collaborators—world renowned manufacturers in every field of engineering.




LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED where technology moves with time

VIMA

P.O. Box 278, Bombay 400 038

When a man does not know what harbout he is making for, no wind is right \_Seneca



CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

# INDIA OUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXVII No. 3

owards a prosperity

of direction hed by the f our

ed manufac ering.

MITED with time

arhow

eneca

July-September 1981

#### EDITORIAL BOARD

VIMAL MEHROTRA

SUKH DEO PAUL

R. RAMA RAO

UMA VASUDEV (Managing Editor)

RAM RATTAN

P. RATNAM

FRANK THAKURDAS

VANITA RAY (Assistant Editor)



INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

# INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

#### CONTENTS COPYRIGHT

© INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Annual Subscription: Rs. 60.00 Single Copy: Rs. 16.00

All correspondence relating to contributions, review of books and reproduction/translation of contributions published in the journal should be addressed to the Managing Editor; correspondence relating to advertisements and distribution of the journal should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary. Both the Editorial and the publication offices are located at the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi-110001.

# India Quarterly & Foreign Affairs Reports (Monthly) (BACK ISSUES)

Some back issues of the above journals are available. For particulars of availability and price, please write to the Assistant Secretary.

BC His

D.P. STU Rom ANC

> Bipat NAT Ian C

THE Sir Ja IND

A HID.D. INDI

VAIS V.P. THE

Polit

Ram THE Sriran INDI Krishi

R.P. BACK Ashok THE 1

ASPE

Maxim MARX W.H. POLIT

Romes
THE V
T.K. J.
ECON

Ori BOMB, BANG, Registe

# Books on History and Political Science

History

D.P. Misra STUDIES IN THE PROTO-HISTORY OF INDIA Rs. 20.00

Romila Thapar ANCIENT INDIAN SOCIAL HISTORY Rs. 75.00

Bipan Chandra NATIONALISM AND COLONIALISM IN MODERN INDIA Rs. 40.00

THE BRITISH RAJ AND THE INDIAN PRINCES Rs. 70.00

Sir Jadunath Sarkar INDIA THROUGH THE AGES Rs. 7.50

N.K. Sinha and Nisith Ray A HISTORY OF INDIA Rs. 30.00

D.D. Kosambi INDIAN NUMISMATICS Rs. 85.00

R. Champakalakshmi VAISNAVA ICONOGRAPHY IN THE TAMIL COUNTRY Rs. 175.00

THE TRANSFER OF POWER IN INDIA Rs. 75.00

Political Science

.00

of sh-

ing

tri-

ant

are

se,

10 10

Ram Joshi, Marina Pinto and Louis D'silva THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS WORKING Rs. 15.00

Sriram Maheshwari INDIAN ADMINISTRATION Rs. 32.00

Krishna Valsangkar, Marina Pinto, Louis D'silva

ASPECTS OF POLITICAL THEORY Rs. 22.00 R.P. Kaushik and Susheela Kaushik

BACK TO THE FRONT: THE UNFINISHED STORY IN VIETNAM Rs. 35.00 Ashok Mitra

THE HOODLUM YEARS Rs. 33.00 Maxime Rodinson

MARXISM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD Rs. 80.00

W.H. Morris-Jones POLITICS MAINLY INDIAN Rs. 70.00

Romesh Thapar

THE WASTE AND THE WANT Rs. 18.50

T.K. Jayaraman

ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT Rs. 28.00

# Orient Longman Limited BANGAY CALCUTTA MADRAS NEW DELHI

BANGALORE HYDERABAD PATNA Registered Office: 3/5 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi 110 002

#### RADIANT STUDIES ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### China and Southeast Asia R.K. JAIN

This new series, consisting of eight volumes, traces the evolution, objectives and course of Chinese policy towards Southeast Asia. Each volume presents the most comprehensive collection of basic documents regarding China's relations with particular countries of Southeast Asia from 1949 up to the present. Each volume is preceded by a concise introduction which analyzes China's attitude towards that country against the background of changes in the international environment, including Sino-Soviet rivalry, Sino-US rapprochement and Sino-Vietnamese hostilities. This indispensable reference work containing over 2,000 basic documents fulfils a long-felt need in Chinese foreign policy and Southeast Asian studies.

Vo

MIC

THE

POL

Eco

IND

PAR

DEN

ORI

INT

G.H

No. 1: China and Thailand, 1949-1982 July 1982 c. 250 pages c. Rs 100

No. 2: China and Malaysia, 1949-1982 September 1982 c. 275 pages c. Rs 100

No. 3: China, Philippines and Singapore, 1949-1982

No. 4: China and Burma, 1949-1982 No. 5: China and Indonesia, 1949-1982 No. 6: China and Kampuchea, 1949-1982

No. 7: China and Laos, 1949-1982 No. 8: China and Vietnam, 1949-1982

#### Power Politics and Southeast Asia LALITA PRASAD SINGH

"a useful and competent wide-ranging treatment of the major issues involved in the international affairs of the Southeast Asian states." The American Political Science Review

"A very broad, useful survey of the international relations of Southeast Asia." Foreign Affairs

208 pages Rs 75

### Ethnic Politics in Malaysia RAJ K. VASIL

"provides a good foundation for analyzing contemporary Malaysia." The American Political Science Review

"A first-rate study of the racial politics of Malaysia." Choice

234 pages Rs 75

## Foreign Policy of Thailand GANGANATH JHA

Examines the mainsprings and objectives of Thai foreign policy towards the Great Powers, India, Japan and neighbours in Southeast Asia.

198 pages Rs 50

# The Philippines and Southeast Asia MAN MOHINI KAUL

Discusses the continuity and change in Philippine's relations with the various other Southeast Asian nations against the background of its special relationship with the United States and its quest for an Asian identity.

214 pages Rs 50

# Radiant Publishers

E-155 KALKAJI, NEW DELHI-110019

# INDIA QUARTERLY

course

ensive ries of introand of rapraining atheast

Rs 100

in the Review Foreign

erican

owers,

other United

# A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXVII July-September 1981	No. 3
MICRO-DEPENDENCY: THE CUBAN FACTOR IN SOUTHERN	
Arrica By Ali A. Mazrui	329
THE "ISLAMIC BOMB" AND INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY  By Aswini K. Ray	346
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN AID TO THE THIRD WORLD:  A STRUCTURAL REINTERPRETATION	
By Ashutosh Varshney	359
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA: AN INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE	
By Indra Nath Mukherji	389
NOTES AND COMMENTS	
INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE  By P. V. Narasimha Rao	405
PARTY SYSTEM UNDER SADAT : CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?	
By Pradeep Sen	414
BOOK REVIEWS	
DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY AND TECHNOCRACY:	
INTERACTION OF THEIR ROLES—A Review Article  By L.K. Jha	428
ORIENTALISM: A CRITIQUE—A Review Article  By Niharranjan Ray	434
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	
General	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	440
G.H. JANSEN: Militant Islam —M.S. Agwani	

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Politi

T.S.

G.G.

J.R. S In

V.K. Co

SHRIR. Inc

Planni

P.B. D

M.L. (Ind

SURAJ

K.S. SA Dev

Econom

C.H. H Refl and Prof

K.K. Vi

Role of

K<sub>HAWA</sub> An

nalit

ROGER D. SPEED: Strategic Deterrence in the 1980's —P.R. Chari	
KARL BRUNNER, Ed.: The First World and the Third World: Essays on the New International Economic Order  —A.N. Abhyankar	
Foreign Policy 445	
AMERICA WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Side-show: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia —S. Nihal Singh	
R.P. KAUSHIK AND SUEHEELA KAUSHIK:  Back to the Front: The Unfinished Story in Vietnam —Syed Shahabuddin	
LATIN AMERICA VASANT KUMAR BAWA: Latin American Integration —V. Shivkumar	
NADER ENTESSAR: Political Development in Chile: From Democratic Socialism to Dictatorship —R. Maria Saleth	
EUROPE ROBERT HARVEY: Portugal: Birth of a Democracy.  —H.S. Chopra	
CHINA RAM K. VEPA: Mao's China: A Nation in Transition —G.P. Deshpande	
IRELAND:  J. BOWYER BELL: The Secret Army:  The IRA 1916-1979 —D.K. Palit	
INDIA	
History of the Modern India 455	
BANI BANERJEE: Surendranath Banerjea and the History of Modern India 1848-1925 —R.L. Shukla	
C. PATRA: Formation of the Province of Orissar: The Success of the First Linguistic Movement in India —Kanchanmoy Mojumdar	

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Political Institutions	459
T.S. RAJAGOPAL IYENGAR: Indian Democracy Speaks —H.Y. Sharada Prasa	d
G.G. MIRCHANDANI: The People's Verdict:  DCM Computer-based Study  —Bashiruddin Ahmed	
J.R. SIWACH: Politics of President's Rule in India —M.V. Pylee	
V.K. VARADACHARI: Governor in the Indian  Constitution  —Dharma Vira	
SHRIRAM Maheshwari: State Governments in India —S.V. Kogekar	
Planning	468
P.B. Desai: Planning in India: 1951-1978	
M.L. Gujral: Economic Failures of Nehru and Indira Gandhi: A Study of Three Decades of Deprivation and Disillusionment  —Ashok Rudra	
Suraj B. Gupta: Monetary Planning for India—R.K. Seshadri	
K.S. Sastry: Performance Budgeting for Planned  Development  —R.V. Subrahmanian	
Economic Development and Social Change	476
Reflections on Economic Development and Social Change: Essays in Honour of Prof. V. K.R.V. Rao	
tions : Changing Role of Caste Associa-  T.K. Oommen	
Role of Women —T.K. Oommen	H H
KHAWAJA AHMAD ABBAS: Sarojini Naidu:  nality  Naidu:  Naidu:	482
—Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay	

JAMILA VERGHESE: Her Gold	and Her Body	—Uttar	n Bhoite	
A. RAMANAMMA: Graduate E in an Urban Setting	mployed Wor	nen —Urmi	la Haksar	
S.P. JAIN and KRISHNAMURTH of Women in Rural Develo of Mahila Mandals	IY REDDY: R pment: A Stu	ıdy	Banerjee	
Drafting of Laws				
G.R. RAJAGOPAUL: The Draft	ing of Laws	—М. Н	lidayatullah	
Media and Society			****	
GASTON ROBERGE: Mediation of the Media in Our Society			ata Banerjee	
Terrorism	••	**		493
SHAILESHWAR NATH: Terrorism	n in India	—N.S. S	Saksena	
Indian Books of the Quarter By Ashok Jambhekar				496

THE INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, the publisher of the journal, is a non-government, non-profit and non-party organisation. It was founded in 1943 to encourage and facilitate the objective study of Indian and International affairs. The Council, as such, does not express any opinion on any aspects of Indian and International Affairs. The opinions expressed in this journal are, therefore, those of the respective authors and reviewers, not of the Council.

Short comments on the views expressed by the contributors in the journal are welcome. The comments should normally be not more than 1,000 words in length and should generally limit themselves to the issues raised in each contribution. An attempt would be made to make a selection out of these comments for publication in the journal.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

W South of ign depen South impor Increa Third anothe For North anothe power thus u or degi Mici develop weak, depend

Two the nature sphere. was W system i The oth The second a global Both Bloc every the war,

Gulf St shall re menon

Struction Prof. Ma Director, Ann Arb

United S

#### MICRO-DEPENDENCY: THE CUBAN FACTOR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

By ALI A. MAZRIII\*

We accept the proposition that the worst kind of dependency lies in North-South interaction. But emphasizing this dimension should not go to the extent of ignoring other dimensions. It is simply not true that all forms of international dependency concern interactions between the Northern Hemisphere and the South, or between industrialism and sources of raw materials. There are important forms of dependency among industrialized nations themselves. Increasingly, there are also forms of dependency between one country in the Third World and another; or between one region of the Third World and another. Dependency is a form of political castration.

For the purposes of this essay, dependency between one country in the Northern Hemisphere and another or between one industrialized state and another, is categorized as macro-dependency. This involves variations in power within the upper stratum of the world system. Macro-dependency is thus upper-horizontal, involving variations in affluence among the affluent, or degree of might among the mighty.

Micro-dependency for our purposes here concerns variations of technical development among the under-developed, or relative influence among the weak, or degrees of power among those that are basically exploited. The dependency of some West African countries upon Nigeria, or of some of the Gulf States upon Iran or Saudi Arabia, are cases of micro-dependency. We shall return to this level more fully later, but let us first begin with the phenomenon of macro-dependency.

Two inter-related events in the twentieth century have helped to shape the nature of variations in power among countries of the Northern Hemisphere. These were complex events rather than single occurrences. One Was World War II and its aftermath, resulting in a resilient bi-polar System involving two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The other factor was itself in part an aspect of the aftermath of World War II. The second factor behind variations in power has been the collapse of the old European Empire and the relative political shrinkage of Europe as a global force.

Both the First World of the West and the Second World of the Soviet Bloc evolved complex hegemonic relationships. With Europe shattered by the War, and seemingly vulnerable to desperate ideological solutions, the United States embarked on a major economic programme for the recon-States embarked on a major economic programme for the land the devastation of the war, Europe definitely had

Prof. Mazrui, a noted and prolific African scholar, is Professor of Political Science and Director, Centar C. Centar hing Arbor. Lica

493

496

the was dian nion ssed

nal rds ach

iese

ers,

MIC

L

dust

juga

depe

[

il

p

Le

and a

coun

accur

gions

a stri

seekii

TI

an

re

Thi

and n

Soviet

Finlar

capita

but hi

Power

action

countr

dustria

betwee

a step

sis. Fo

hegemo

proport

Wes

But

Lei

surplus need of the United States and was experiencing deficit control over its own destiny. On 5 June 1947, the Second Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, in an address at Harvard University, proposed a plan of American aid to help European rehabilitation and recovery. The United States seemed almost frightened by the gap in power between itself and European countries; but it was even more afraid of the implications of that gap for the survival of liberal democracy in Europe.

The aid that Marshall proposed included the condition that European states should act together in estimating their needs and in planning their rehabilitation. Sixteen European states (later joined by the Federal Republic of Germany) set to work to draw up an inventory of requirements and resources. They then applied to the United States for loans and gifts of over 21 billion dollars for the period 1948-52. The stage was set for one kind of macro-dependency, though the Marshall Plan itself seemed in part to reduce European dependency on the United States by enabling Europe to recover from its own devastation.

Another form of macro-dependency came with the establishment of the North Atlantic Organization within a year of launching the European Recovery Program under the Marshall Plan. On 4 April 1949, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States signed a treaty in Washington, D.C. for collective security. The alliance was later joined by Turkey and Greece, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The American nuclear power umbrella provided patriarchal protection for the Western World as a whole.

The third aspect of macro-dependency involved relations between the United States and Japan following the American occupation of Japan. The original security treaty between Japan and the United States was signed with the peace pact in 1951, and was designed for what Article 1 described as "the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." The original version was even more blatantly based on dependent relationships for it provided no prior consultation with Japan should American forces, based in Japan, be used on military assignment outside the country. The treaty has since been modified to reduce the more blatant aspects of macro-dependency. But on the whole the de-militarization of Japan has meant de facto American hegemony in the military field.

This relationship was stabilized by the rather unusual and controversial Chapter 2, Article 9, of the Constitution of Japan. Under this provision, the people of Japan would aspire to peace and "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means ef settling international disputes." The Article was originally interpreted to mean that Japan would not maintain any land, sea or air forces, or permit other war potential on its soil. But subsequent constitutional usage has permitted minimal forces of self-defense. However, Japan is on the whole a case of self-castration in the whole a

case of self-castration in the military field.

MICRO-DEPENDENCY: THE CUBAN FACTOR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Lenin did not recognize any distinction between subjugation of one industrialized country by another (macro-dependency) and imperialist subjugation of an underdeveloped country by an industrialized one (vertical dependency). Kautsky had asserted:

Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capital. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex larger and larger areas of agrarian territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit those regions.1

Lenin rejects this formulation as "utterly worthless because it... arbitrarily and inaccurately connects this question only with industrial capital in the countries which annex other nations, and in an equally arbitrary and inaccurate manner pushes into the forefront the annexation of agrarian regions."

Lenin continues to emphasize that the dialectic of imperialism included a striving for annexation, but it was not simply a case of industrial states seeking agrarian colonies.

The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex not only agrarian territories but even most highly industrialized regions (German appetite for Belgium, French appetite for Lorraine)....2

This was a rejection of any clear distinction between vertical dependency and macro-dependency. Others later on might have referred also to the Soviet Union's appetite for the Baltic States, or for portions of Poland and Fiuland. Lenin mistook the dynamic of imperialism for the dynamic of capitalism. In the history of the West, the two were indeed inter-connected; but history has since proved that the abolition of capitalism in a major Power was no guarantee that that Power would not become imperialistic.

But Lenin was at least on the right track in assuming a logic of interaction between vertical colonization of agrarian countries by industrial. countries and horizontal colonization of industrial countries by other industrial states. Lenin did not fully understand the nature of the interaction between vertical dependency and horizontal macro-dependency, but it was a step in the right direction to assume a profound linkage between the two.

We shall return to other aspects of this linkage subsequently in our analysis. For the time being let us now turn our attention to problems of subhegemonic relations between countries in the Third World itself.

## OF DEPENDENCY AND MICRO-DEPENDENCY

Quite simply, international micro-dependency arises in a situation where one section of the under-developed or under-privileged world is dis-Noportionately reliant upon another or disproportionately influenced by

over eorge n of

ZRUI

nited and is of pean

their ublic s and ts of r one n part

urope of the opean gium, ourg, treaty

oined erican estern

n the . The igned cribed East." ation-

erican untry. ets of n has

ersial ision, r as a ns ef

ted to permit e has

hole a

MIC

fol

SOV

bas

dep

ing

soli

as 1

of 1

Evo

T

the and

spec

Afr

mer nati

tion

con

pari

Afr

stro

eco

upo

Ara

whi

shar

The

in A

by

nom

inde

The

the

fron

phas

Afri

N

T

T

B

I

E

another. The other side of the coin of micro-dependency is micro-imperialism or what is more often referred to as sub-imperialism. The power of Saudi Arabia in the rest of the Arab World has become micro-imperial. The role of Nigeria in Africa is slowly taking a similar direction.

Micro-dependency could be either congruous and natural, or it could be in-congruous and unnatural. Congruous micro-dependency arises where a much larger country, or a much richer country in the Third World, acquires undue influence over a smaller or poorer neighbour. When Brazil begins to exercise greater influence on Uruguay, for example, the relationship would have a natural and congruous dynamic. If Nigeria already exercises disproportionate influence on Niger, that again is a case of congruous hegemony by Nigeria and congruous micro-dependency on the part of Niger.

An incongruous or unnatural micro-dependency arises when either the bigger is dependent on the smaller or the richer upon the poorer, or the

well-informed upon the ignorant.

Thus a situation in which a particular Caribbean island becomes dependent on the African continent for support in order to realize liberation from American hegemony would be a case of natural international micro-dependency. On the other hand, a situation in which it is Africa that is dependent upon the Caribbean for fundamental areas of its own continental liberation would be clearly a case of incongruous or unnatural international micro-dependency.

It should be emphasized at this stage that to describe a certain form of sub-dependency as natural is not necessarily to accept it as inevitable. After all, historically important areas of both private and public morality have required subordination of what is natural to what is right. Civilization has often developed on the basis of both exploiting nature and controlling nature. That side of civilization which is concerned with values and principles has inevitably required the taming of nature. While therefore it might well be natural that the bigger should have excessive influence over the smaller, or the richer over the weaker, or the well-informed over the lesser informed, this could still be an aspect of nature which needs to be subjected to the modifying calculus of morality.

Of the three continents of the Third World (Africa, Asia and South America), Africa contains the highest number of the least developed countries and the service of the least developed countries are serviced as the service of the service of the least developed countries are serviced as the service of the service tries and the continent as a whole has the lowest per capita income. Africa's potential in terms of resources is of course considerable, but the degree to which those resources have for the time being been adequately exploited,

or the benefits equitably distributed, is still very modest.

Partly because Africa is in this sense the least developed of the three condependency Africa world, it has been particularly susceptible to microdependency. Africans in the twentieth century have much more often been followers than head followers than leaders, responsive rather than innovative. For much of Africa the twentieth century is a century of both cruel exploitation by others and voluntary initiation of others. Imperialism and dependency continue to

fourish even in those countries in Africa that are now nominally sovereign.

But while vertical dependency upon northern metropolitan countries has basically been dysfunctional to the interests of African societies, microdependency upon other parts of the Third World has at times served liberating functions for Africa. This micro-dependency was at times also a form of solidarity however asymmetrical. And yet the question could still be raised as to whether Africans needed to be followers so often even in the politics of the Third World.

#### Evolving African Micro-Dependencies

The three forms of solidarity in the twentieth century have been: first, the Afro-Asian movement; secondly, the politics of Afro-Arab alignments; and more recently the emergence of Afro-Latin collaboration, involving special areas of contact between Africa and Latin America.

In addition to these three forms of solidarity implicit in Afro-Asianism, Afro-Arabism and Afro-Latinism, there is the broader Third World movement as a whole, including its latest platform of struggle for a New International Economic Order.

As between the older alignment of Afro-Asianism and the new collaboration of Afro-Latinism, there has been a shift in favour of the new in matters concerned with liberation. The role of Cuba as an Afro-Latin country is particularly crucial with regard to this shift.

But while Afro-Asianism has indeed declined as a basis of solidarity, Afro-Arabism as an overlapping sub-category of solidarity has become stronger in the 1970's.

The evolving African micro-dependency upon the Arabs is mainly economic and to some extent cultural; whereas African micro-dependency upon Latin-America is partly military and to some extent ideological. The Arab role in the years to come could be vital for Africa's development; while Cuba's role has already become significant in Africa's liberation.

The old solidarity of Afro-Asianism arose primarily from a sense of shared racial humiliation among the non-white peoples of Africa and Asia. The racial humiliation had included the shared experience of colonialism in Africa and Asia. But while some parts of Asia were never directly annexed by Europeans, and while Ethiopia and Liberia were permitted at least nominal sovereignty by the European Powers, all Africans and Asians had indeed indeed experienced in some degree or another a form of racial humiliation. The struggle against racism and the struggle against colonialism were at the heart of Afro-Asian solidarity.

While the solidarity persisted, it was clear that leadership came primarily from the Asian part of the alliance. The most important meeting of that phase was held in Bandung in Indonesia in 1955. There was very modest African representation then, partly because the bulk of the continent of

sm ıdi ole

Ui

be a res to uld

roony

the

the ent om

dedental nal

of fter ave has ure.

has 1 be ller, ied, the

uth unca's e to ted,

on. croeen 1 of

hers e to Africa was still under colonial rule. Ten years later President Sukarno hosted another meeting in Indonesia, and partly celebrated the acquisition of a nuclear capability by the first Asian country, the Peoples Republic of China.

The doctrine of non-alignment was also born in Asia. Jawaharlal Nehru was virtually the founder of the movement, and remained its most important spokesman until the 1960's. One African country after another on attaining independence, embraced at least the rhetoric of non-alignment in its conduct of foreign relations.

India under Nehru also led the way in voluntary membership of the (British) Commonwealth. When their turn came, one African country after another, previously ruled by Britain, decided to follow India's precedent and accede to the Commonwealth. Later on, the People's Republic of China also became influential in Afro-Asian circles, though by no means as universally popular as Nehru's India had been for at least a while.

But then things began to change. By 1965 even the prophet of Negritude, President Leopold Senghor of Senegal, could say:

For my part, I think Afro-Asianism has been superceded, for this form of solidarity should be extended to Latin America and to the *tiers monde* in general.<sup>3</sup>

A few months later an unusual conference took place in Havana. Cuba was host to an Asian-African-Latin American Conference of Solidarity, sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. The Conference went on from 3-15 January, 1966. Eighty-two countries were represented. The outcome was the creation of the Tri-Continental People's Solidarity Organization, with an Executive Committee provisionally in Havana. The Committee was to consist of four representatives from each of the three continents, with an Executive Secretary. There was also to be a Liberation Committee.

The conference in Havana was primarily of radicals. Its impact on world affairs was negligible. Yet it probably qualifies as an important landmark in the evolution of the concept of the Third World.

Also a landmark at the governmental level was a conference which had taken place two years earlier in Geneva. This was the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Latin America, Asia and Africa had confronted the developed countries of the world—and demanded a transformation of the international trade system in the direction of better terms for producers of primary products and more concern for the needs of the underdeveloped world at large. The idea of "collective bargaining." which had vastly changed the lives of the poor in the industrialized countries the first time at the level of inter-state relations. For a brief period in 1964, the poor of the whole world had formed a global "trade union"—and were

for St Th self-C Asial But t colou Dia, book darit movi taria if he

MICR

barg

Cont

And of al

Bu indee rest of from

La

The of L in Spintell have And "the great

Sin to the econ Journ outp

And

TI

a

Ui

ed

of

ru

nt

ng

ict

he

er

nt na

i-

le,

m

rs

oa y,

n-

e-

's

in

h

e

d k

d

ıs

a

a T

S

,,

S

1, e

bargaining away at a conference table in Geneva. A groping had started barganing barganing had of collective answer to a shared economic weakness.

That is why the concept of the Third World signified a major shift in self-conception among the countries concerned. As we indicated, Afro-Asianism had been a solidarity of a shared humiliation as coloured people. But the concept of the Third World is an attempt to transcend the bonds of colour and to emphasize instead the bonds of shared poverty. Mamadou Dia, the former Prime Minister of Senegal, called the first section of his book "The Revolt of the Proletarian Nations." Ideas of Afro-Asian solidarity were still implicit in much of Dia's discussion, but the emphasis was moving from pan-pigmentationalism (the affinity of colour) to pan-proletarianism (the affinity of being economically under-privileged). Almost as if he was defending this shift of emphasis, Dia quoted Gabriel Ardant's powerful line that the "geography of hunger is also the geography of death." And the bonds of a joint struggle for survival came to re-define the frontiers of allegiance among the nations concerned.4

#### Contribution of Latin American and African Intellectuals

But although leaders of thought in Africa, like Dia and Senghor, were indeed pointing to the shared predicament which binds Africa with the rest of the Third World, most of the initiatives in the struggle were coming from outside Africa.

Latin America's contribution has been partly intellectual and theoretical. The whole body of literature on dependency was born out of the womb of Latin America's experience. Much of the literature on dependecia is still in Spanish and Portuguese and therefore inaccessible to the bulk of African intellectuals and writers, but some of the writers that have influenced Africa have themselves been influenced in turn by the Latin-American experience. Andre Gunder Frank, widely regarded in the English-speaking world as "the Copernicus of the new paradigm" was intellectually transformed by greater contact with Latin-America's experience.

...Frank admits this quite explicitly: he went to Latin-America a liberal, and rapidly became a revolutionary in response to various circumstances, above all the Cuban revolution.

Since then African writers and analysts have made their own contribution to the literature on dependency. Among the most influential of the African economists of this school is Samir Amin. As a reviewer in the Canadian Journal of African Studies put it: "In theoretical perspective and prolific output, Samir Amin has become Africa's counterpart to Latin America's Andre Gunder Frank among the radical anti-imperialists."6

The link between paradigms in the social sciences on the one side, and

ideology on the other, can be very close. The theoretical formulation of the Latin American school of dependency may not be all that far removed from the ideological formulation of Frantz Fanon, another Latin American benefactor of Africa. Fanon, a Martiniquan, who immersed himself in the Algerian war against France and formulated brilliant theories on the necessity of bloody revolution, was destined to capture the imagination of young radicals in much of the black world. French-speaking Africans were among the first to respond to Fanon's stimulation. Some of the observers of the rebellion in Zaire (then known as the Congo) in 1964-65, even suspected that Fanon, along with the Algerians and the Chinese, constituted part of the total external influence on the techniques of that rebellion. Roger Anstey, the British historian, put it in the following terms:

Ferocity in war is known well enough in Africa, but the continuing calculated murderousness of the rebellion seems to have about it some imported revolutionary method .... It is at least credible that such methods should stem from Chinese and Algerian techniques of revolution, whilst it may also be relevant to recall the vogue currently enjoyed in some French-speaking circles by the late Frantz Fanon ....?

In Fanon we have the attempt to formulate strategies of national liberation and revolution. Unlike Marx and Engels, Fanon put his faith not in the proletariat but in the peasantry. From an African point of view, Fanon's success in reinstating the peasantry in the mainstream of history has to be put alongside his achievement in reinstating race into the mainstream of radical social analysis. Fanon wants us to look at Marxism again against the background of the salience of race in the colonial experience. After all, within the colonial situation, "it is neither the act of owning factories nor estates, nor a bank balance which distinguishes the governing class, the governing race is first and foremost those who come from elsewhere, those who are unlike the original inhabitants, 'the others."

Fanon goes on to argue that the colonial world is divided into compartments inhabited by "two different species." There were indeed economic realities, in terms of who owned what, but there were also human realities in terms of who was what:

When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world begins with the fact of belonging or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies economic sub-structure is also a super-structure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem.

The ideas of Frantz Fanon when appended to the theories of dependency

tellecti in the in the Frantz colonia both t Latin A of stru cultura Gunde experie

MICRO

emana

racial a
Intellectorespons
the other in actions

the triu

racial a

But '

to the A
We n
the experimentalization
that Cui
Angola.

Medical
cipation

Never

success be organizated organizated with the austere stourists?

These is as to whee attornal of were to he

upon Lat

UI

he

om an

he

itv

ng

ng

he

ed

of

ey,

ng

ne

ch

oed

a-

in ı's

to of

ist

11,

Or

he

se

t-

ic

es

nt or

ic

Э;

y

comanating from Latin America, have together constituted part of the inlelectual leadership of Latin America in the whole struggle for liberation
in the Third World. The Latin American structuralists have been inspired
in their theories by the neo-colonial experience in Latin America itself.
Frantz Fanon, on the other hand, is a culturalist in his interpretation of the
colonial predicament. To understand the realities of the colonial experience,
both the structural and the cultural dimensions have to be understood.
Latin America as a region of the Third World provides virtually a paradigm
of structural dependency; while Africa provides a striking paradigm of
cultural dependency. It is the more fitting that structuralist writers like
Gunder Frank have based their sharp formulations on Latin American
experience, while Frantz Fanon has used Africa as his ultimate paradigm of
racial and cultural subjugation.

But while Africa has inspired the ideas of Fanon, as well as provided his racial ancestry, Africans have once again been followers rather than leaders. Intellectual micro-dependency continues to manifest itself in the African response to these theoretical and ideological traffic indicators provided by the other parts of the Third World.

In addition to theorists of dependency, and the ideas of Frantz Fanon, there is also the ideological experiment of Castro's Cuba. This last completes the triumvirate of intellectual examples that Latin America has provided to the African continent.

We mentioned earlier that behind Gunder Frank's radicalization was the experience of the Cuban revolution, just as behind Frantz Fanon's radicalization was the experience of the Algerian revolution. The two revolutions together merged into a heritage of radical Afro-Latinism. But unlike Algeria, Cuba has continued to command revolutionary admiration. For Africa it does provide an organizational miracle. There is a possibility that Cuba might now influence organizational changes in a country like Angola. Cuban lessons might include efficient ways of organizing limited medical services, more relevant ways of giving the masses a sense of partition, more solid ways of constructing an egalitarian society.

Nevertheless, two things remain uncertain. Can Cuba's organizational success be adequately transplanted onto African soil? Secondly, can Cuba's with the rest of the Western Hemisphere in the years ahead? Can Cuba's lourists?

These are still unanswered questions. To that extent we are still uncertain at to whether the Cuban paradigm might turn out to be an effective organizational contribution from Latin America to the African continent. If that pon Latin America might re-emerge.

#### CUBA'S MILITARY INTRUSIONS IN AFRICA

On 16 February 1965, following the bombing of two Ugandan villages by Congolese planes of American manufacture, three ministers of the Uganda Government publically submitted a protest to the American Embassy in Kampala. The first two demands made in the protest note were that the United States should stop giving military aid to the Congo and should "withdraw the Cuban rebels from the Congo." Castro's adversaries in exile seemed to be easing their frustration by offering themselves as mercenaries to Tshombe's regime. <sup>10</sup>

This was only one aspect of these initial Cuban intrusions into African affairs. An earlier aspect was Cuba's participation in the events which led up to the Zanzibar revolution. In historical terms it is perhaps too early to be sure—but it seems very likely that the example of the Cuban revolution helped to influence the shape of the Zanzibar revolution of January 1964. John Okello might indeed have been the spearhead of the revolution—and Okello was not a plausible Marxist. Yet the revolution did take a Marxist orientation soon after it occurred—and Okello was ousted before long. The legation that Abdul Rahman Babu, the Zanzibari Marxist, had established in Cuba well before the revolution, and the training of Zanzibari militiamen that probably took place on the Caribbean island, must have affected the shape of things to come in Zanzibar. Indeed, the very fact that Cuba was an island made it a plausible paradigm for revolutionaries from Zanzibar.

The act itself of overthrowing the Sultan's regime had probably had no connection with Cuba. There was a widely publicized report that Cuban militiamen were among the Zanzibari revolutionaries. But Michael Lofchie's theory about the source of the confusion is persuasive. It is probable that the Cuban rumour was due to the presence of several trade union leaders who had joined the Zanzibari revolutionaries early on the first day of the new year. Lofchie points out that:

Many members of the group had adopted the Cuban style of dress and appearance, and even employed the Cuban cry 'Venceremos' (We Shall off clearly from the (Afro-Shirazi Youth League) members and was probably the base of the report that the revolutionary army contained Cuban soldiers. 11

Yet even if the overthrow of the Sultan's regime had nothing to do with the Cuban revolution, the direction of change following the royal ouster of Zanzibar might well have been inspired by the momentous precedent in the Caribbean more than five years earlier.

In fact, the impact of Cuba on the whole concept of the Third World has probably been crucial. Until the Cuban revolution Afro-Asian radicals

MICRO-L

found it

restricted and Indi independ the area was rega hemisph in 1961, ment wi the impa he imple and con of the r America In sor equivale viability Cubans o the Gove Governn African a civil war ment for As aga of Angol Angola (

support to UNITA's movement any A government unit rema

MPLA W

factors w

still in occurrence still in occurrence string the oriente string or advance marily or available to supply

The con

South Af

army to 1

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

WCRO-DEPENDENCY: THE CUBAN FACTOR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

build it hard to identify themselves with Latin America except within the restricted boundaries of literary nationalism and of empathy for the Blacks and Indians of the American hemisphere. But the Cuban assertion of independence from the hegemony of the United States dramatically widened the area of Afro-Asian identification with Latin America. At first Castro was regarded as the first symbol of militant non-alignment in the Western hemisphere. He even attended the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned in 1961, along with a less militant Brazil. Castro's drift into military entanglement with the Soviet Union later disillusioned his non-aligned friends, but the impact of his defiance of the United States, and the social transformation he implemented at home, gave Cuba the youthful status of "a new state" and continued to give Castro himself the rank of a crucial revolutionary of the new age. In short, Castro was part of the credentials for Latin America's admission into the fellowship of the Third World. 12

In some cases later on, Cubans allowed themselves to be hired as the equivalent of the Swiss Guard for the Pope—soldiers to help maintain the viability of particular African palaces. Regimes in Africa which have used Cubans over the years have ranged from the Government of Sierra Leone to the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Now it is the Government of Ethiopia. But the most dramatic Cuban intervention in African affairs came in 1976 in the course of the final stages of the Angolan civil war. The Cubans arrived in Angola on the side of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

As against the rival movement of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), there seems to be little doubt that Cuban support for MPLA was decisive in tilting the balance, though there were additional factors which helped the MPLA. Among these additional factors was the support that South Africa temporarily gave to Agostinho Neto's enemies. UNITA's flirtation, especially with South Africa, was disastrous for the movement from the point of view of its standing in African circles. While Many African states had previously been ready to push for a coalition government they later decided to give moral support to MPLA in reaction against UNITA's flirtation with South Africa.

It remains to be seen if Cuban troops would be used in Namibia or against South Africa's apartheid. It must not be forgotten that there was no Cuban army to help the liberation of Angola for as long as the Portuguese were sill in occupation. MPLA fought the Portuguese for two decades without getting the active support of Cuban troops and without an adequate supply Of advanced heavy weaponry from the Soviet Union. It was only after the Portuguese left Angola in November 1975—and the war had become pri-Marily one among Africans themselves—that the Cubans were suddenly available for Angola's liberation, and the Soviet Union was at last willing b supply war planes and heavy artillery. The conclusion is irresistable—neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba wanted

lages

ZRUI

anda sy in t the ould exile

aries

into vents haps uban lanu-

revo-1 did usted rxist,

ig of land, , the volu-

d no uban chie's that aders

and Shall hem

f the

ined with

was

uster dent

orld icals to fight the Portuguese colonialists and risk confrontation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They did not fight Ian Smith in Rhodesia

Have the Soviet Union and Cuba now acquired enough confidence to move directly into Namibia and help SWAPO throw out apartheid and South Africa's domination? Again, there is still no adequate evidence that Russian and Cuban liberators are prepared to risk such a direct confrontation with South Africa. Are they once again waiting until "the natives" begin to fight each other before moving in with an army to help one of the factions?

What about Zimbabwe? Did Cubans and Russians move in to help the Patriotic Front? The prospects for Soviet-Cuban support against Smith in Zimbabwe were no brighter than prospects for such support being available against Botha in Nambia, let alone in South Africa itself. On balance there seems little doubt that the Russians and Cubans normally prefer to wait until the war is directly a conflict between Blacks themselves before they go to the extent of providing war planes to one of the factions or importing an additional army to back their favourites.

Once again, while not denying the impressive difference Cuba has made to prospects for liberation in Southern Africa, the timing of the Cuban intervention in Angola raised questions about the extent of Castro's commitment to African liberation. In Ethiopia, it raised questions about Castro's commitment to the national integrity of African States.

There has been a suggestion in some circles that Cuba's intervention is in fact a kind of renewed validation of Pan-Africanism. After all, Cuba's population is at least forty per cent black in one sense or another. In the streets of Mexico City I have myself known the excitement of being mistaken for a Cuban. It gave me a feeling about the wide distribution of people of African descent in the Western hemisphere.

In his effort to legitimize Cuba's intervention in Angola, Castro himself has emphasized the African blood flowing in the veins of many Cubans. In his rhetoric he has even suggested it was flowing in his own veins, though that seems to be a statement made more in response to the exigencies of the Angolan situation than in response to the boundaries of genuine biological self-definition.

At the Second General Meeting of the African Association of Political Science held in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1976, a relative of President Neto of Angola also attempted to legitimize Cuba's participation in an African civil war on the ground of the country. civil war on the grounds that Cuba was "an Afro-Caribbean country."

But if the United States were a stated as a state of the country and the country are country and the country are country and the country and the country are country are country. But if the United States were to start describing itself as fundamentally an "Afro-Caucasian counter" "Afro-Caucasian country" would that help to give Washington legitimacy to participate in a future African to participate in a future African war? Is the presence of people of African ancestry in a country outside As ancestry in a country outside Africa an adequate basis for the intervention by that external country in an adequate basis for the intervention by that external country in an internal African conflict?

Nevertheless, there were positive aspects also to Castro's claim on the

issue of changes Binder, civil wa eastern writing oppressi

MICRO-D

My in C in C unde No Clul mula It ha now

The o Havana Cuban him to or light

On b regard interver more re what is and wh to fight consisti that wo nism. C to send were ma by a sol whether just as i mitmen in Apri 1974 W No suc As fo

respond

be to b

WICRO-DEPENDENCY: THE CUBAN FACTOR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

isue of race. After all, under his revolution, Cuba has witnessed remarkable changes in race relations. A correspondent for the New York Times, David changes in face this issue even before Cuba's involvement in the Angolan Binder, explored with a Cuban poet of mixed ancestry from the civil war. It of the island—Nicola Guillen—Guillen, a man who began writing verse in the 1920's and soon turned to themes of race and racial oppression, captured the change in Cuba in the following terms:

My revolutionary feeling was awakened by the struggle against racism in Cuba. I was considered black. There was a clearly defined color line in Cuba, a product of 400 years of colonialism that included 60 years under United States influence, particularly the southern United States. No blacks were allowed in American hotels here and the Havana Yacht Club wouldn't even admit President Batista, who was considered a mulatto. Now racism is severely punished with fines and jail sentences. It hasn't disappeared altogether, but we do have lots of mixed marriages now.13

The correspondent for the American newspaper noted that at the Hotel Havana Libre, mixed marriages were much in evidence among the young Cuban couples "honeymooning on the upper floors." Nor did there seem to him to be any district of Havana or any enterprise or school where darker

or lighter Cubans predominated disproportionately.

On balance therefore, there is a good record on the side of Castro with regard to the issue of race. But such a good record does not make Cuba's intervention in Angola or Southern Africa a case of Pan-Africanism. Much more relevant would be the question of who made the decision to intervene, what is the actual structure of political power in Cuba as between black and white, and what was the composition of the actual men who were sent to fight in the Angolan civil war. If the United States were to send an army consisting entirely of black Americans to participate in a conflict in Zaire, that would not make the black American intervention a case of Pan-Africanism. One would have to investigate the race of those who made the decision to send those black Americans, the structure within which such decisions were made, and whether or not the motives for the intervention were inspired by a solidarity based on shared African ancestry. It is still an open question whether the Cuban intervention qualifies as a kind of Pan-African venture, just as it is still a point of debate whether intervening in 1976 proved commitment to liberation more than intervening before the coup in Portugal in April 1974 would have been. After all, Cuban intervention before April 1974 would have been. 1974 Would have been a direct challenge to Portuguese imperialism itself. No such intervention occurred.

As for the arguments that Cuba's intervention in Angola was a case of responding to the legitimate government of the country, that surely would be to have be to beg the question. After all, none of the factions could yet be deemed

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

IAZRUI

North odesia

nce to id and ce that nfronatives"

of the

elp the nith in ailable e there o wait hey go

made Cuban s comastro's

ing an

ion is Cuba's In the staken ple of

imself ibans. hough ies of e bio-

litical Neto frican ntry." lly an imacy

frican ntion

n the

to be the legitimate government of the country. The fact that MPLA controlled the capital city was not an adequate assertion of legitimacy—any more than the previous Portuguese control of the capital was such a validation. Africa had also before witnessed situations where the capital city—like Kinshasa in Zaire—was controlled by a regime which many in Angola itself under MPLA regarded as illegitimate. In previous times the capital city of Zaire was even controlled by Tshombe, with even more limited credentials for legitimacy.

There seems little doubt that the decision in Havana to back MPLA with an additional 12,000 troops drastically tilted the balance in favour of MPLA—and therefore decided the issue for Angolans. UNITA is still kept at bay with Cuban troops.

As it happened, MPLA was probably the best qualified of the three movements to rule a newly liberated country in Southern Africa, situated in close proximity not only to Namibia but, in the ultimate analysis, to the land of apartheid itself. Southern Africa did need a relatively radical Angola if the liberation of the region was to be accomplished. In this case the argument we are putting forward regarding Cuba should not be interpreted as an expression of preference for MPLA's rivals within Angola. This author is quite satisfied that for the time being at any rate there is no evidence to dispute MPLA's superiority in terms of organization and moral purpose, and in terms of potential effectiveness as a base for the liberation of Namibia and one day as an ally in the struggle to liberate South Africa itself.

The point we are raising here, once we accept the superiority of MPLA as against UNITA and FNLA, is whether this kind of issue should have been decided ultimately by a Caribbean factor introduced into a delicate balance of forces. Was the Cuban tail once again wagging the African dog?

Cuba threw out Somali troops from the Ogaden! Was Cuba the new policeman of Africa? Was it the conscience of the OAU?

#### CONCLUSION

The sub-Saharan sector of the African continent has important areas of linkage with Latin America. Those linkages include the following factors. First, there is the black factor in the racial composition of Latin America. There are millions of people of African ancestry resident within Latin America. Among these are a sizeable number of Cubans, as we indicated. There are also millions of black Brazilians

A second factor which links sub-Saharan Africa with Latin America is something which will gain in importance in the years ahead—the presence of the Portuguese language in Africa. Brazil is to Portugal what the United States is to Britain—a child that grew too large for the mother. In the case firmly evershadowed Britain in world affairs. Brazil by the second half of the twentieth century the twentieth century is also firmly overshadowing Portugal in world affairs.

Just as creasir the Po Brazil' Angola a majo

MICRO.

Latin
is to t
becam
over
The
fragme
of the

The

times

zation is one Chilea is well concer Sixt

Kenya
co-ope
In 7
the ris
in Afr
of Sov

of sol

has go

What the wo began Castro the lev

behind Braz in the imperi the tin

contin

MICRO-DEPENDENCY: THE CUBAN FACTOR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Just as the importance of the English language now in the world is in-Just as the world is increasingly derived from the stature of Brazil. Brazil's future relations with Lusophone Africa with special reference to Angola, but also Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and the islands, may become a major factor in the years ahead.

The third factor that makes black Africa have some kind of linkage with Latin America is the nature of its dependency relationship. Latin America is to the United States what Africa is to Western Europe. Western Europe hecame the colossus of the North for Africa, the United States the colossus

over Latin America.

The fourth factor linking Latin America with Africa is the nature of their fragmentation. The two continents fragment into multiple countries, many of them of very limited size and influence.

The fifth factor is the comparable mineral resources. These may sometimes provide a future opportunity to create producer cartels or organizations that might help to influence the nature of the world economy. OPEC is one striking precedent. But for the moment Zambians, Zairians and Chileans do not have much leverage with regard to copper, since the price is well down. But the fact that they are forced together by a shared mineral concern could have repercussions on the future.

Sixthly, these are comparable agricultural economies. Whereas copper has gone down, coffee is still riding fairly high. What might link Uganda, Kenya and Brazil on the coffee front, could have possibilities later of both

co-operation in price-fixing and competition in marketing.

In Third World politics, the two main changes of the 1970's have been the rise of Arab economic influence and the rise of Cuba's military influence in Africa. In East-West relations a major change has been the expansion of Soviet diplomatic leverage in Africa. Through petro-power Afro-Asianism had been strengthened via the Arab connection. Afro-Latinism as a form of solidarity between Africa and Latin America has been strengthened mainly through the Cuban connection.

What is also clear is that relations between the world of socialism and the world of underdevelopment entered a new phase when the Soviet Union began to feel confident enough to tilt the balance in Angola and Ethiopia. Castro's Cuba and Africa's castration created new inter-relationships at

the levels of both vertical and micro-dependency.

Once admitted into Third World fellowship, the Latin Americans generally have been among the leaders in intellectual and ideological formulation behind the struggle of the Third World for a more just global system.

Brazil is also slowly becoming a contender for some kind of leadership in the politics of the Third World, and to some extent some level of subimperialism within Africa. The fact that Portuguese-speaking Africa for the firm the time being constitutes part of the most radical element in the African continue of capitalist continent, while Brazil itself remains one of the paradigms of capitalist

AZRUI

con--any alida. city\_ ngola

apital cre-

With IPLA t bay love-

ed in o the igola argued as thor

ce to ose. iibia

PLA have icate dog? new

is of ors. ica. atin ted.

rica nce ited ase

ury · of irs.

reaction—these two facts together have resulted in a divergence between Portuguese-speaking Africa and the largest Portuguese-speaking country in the world, Brazil. But the size of Brazil, and its growing industrial potential, are likely to make a difference sooner or later in Mozambique's and Angola's response to Brazilian overtures. Socio-linguistic links might in time compensate for ideological differences.

In the meantime, Brazil has at least taken the lead in a few economic initiatives affecting the Third World. African producers of coffee have reason to be grateful to Brazil for the high prices enjoyed by coffee in the second half of the 1970's. At first, it was a case of frost affecting Brazil's production and reducing the world's supply of coffee. But by the second half of 1977 it had become a clear and open policy of Brazil to keep the prices of coffee high even if it meant its buying up large supplies of coffee on the international market. Brazil's leadership in getting a good price for this popular beverage of the affluent societies heralded Brazil's future function as an originator of Third World initiatives. Struggling economies partly based on coffee looked to Brasillia in 1977 for economic salvation. Even Idi Amin's Uganda managed to stagger along a few economic steps further partly because the prices of coffee continued to be buoyant.

What all this means is that micro-dependency by some Third World countries upon others in the Third World helps to make more effective the struggle of the Third World as a whole for a better deal in the global system. Cuba's role in Africa is thus a case-study.

From this point of view, Afro-Latinism is on the one hand an asymmetrical alignment between Africa and Latin America, involving Africa's micro-dependency on Latin American initiative; but on the other hand Afro-Latinism is also an alliance for liberation, a merger of forces among the exploited, a partnership in the quest for a just world order. Castro's Cuba has for the time being been cast in precisely such a role.

Yet the temptation to make fun of the political eunuch is often great. That temptation is a special case of exploitation. It remains to be seen if Castro will resist the arrogance of machismo at Africa's expense.

May 1981

1 Die 2 Leni 3 See

MICRO

4 See Cool 5 See in t

Cope ary See I Gund A hel

6 The 1 (New 7 Roge April Earth 8 The 1

Univ

9 Ibid, 10 See A Argus 11 Micha 12 This p

On H.
13 David
9, 197
14 Ibid.

#### NOTES

Die Neue Zeit, 1914, 2, Vol. 32, p. 909, 11 September 1914. The emphasis is Kautsky's. 2 Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, pp. 783-784.

3 See Africa Diary (New Delhi), 19-25 June 1965.

4 See Mamadou Dia, The African Nations and World Solidarity. (Translated by Mercer Cook) (London, 1962). Ardant is quoted on p. 19.

5 See Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," World Development (Oxford) Vol. 4, No. 2, March 1976, p. 176. Aidan Foster-Carter argues that if "Frank is the Copernicus of the new paradigm, then Baran is surely its Aristarchus—an older visionary that apprehended the same truth, but was for a while far less influential." See Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York, 1957), and Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York, 1969). A helpful critical survey of the Latin American structuralists is P.O'Brien, "A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency" (Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow, March 1973, Mimeo).

6 The reviewer is quoted on the cover of Amin's book, Neo-Colonialism in West Africa (New York and London, 1973).

7 Roger Anstey, "The Congo Rebellion," The World Today (London), Vol. XXI, No. 4, April 1965. Fanon's most influential work has of course been The Wretched of the Earth (Translated into English by Constance Farrington) (New York, 1963).

8 The Wretched of the Earth, p. 33.

9 Ibid, p. 32.

RIT

een

ntry

rial

ue's

ght

mic

son

ond

ion

977

ffee

ter-

ılar

an

on

n's

tly

rld

ive

oal

m-

a's 0-

he ba

at. if 10 See New York Times, 18 November 1964; Uganda Argus, 17 February 1965; Uganda Argus, 19 February 1965.

Il Michael Loschie, Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton, 1965), p. 276.

12 This part of the paper has been borrowed from Mazrui, "Africa and the Third World," On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship (London, 1967), pp. 224-229.

13 David Binder, "Cuba Seems to Vanquish Racism," The New York Times, October

14 Ibid.

# THE "ISLAMIC BOMB" AND INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

By ASWINI K. RAY\*

The periodic "bomb" debate has again been launched in India, predictably, as always, spearheaded by a section of sophisticated military-strategists. As in the mid-sixties, this time again the debate has been triggered off by a strategic perception of external threat: earlier, as a fall-out of the Lop Nor explosion, and now of the anticipated "Islamic Bomb". This paper attempts, firstly, to question the adequacy of the military-strategic approach to provide the basis for a viable concept of national security; it argues the case for the primacy of the political and economic component of any concept of national security for meaningful policy-prescriptions, especially for underdeveloped post-colonial societies. It also pleads for the importance of political and diplomatic responses to meet any such threats to India's national security as may be posed by the "Islamic Bomb."

#### NATIONAL SECURITY: MILITARY STRATEGIC VIEW

The military-strategic view of national security, with its a-priori assumptions about the inadequacy, even irrelevance, of a diplomatic or political response to any threat to the integrity of the country—whether from external sources or internal disaffection—has a built-in preference for military responses to such threats. A strategic counter-offensive against any securitythreat essentially, often exclusively, consists of measures to strike a technological balance in one's favour over the logistics and fire-power of the sources of such a threat. This simplistic perception of national security, despite its populist appeal from the standpoint of the quantitative logic of military hardware, has historically been proved to be inadequate, often counterproductive, as, among other examples, American experience in Indo-China, or the Pakistani military-bureaucratic clique's experiences in the erstwhile East Pakistan, would bear out. In both these cases, it was military adversary that was defeated—even militarily—by the impact of political, diplomatic and ideological factors that have often remained outside the reckoning of a traditional, technocratic, view of the strategic environment. Contamonal ment. Contemporary global strategic offensive of the United States, particularly after the Williams cularly after the Vietnam war, and its "anti-insurgency operations" in its client-states, manifests an acknowledgement of the importance of the political economic and the international economic and t cal, economic and diplomatic component of national security. The inadequacy of the military-strategic approach to national security, and the need to give primacy to its political, economic and diplomatic component, have also been continuously underscored in India's North-Eastern frontiers,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

as V fledg the P and respo out diplo The moti techr Cold politi War, of the as it 1 wheth in a with t fully prima Power globa of suc

THE

strateg
"strate
Cold V
Inadea

the po

of his

indust

for rea

How gists' a strategy ofter to be in tary-stratelevan highest organiz the Na

in the strategic

<sup>\*</sup>Dr. Ray is Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

as well as in the northern frontier. Lenin's defence-mechanism for the fledgling Soviet state was, to begin with, diplomatic and, subsequently in the phase of the interventionist civil war, he made judicious use of ideological and political factors along with the military. Similarly, Stalin's immediate response against the threat of Nazi aggression was diplomatic,<sup>2</sup> and, throughout the war and its immediate aftermath, the political, ideological, and diplomatic component of national security always remained in the forefront. The entire population of Stalingrad and Leningrad was ideologically motivated to a level of patriotism that the Nazi war machine, despite its technological superiority, could not match. Till at least the launching of the Cold War, the Allied Powers' military strategy gave due primacy to the political and diplomatic component of the war efforts. Throughout the Cold War. Soviet counter-offensive strategy against the global military superiority of the Western Powers gave primacy to political and diplomatic measures, as it has tended to do whenever perceiving any threat to its national security, whether in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or now again in Afghanistan and, in a different sense, in Poland. In fact, throughout the period beginning with the American nuclear explosion in 1945, the Soviet Union has successfully met the threats to its national security caused by the armament-gap primarily through diplomatic and political counter-offensive. The Western Powers, initially ensuared by the tantalising attractiveness of a policy of global military "containment," took some time to appreciate the relevance of such components of strategy. Even George F. Kennan, the author of the policy of "containment," regretted in his memoirs the misinterpretation of his theory by America's post-war "power elite" from the "militaryindustrial complex" to suit their subjective version of "national security," for reasons not under discussion here. But characteristically most militarystrategists of the "Third World" seem to derive their inspiration from the "strategic environment" approach of American foreign policy of the early Cold War years that their American counterparts are now revising.

Inadequacy of Military-Strategic View

oly.

sts.

ya

Vor

ots.

ide

the

nal

ped

plo-

nav

np-

ical

nal

res-

ity-

no-

rces

its

tary

ter-

ina, hile

rior of

side

on-

erti-

its

liti-

in-

the

ent,

ers,

nces,

However, despite its historically proven inadequacy, the military-strategists' uncritical faith in the primacy of the technocratic version of the strategic environment is acknowledged the world over. Hence this propensity often a professional hazard of narrow technical excellence—is sought to be institutionally countervailed in many countries by blending the mililary-strategic approach to national security with the perceptions of other televant groups in the society before policy-options are decided upon at the highest political level. This concept of national security is built in the organizational structure of all apex institutions for national security, whether the National Security Council of the United States or their counterparts in the Socialist States. Such institutionalised co-option of the military-States Such institutionalised co-option of the states on a viewpoint, within the decision-making apparatus based on a

comprehensive concept of national security, apart from improving the quality of decision-making on questions pertaining to national security, also helps in making the military-strategists a little less righteous and more responsive to the other dimensions of national security. People from the Armed Forces, benefiting from such political and diplomatic insights into their strategic perceptions are many; for example, Marshall, Eisenhower, MacArthur, or even Haig, in the United States; Smuts and Mountbatten in Britain or de Gaulle in France; people like Zhukov or Malinovsky in the Soviet Union; Chu Teh and Lin Piao in China, or Giap in Vietnam. Similarly, but for their political and diplomatic insights into the strategic environment, it is doubtful if people like Kennan, Dulles, MacNamara or even Kissinger in the United States; or Lloyd George and Churchill in Britain; Mao Tse-Tung or Chou en Lai in China, Ho Chi-Minh in Vietnam or even Kim il-Sung or Castro in Korea and Cuba, all in their own way, would have been able to meet the perceived threats to their respective national security. A purely military-strategic view of national security has very limited relevance for prescriptive formulations in any society, even in situations of actual war and much less for perspective planning for national defence.

#### Need for Political Checks

While there is a case for some form of institutionalized co-option of the military-strategic view of national security within the overall framework of national decision-making, there is a much stronger case to provide for political checks against its natural propensity for excesses. Under normal circumstances, in democratic countries such checks are provided by the built-in primacy of the political process. The absence of such checks, in the military or civilian dictatorships of various hues contributes to the primacy of the military-strategic perception of national security. The consequence of such a development for the country are borne out by the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco and the Shah of Iran, or the regimes in our neighbourhood, and in some parts of Asia, Africa and most of Latin America.

In most countries, there is in fact an inverse co-relationship between the relative primacy of the military-strategic perception of national security and the strength of its democratic political institutions. Even in the United States, with its relatively developed democratic institutions, the high level of post-war militarisation and global military expansion, emanating from a military-strategic perception of threats to national security, had to be legitimized by a moratorium on its democratic institutions through Mcarthyism. Paradoxically, while the democratic institutions in the United States reasserted themselves at a subsequent stage, most post-colonial "Third World" security-never recovered from the dent caused to their weak democratic institutions and, consequently, were condemned to be ruled by a surrogate class of military-bureaucratic elite, as in Pakistan. The so-called "Cabinet

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

"So way The thor from dan rem cula dipl

THE

of ?

with

the simple dem econ bure to b the t exist

In

Econ

again

out.

Ur envir color sidere an ap demo have, legitii comp Chair Board States nomic truly ; States tion o

for by

unem

differe

ty

ps

ve

es.

gic

or

or

n:

or

is

he

ng

ng

to

ely

for

var

the

of

for na1

the the

acy

nce

ler,

ur-

the

rity

ted

vel

om

egi-

m.4

re-

1d"

nal

atic

rate

inet

of Talent" in Pakistan in 1954, consisting of its military-bureaucratic elite. with its military-strategic perception of "threat" to national security from "Soviet expansionism" and "India's aggressive designs," directly paved the way for military rule to which the country has been condemned since 1958.5 The brief Bhutto interlude was only possible when the ruling clique was thoroughly discredited after the disintegration of the country resulting from such technocratic perceptions of national security. Such sources of danger, emanating from a purely technocratic perception of national security, remains thinly-veiled in most contemporary post-colonial societies, particularly in the context of the high stakes with which Super Power global diplomacy continues to be played.

In other words, in most post-colonial societies, a technocratic version of the "strategic environment" approach to national security, not only involves simply the quality of decision-making, but also involves the fate of the democratic political process. It also involves a level of militarisation of the economy, society and polity that could only be sustained by a militarybureaucratic technocracy that has historically been proved, in such societies, to be parasitical, sociologically and intellectually. In such an eventuality, the thin line of distinction between external and internal threat, an endemic existential reality in most contemporary post-colonial societies faced with the global designs of the Super Powers, is likely to disappear altogether, again, as the experiences of the countries in our neighbourhood would bear Out

# Economic Consequences of "Strategic Environment" Approach

Unlike in some capitalist democracies in specific situations, the "strategic environment" approach to national security has little relevance for postcolonial societies on more important political grounds than would be considered necessary to consider by our military-strategists. The case for such an approach is still weaker on economic grounds. In many such capitalist democracies, the level of their post-war militarisation had, and continues to have, deep-seated economic roots which has provided considerable political legitimacy to a concept of national security that reflected the economic complementarity between defence and development. Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman of President Truman's International Development Advisory Board, recommending the Mutual Security Act (1953), reported to the United States Congress: "The more we have explored the relationship of economic development to defence, the more impressed we have been with how truly inseparable they are." Baran and Sweezy in their study of the United States economy have pointed that "the difference between the deep stagnation of the tion of the 1930s and the relative prosperity of the 1950s is fully accounted for hyth. for by the vast military outlay of the fifties," and that between 1939 and 1961, unemployment fell from 17.2 per cent to 6.7 per cent, only because of the difference in US military spending, so that if the military budget were CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

reduced to the 1939 level, unemployment would have also reverted to the same level. According to another study, "the sharp increase in military spending and its percentage of the Gross National Product at the time of the Korean War is associated with a marked increase in the GNP and a marked decrease in the rate of unemployment. The cut-back in arms expenditure in 1954 was, in turn, accompanied by a standstill in the GNP and a sharp rise in unemployment." In any case, documentation to establish the economic basis of post-war American militarisation is now comprehensive enough to leave much scope for debate on the subject.

Unfortunately, empirical studies on the economic consequences of the rate of military spending in such of the post-colonial societies that still maintain their democratic structure, is not so comprehensive. But even from the sketchy literature that is available, some co-relationship between high military spending and the political economy of underdevelopment is possible to establish. Firstly, most such post-colonial societies, with a high level of defence budget emanating from a military-strategic perception of national security are under one or other form of military or civilian dictatorships as in countries like Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan or some of the Latin American countries. Secondly, almost all of them have, what may be described as, surrogate political regimes managing satellite economies of one or the other Super Power, as in the aforementioned regimes, as well as in some oil-rich West Asian countries. Thirdly, most such countries' high military outlays, ostensibly against "external threat", are very often investments to defend unpopular regimes against internal discontent caused by mass poverty sustaining a narrow social base of enormous personal wealth and ostentatious consumption, sought to be rationalized by statesponsored clergies and intellectuals. Allied to this politico-economic reality in many such countries, is the absence even of the basic minimal level of social transformation and/or political mobilisation that is an essential component of economic development of such countries. Fourthly, and following from the aforementioned characteristics of the political economy of such countries, is the feature of most such countries in which the apparent levels of prosperity in its pockets of wealth, or its GNP, is no true indicator of the abysmal depths of mass poverty, hunger, malnutrition or unemployment. The GNP in most West Asian countries, inflated by their oil wealth, do not even indicate these countries' potentials for development within the existing social structure, and hence the petro-dollars have had to be recycled. Phenomenon, like "Brazil is becoming richer, and its people poorer," could be generalised about many such countries. There are other paradoxes in such countries, as in Saudi Arabia which has equipped itself with the most modern fighter-aircraft but, in the absence of the necessary technological base, has to run and maintain them with foreign personnel, ostensibly to defend the country against external threat.

The consequences of such heavy military spending for national security is not far to seek. Swinging Teheran of the Shah of Iran, or his mighty

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

milita any e armar to pro The under to ha and the

THE "

and no case f "Islan

is frau

threat

It is countr of the differe sophis the res the fra variati to the though able pr Father matic c foreign this per withsta conjunc remain But in legitima the oth Since strategi crying from th

The der

of war,

military machine—built on a social base of mass poverty—did not require any external aggression to collapse. With all its wealth and sophisticated amaments, the Saudi Monarchy has to depend upon foreign palace guards 10 provide security against internal disaffection.

The moral sought to be underscored by these examples is, that, for any underdeveloped post-colonial society, the concept of national security has to have a built-in predominance of its social and economic component: and that, any temptation to opt for the soft option of a purely militarystrategic perception of national security, involving heavy defence outlays. is fraught with positive hazards. In such societies, actually faced with external threat, the military-strategic option could only be an option under duress. and not of preference. It is within the framework of these principles that the case for the Indian "bomb", in the context of the threat posed by the "Islamic bomb," should be viewed.

#### TT THE BOMB DEBATE

It is of course true that India is not exactly comparable to many of the countries from which generalised conclusions about the salient features of the political economy of underdevelopment have been derived. It is different in terms of the socio-economic base of its technology, its level of sophistication, or in terms of the socio-economic base of its political elite or the resilience of its democratic institutions. Further, it is also true, that within the framework of the concept of post-colonial underdevelopment there are variations in levels of post-colonial legacies and of underdevelopment. But to the extent that India's achievements in these regards have been unique though it could easily be exaggerated—they are in no small measure accountable precisely to a strategy of national security espoused by the Founding Fathers which gave due emphasis to its social, economic, political and diplomatic dimensions, despite the pressures of military strategists, domestic and foreign. Whether the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 signified a failure of this perspective of national security, or a political and diplomatic failure to withstand the pressures of the military-strategic perspective, in a specific conjuncture of national and international politics, are questions which still temain to be resolved with the requisite rigour of scientific documentation. But in any case, the war of 1962 gave the first major set-back to the political legitimacy of this Nehruvian perspective of national security, as it has to the other spheres of the country's developmental perspective.

Since then, through the two rounds of war with Pakistan, our militarystrategists and their foreign counterparts have had a field day in this country, crying for blood, as it were. Only, our strategists distinguish themselves from their foreign counterparts by their demand for the Indian "bomb". The demand was first raised when the cumulative impact of the three rounds of war, among other factors, contributed to a considerable distortion of

Y

e f

**(**-P

-5 1e

111 n

en is

h n

cof

at es

ell es' en

edal

ety

of n-

ng ch

els

of nt.

do

he d.

ıld in .

ost

cal

to

ity

ıty

the country's developmental perspective and the first potential threat to the fledgling democratic structure after the death of Nehru. The most intense phase of the "bomb" debate in India coincided with the political hegemony of the so-called "Syndicate" and an economic crisis leading to the country's surrender to the World Bank-dictated devaluation in 1966.

The re-assertion of centralised political authority in the country particularly since 1969, again put the military-strategists and the "bombwallas" on the defensive till at least the war of 1971. Even more than the three rounds of the Kashmir war, this war for the liberation of Bangladesh was the first real confrontation between two alternative concepts of national security; the Pakistani military regime's technocratic version of a purely military-strategic concept of national security and India's concept of giving primacy to the political "ideological" and diplomatic component. In the ultimate analysis of the outcome of the war, and our admiration for the valour and fighting qualities of our Armed Forces, the importance of diplomatic factors like the Treaty with the Soviet Union—and political factors—like the role of the Awami League leaders, the Mukti Bahini and the liberal public opinion in the West—could easily be under-rated. The 1971 war was a significant example to demonstrate the superiority of the Nehruvian concept of national security, as also of the hazards involved in a post-colonial society's exercise of military option, even under duress. While the war, perhaps like never so decisively after the death of Nehru, established the primacy of political process in the country and of centralised authority within the democratic structure,10 the economic consequences of the war in an underdeveloped, post-colonial, society were far-reaching. As earlier in 1966 after the three rounds of war, it contributed to scarcity, runaway inflation and economic chaos which, now provided the socio-economic base to the JP-movement, the Nav Nirman Samiti and the most organised political challenge to the central authority of the country. Significantly, it is in the midst of this serious economic and political crisis in the country, in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, that the political decision for the Pokharan "implosion" of May 1974 was taken, thereby providing further grist to the mill of our technocrats and military-strategists basking in the reflected glory of the nuclear feather in the cap of our political leadership.

## Impact of the Bangladesh War

The morally and politically legitimate military support provided by India to the war of national liberation of Bangladesh—for which our military-strategists have taken unjustifiable credit—is a clear case of doing the right things for the wrong reasons. The content of our political sympathies—at least at the highest political level—for national liberation per se, had been proved in the mid-sixties when a groping leadership opted to remain understandably "pragmatic" during the American bombings in Vietnam; besides, the social base of our ruling elite, or the economic base of the ruling party,

make all the prowhich t upon. 11
Pakistar reasons
America rational threats to mark. A security tically of through sovereig tinent w

THE "IS

The n
easily b
this stru
some o
middlejust as
before t
In und
facets a
the Vie
our stra

Costs of

The s
from be
the asse
develope
Super P
tions. D
South A
of India
Imagina
the Ban

Significa

national

Just a Pokhara fulness of and not

THE "ISLAMIC BOMB" AND INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

make any such claims somewhat unconvincing. But, for historical reasons, the prospects of Pakistan's disintegration had potential political pay-offs which the erstwhile uncertain political leadership was not averse to cash which the was a political decision to be "humane" to the erstwhile East Pakistan refugees, to receive, shelter, and feed them for no more altruistic reasons than those prompting the military regime in Pakistan to do, with American money, to the Afghan refugees now. But our military-strategists' rationalisation before, and afterwards, that the war successfully met the threats to India's security posed by Pakistan has proved to be wide off the mark. Another example of the inadequacy of a technocratic view of national security bereft of its social, political and diplomatic component—a politically divided Pakistan, as it existed before Bangladesh, had proved all through to be militarily less of a threat to India than two politically united sovereign states flanking India at two ends, as recent events in the sub-continent would bear out.

The military-strategic achievements of the Bangladesh war for India could easily be exaggerated, just as the selfless sacrifices of our Armed Forces in this struggle for national liberation, in view of the subsequent reports about some of the sociological perversions of the Indian Army's north Indian middle-class social base displayed in the liberated areas of East Pakistan just as they continue to be displayed in India's North-Eastern parts before the political leadership of the Awami League established their control. In underdeveloped post-colonial societies, military options have many facets affecting its social fabric, more than even that which the veterans of the Vietnam war wrought to the American society in the seventies, than our strategists would care to consider as of any consequence. The social costs of war are never inconsequential, less so for underdeveloped countries.

The significance of the Bangladesh war for India's national security, far from being military-strategic, lay in the political and diplomatic spheres: the assertion of political will and of national sovereignty of an underdeveloped post-colonial society, in open defiance of the global designs of a Super Power acting in concert with another power with Super Power ambitions. Diplomatically, it signified the assertion of regional autonomy in South Asia from the global designs of the Super Powers and a legitimisation of India's logical geopolitical role in the new regional power structure. Imaginatively handled, these two political and diplomatic advantages of the Bangladesh war can be made into the most important in-puts in India's national security in the foreseeable future.

Significance of Pokharan

Just as the Bangladesh war, the military-strategic significance of the Pokharan implosion could easily be exaggerated. Firstly, because the uselulness of a nuclear arsenal lies almost exclusively in its deterrance-value and not its use-value. In fact, the paradox of a nuclear arsenal is that its

AY

to nse nv 'y's

rly the the eal the gic

the ysis ing s ole

ion ant nal cise so

ical atic ed. ree nic

ent, the ous gla-

lay noear

dia IYght

-at een ler-

les, rty,

utility to the possessor decreases to the extent it is tempted to use it; it was certainly not out of moral compunctions that America could not use nuclear weapons—when it actually used all other inhuman weapons of mass destruction—to save itself from defeat in the Vietnam war. Even, theoretically, granting its use-value as a weapon of war, in any Indo-Pakistan or Sino-Indian war the use of nuclear weapons would be militarily self-deafeating for the simple reason that in these geographically proximate regions, depending upon wind-directions at any point of time, the fall-out of nuclear weapons hurled against an adversary would cause unacceptable damage to the country using it. It is again for no grounds of morality that the only occasion when such weapons have been used in war, was by the Western Powers in a region far away from the crucible of Western civilisation. The logic of strategic deterrence lies in continually improving the quality of nuclear weapons and delivery capacity and its stockpile on a scale that only Super Powers with global commitments could afford, and find worthwhile to undertake. One or two small nuclear weapons, and corresponding delivery system, makes no convincing nuclear arsenal in terms of strategic deterrance; they can only manifest the desperate strategic perceptions of societies permanently in a state of siege and haunted by insecurity and guilt-complex as the racist regimes of South Africa and Israel.

Secondly, nuclear weapons, in the arsenal of a strategic command, on a social base of mass proverty, hunger, malnutrition and unemployment leading to deep-seated political divisions within the country is, apart from being counter-productive, thorughly unconvincing as a strategic deterrence. Such societies tend to be fragile, even politically, with little potentials for patriotic mass mobilisation in the defence of national security. It is of some significance that, empirically, none of the major nuclear Powers of the contemporary world are confronted by such a social base that erodes, at the outset, the credibility of their potential nuclear arsenal as a strategic deterrence, as in the case of the Indian "bomb" or the "Islamic Bomb."

Despite its credibility-gap in terms of strategic deterrence, just as the Bangladesh war, the Pokharan "implosion" registered an important political point, apart from the scientific and technological point of the country's capability. The political point was the critical importance of political will the assertion of national sovereignty in open defiance of the Super Powers of the important, but often forgotten, political point that Nehru was making been muffled in the "pragmatic" phase of our foreign policy by a groping was resurrected—howsoever fitfully—particularly in 1970 when the country Power-designed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since then, through the right, and

the possi defy the system. 7 and diplo portant ] political as a strat in transla for a nuc from the time with This seer since one six mont even at a with tota that is ed

THE "ISL

Myth of

the fores

If the lised by Pakistani India see constrain absence. surrogate insurmou that was Pakistani denied to Iran and t its stars America's dent upo domestic be, allow country security 1 Depender tradiction. ing a nuc for the c

Sovereign

RAY

was

lear

des-

illy.

inoting

de-

lear

age

only

ern

The

of nly

hile

eli-

egic

of

and

n a ent

om

ice. for

me

he

er-

he

cal

y's

vill

in

rs'

on

ng ad

ng

ra

ry

er

gh 1d

on- '

possibility, of a determined political will in underdeveloped countries to the possibilities logic of the duopolistic structure of International political The Pokharan "implosion", as it were, made this crucial political and diplomatic point with a bang, howsoever, symbolically. It was an imnortant point to be made with potentials for significant diplomatic and political pay-offs to national security. But beyond that, it had little validity as a strategic deterrence. There would be as little strategic deterrence-value intranslating the nuclear option emanating from Pokharan to a programme for a nuclear arsenal. The necessary strategic mileage, if any, could be derived from the post-Pokharan situation of technologically being at any point of ime within six months of the political decision to go militarily nuclear. This seems to be a resonably happy situation for Indian military strategy. since one does not usually visualise an Indo-Pakistan war without at least in months of warm-up session preceding it. A pre-emptive first-strike. even at a theoretical plane, is the prerogative of two first-rate nuclear Powers. with total strategic nuclear capabilities of near-equal strength, on a scale that is economically unrealistic to visualise in the Indian sub-continent in the foreseeable future

#### Myth of the Pakistani Nuclear Arsenal

If the strategic significance of India's proposed nuclear arsenal, as visualised by our military-strategists, is illusory, the phantom of an imminent Pakistani nuclear arsenal, upon which such pressures are being mounted in India seems to be unreal; not on grounds of any technological or financial constraints but, paradoxically in the case of Pakistan, in spite of their absence. It is the satellite character of Pakistan's political economy, and Surrogate nature of its military-bureaucratic regime that is likely to prove an insurmountable constraint for Pakistan to make precisely the political point that was made by India at Pokharan. The Super Power underwriters of the Pakistani military regime simply cannot allow it an indulgence they have denied to no less faithful—and strategically critical—allies as the Shah of han and the monarchy in Saudi Arabia; and, the Pentagon must be thanking Its stars for its foresight on this score in the context of Iran. None of America's dependent allies in the under-developed world, so totally dependent any dent upon its economic and military aid, and with a regime lacking any domestic political base, as in Pakistan, have been or could be expected to be, allowed the indulgence of a nuclear arsenal that could provide such a foundary to national puntry a level of autonomy in policy-planning pertaining to national Dependent is simply unacceptable to a Super Powers' global interest. Dependent allies with autonomy of national decision-making is a conladiction in terms. In other words, Pakistan's political capabilities of building a nucl ling a nuclear arsenal is inseparably linked with the inter-woven movements the court arsenal is inseparably linked with the inter-woven movements the country's democratisation and the political assertion of national sovereignty. In the present context of that country's political economy, a nuclear arsenal for Pakistan with adequate capabilities of strategic deterrance appears to be an unrealistic assumption on which to build any case for India's strategic response.

#### Reality of Pakistan's Capability

But Pakistan's ambitions to demonstrate its nuclear technology capabilities-for reasons of obvious political pay-offs as for the Indian leadershipcould be a more realistic assumption as a basis for an appraisal of India's possible response. It is a realistic assumption because the Super Power underwriters of the Pakistani ruling clique could not be averse to demonstrating, through a Pakistani nuclear explosion, to its Super Power allies and India, the dangerous implications of an unrestricted nuclear proliferation. It may be wise for India to conform to the logic of such a signal, even if it was American-inspired because an unrestricted competition to improve the quality of their respective nuclear arsenal—a logical corollary of a policy of strategic nuclear deterrence—between these two under-developed post-colonial societies would be even more counter-productive than the existing race for superiority in conventional armaments promoted in the region by the Super Powers and the new, proliferating, breed of their local agents, liaison men and defence contractors. In fact the far-reaching consequences of a probable nuclear arms race in the name of national security, on the political economy of the sub-continent, would, in the long run, be conducive to the Super Powers' global designs; in which case, in trying to establish our one-up-manship in the battle for a nuclear arsenal, we would lose the war of asserting our national sovereignty. We might as well deny ourselves the pleasure of such dubious "anti-Americanism"—of the sort often indulged in by the Shah of Iran, Ayub Khan or others among the Super Power's dependent allies for socio-psychological reasons not under discussion here—and work out policy-alternatives which, in the long run, help in the assertion of the country's national sovereignty, which is the most effective defence-mechanism of the national security of undeveloped post-colonial societies.

### Options for India

If the Pokharan "implosion" has weakened India's objections against a possible Pakistani "explosion" to demonstrate its nuclear capability, a nuclear arsenal by India—with little impact as a strategic deterrence—would further weaken India's case against a Pakistani nuclear arsenal only make the case politically more attractive for the Pakistani regime. Also, ercising its option in favour of a nuclear explosion and even, theoretically, for a nuclear arsenal, except appealing to the United States to advise

THE "ISL

restraint even stra Super Po continent national tical base the excess productive them to

The p of nation "self-der bility-r That wo hood-t political the base off a self tensions importa would in democra ments f Super P any assi possible cratic P for a nu prevent to go nu the nucl desperat pirically mechani being di of milit develop

The s

for the

aspiration

support

"ISLAMIC BOMB" AND INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

estraint on its dependent ally. But it would be politically and economically strategically—counterproductive to help, and endorse, Pakistan's power linkages, in the interests of the long-term security of the subsuper round. A more preferable alternative, from the standpoint of India's minimal security, may be to help the emerging process of a social and polipallonal base in our neighbourhood that would provide built-in checks against the excesses of regimes that thrive off such desperate, and nationally counterproductive, military-strategic perceptions of national security which tempt them to opt for nuclear armaments.

#### III SOME POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

The policy prescriptions emanating from such a comprehensive strategy of national security for India would involve, firstly, the announcement of a "self-denying ordinance" -in a manner that carries conviction and credibility-renouncing the counter-productive option of a nuclear arsenal. That would considerably help in allaying the insecurity in our neighbourhood—to the extent that it is legitimate—which has conferred considerable political legitimacy to the "Islamic Bomb." It would simultaneously weaken the base of one of the supporting props of the military regime which thrives off a self-generating cycle of military-strategic perception of national security, tensions in the sub-continent, and authoritarian rule at home. The second important component of the comprehensive strategy of national security would involve imaginative political and diplomatic support to the forces of democratisation in our neighbourhood, which are also, potentially, movements for the assertion of the autonomy of the sub-continent from the Super Powers' global designs. This policy-prescription is suggested not on any assumption that a democratic Pakistan would ipso facto renounce its possible nuclear ambitions; on the contrary, as already indicated, a democratic Pakistan is a necessary—though not necessarily sufficient—condition for a nuclear Pakistan. But since there is precious little that we can do to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear—and less so, once we ourselves decide to go nuclear—we might as well ensure, or at least aid the process, by which the nuclear trigger is provided with political checks against its misuse by desperate military regimes for ill-conceived personal aggrandisements. Empirically, democratic, political checks have been the only effective defencemechanism for an under-developed country's social and economic priorities being distorted by military options to national security under the pressures of military-strategists, domestic and foreign. This is also true for many developed countries as well.

The second policy-prescription also involves a "self-denying ordinance" and for the Indian leadership; to be sensitive to the democratic institutions and aspirations within the country so as to make our political and dipromatic support for similar aspirations in the neighbourhood to be morally legitimate

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

RAV

detercase

abilihipndia's ower mon-

allies

proliignal. on to ollary devethan ed in

their ching secug run, rying 1, we

well of the ig the ınder run, s the

oped

nst a ty, a nceenal.

yould Also, n excally;

dvise

and politically convincing. But that by itself, would not be too bad a bargain for the country's national security, with or without a nuclear arsenal. In fact, the additional merit of such a comprehensive strategy of national security is the built-in premium it provides in this significant, but often forgotten, political component without which a strategy of national security built exclusively against external threat would be inadequate to meet the resultant challenges of internal disaffection. From the social, economic and political angles, a nuclear arsenal for India at present—with little impact as a strategic deterrance—could become the major liability for the country's national security, with or without the "Islamic Bomb."

June 1981

#### NOTES

1 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) and the subsequent Decrees of Peace.

2 Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, and subsequently the alliance with Western

3 For a detailed discussion of the causes and its consequences, see Aswini K. Ray, "Myths in American and Pakistani Foreign Policies: Their Contemporary Relevance," Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), September-October 1980.

4 Ibid.

- 5 See, Aswini K. Ray, Domestic Compulsions and Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1975).
- 6 Cited in Lenny Siegel, "The Future of Military Aid," in Steve Weiseman et al, The Trojan Horse (Palo Alto, 1975), p. 209.

7 Monopoly Capital (Hammondsworth, 1966), pp. 176-77.

8 Joseph D. Phillips, "Economic Effects of the Cold War" in David Horowitz, (Ed.), Corporations and the Cold War (New York, 1970), p. 174.

9 See "Aswini K. Ray, n. 3.

- 10 Mrs Gandhi's unprecedently massive popular mandate in the General Elections of 1971 is an evidence of this statement.
- 11 Just as the Pakistani leadership, with similar prospects, would not perhaps hesitate to cash upon. Even Bhutto could not resist the political temptation to declare a "thousand years' war' against India, shortly before he persuaded Mrs Gandhi to receive him at

POLITI

The Apart f ments, Firstly, the der vulnerat entered as well Secondl shift to insights studies. been fo like tra cation.

> Met and tec in order to situa between or not t tical str develop relates t

struction

structur Exist econom method. tions to evidence Where s

Mr Vars Continui

formula

# POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN AID TO THE THIRD WORLD: A STRUCTURAL REINTERPRETATION

By ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY\*

. RAY

argain al. In tional

often

curity

et the

c and

act as

ntry's

estern

Myths

oreign

1975). ', The

(Ed.),

ns of

ate to

usand

im at

The problem of economic aid requires a comprehensive reassessment. spart from the shortcomings of the existing studies, a few other developments, having their origins in the seventies, have made this imperative. Firstly, consequent upon the intensified theme of transfer of resources under the demand for a new international economic order and the increasing wilnerability of the international credit structure, the issue of aid has reentered the core of the development debate. The Brandt Commission Report as well as some other development documents have amply recognized this.1 Secondly, the discipline of international relations has witnessed a paradigm shift towards political economy,2 bringing along some new methodological insights which can be used to overcome the limitations of the available studies.3 Of the many such approaches offered,4 the structural approach has been found to be exceedingly useful particularly with regard to problems like trade, technology and private capital. Aid so far has escaped its application. This paper seeks to fill this gap by attempting a two-fold reconstruction, theoretical and empirical.

#### I METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

Method, broadly speaking, is a composite of two dimensions, substantive and technical. In broad terms, the "substantive" dimension implies that, in order to analyse a particular phenomenon or an aspect of reality, one has to situate it first in its totality and make assumptions about the relationship between the aspect chosen and the totality of which it is a part; whether or not these assumptions are valid will be determined by how far the theoretical structure built upon them corresponds with reality as it has historically developed and, is concretely manifesting itself. The technical aspect basically telates to the details of this enterprise, i.e. the building up of the theoretical structure and showing the proposed correspondence or absence thereof.

Existing studies on aid perform poorly on this plane. While most of the economic studies have made a fetish of technique taking it as the whole method, the political studies have, alongside, attempted substantive assumptions too. They are inadequate on both the fronts. The two constituents of where statements and statistical data—have not been rigorously tackled. formulation, they have been used as evidence and contrasting data either

Mr Varshney is teaching Political Science at the School of Correspondence Courses and Continuing Education, University of Delhi, Delhi.

set aside or marginally touched upon (applicable mostly to political studies). Where on the other hand data serves the purpose, statements to the contrary have been either neglected or down-played (applicable mostly to economic studies).

A slightly careful examination would reveal that neither of the two types taken in separation can constitute a self-sufficient proof, though statistical evidence, even in the absence of statements, would be closest to self-sufficiency. The statements can be either mystificatory of the real motives, consciously or unconsciously, or may just represent perceptions of the decision-makers or actors involved, which in turn may not be necessarily true of reality? Official statements can be used as rigorous evidence only if statistical data support or supplement them.

It is clear therefore that methodological scientificity demands a set of assumptions, (based on an understanding of reality as it has historically unfolded itself), which will inform our interpretation of evidence, and for which data and statements will be used in the order of their reliability.

What then are our substantive assumptions with regard to our problem and why? The discussion here would start with the inadequacy of existing assumptions—implicit or explicit—and then proceed on two interconnected

levels, on the "structural" level of aid relations and on the contextual determinants of that structure.

Aid so far has been discussed either as an enterprise purely economic or something which is predominantly political with the economics involved seen just as an instrument for political purposes. With isolated exceptions, the mainstream of aid-scholarship has followed either of these two approaches. Economists, particularly of the neo-classical persuasion, have primarily been concerned with the relationship of aid with levels of income, savings, investment, growth rate etc. Since their methodology and perspective take little note of, if not neglect altogether, the social context of economic transactions, economic development has been presumed by them as the determinant of aid-relations. If it has not materialized, it is because of the intrusion of extra-economic irrationalities into the mathematized rationality of economics. Needless to add, until failures of the developmental objective itself are not incorporated in the framework, its explanatory utility is inherently limited which is exactly the case with these studies.

Political scientists on the other hand emphasize the primacy of politics in two ways. The earlier writers, 10 writing in the Cold War milieu or just thereafter, focused on the politico-strategic imperative as the guiding force of aid and domestic economic necessities were regarded as relatively unimportant. The more recent writers 11 on the other hand, have given the economic dimension a logical twist; while domestic economic interests, like the former argument, have not been important as far as aid extension is concerned, "aid-weariness" is primarily explained by referring to the "realization" that aid was not bringing about economic development and was instead creating an exploitative image in the recipient countries.

Explair econor which the point

POLIT

this vie in a soo also at econom tendence interco socio-ec that ne

Hov the defi official fact tha and tha level. T an illust from. H exist in countrie countrie Surely, i aid shou forces ha causation ances and of the in

Sever nation-st but conc with resp inisuse? Inis

systems in

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN AID TO THE THIRD WORLD

SHNEY

dies), 6

itrary

omic

types

stical

iency.

ously

akers

lity.7

et of

y un-

vhich

blem

sting

ected

leter-

ic or

olved

ons,8

pro-

pri-

ome,

pers-

xt of

hem

ause

tized

ental

tility

itics-

just orce

un-

the

ests,

n is

the

and

Thus, while linkages have been sought, it has been done eclectically. Explanatory convenience has basically decided which factor—political or conomic—will be important. There is no genuinely integrative attempt, which can trace the *underlying inter-connections* between the economic and the political levels—as they interact on the plane of aid-relations.

The concept of "structure" can integrate the two levels. The basis for this view is the fact that all economic transactions, including aid, take place in a social setting, where forces which generate interaction with the economic also at the same time pressure the political. 12 Every state is rooted in a socio-conomic system. The latter at every given point produces certain objective tendencies and necessities which the State has to manage. The set of these interconnected objective forces, tendencies and necessities present in every socio-economic system at all points of time are the integrative structures, that need to be examined.

How do these considerations apply to aid relationships? A dissection of the definition of aid would be helpful. Aid is defined as a cross-national official flow of resources made available at concessionary terms. Now, the fact that it represents a flow of resources relates it to the economic level and that it is official, connects it to the state and therefore to the political level. To show how this objective interconnection has a logic of its own, an illustration can be given and the relevant generalization abstracted therefrom. How does one, for example, explain the fact that aid still continues to exist in substantial magnitude, despite the oft-heard complaint in the poor countries that aid is "exploitative" and the over-used chorus in the donor countries (including United States), that aid is "ineffective" and "misused"? Surely, if conscious perceptions of decision-makers were the guiding logic, aid should have lost its existence by now. It is obvious that certain objective forces have been more important than subjective assertions. The search for causation therefore involves an exploration beneath these immediate appearances and identification of the underlying forces and tendencies—structures of the interacting systems.

Several questions immediately crop up here. Given the fact that the nation-states interacting as donors and recipients are not monolithic units, but concrete entities in which various social groups are differentially placed with respect to hold over resources, can the question of "exploitation" and differential placement—an objective fact—not generate continuity of aid—nother objective fact—despite the various reservations? Is there not the possibility of some particular groups benefiting on both sides despite the produced by the growth pattern not an impelling consideration? The available studies have either partly raised these questions or only partly answered systems involved, the differential placement and needs of social groups, the

insertion of state therein and the consequent resources, our attempt shall be addressed to exploring the structures which these questions suggest.

II

# EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS : AID AS PART OF THE STRUCTURE OF DOMINANCE AND DEPENDENCE

It is clear that, in the first place, interaction between two types of structures is involved—one relating to the needs of the recipient and the other to the extension by the donor. But this is not the only level of the process at work. While both the structures have their own systemic contexts, the interaction takes place in a still wider context, the world system, of which the two interacting systems are a part. As a result, there is also present an overarching structure specific to the wider system, which shapes the aid-interaction. This structure is the International Division of Labour, which has developed historically along with the evolution of the World System itself.<sup>14</sup>

The literature on aid tries to posit the two sides as completely separate, having to inter-systemic linkages. What is being essentially argued here on the other hand is that, though functioning apparently separately, the limits of the two operations—extension and receipt—are set by the broader structure of International Division of Labour. The latter, by historically dividing economic labour between various countries, also shapes objective relations of dominance and dependence between them. Perspectively seen, aid transactions are a component of this pattern of dominance and dependence; they connect the dominance-rationality of the donor to the dependence-pattern of the recipient, both processes having been generated historically and finding expression inter alia in the form of aid in a given historically specific period of relationship. 15 While the dominant systems tend to maintain the existing Division of Labour, wherein lies their dominant position, and aid is one of the many mechanisms for this purpose, the dependent systems are caught in the rigidity of this Division and aid is one of the many reflections of it. The other components are transfer of private capital (as distinguished from official transfers of aid), technology, and trade.

This pattern however is not static; while aid generates (and is in turn generated by) dependence, it does not mean complete subordination. Nor does it imply the absence of attempts to overcome dependence. Such attempts do exist; their effectivity however is circumscribed by the Division of Labour. The resultant tension is reflected in the aid relationship, particularly on the political level where the presence of independent statehood leads to erosion of aid links too. The point needs emphasis, for the Marxist writers, in particular, have either totally ignored or considerably underemphasized it. The result is a unilinear economic causation, which fails to explain periodic assertions of autonomy by the dependent states. Most of the liberal writers on the contrary have made too much of political

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

TH

POLIT

indep

five I

the ob Th which

basic gaps i mestic impor because aid by

The

and co

not go

diverse

surplus
and ye
writers.
in deve
it was la
of these
of grow
in a nu

these ga account and the potentia was ger

been ov

What of these the post economic lationsh followed

consum:
It is

new stat

independence while analyzing aid relations. Klaus Knorr's list of "twenty five notorious cases" is an example of this. 17

## THE RECIPIENT SIDE : AID AND THE STRUCTURE OF DEPENDENCE

why at all is aid needed? Since most of the controversy revolves around the objectives of the donors, this question has received inadequate attention. 18 The most frequently quoted explanation rests on the two-gap model<sup>19</sup> which has become conventional wisdom in development literature. The hasic argument of the model is that growth in the LDCs is hampered by cans in two types of resources—savings and foreign exchange. While domestic savings are needed to generate investment, exchange is needed to buy imports and technology which can sustain and enhance its level. However, because of their poverty, the LDCs have meagre quantums of both, and aid by intervening at the low savings part of the process can help these conomies break out of the vicious circle of poverty.

The model bases itself only on a part of the truth and is both factually and conceptually weak. By presuming general insufficiency of capital and not going into the question of differential availability of resources with diverse social groups, it glosses over the issue of "potential" economic surplus20 being existent with the privileged classes/strata of these countries and yet not being properly utilized. Baran and following him some other writers, 21 have convincingly shown that even though the potential surplus in developing countries was small in comparison to the advanced countries, it was large as a proportion of the total domestic output and national income of these countries and accordingly was sufficiently large to permit high rates of growth.22 Similarly, the presence of substantial foreign exchange resources in a number of these countries at the time of their independence has also been overlooked by the model. Here too its proportion to the national income has been found to be sufficiently large. 28 Therefore it is not so much these gaps themselves, but the causes behind the creation of these gaps which account for the need of aid. The causes, on the most obvious level, are two and they are inter-related; (i) the failure of these states to fully mobilize the Potential resources, and (ii) the mode of the utilization of whatever surplus

What relates the two phenomena is the structurally dependent character of these systems. Structural dependence is a product of three basic features of the post-colonial systems: (i) the historically shaped structure of the tonomy; (ii) the nature of the new state, particularly in terms of its relationship with the privileged classes; and (iii) the development pattern followed by the state, given the first two features. These features would thatify how aid is interwoven with trade, private capital, technology. It is wild and market pattern and the state's role therein.

It is widely accepted now that the economic structure inherited by the states had certain built-in distortions, which the logic of the colonial

INEV

shall

THE

es of

d the f the exts. n, of

esent aid-

h has elf.14 rate.

here , the ader cally

ctive seen, end-

endated given

tems nant endf the

pital

turn Nor at-

sion artiood mes

the ably

hich es. 10

ical

phase had concretised. For our purposes, the most important distortion is the market-pattern which on account of industrialization not being preceded by an agrarian revolution (as was the case in the advanced countries), was biased against "mass" consumption goods and oriented in favour of "luxury" consumption goods. "Marginalization of masses" produced the former and the Europeanized consumption pattern of the privileged social strata accounted for the latter.<sup>24</sup>

The nature of the "new state" was such that it could not radically alter the consumption-pattern, for that would have meant a fundamental restructuring of income-distribution in favour of masses to generate substantial demand for mass-consumption goods. This in turn implied transferring the surplus available with the privileged classes, in particular the indigenous capitalist class (wherever it existed), and the landlords, which the actively supportive role of the former in the national liberation movement and the entrenched power of the latter in the socio-economic structure made objectively difficult.25 Therefore, the industry-based development that was followed after independence inevitably reflected the existing consumption-bias. Moreover, appropriation of the privileged surplus being ruled out, the mobilizing of resources required for industrialization was based more and more on indirect taxation, which meant a further squeeze on mass-incomes. A cycle was thus built; whereas industrialization itself was heavily focused on the production of capital and luxury goods; the further marginalization of masses that resource-mobilization implied meant at any rate no increase in the demand for mass-consumption goods. Industrialization therefore became "top-heavy", with the capital and luxury goods industries flourishing and those producing mass consumption goods languishing.26 Now, the fact that luxury and capital goods are technology and capital-intensive made import of inputs a necessity and the latter in turn demanded considerable foreign exchange to pay for the imports. If the exports too could correspondingly be increased, foreign exchange reserves would have existed. But the exports of these countries principally being primary goods, and the world demand for the latter being considerably inelastic,27 persistent balance of payments problems drained away the exchange reserves. Thus, industrialization required substantial aid.

Need for aid at a particular stage however does not mean continued dependence on it. After all, West European countries which received heavy economic pre-eminence. A combination of atleast five specific factors prevented its repetition in the case of the LDCs. First, the export-lag, which above. Heavy increase in exports on the other hand was required to offset the continued need of aid

Secondly, aid itself was accompanied by "strings," the most important of them being the insistence of donors on lesser state interference in the economy and greater play of market forces. Its two important results were:

the exi to sup techno.
a substitute for the in the out:
burden.

POLITI

vested if
power of
properl
zation
could h
shuffle,
easier o
level of

Fou

Thi

interest generate way. Gization, t market than no indigenc technolo provide. capital w independ a larger i an absolu of marke despite t export-ri needs of i

Finall debt burd ability of To su it is clear structura

is also cle

ion is ceded

HNEY

, was ur of d the social

alter al resuhransr the ch the ement

cture t that umpruled based

ze on f was irther t any trialigoods

nguiand turn f the erves

being rably e ex-

nued icavy rican prehich

atcd t the

the ere:

tant

demand being the stimulant of supply in a market economy, it deepened the existing consumption bias; and (ii) it also brought with it foreign capital the existing investment. Notwithstanding this initial influx of capital, the 10 supports the same of the sa a substantial rise in mass-employment. 28 The marginal mobilization-effect therefore further consolidated the existing consumption-bias. Though exports in a number of cases did rise, because of the export-restriction clauses<sup>29</sup> of the investment, they did not rise significantly enough. As a final addition. the outflow of profits (generated from the domestic market), dividends etc. 30 burdened the balance of payments situation still more.

Thirdly, the state—the political level of the system—too developed a vested interest in the continuance of aid. The existence of the ruling elite in nower demanded a consequent growth rate so that the system could function properly. However, given its inherent incapacity on the resource-mobilization front and the intrinsic unpopularity of tax-measures which alone could have generated those resources in the absence of a fundamental reshuffle, aid (along with private foreign capital), constituted a relatively easier option to get the resources that were needed to maintain a comfortable level of investment.

Fourthly, indigenous capital also, like the state, developed a vested interest in the continuation of the trend. Precisely the same factors that generated the state's dependence brought this about, though in a different way. Given the technology and capital-intensive character of the industrialization, the indigenous capital realized that a complete capture of the domestic market on its own was objectively impossible. Since some growth is better than no growth or even very little growth, the very growth-needs of the indigenous capital impelled it to make use of whatever co-operation the technologically superior and capital-abundant foreign business was ready to provide. The "strings" of aid particularly in terms of the entry of foreign capital with which the indigenous capital had an adverse relationship before independence, were not really important, for so long as aid could support a larger investment programme within an already limited market, it implied an absolute increase in the share of indigenous capital. The same limitation of market later induced a drive towards exports for growth; here again, despite the export-restriction clauses of the MNCs, a share in whatever export-rise was possible was an absolute increase. So, the very growthneeds of indigenous capital required persistence of aid, irrespective of whether was desperately needed or not.

Finally, given the co-existence of limited export-earnings and the rising debt burden, the repayment of earlier debt itself necessitated greater availability of

To sum up, three basic themes seem to be consistently inherent. Firstly, it is clear that continued dependence on aid is precisely the result of those structural features which generate its need in the first place. Secondly, it is also clear that the process unleashed by the internal structure has superimposed on it the confines of the International Division of Labour. While the market and consumption patterns, and the state's relationship with the privileged social groups define the internal structure, the limitations of export earnings and the differential hold over technology and capital in the world system define the external structure. On yet another level, the colonial genesis of both the market and the consumption pattern shows how the historical evolution of this division patterned the internal structure itself. The role therefore of the external structure in the generation and maintenance of the need for aid is critically important and needs thus to be noted. In a way, it is not only super-imposed on the internal structure but is very much internalized therein.

Thirdly, management of the system being one of the primary tasks of the state and aid being intrinsically connected with it, the new state operates within the economic parameters outlined above. While the economic logic does not automatically translate into political logic in the sense that economic dependence does not force a re-incarnation of political dependence, it does militate against a blanket assertion of political independence. And added to the vested interest of the ruling elite itself in the continued availability of aid, one can clearly see the objective tension that exists between this necessity and the necessity of maintaining political independence. The foreign policy of these states therefore reflects this tension. Both compromises with and/or submission to the donor on the one hand and autonomy-assertion on the other, will co-exist, the exact extent of each at a particular conjuncture being determined by the extent of necessity itself.

### Explanatory Framework

What evidence do we have for these theoretical formulations? We shall divide this part into three sub-parts—(a) concerning aid flows, debt service burden and private capital flows; (b) concerning the trade-pattern, on the basis of which limitations of the export earnings of the LDCs and their implications for aid could be shown; and, (c) concerning the market and consumption pattern. Statements here will not be a part of the empirical evidence, primarily because, given the number and heterogeneity of developing economies, any single set of statements made by any given country or leader may not be generally reflective of the entire developing world, even though a single explanatory framework may exist. Data on the other hand can show the latter and will be relied on here

Table I gives the latest available figures (1965-78) on official and private flows from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD countries, which cover all the developed market economies. While official development assistance (aid) has increased, what is more important to note is that private flows, consisting predominantly of private investment and lendings have increased at a faster pace. Whereas the value of private investment and lending was roughly 50 per cent of the aid-flows in 1965, it had

Net Off

POLITI

Type of

official ment As Private Market Private and Ler

Notes:

Sources

overtak 75 per develor has bee the pos This is shown was alrement to 'seventi flows. S we exar

Table given, to over two fixed taken and fixed

function

Table 1 Net Official and Private Flow of Resources from DAC Countries to Developing Countries and Multilateral Agencies1

ATT						(\$ million)	
Type of Flow	1965-67 Average	1970	1972	1973	1976	1977	1978
Official Develop- ment Assistance <sup>2</sup>	6118.0	7983.8	10253.1	11995.0	13665.4	14695.7	19881.8
Private Flows at Market Terms <sup>3</sup> Private Investment	4134.8	6870.6	8618.8	11071.6	22417.0	29987.9	44611.3
and Lending <sup>4</sup>	3174.0	4728.9	5237.0	09873.0	16993.2	21887.8	34924.5

Notes:

RSHNY

While

With ns of n the onial w the itself. mainoted verv

of the erates logic

iomic

does

ed to

ity of

ecesreign

with

rtion

con-

shall

rvice n the

their

and

irical

elop-

y or

even

nand

vate ECD

icial

note

and

est-

had

- Includes all multilateral organizations meant for extending resources to developing countries. Only part of EEC funds went to EEC members. This will not significantly affect the conclusions.
- Includes both bilateral and multilateral flows.
- Includes private investment and lending and private export credits.
- Includes direct investment, bilateral and multilateral portifolio investment.

Compiled from the following:

- (i) Development Co-operation, 1974 Review (OECD, Paris, 1974), p. 233.
- (ii) Development Co-operation, 1978 Review, 1978, p. 216.
- (iii) Development Co-operation, 1979 Review, 1979, p. 226.

overtaken the official flow by 1976, and by 1978, the former was nearly 75 per cent higher. In an effort to explain this change in the structure of development finance, centering more on private investment and lending, it has been generally argued that the enormous increase in private lending in the post-'73 phase was entirely because of the need to recycle petro-dollars. This is an overstated point. As many reports and statistical studies have shown now, existence of petro-dollars merely quickened the process that was already under way in the early's eventies. 31 In any case, direct investment too continued to increase though admittedly at a lower pace in the seventies. Aid certainly facilitated the tightening grip of private market Nows. Some more dimensions of this relationship will be made clear when We examine donor structures.

Table II shows the rising debt burden. Only the latest figures have been given, but the trend is quite clear. While the official debt has had a little over two fold increase, its servicing in 1977 too is twice the 1970 amount. If we take all the flows together—all in any case being a part of the dependence relationships to the dependence relationships to the grown has been ence relationship—the rate at which the debt-service has grown has been greater at greater than the total flow itself; four times increase as opposed to the three of limes increase in flows in the period covered. It is clear that the presence of did has neither meant elimination of its need (despite its so-called gap-filling function). It has in fact been function), nor has it meant a lesser debt-service burden. It has in fact been

POLITIC

for mo

combin

Debt.

Non-O (\$ billi

180

160

20

<sup>1</sup>Disburs <sup>2</sup>Paymen NOT countries 1976 figu earnings

Country, Source:

accompanied by larger private capital. Table III covering the period upto 1972 further shows how the service—both on official and private flows—has consumed an increasingly large share of the export earnings, explaining partly the difficulty LDCs face in getting rid of aid. As for the period after 1972, the picture is all the more telling. The Brandt Commission Report notes that during 1973-78 "debt grew two-and-a-half times as fast as exports

Table II

Total Debt of Developing Countries (Disbursed) At Year End And Total Annual Debt Service
(1970-77)

				The second	(\$ billion)
Type of Debt	1970	1972	1974	1976	1977
Debt  1 Bilateral and Multilateral ODA 2 Other Multilateral 3 Total Export Credits 4 Other (Market Items) 5 Unallocated Total Debt	28.60	33.30	43.50	56.60	64.30
	6.40	8.40	11.40	17.60	21.60
	26.10	32.50	39.20	57.50	66.00
	12.10	20.10	44.80	79.40	91.60
	0.90	0.90	1.10	1.10	1.10
	74.10	95.20	139.90	212,20	244.00
Debt Service  1 Bilateral and Multilateral ODA  2 Other Multilateral  3 Total Export Credits  4 Other (market items)  5 Unallocated  Total Debt Service	1.40	1.80	2.00	2.60	2.80
	0.80	1.10	1.40	1.90	2.20
	4.90	6.50	9.20	13.40	16.20
	1.80	3.40	7.50	13.20	15.20
	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.20	0.20
	9.00	12.90	20.30	31.30	36.60

Source: Development Co-operation, 1978 Review, (OECD, Paris, 1978), p. 250.

Table III

Exports, Debt Service and Investment Income Payment of Developing Countries


		(\$ billion
. 1960	1970	1972
Total Exports		
Debt Service Payments 29.60.	63.00	79.90
as per cent of Event	5.40	7.30
Foreign Investment I. 0.80	8,60	9.10
rayments (net) as not	7.60	10.00
	12.10	12.60
as per cent of Exports 5.00	13.00	17.30
16.80	20.70	21.70

Source: The United States and the Developing World Agenda for Action 1974, (New York, Praegar 1974), pp. 156-7.

for more than half the oil importing developing countries."32 Figure 1 combines these trends at one place.

Figure 1

Debt. Debt Service, and Export Earnings of Non-Oil-Exporting Developing Countries, 1967-1976 (\$ billions)



<sup>1</sup>Disbursed and undisbursed debt

<sup>2</sup>Payments of principal (amortization) plus interest payments

NoTE: Debt and debt service data include only those 74 non-oil-exporting developing countries (plus the East African Community) that report debt to the World Bank. The 1976 figures for debt and debt service are ODC estimates based on World Bank data Export earnings data are for all "non-OPEC developing countries" (as classified in the UN Standard Country, whether they report debt or not.

Source: United States And the World Development Agenda 1979, Overseas Development Council, (New York, 1979), p. 240.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

SHNEY

upto OWSining

after eport ports

Service illion)

977

4.30 1.60 6.00 1.60

4.00 2.80 2,20 5.20

1.10

5.60

5,20

0.20

es lion)

ork,

Tables IVA, IVB and IVC carry further the point established by Table III. They show—(i) the lagging export-growth rate of developing economies (IVA); (ii) the high and increasing percentage of manufactures in world trade (IVB); and (iii) the abysmally low share of the developing economies in the export of manufactures, even as late as 1977 when some of the newly-industrialising countries had stepped up their manufactured exports (IVC). Moreover, even in the export of non-fuel primary commodities on which the LDCs depend for the most part, the share of the developed world is comparatively larger. Seen in conjunction with the first three tables, one

Table IV<sup>a</sup>

Annual Average Growth Rates of Total Merchandise Exports

	1961-70 per cent	1971-80 per cent
World	7.8	6,0
All Developing Economies <sup>1</sup>	6,5	5.4
Developed Market Economies	6.3	6.7

Note: 1 Excludes the seven capital-surplus oil exporters.

Source: World Bank Annual Report, 1980, (Washington, D.C.), p. 18.

Table IVb

World Merchandise Exports by Category

	ent by caregory	(Percentages)
Category	1960	1979
Fuels		
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities	10.6	21.7
Manufactures Commodities	37.2	19.5
Total	52.2	58.8
	100.0	100.0

Source: World Bank Annual Report, 1980, p. 18.

Table IVe
Percentage Shares in World Exports, 1977

Country Groups	Non-fuel Primary Commodities	Manufactures
Developing Economies1		
Developed Market Economies	35.0	10.1
Others	55.6	79.6
	9.4	10.3

Note: 1 Excludes the seven capital surplus oil exporters.

Source: World Development Report, 1980, (World Bank, Washington, D.C.) p. 7

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

can se given nected On show t the me rated. logical povert

POLITI

so far earnin for the It is cl centag and th can su

the pe minati donors sustain

The in

bias at

If endless control is nece "M poses coand ecco of the 1 compo

politice stated Liberal have r Finally of the

to be to begin we pitched

SHNY

Table Omies Vorld

omies ewly-

IVC).

vhich

ld is

one

can see how the sluggish growth of exports—which is not likely to change given the commodity composition—and rising indebtedness are inter-con-

On the question of the consumption and market patterns, if we could show that a large section of the population has been below the poverty-line. the meagre level of demand for mass consumption goods would be demonstrated. The greater demand for capital and luxury goods would then be a logical corrollary of this. There are a number of studies available on the poverty issue. According to one of the most exhaustive studies undertaken so far under the auspices of the World Bank, 33 the percentage of population earning below \$ 75 per annum was found to be as large as 57.2 per cent for the Asian and 43.6 per cent for the African countries chosen for study. It is clear, if the percentage of low-income population is added to the percentage below the poverty line, the overall figures will be enormously large and there is absolutely no question of a substantial level of demand which can support the sustained growth of industries of mass-consumption goods. The implications of this have already been discussed. In most of the cases, the percentage seems to be increasing over the years. Thus, instead of eliminating poverty or promoting development—as claimed sometimes by aiddonors—the very existence and continuity of aid is to a substantial extent sustained by the existing poverty, with the latter's reflection on the market bias and industrialization pattern.34

## THE DONOR SYSTEM: AID IN THE STRUCTURE OF DOMINANCE

If relative neglect characterises the recipient state of the process, endless controversy marks the donor's side. In fact, so much has been written, controverted and re-answered that an evaluation of the existing viewpoints is necessary before positive formulations are put forth.

"Mixed bag of purposes" has become an aid-cliche. The discussed purposes can be divided into three categories—humanitarian, politico-strategic and economic. While most of the controversy has been on the relative weights of the last two purposes, "humanitarianism" too has formed an important component of the discussion. Moreover, as a matter of averages, the liberal writers have tended to exaggerate the humanitarian and/or the politico-strategic factors while most of the Marxian scholars have overstated the economic category, which again leaves a great deal unexplained. Liberal criticisms apart, even the recent developments in the Marxist method have rejected such reductionism as a simplistic explanation of reality. 35 Finally, though all the developed countries have extended aid, the focus of the available discussion is understandably on American aid. Despite the recent decline (as per cent of GNP) in the latter's contributions, it continues to be the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to begin the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to begin the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelm single aid-donor country so fa begin with and significantly large even now. 36 Though our discussion is pitched at an experimental pitched at a would follow this pattern pitched at places at the level of generality, we too would follow this pattern

with one proviso that the politico-strategic objectives are far less applicable in the case of other major western donors (Britain, West Germany, France)<sup>37</sup> for the simple reason that their "strategic" power has been considerably smaller than that of the United States and that it is the latter which has been leading the west in its various struggles with the opposite camp so far. In fact, some of the lesser western donors have explicitly acknowledged their utmost concern with commercial reasons.<sup>38</sup>

We take up first the "humanitarian argument," the intensity of which has fallen over time but to date has not died. The United States Government has repeatedly patronized the idea that being the richest country in the world, it has a "moral obligation to help alleviate poverty and promote more equitable economic growth in the developing world." And aid symbolises this deep concern.

This argument has another variant, which emphasizes on philanthropy as an innate part of American tradition and relates aid thus to the national value-system. This variant gained a fair degree of academic currency, particularly after Gunnar Myrdal's view in the late fifties that aid was a twentieth century extension of the principles of welfare state into the international sphere.<sup>41</sup>

The argument has both conceptual and factual flaws. While one would certainly concede that humanitarianism played an important role in the actions of individual Americans or their teams, it would be rather naive to transplant this contention on to the official plane as well. The foreign-aid programme is formulated and executed in an administrative and political setting, whose continuity is sustained by the extent to which the interests of the vitally important lobbies are taken note of. Altruism in this setting is at best—that too not always—the public face of a formidable interestcore. This becomes all the more clear when the process involved is examined.42 The agencies of government concerned with those programmes have also to annually justify them before a Congress which in turn has to give expression, inter alia, to the interests of its constituencies. While the total tax for aid-programmes may not be large, it is nonetheless true that until they have at least some commensurability with the economic interests of important interest groups or with the safety of the state, it would be difficult to proceed with those programmes. 43

The internal process apart, even on external grounds the argument cannot be sustained. In a world of clashing ideologies and interests, humanitarian a rival ideology or power will be and is viewed as self-deafeating. A number of incidents can be quoted, where despite an existing commitment and immediate necessity on humanitarian grounds, aid was held up for political reasons.<sup>44</sup>

To the extent therefore, the value-system is germane to analysis—and it is certainly not without significance—it is in fact its ideological component which is more important than the humanitarian component, defining ideo-

logy wi humani emerger humani mental his opi

Thi

POLITIC.

been p and (ii) improvement a are investing

The

that "a

balance Commeless to develor US see menter

> of the given, free na this v effecti impornot th

are to

they !

and/o

of pr not v econd interelevels dicho

relati diver milita stanc VY

ole 137

oly

en

In

eir

ch

n-

he

ote iid

ру

nal

ti-

eth

nal

ıld

he to

id

cal

sts

ng

st-42

ve

ve

tal

til

of

ılt

ot

an

ds

er

11-,

1d

nt

0-

al .

logy with reference to the concrete socio-economic beliefs. Seen in the logy with recording sense, it can either refer only to the occassional instances of emergency relief operations, or to the group-activities of the explicitly humanitarian agencies, as opposed to being a sustained force at the governnental level. It was no wonder therefore that Myrdal himself had to revise his opinion in his later works.45

This brings us to the main controversy. The terms of the debate have been posed in two broad ways: (i) strategic versus economic, purposes, and (ii) strategic primacy rersus economic primacy. The latter has been an improvement of the late sixties and the seventies. However, the improvement also suffers from limitations in the light of the larger questions which are involved, questions which are not just confined to aid and in the context

of which an integrated position will be constructed.

The politico-strategic argument is best represented in the proposition that "aid is a strategic reflection of a world outlook." 46 Concern for security in a world dominated by contending Powers implies maintaining the strategic balance of international forces in favour of the United States vis-a-vis the Communist Powers. To the extent economics has played a role, it has had less to do with "mercantilism" and more with the promotion of economic development of the recipients for the latter facilitated stability and thereby US security. Economics has been a tool in the hands of security and not its mentor.

The economic primacy argument has many variants: surplus capital and/or, the need for raw materials and markets have been regarded as the causes, particularly in the case of the United States, requiring incorporation of the newly independent countries into the capitalist system. This was given, according to these studies, 47 an ideological garb of the security of free nations and was achieved inter alia through the extension of aid. Initially, this was done on a bilateral basis and subsequently, with the lessening effectivity of this mode, multilateral channels like the World Bank became important and were relied upon. 48 The problem with both these views is not that they have marshalled no evidence for their positions, or that they are totally wrong. Where both err is in the very narrowness of the questions they have raised and the resultant limitation of their evidence search.

Two interrelated flaws have produced the inadequacy. First, the concept of primacy or causality has been wrongly perceived by them. The issue is Not whether aid was meant to promote strategic interests either through economics or without it, or whether it just meant furtherance of economic interest. interests behind a strategic smoke-screen. No system, given its various levels economic, strategic, political, ideological etc., — functions in such dichete. dichotomies. In various phases the levels may have differences or different telative emphases. Such differences will continue to exist due to the periodic diverges. divergence of interest between various social strata, business, bureaucracy, military elites, etc. but the important thing is to recognize that, notwithstanding these periodic differences or differential emphases, the fact that they

ASHUTOSH VARSHNY

are levels of the same system gives them an underlying objective unity too. The short-term and the long-term are therefore to be clearly distinguished while assigning causality. Short-term primacy is not causality, which is essentially long-term and constituted by the structural connections between the various "spaces" of the system. The same long-term dynamism of the structure has been at work, its only that the changing contexts have given it changing short-term modalities. The Cold War gave it a strategic edge and the 'sixties an economic thrust which further deepened in the 'seventies.

The point is all the more underlined by the second flaw of these approaches. While the politico-strategic argument concentrates on the compulsions of the international system, the economic argument focusses on the needs of the domestic system. The interconnections between the external and the internal have not been identified, which is basically because of the confusion of the short-term with the long-term.

What then are the interconnections in the case of the United States, our focus as the donor-system? Just as the existing International Division of Labour shaped the interaction between the external and the internal in the case of recipients, its historical specificity provided the base for such interaction in the case of the United States too, but in a necessarily different way. The specificity was two-fold: (i) the rise of the United States to a position of supreme dominance (in place of Britain) with the internal features of a dominant economy but without colonies as the external adjuncts, and (ii) the emergence of a rival sociolist bloc along with a rising tide of decolonization.

Considerable evidence can be given in support of the argument that the American socio-economic system was generating external drives. The most important indicators are four: the state of the availability of raw materials, the function of external markets, the close association between the economic, military and the political elites, and the acute "depression psychosis." The first two can be historically demonstrated showing thereby the long-term nature of the drive. A study conducted by the United States Bureau of Census on "The Raw Materials in the United States Economy" itself showed that, whereas till the 1920s the United States was a net exporter of minerals, by 1940-44 it had become a net importer. 49 This trend has consolidated after 1945. On the question of capital export and external markets too, similar trends are visible. While by 1914, American investments accounted for only 6.3 per cent of the total investment of major capital exporting countries as opposed to the British share of 50.30 per cent, by 1930, the respective percentages were 43.8 per cent and 35.5 per cent and by 1960, the United States share are 43.8 per cent and 35.5 per cent and by 1960, the United States share constituted 59.1 per cent as against the halved British position of 25 per cent<sup>50</sup>. One can therefore clearly identify the American drive towards come. American drive towards economic ascendency in the international system. That the drive was not purely economic can be shown by its roots in the socio-economic structure. socio-economic structure. Various studies, particularly that of C. Wright Mills, 51 have empirically proved the interconnection between the economic

and the was add the Am

POLITIC

Thu require particu export, hand, ge charact of the sindeper them so historic could system technoothe exi

ence rice the lighted state of makin orients need s

of trac

minan

Pre

Fu itself stantia and it so de struct emph this lo probl

Empi

T

are b

V

0.

bs is

en

he

en

S.

0-

ns

ds

he

on

ur

of

he

r-

y.

n

a

ii)

ıi-

1e

st

c,

ie

m

ıs

d

s.

),

d

), d

e

t C

and the political elites of the United States. To these structural features and the political reatures added the contingent factors of depression psychosis which had caught the American business. Galbraith has given ample testimony of this fact. 52

Thus, whereas the internal needs of the American socio-economic system, required maintenance of the International Division of Labour, reflected particularly in the historically existing pattern of raw materials and capital export, the external situation was threatening to weaken it. On the one hand, given the fundamentally different political, economic and ideological character of the socialist system, its further proliferation implied contraction of the area in which capitalism could operate. On the other hand, political independence of the erstwhile colonies, added to the above mentioned, gave them some measure of maneouvrability within the system. The logic of the historical process, therefore, demanded newer forms of control, which could orient political independence towards the dominant centre and its system. Aid essentially emerged as one of the new features (the other being technology), of this structure of dominance, which also sought to maintain the existing international division of labour with its longstanding patterns of trade, market and private capital.

Precisely the same two contending forces however also meant that dominance had to be wider than just economic. The fact of political independence required that the process of penetration had to start through the State i.e. through the political level, and the fact of socialist antagonism highlighted the need for a strategic alliance with these states. Being a state-tostate operation, aid could perform the politico-strategic function of alliancemaking too. So, which level came first did not matter. As long as overall orientation could be shaped forwards creating dependence the contingent need shaped the form of aid-policy;53 the structure of dominance continued to evolve.

Further, the logic of this evolution also determined what importance aid itself would have vis-a-vis other components of the structure. Once it substantially oriented the developing economies towards the dominant centre and its system, the patterns of trade, private investment, and technology, so developed, themselves could be relied on for the continuance of the structure. The general decline of aid levels in the 'seventies and the greater emphasis on the last three issues could be explained to a great extent by this logic. Giving "determination" to cold war or even balance of payments problems of the developed world would be an inadequate explantion.

Empirical Evidence

The empirical evidence on which theoretically the above formulations are based is divided into three parts. The issue of overall orientation is lackled first and its two predominant constituent levels, politico-strategic and economic, dealt with next.

While, because of the nature of the structural argument, one is usually

obliged to cull out fragments from various Reports and Acts to exemplify the overall thrust, it is interesting to note that a memorandum prepared by the Agency of International Development (for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1965), has put across the aggregate picture in an unusually illustrative way. Since it has not been properly noted by aid-literature, quoting it at length would be in order:

The United States Government carefully considers whether diplomatic aid and cultural relations between the new nation and its former metropole will adequately maintain a western orientation within the country or whether the United States wishes to establish more extensive ties with the new nation than diplomatic relations alone permit, in order to bolster the country's western orientation and/or to promote more specific US interests...

Total reliance on the former colonial Power is often politically unacceptable in the newly independent state—moreover, the US position on, for example, issues before the United Nations may differ from that of the former metropole. In such cases, a modest US assistance program may 'sweeten' and thereby make possible continued primary reliance on the former metropole and/or may demonstrate US concern and interest and thereby increase receptivity to US views on international issues.<sup>54</sup> (Emphasis added).

While most of the other official accounts vaguely touch upon the question of "receptivity," the illustrative merit of the aforesaid lies in its location of the problem historically and stating that the purpose is both systemic i.e. general (irrespective of whether it serves the US interests in the immediate sense) and specific, both being fundamentally complementary.

# Politico-Strategic Level of Operation

On this level, aid has been used for two functions—principally to keep the strategically important areas of the world under US influence, and additionally to induce desired contingent foreign policy changes.

Tables V, VI, VII and VIII show how the changing politico-strategic salience of different regions or countries over a period has accounted for changes in aid-concentration. Table VIII makes clear the disproportionality between population and aid percentages. Despite the fact that the Marshall Plan countries and the "client" countries, lying at the Soviet and the Chinese periphery, constituted only 30 per cent of the total population covered, they, received 70 per cent share of the aid provided in the period. The reverse is true in the case of the LDCs. Table VI further shows how the share of Marshall Plan countries declined after the shift of the Cold War to Asia.

For the period after this, Tables VII and VIII cover two types of data and are to be read together. They strengthen the conclusions of the preceding

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

To

2

POLITICAL

Votes: 1 W

Source: 1-

2 1

To

Source: 1-

Obligations anthorization

1962-74 (av

loan Repa and Receip 1962-74 av

Source: I

Table V US Bilateral Economic Assistance (1945-1967)

To	Aid	1965 Population
	Per cent of Total	Per cent of Total
1 Developed Countries <sup>1</sup> 2 "Client" Countries <sup>2</sup>	39	19
2 "Client" Countries <sup>2</sup>	31	11
3 All other LDCs	30	70

Western Europe (except Spain & Portugal), Australia, New Zealand and South

2 11 LDCs which had special military pacts with the US for "containment", including Pakistan.

Surce: Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York, 1969), p. 124.

Table VI US Bilateral Economic Assistance (1957-1967)

To	Billion \$	Percent of Tota
1 Developed Countries	7.5	13
2 "Client" countries	20.7	. 37
3 All other LDCs	27.8	50

Source: Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York, 1969), p. 124.

Table VII Geographical Distribution of US Economic Assistance (1962-75)

		(fiscal	years)		(\$	million)	
Ohling	Total	Near East & South Asia	Latin America	East Asia (inclu- ding South East Asia	Africa,	Europe,	Others (inter- re- gional)
Obligations & Ioan authorizations.		,					
1962-74 (average)	3981	1144	867	969	336	49	616
1975		(28.74)	(21.70)	(24.34)	(8.44)	(1.23)	(15.44)
	4892	1785	776	737	334	13	1247
loan Repayments and Receipts. 1862-74 average		(36.49)	(15.86)	(15.06)	(6.83)	(0.27)	(25.49)
1975 average	675	421	75	93	34	48	4
Noles: 1 Figures in	783	330	144	103	71	133	1

gures in bracket represent percentages of the total.

Economic Report of the President, January 1977, United States Government, (Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 300.

INY

lify by ons ally

ure, olo-

mer the sive 'der

rific ally

ion hat am

on rest S. 54

iesion i.e.

ate

eep

ind gic for lity

iall ese

hey, e is of

ata

ing

Table VIII

Annual Ranking of the Major Recipients of US Bilateral Official Development Assistance, Fiscal Years 1967-77.

Country	1977	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967 (If k	1982 nown)
	1	1									
Egypt	2	1 2	10	7	8	10	8	8	8		2
Israel	2	-	10		0	10	0	0	8	-	1
Republic of											
Vietnam (South Vietnam before											
unification)		5	1	1	1	1	1	2	2		
Republic of			*				1	2	2	2	
Korea				3	3	4	5	3	4		
India	6	4	3	10	7		2	1		4	
Pakistan	5	6	4	4	5	2 5	3	5	1 3	1	4
Takistan							3	3	3	3	Not
											clear
Bangladesh	3	3	6	5	2						yet.
Indonesia	4		5	2	2 4	3	4	4	6	7	7
Phillipines	9		8	6	9		9	10	9	9	6
Cambodia		6	2	9	_	9		10			- 0
Turkey	_	_			10	8	7	7	7	5	3
Colombia			9	8	6	9	6	6	5	6	_
Jordan	10	9	6	_				U	,	8	

Notes: 1 Major recipients means the ten largest recipients in each fiscal year.

2 The thirteen countries tabled above have figured most frequently in the list of major recipients. In some isolated years, other countries also figured, e.g., Bolivia, Syria, Chile, Brazil, but their frequency of appearance was very limited; at best two years in the decade covered.

3 For lack of data, no aggregate order has been given to the countries. Their appearance is based on the approximate recent ranking and/or largest frequency

of appearance on the list of major recipients.

4 Blank spaces mean that in the year, for which no ranking is given, the country concerned does not figure in the ten largest recipients. It does not necessarily mean zero aid figure, though in some cases it may be so, e.g., Vietnam in 1977 and Frynt in the lets view. and Egypt in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies.

5 The ranking proposed for the fiscal year 1982 is on the basis of requests made to

the Congress by the Reagan Administration and is preliminary.

Sources: Compiled from the following-

(i) The United States and the Developing World, Agenda For Action 1974,
Overseas, Development Co.

Overseas, Development Council (New York, 1974), p. 202. (ii) The United States and World Development, Agenda for Action 1976, (New York, 1976), p. 200 York, 1976), p. 209.

(iii) The United States and World Development, Agenda 1979 (New York 1979), p. 258.

"(iv) For the fiscal year 1982 figures, Business America (Washington, D.C.) April 1981, pp. 2-5 1981, pp. 2-5.

ubles. F natically end of th owards a anking f

OLITICAL

ppmost and by 19 ill 1974, recipients trend. Se by the ty

of low in countrie strategic East Asi its abyst

The substant

three (Ba

portant needing as the or revolution aggerate Union c

in Latin internal socialist ments, t

the basi Secretar mittee o

> Soci econ pros goal

and nece para

othe

Itis being fa rolveme RSHNEY

sistance,

67 1982 known)

2

4 — 1 4 3 Not clear

yet. 5

e list of Bolivia, at best

equency

essarily in 1977

nade to

1974, (New

1979),

April

anking further shows (Table VIII), the Republic of Vietnam, after being the opmost recipient from 1970 to 1974, slides down to the fifth rank in 1975 and by 1977, completely disappears from the list. In contrast, Egypt, absent recipients from 1975 on. The present Administration had continued the rend. Secondly, the low salience of poverty in aid-allocation is borne out by the twin facts that (i) of the major recipients between 1967-1977, only three (Bangladesh, Pakistan and India), figure in the United Nations category of low income countries, 55 and (ii) the share of Africa consisting most of the countries in the low-income category, has been quite minimal. The low strategic importance of Africa, as compared to the Middle East and South East Asia, explains the meagre aid-attention given to it, notwithstanding its abysmal poverty.

The most interesting feature of the table (Table VII), however is the substantial share of Latin America, which has not been strategically im-

poles. First, the importance of the strategic factor is revealed quite draductionally. South East Asia and the Middle East change places with the and of the Vietnam war and the emergence of the Egypt-Israel detente tilted owards and worked for by the United States (Table VII). As the countrywise

substantial share of Latin America, which has not been strategically important in the sense of either being geographically contiguous to the USSR needing preemptive protection or having a communist threat as strong as the one in South East Asia requiring counter-measures. While the Cuban revolution did cause concern about Soviet designs, it should not be exaggerated. Neither in the strategic nor in the economic sense has the Soviet Union consequentially penetrated into Latin America. The basic problem in Latin America in this period has been its utter political instability and the internal radical threat forcing a drive towards nationalistic and at best mildly socialistic, economic measures. Given the high level of American investments, both nationalism and communism merged into a single process and the basic purpose of aid therefore was to preserve domestic stability. The Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara himself Stated before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives:

Social tensions, unequal distribution of land and wealth, unstable economies, and the lack of broadly based political structures create a prospect of continuing instability in many parts of Latin America... the goals of the alliance can be achieved only within a framework of law and order... The primary objective in Latin America is to aid, where necessary, in the continued development of indigenous military and para-military forces capable of providing in conjunction with police and other "security" forces, the needed domestic security. (Emphasis added)<sup>57</sup>

lt is important to note that Africa did not receive equal attention, despite being faced with similar instability. Thus, level of economic interest or informent in an area of instability also created strategic importance, regard-

less of whether instability generated nationalism or a communist drive. This is another factor which explains additionally the large share of the Middle East and of Egypt and Israel in particular. The present Secretary of State frankly admitted: "Many of our security assistance partners enjoy a geographical proximity to the resources of our economic demands. Others possess timely knowledge of complex regional events and are best suited to understand these events and assure that they do not slip beyond responsible control." (Emphasis added) This statement was made while presenting the new aid policy to the Congress in March 1981.<sup>58</sup>

Apart from this, aid has also been used to achieve short-term foreign policy changes in the LDCs, mainly through suspension, delay or reduction in the promised aid authorization. For example during the Korean war, the promised food shipment for India was reduced as a reaction to India's role in the war. Aid to Chile was, similarly, suspended after Allende's rise to power and resumed after a pro-American regime overthrew him.

## Economic Level of Operation

The economic dominance functions of aid have been basically four-fold: (i) encouragement of private enterprise in general in the LDCs; (ii) Simultaneous expansion of American capital; (iii) Liberalization of trade, and (iv) Simultaneous promotion of American trade-interests. All the four purposes are inter-related. Besides, roughly till the late 'fifties, when the American economy held a position of supreme pre-eminence, the last three purposes were in fact subsumed by the first. Greater free enterprise was practically synonymous with greater dominance of the United States, for economic challenge being non-existent, it only meant greater freedom for American capital and consolidation of its trade pattern. However, with the rehabilitation of Western Europe and Japan by the 'sixties, attempts at specific trade and private capital promotion also were undertaken within the larger framework of the free enterprise system. Aid was used as an instrument in both the phases, and for all the purposes. Note for example, the following statement by the present AID administrator made before the Congress in justification of aid in March 1981: "Private US investment has been encouraged and the system of international trade strengthened in recognition of the opportunities trade can offer as an engine of growth especially for market-oriented economies."59

Starting with the Marshall Plan, American insistence on "free enterprise" has never been in doubt, even when the development plans of aid-recipients have attempted a niche for the state sector in their economies. The various reports have converged on this point. While the Clay Committee Report industrial and commercial enterprises which compete with existing private endeavours," the Pearson Task Force of 1970 maintained that "US inter-

national

give, priv

Reagan

POLITICA

The property of the Union of the integration of the

As reg
IX sums
ment assis
ment rose
Private fl310 per c

ector.

Net Flow

Assistance of which (a) bilate (b) mult

(incl

to II

Private F
of which:
Private D

mes: 1 Flor

A trend

drive of the retary enjoy Others

SHNEY

ted to nsible ng the reign

action r, the ndia's s rise

-fold: imul-, and four n the three

was s, for n for h the its at ithin s an

nple, e the t has d in owth

rise" ents

ious heir port

vate ter-

ned

ational development policies should seek to widen the use of private initiaprivate skills and private resources in the developing countries."61 The Reagan Administration has also stated this explicitly. 62

The picture however needs some modification in its details. Despite the (lay Report, even the public sector of developing countries has been aided w the United States, but this has been true only of infrastructure projects and not the socalled "strategic" industries. Aiding these technology-inensive industries would obviously have gone against the American position nthe international division of labour. The overall result, realized somewhat later, in any case has been promotion of free enterprise, for the state sector hall these economies was predominantly serving the interests of the private sector.

As regards the specific strengthening of American private capital, Table IX sums up the general trend. Whereas in the period covered, US development assistance increased only by about 70 per cent American private investment rose by 330 per cent which is nearly five times the increase in aid flows. Private flows in general (including portfolio investment) grew by about 310 per cent in the same period.

Table IX

Net Flow of Financial Resources from the United States to Developing Countries and Multilateral Agencies

				(3	million)
	1966-68 Average	1970	1976	1977	1978
Official Development					
of which	3351.8	3046.00	4334.00	4159.00	5663.5
(a) bilateral (b) multilateral (including contribution to IRPD 2	3177.4	2653.0	2838.0	2897.0	3474.0
Private Cl.	174.40	393.00	1496.00	1262.0	2189.5
of which:	2006.30	2521.7	6399.0	6159.0	8287.0
Private Direct Investment	1302.30	1888.00	3119.00	4866.00	5619.0

Flows include portifolio investments and export credits also.

Development Co-operation, 1979 Review, (OECD Paris, 1979), p. 225. 2 Development Co-operation 1978 Review, 1978, p. 215.

A trend like this was ensured by the various Foreign Assistance Acts the explicitly established a connection between American private capital aid The example, enjoined the The Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, for example, enjoined the

Table X

Aid Financed US Agricultural Exports

Year	PL 480 as percentage of total agricultural export
1960	27
1961	26
1962	. 29
1963	27
1964	26
1966	19
1967	19
1968	19
1969	17
1970	16
1971	13
1972	12

Source: The United States and World Development Agenda For Action 1975, Overseas Development Council (New York: Praegar, 1975), p. 246.

United States Government not to provide aid "to the government of any less-developed country which has failed to enter into an agreement with the President to institute the investment guarantee program...providing against... expropriation or confiscation." The investment guarantee programme, administered by the AID, provided insurance for US citizens and corporations investing abroad. By the late 'sixties, it has been calculated, more than 70 LDCs had signed investment guarantee treaties. Further, one of the official statements refers to the fact that earnings from US direct investment in 1975 in the LDCs amounted to \$7.4 billion—"more than our total foreign assistance that year." Thus, not only has the annual growth-rate of direct investment been higher than that of aid (Table XI), even the earnings from One can see both the drive towards control and benefits therefrom.

Table XI

Major Voting Powers in the IBRD at the End of Fiscal 1980

Country	o at the End of Fiscal 1980
United States	Voting Power in per cent of Total
United Kingdom	23.39
. Federal Republic of Germany	08.62
Japan	05.84
France	05.81
ote: By having more than 20 per carri	05.82

by having more than 20 per cent voting rights of the total, the United States has a blocking minority on major decisions, which need 80 per cent votes to be passed.

Source: World Bank Annual Report 1980, (Washington, D.C.) pp. 158-9.

by an ar quently substitut aimed at and the t has com-

DLITICA

The t

n two F

recipient prevalent sixties. Since oroblem

aid-recipt Aid-the other Bhagward so far, 67 practice. all AID increase the Unit financin petitive

Tabl exports. we furth States b

would f

In the aid-relate of the exim the pattached lt is arguare a position the erst.

whereas econom aid was OLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN AID TO THE THIRD WORLD

RSHNEY

of the

ports.

verseas

of any th the inst... mme. porathan of the

tment reign direct from ount.

ent of

States to be

The third and fourth functions—aid to promote trade—have proceeded two planes: by conditioning aid on general import liberalization of the peipient economy and by the practice of aid-tying. While the first has been prevalent all along, the second aspect has grown in importance since the

Since aid has been intrinsically connected with the balance of payments or oblem of the LDCs, its extension has almost invariably been preceded by an analysis of the problem by the United States. One of the most frequently advised solutions has been liberalization of trade policy; importsubstitution plans of many countries during the 'fifties and early 'sixties, aimed at establishing an indigenous industrial base, were heavily criticised and the thrust sometimes changed. From the mid-sixties, this kind of control has come to be exercised in the form of program loan practices which conditions aid on an overall assessment of the economic programme of the aid-recipient.66

Aid-tying too was largely a product of the 'sixties, when the goods of the other Western Powers had started becoming competitive. Jagdish Bhagwati, in one of the most exhaustive studies undertaken on aid-tying so far,67 has arrived at the following conclusions regarding the American practice. Beginning from 1959, when development loans began to be tied, all AID loans have now become formally tied. "Informal" tying too has increased in the sense of AID missions seeking to encourage imports from the United States. Finally, AID has successfully imposed limitations on financing projects and/or commodities where US exports would be competitive on commercial terms, thus making it more likely that additionality would follow from aid-tying.

Table X gives statistical substantiation of the point regarding agricultural exports. The 'disposal of surplus'68 thesis gains considerable credibility, if we further note that 68 per cent of the total wheat exports from the United States between 1955-66 was financed by PL-480.

#### III CONCLUSIONS

In the paper, an attempt has been made to locate the structural bases of did-relations. Essentially because of their methodological inadequacy, most of the existing studies have not realized the importance of the issue and have the process failed to comprehensively explain the various dimensions attached to the problem. We can briefly re-capture our contentions here. It is argued that after 1945, the historical process placed the world system in <sup>4</sup> position where the structure of dependence, built into the economies of the erstwhile colonies, made their economic development dependent on aid, whereas the structure of dominance created supremely in the American economy generated a drive towards orienting the world along its needs and aid was a part of this expression. Both the drives were shaped by the existing international division of labour, which the United States sought to maintain for its dominance inter alia through aid, and which was against the interests of the newly independent but whose limits nonetheless circumscribed their development into an aid-oriented pattern. It is also shown how this process was not purely economic; whereas the dominance-drive demanded overall control within which economic control operated and to which aid was addressed, the dependence logic created both divergence and convergence between the political and the economic on the issue of aid.

The process has not yet ended and is not likely to end either. Until such time as the international division of labour continues, as it does, the process too will go on, though with varying emphasis on the components of the structure. Presently, with the entrenchment of the other components which aid facilitated, the utility of aid as a creator of favourable orientation has declined. This trend however is likely to change. To ease the pressure on the international credit structure created largely by private finance, greater flow of official concessionary finance, according to most analyses, would have to be made available—even to the middle income developing countries. Newer modes of concessionary resource-mobilization are being increasingly discussed and thought of, which are however yet to filter down to the political levels. Revival of the strategic edge of the American-Soviet struggle is another factor, which may reinforce the above necessity.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the long stretch of aid-inflows, the continuing and, in most of the cases, increasing dependence of the Third World, with the exception of a small category of countries, <sup>71</sup> which can be labelled either as middle Powers or clubbed as the semi-periphery of the World system, has led to demands more comprehensive than just aid. In their case too, the increasing realization about the insufficiency and distortions, though not the irrelevance, of aid has produced simultaneous emphasis on trade and technology. On "aid" proper, this realization has engendered demand for more concessionary terms along with desired changes in the other two components. The earlier demand was more or less without these components.

It has been sometimes argued that the "big" emergence of multilateral aid-agencies like the World Bank—a development of the 'seventies—has changed the dominance overtones of aid and in particular, has de-linked it from western and/or American dominance. Facts however point to the contrary. Table XI shows the respective voting strengths of major countries. Western control over it, and American preponderance therein, are more—import liberalization, promotion of foreign investment, emphasis on programme assessment—also reveal, economically speaking, the orientation-similarity between the western and the Bank aid-policies. And

Therefore, rather than signalling the end of the link between aid and dominance, western and/or American, multilateralization of aid represents a new form through which dominance is getting articulated. The increasing

new c with l accou contir

POLIT.

penet

June

1 See Rep 2 Acc follo

The

Spritem
3 The exer of I Day 1973

Rela

Aid'

4 For "Lib and 5 Both Joha

Paul

6 As a rigor Rela Stud. 7 Some Deve

8 The 1969 9 The many cussic Patte

(Kara erciso World 10 See H Mon

11 D.H. 1976) 12 The r

increa

RSHNEY

intain terests d their rocess overall d was

rgence I such rocess of the which n has on the reater would

ries.69

singly

o the uggle lows, Third in be f the d. In

diseous 1 has sired e or

teral -has iked the ries. nore

nme on ion-

and ents ing

penetration of the World Bank into the Third World is, in fact, building new channels of dependence. While the magnitude of problems associated with bilateral aid and loss of the strategic edge of the struggle had mainly accounted for this phenomenon, 74 the essential point remains that aid has continued to be a part of the structures of dominance and dependence.

June 1981.

#### NOTES

1 See the two chapters devoted to development finance by the Brandt Commission in its Report, North-South: A Programme for Survival (London, 1980), pp. 221-56.

2 Accounts of the paradigm-shift are now available in abundance. In particular, see the following: Donald J. Puchala and S.I. Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970s: The search for a Perspective," International Organization (Stanford), Vol. 28, no. 7, Spring 1974; Michael P. Sullivan, "Competing Frameworks and the Study of Contemporary International Politics," Millenium (London), Autumn 1978.

3 The burgeoning literature on International Political Economy has already started this exercise. The two most exhaustive recent attempts on aid are from the Political Economy of International Relations Series (series edited by Benjamin Cohen). The books are: David Wall, The Charity of Nations: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid (New York: 1973), and Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations, (New York, 1975), Chapter On "Economic Power in Economic and Military Aid", pp. 166-206.

4 For a summary of the available approaches, see James Petras and Kent Trachte, "Liberal, Structural and Radical Approaches to Political Economy: An Assessment and an Alternative," Contemporary Crises (Amsterdam), April 1979, pp. 109-148.

5 Both Liberal and Marxian writers have used this approach. Among the former are Johann Galtung, Raul Prebisch and Furtado. The important Marxist scholars are Paul Baran, Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin and Arighi Emmanuel.

6 As an exception, some isolated recent studies by political scientists have attempted to rigorously use data. For example, see R.D. McKinley and R. Little, "The U.S. Aid Relationship: A Text of the Recipient Need and Donor Interest Model," Political Studies (London), June 1979.

7 Some studies are aware of this point. For example, David A. Baldwin, Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, (New York, 1966).

The notable exceptions are: Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, (New York, 1969), Chapter on "Aid and Trade" and David Wall, 3.

The most important exponent of such an approach has been Hollis B. Chenery. His many studies include "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," AID Dis-Patterns of C. (Washington D.C.,), No. 7, June 1963, (done with M. Bruno), "Optimal Patterns of C. Patterns of Growth and Aid: The Case of Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, (Karachi), summer 1966 (done with A. MacEwam). For a recent mathematical exercise and the summer 1966 (done with A. MacEwam). ercise, see Michel Beenstock, "Political Econometry of official Development Assistance," World Development (Oxford), February 1980.

10 See Edward Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy, (New York, 1964), and John D. Montgo. Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics, (New Jersey 1967).

11 D.H. Blake and R.S. Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations (New Jersey, 1976). Ch. 1976), Chapter on Aid. Also Knorr, p. 3.

12 The relevance of the social context of economic processes in economic analysis is being increasing the entire range of literature increasingly recognised even in liberal writings now. The entire range of literature

POLI

29 F

30 T E

P in

th

19

((

p

E

CC

of

G

66]

si

M

pe

1.

2.

3.

38 A

39 S€

41 G

Vi

no 42 F

43 E

44 T

sh

10

A 45 G

46 Jo 47 R

48 Te

m

ai

pe 40 Sr

34 T

35 T

36 A

37 F

32 N 33 H

31 Se

published in the journal Economic Development and Cultural Change (Chicago), and the Structural Schools led by Johann Galtung and Raul Prebisch respectively fall in 13 Cheryl Payer, has raised some of these issues. See her The Debt Trap (Hammondsworth,

1974), pp. 43-46.

- 14 For a brief account of the evolution of the World-System and the rise of International Division of Labour, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Demise of the World Capitalist System," in The Capitalist World Economy (Ed.), (London, 1979), pp. 1-36. Also see W. Arthur Lewis, The Evolution of the International Economic Order (Princeton,
- 15 Some writers have expressed the mistaken view that aid existed even in medieval times and have failed to see its historical specificity. For example, see Klaus Knorr, n. 3, p.
- 16 Teresa Hayter in Aid As Imperialism (Hammondsworth, 1971), Jack Woddis in Introduction to Neo-Colonialism (New York, 1967) and even Andre Gunder Frank have committed this exaggeration.
- 17 Klaus Knorr, n. 3, pp. 180-183 and p. 338. He only analyzes the end-point of a process which has already produced dependence and in the process overdoes the independence shown by recipients.
- 18 Even Walls' book (n. 3)—the most exhaustive attempt in the Political Economy Series so far-totally neglects this part of the process. There is no full-length politico-economic analysis available on this question, except some specific case studies. On India, see P.J. Eldridge, The Politics of Foreign Aid in India (New Delhi, 1969). Purely economic explanations are however available.
- 19 Chenery's many studies (n. 9), are based on the two-gaps model. Another important writer, P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan has more or less followed this line. See his "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," in Jagdish Bhagwati and Richard Eckaus, (Ed.), Foreign Aid (Hammondsworth, 1970). For a particularly effective critique of these models, see Amiya Bagehi, "Aid Models and Inflows of Foreign Aid," Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), Annual Number, February 1970, pp. 223-38.
- 20 For an elaboration of the concept of "potential economic surplus" see Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (Hammondsworth, 1973 edition), p. 376. He has defined it as "what would be available for investment given a purposeful utilization of the national output produced with such resources as are presently employed."

21 For calculations on Egypt see Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale (New York, 1974), p. 9.

22 Paul Baran, n. 20, pp. 355-56.

23 Cheryl Payer, n. 13. She has examined the implications of this question with reference to a number of developing countries.

24 For an excellent analysis of this question, see Samir Amin, "Self-reliance and the New Economic Order," in A.W. Singham (Ed.), The non-Aligned Movement in World Politics, (Connecticut, 1978), pp. 145-57.

- 25 A number of studies are available on the relationship of state with the privileged classes. Two of them are important: Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," New Left Review (London), 74, (July-August 1972), pp. 59-81 and W. Ziemann and M. J. pp. 59-81 and W. Ziemann and M. Lanzendorfer, "The Societies, The Societies, 1977 (1974) and M. Lanzendorfer, "The State in Peripheral Societies," The Socialist Register 1977 (London, 1977), pp. 143-77.
- 26 Prabhat Patnaik, "On the Political Economy of Underdevelopment", Economic and Political Weekly Annual Number, Economy Political Weekly Annual Number, February, 1973, especially pp. 203-205.
- 27 For a brief statistical account of the inelastic demand for primary goods, see Michael P. Todaro, Economics For a Developing 1973. P. Todaro, Economics For a Developing World (London, 1977), pp. 295-6.
- 28 For a further discussion of the social implications, see Paul Streeten, "Costs and Benefits of Multinational Enterprises in Loss Paul Streeten, "Costs and Benefits" (Ed.), of Multinational Enterprises in Less Developed Countries" in J.H. Dunning, (Ed.),
  The Multinational Enterprise Conden (Conden Countries) The Multinational Enterprise (London, 1971), pp. 240-58.

and all in

NEY

orth. onal orld

1-36. eton, imes

3, p. ntrohave

ocess lence

eries omic , see omic

rtant nterchard e cri-Aid," 3-38.

aran. e has on of

York, rence

New litics,

asses. eties: (972), ties,"

ic and chael

nefits (Ed.),

- 29 For export-restriction as a part of the monopolistic practices of MNCs, see Edith Penrose, "Ownership and Control of Multinational Firms in Developing Countries," in G.L. Helleiner, (Ed.), A World Divided (London, 1976), pp. 165-168.
- 30 This has been accepted even by official sources. See US Council on International Economic Policy, The United States in the Changing World Economy : A Report to the President, The Peterson Report, Government Printing Office, (Washington, D.C., 1971).
- 31 See Orio Giarini, Dialogue on Wealth and Welfare: A Report to the Club of Rome (Oxford, 1980), p. 332. For statistical calculations see Cleveland and W.H.B. Brittain, "Are the LDCs in over Their Heads?," Foreign Affairs, (Washington, D.C.), July 1976 pp. 732-50.

32 North-South: A Program for Survival, n. 1, p. 240.

- 33 Hollis Chenery, et. al., Redistribution with Economic Growth (Oxford, 1974), p. 12. Even though these figures are large enough, they have been found to be considerably conservative, which further increases the top-heaviness of the market. For an appraisal of these estimates, see Ashutosh Varshney and Satish Jha, "The World Bank and the Global Economy in the Seventies," Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), April 1981.
- 34 This point has been touched upon by another study. See Juan C. Sanchez-Arnam, "Debt and Development," IFDA Dossier (Geneva), December 1979, pp. 55-66.
- 35 The new tradition roughly starts from Louis Althusser's "intervention" in the midsixties with "Contradiction and Over-determination" in his collection of essays. For Marx (Hammondsworth, 1969).
- 36 According to OECD calculations, the United States share in total DAC ODA was 59 per cent in 1962 and 28 per cent in 1977.

37 For the aid policies of other donors, see the following:

1. Goran Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered (Paris, 1965).

2. R.D. McKinley, "The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model And Interpretation of the Distribution of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany," Comparative Political Studies January 1979, pp. 411-464.

3. Eugene R. Wittkopf, Western Bilateral Aid Allocations: A Comparative Study of Recipient State Attributes and Aid Received (Beverly Hills, 1972).

38 According to the Report from the Select Committee on Overseus Aid (House of Commons); "Commercial considerations alone would suffice to justify participation in the aid effort, both bilaterally and through multilateral agencies." Quoted by David Wall,

39 See a relatively recent writing on aid by David Gordon, "United States Aid in Perspective," Current History (Philadelphia) July-August 1979, p. 2.

40 Speech by the Secretary of State of the Carter Administration quoted in the Depart-

ment of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), June 1978, p. 14.

41 Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy (New York, 1956), pp. 120-122. Similar view was held by another prominent scholar Jan Timbergen, Shaping the World Economy, (New York, 1962).

42 For an elaborate analysis of the domestic context, see David Wall, n. 3, pp. 50-79.

43 Edward Mason, n. 10, pp. 26-7. 44 Two important examples are: President Johnson's policy of not sanctioning food shipments to drought-struck India, apparently for inducing a change in India's stance on Victoria Chile by the Nixon on Vietnam in 1966, and suspension of aid to the Allende regime in Chile by the Nixon Administration.

45 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Volume II (Hammondsworth, 1968), 634-640.

46 John D. Montgomery, n. 10, p. 18. 47 Refer n. 17.

48 Teresa Hayter, n. 17.

49 Quoted in Harry Magdoff, n. 8, p. 47.

50 William Woodruff, Impact of Western Man, (New York, 1966), p. 150.

51 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, (New York, 1956).

52 J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalism (Hammondsworth, 1963), pp. 76-97.

53 Also see Harry Magdoff, n. 8, pp. 164-7.

54 US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act 1965, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, (Washington, D.C.), p. 584.

55 See Development Co-operation, 1978 Review (OECD, Paris, 1978), p. 179.

- 56 For Latin America's low position in the Soviet Union's economic relations, trade and aid, see Deepak Nayyar, Economic Relations Between Socialist Countries and the Third World (London, 1977).
- 57 Quoted in Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, (Washington, D.C., 1967). pp. 116-17.
- 58 See the reproduced speech in Agenda, an AID publication. (Washington D.C.), May 1981, p. 4.

59 Ibid., p. 21.

60 Quoted in Goran Ohlin, n. 37, p. 33.

61 Report of the Peterson Commission, "US Foreign Assistance in the 1970s: A New Approach" (Washington, D.C.), March 1970, pp. 2-4.

62 See Agenda, n. 58, p. 3.

63 Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, quoted in Harry Magdoff, n. 8, pp. 127-8.

64 Ibid.

65 Department of State Bulletin, (Washington, D.C.), April 1978, p. 24.

- 66 For a brief discussion on the partial shift from "Project" to "Programme" Aid ,see Cheryl Payer, n. 13, pp. 28-29.
- 67 Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Tying of Aid," UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/7/Supp. 4, United Nations, 1967, reproduced in Bhagwati and Eckaus (Ed.), Foreign Aid, n. 19, pp. 235-
- 68 Studies on this aspect abound. For a critical account, see Susan George, How the Other Half Dies (Hammondsworth, 1978). For the case of food aid, see J.A. Pintus, "The Lost of Foreign Aid," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 45, no. 4, 1963, pp. 360-67. Further important studies on farm surpluses are by T.W. Shultz, and E.M. Fisher, both reproduced in Bhagwati and Eckaus, no. 19.

69 See North-South: A Programme for Survival, n. 1, p. 229. Also Orio Giarini, n. 31,

70 Ideas like international taxation, automaticity, special development taxes are being increasingly discussed. For details, see the following: (i) Horst Paul Weisbach, "Mobilization of Development Finance: Promises and Problems to Automaticity", Economics, A Bi-annual Collection of Recent German Contributions to the field of Economic Science (Tubingen), Vol. 22, 1980, pp. 7-37. (ii) North South: A Programe for Survival, n. 1, pp. 244-256. The Brandt Commission Report has even suggested the creation of

a new agency, World Development Fund, for supplementing the present aid agencies. 71 This category includes the relatively economically stronger third world countries designated by various phrases—which include the OPEC countries, Brazil, Argentina, India and Nigeria, Well-patrick, India and Nigeria, India and Nige India and Nigeria. Wallerstein's description of these economies as the "semi periphery" of the world system is particularly appropriate. The concept middle Powers was first

72 The various statements and policy-pronouncements made by the Bank officials take this position.

73 J.M. Vaan De Laar, "The World Bank and the World's Poor", World Development (Oxford), October-November 1976.

74 See the two articles by Thomas Balogh and P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan respectively in part four of Bhagwati and Eckaus (Ed.), n. 19, pp. 203-231.

ECON

This econor to exa level o income compo social of asso of agri subject The fil equalit Asian is also

> To r host of paritie this di parison World nationa dollars US dol

L

not be better 1 canvas Tabl countri capita

countri obscur Bangla Parisor

Dr. Mu Nehru I

## INEY

tance

and

Third

967),

May

New

,sce

ited 235-

ther

The

360-

her,

31,

ing

oili-

ics,

nic val,

of

ies.

s-

na,

y"

ke '

nf

iΠ

# ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA: AN INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

#### By INDRA NATH MUKHERJI\*

This paper initially examines the level of development and the rate of economic growth in South Asian countries. Subsequently attention is shifted to examine how far economic growth has contributed to social justice. The level of development is examined conventionally in terms of relative per capita incomes, while the rate of economic growth is examined in terms of annual compound growth rate in real gross domestic product (GDP). For evaluating social justice several indices are used—relative income inequality, distribution of assets, proportion of population below the poverty line, and real earnings of agricultural labourers. Having consolidated the available literature on the subject, a search for their consistency is attempted and interpretations offered. The final section thus examines the evidence with respect to causation of inequality and offers policy guidelines. While the focus of the paper is the South Asian countries, illustrations from the experience of South East Asian countries is also drawn for comparison.

#### I

#### LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

To make international comparisons of national income is beset with a host of problems, the most difficult being comparisons in purchasing power parities of national currencies. The most elaborate and ambitious effort in this direction is being attempted by the United Nations International Comparison Project with the support of the World Bank. In the interim, the World Bank continues to publish the Atlas indicating population, per capita national product, and growth rates therein. The values are indicated in US dollars which is obtained by converting the values of national currencies to US dollars at the official rate of exchange. In the words of Myrdal, "it may not be too unreasonable to present these figures on the hypothesis that it is better to paint with a wide brush, of unknown thickness, than to leave the canvas blank."

Table I presents the per capita incomes of South and South East Asian countries. The World Bank classifies low income countries as those having per capita incomes below US \$ 200. Judged by this criterion, all South Asian countries could be considered as belonging to this category. This should not bangladesh are in the lowest rung of the low income countries. By comparison, the countries in South East Asia which have, in general, more

<sup>\*</sup>Dr. Mukherji is Associate Professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal University, New Delhi.

Table I

Per, Capita Income and Growth Rates of Real Gross Domestic Product at Constant Market Prices in South and South East Asian Countries, 1950-76

	6.5 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3
	1.5 1.5 2.6 2.9 9.5 7.5 13.0 7.3 6.8
	8.9 8.9 6.9 3.6 5.4 1.8 6.6 3.9 5.5
	0.2 1.4 0.4 11.1 6.9 6.3 6.3 4.6
0	3.7 8.4 6.0 4.7 2.0 12.9 13.1 8.6 11.5
Growth Rate (Per cent per annum)	1972 1972 0.9 3.2 3.2 2.0
er cent p	1971
Rate (Pe	2.9 3.7 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.2 8.3 6.1 6.5
Growth	3.5 3.8 3.7 4.7 2.9 2.5a 5.4a 7.4 7.2 3.7 3.0 4.5 3.8 5.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
	3.7 7.4 3.8 4.6 2.5 2.0 1.9 6.9 5.2 5.2
	3.8 3.43 5.43 4.5             
	3.5 2.5a 3.0 3.0 
Per Capita Income (US \$ 1975)	140 160 160 190 90 110 70 220 760 380 380 350
Per Inco (US	2 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Countries	India Pakistan Sri Lanka Bangladesh Nepal Bhutan Indonesia Malaysia Phillipines Singapore Thailand Developing ESCAP Countries

(i) United Nations ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 1974, 1977, 1978 (ii) World Bank Atlas, 1977 Source:

Note: (a) : Includes East Pakistan

favou times The in rea Decad (with Assur in the the gr three growt lation per ca the gr vigor been And is thei

ECONO

margin to the more a pared slump they a South countr toward in thes Asian fluctual factor It m

Relativ

base h illustra

Whil in socia how th way of examin HERJI

favourable man-land ratio, also have per capita incomes some two to three times higher than those in South Asia.

The United Nations had set a target growth rate of 6 per cent per annum in real GDP for the developing countries during the first Development Decade. It will be seen in Table I, that in none of the South Asian countries (with the exception of Pakistan during the 'sixties) was this target realized. Assuming a growth rate in population of around 2.5-3 per cent per annum in these countries, in only three, namely, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka did the growth in real GDP exceed population growth. However in the other three countries, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, during the 'seventies, the growth rate in real GDP has been barely adequate to keep pace with population growth. Accordingly there has been no improvement in their real per capita incomes over the last quarter century or so. In marked contrast, the growth rate in real GDP in South East Asian countries has been more vigorous, and in many of them the target set by the United Nations has

Another feature of the growth rate in real GDP in South Asian countries is their unevenness. In India and Sri Lanka the rate of growth accelerated marginally during the 'sixties, particularly during the mid-sixties as compared to the 'fifties, but slumped during the 'seventies. Pakistan witnessed much more appreciable acceleration in its growth rate during the 'sixties as compared to the 'fifties, but as in case of India and Sri Lanka, its growth rate slumped in the 'seventies. In Nepal and Bhutan the growth rates, modest as they are, show no sign of either acceleration or declaration. In contrast to South Asian countries, the growth rates in real GDP in South East Asian countries have not been subject to so much fluctuation. Moreover no trend towards slackening of the growth rates during the 'seventies can be discerned in these countries. While political factors have intervened in most South Asian countries contributing to economic instability in the early 'seventies, fluctuations in the agricultural sector over a long period have been the main factor contributing to economic instability in the region.

It may be observed finally that countries with a lower per capita income base have been experiencing generally lower growth rates as well. This is illustrative of growing disparities among the developing countries.

#### II EVALUATION OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Relative Income Inequality

While economic growth may be a necessary condition for an increase in social welfare, it is not by itself sufficient. It is equally important to see how the benefits of growth have been shared by the society at large. One way of doing this is to stratify the population by income groups and to examine what proportion of the national income accrues to these groups.

By stratifying cumulatively the proportion of income and the corresponding proportion of population, it is possible to estimate the Gini co-efficient of concentration.<sup>2</sup>

Table II. indicates the Gini Concentration Ratios (CR) of incomes in South and South-East Asian countries using different sources for different countries over different reference periods.

Table II

Gini Co-efficient of Concentration of Income in South and South-East Asian Countries,

Country	Source	Year	Concentration Ratio		
			Rural	Urban	Total
India	Ojha and Bhatta	1953-55	.343	.401	.376
		1961-64	.319	.474	.385
	ESCAP <sup>b</sup>	1968-69°			.310
		1970-71°			.290
		1973-74			.280
Sri Lanka	ESCAPb	1953	.45	.52	.50
		1963			.49
		1973			.40
Bangladesh	Alamgird	1963-64	.33	.41	.36
		1966-67	.31	.38	.30
		1968-69	.27	.37	.30
Pakistan	ECAFE <sup>©</sup>	1963-64	.350	.366	.358
		1966-67	.321	.384	.346
		1968-69	.294	.364	.333
Indonesia	ESCAPb	1973			.41
Thailand	ESCAPb	1962-63			.41
		1968-69			.43
		1971-72			.50
Singapore	ESCAPb	1966			.48
		1973			.46

Source: (a) Ojha and Bhatt, "Pattern of Income Distribution in India, 1953-54 to 1961-64," Paper presented at the Seminar on Income Distribution, organised by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, February 1971.

(b) For original source see UN/ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 1978, Table 76

(c) This is based on consumption data; accordingly the concentration ratios are lower than those based on income data

(d) Mohiuddin Alamgir, "Some Analysis of Distribution of Income, Consumption, Saving and Poverty in Bangladesh," The Bangladesh Development Studies (Dacca), October 1974, p. 775

(e) UN/ECAFE, "Intra-regional Trade Projections, Effective Protection and Income Distribution, Vol. III (Bangkok, 1972), Table 2, p. 95.

CONO

Whe

be seen than in likely equalit Asian highest

fall in Regainequal to the thereby end of reveals
This sumption

ambigu availabi Among be obse

inequali Distribu

It is

potentia the own to comp rural sec concents This has An exland in a in the di Zero land

followed somewhat ccuntry A disconstitute inc

India. In

during the National in such c

Wherever available, rural urban CR have also been indicated. It may he seen that in all cases inequality in the urban sector is more pronounced han in the rural sector, indicating thereby that increasing urbanization is ikely to accentuate income inequalities. It may also be observed that inqualities in South Asian countries are less marked than in South-East Asian countries. Among South Asian countries income inequality is the highest in Sir Lanka and the lowest in Bangladesh while India and Pakistan

Regarding the trend in income inequalities, it may be seen that in India, inequalities in the rural sector declined over the decade from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties, whereas inequalities in the urban sector got accentuated thereby contributing to an increase in overall income inequalities. From the end of the 'sixties to about mid-seventies, the consumption expenditure data reveals a lessening of inequality.

This is further corroborated by Ahluwalia's estimate of CR in consumption expenditure during the period 1956-57, particularly between 1967-68 to 1973-74.3 In Sri Lanka, the trend appears to be towards an unambiguous decline in inequality between 1953-73. In Bangladesh the data available for the 'sixties reveals some decline in inequality between 1963-68. Among South East-Asian countries an increase in income inequality is to be observed during the 'sixties. In Singapore however, some decline in income inequality may be observed between 1966-73.

Distribution of Assets

It is from the possession of productive assets that income generating potential is created. Its significance however is wider since assets confer on the owner not only this potential but also status, security, leisure, and access to complementary resources. Since land is the most important asset in the rural sector of South Asian countries, it may be interesting to examine the Concentration of land holdings in these countries and the trend over time. This has been presented in Table III.

An examination of Table III reveals that inequality in the distribution of in all the countries is considerably more pronounced than inequality in the distribution of income. The difference gets further accentuated when leto landholders are included in the distribution of land as in the case of landia re-India. Inequality in land distribution appears to be lowest in Sri Lanka lollowed by Bangladesh. Although the data for Pakistan in the Table is Somewhat remote, the very high degree of concentration of land in the ecuntry is apparent.

A disquieting feature of the trend in concentration of land holdings, Is the increasing concentration of land holdings in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh during the sixties. In the case of India however, the various rounds of National Sample Surveys (NSS) of land holdings point to a steady decline Sample Surveys (NSS) of land holdings point to a steer concentration: While this may in fact, have occurred, two surveys

iding nt of

HERJI

s in erent

tries.

tal 76 35

0 00 0

to ised

4sia tios

onient

and

Table III stration of Land Holdings in South and South-East-Asian Countries

Country	Year	Concentration Ratio
D la deab	1960	.47
Bangladesh	1974	.57
	1961	.59
India	1970-71	.63
	1970-71 1953-54 <sup>a</sup>	.03 .78b,
	1959-60a	.73b
	1961a	.72b
	1971a	.71b
Pakistan	1960	60
Sri Lanka	1962	.35e
	1970	.41°
Thailand	1963	.46
	1971	.41
Indonesia	1963	.55
	1973	.53

UN/ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 1976, p. 69. Source: 1

This is based on national sample surveys 8th, 16th, 17th and 26th rounds respectively. This has been presented by A.C. Minocha, "Some Aspects of Income Distribution in India." The Indian Economic Journal, (Bombay). Vol. 25, no. 2, October-December 1977, Special Conference Number, Part II, p. 5.

b. The high value of these ratios is due to the inclusion of zero landholders. Ideally they should be included to measure the concentration of land holdings. However in the absence of similar data for other countries we have shown concentration of land distribution in respect of cultivators who

own some land.

Size distribution of holdings in 1962 and 1970 has been presented in E.L.H. Lee, "Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka, 1963-73" in ILO, Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia, 1977, Table 64.

of Reserve Bank of India, All India Rural Debt Survey 1961-62 and All India Debt and India Control of the contr India Debt and Investment Survey, 1971-72 point to an increase in the concentration of accest held: centration of asset holdings in India. The CR in respect of asset holdings increased from '68 to '70 during this period.4

In the case of two South-East-Asian countries, Thailand and Indonesia, the inequality in land distribution does not appear to differ significantly from that of the South A. in the from that of the South Asian countries. Moreover some decline in the concentration of land half concentration of land holdings appears to have taken place in those countries during the circumstance of the countries of the countries during the circumstance of the countries of the count countries during the 'sixties. This is in contrast to trends in income inequality. Perce.

Wh

ECONO

the ta appro chasin modit In 7 tries 1 It w point India from a desh h incom povert that of adopte by Nas consid than in strictiv

reveals increas study, Dutta's of the ' the per ratios i namely in the i significa inciden both in took pl revoluti Both of pove during 1

incidence

to 1973

Loo

observ

395

percentage of Population Below Poverty Line

While overall income inequality measures are useful, they fail to identify the target group—that is, those who constitute the poor. This alternative approach seeks to identify that proportion of the population whose purchasing power falls below the minimum necessary to buy a bundle of commodities required to meet the minimum calorie requirements.

In Table IV alternative estimates of poverty ratios for South-Asian countries have been presented for different periods.

It will be seen that not all the estimates are consistent. These nevertheless point to the very high incidence of poverty in South Asian countries. In India for instance, the incidence of poverty has fluctuated during the 'sixties from a little over 40 to 50 per cent of the rural population. Although Bangladesh has less income inequality than India, in view of its lower per capita income, a larger proportion of the population in the country is below the poverty line than in India. Alamgir's estimate<sup>5</sup> reveals higher incidence than that of Khan<sup>6</sup> because of more restrictive assumption of the poverty norm adopted by the former. The incidence of poverty in Pakistan as estimated by Naseem<sup>7</sup> appears to be quite high in comparison to India especially when considering that the per capita income in the former is marginally higher than in India. This difference would have been higher but for the less restrictive definition of poverty in Pakistan than in India.

Looking at the trend in poverty ratios, some inconsistencies are to be observed. While Minhas' study, covering the period during the 'sixties, reveals a decline in the incidence of poverty, Bardhan's study points to an increase in this incidence. Bardhan's findings are corroborated by Ahluwalia's study, a part of which covers this period. Again both Ahluwalia's and Dutta's findings reveal a decline in the incidence of poverty since the end of the 'sixties. Ahluwalia's most comprehensive study of the subject covering the period 1956-57 to 1973-74 shows no significant time trend in poverty latios in India. His analysis at the states level reveals that only two states, namely, Assam and West Bengal, show a significant trend in the increase in the incidence of poverty while Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu show a significant decline. For all other states no significant time trend in the incidence of poverty could be observed. It is pertinent to observe here that both in Punjab and Haryana no appreciable decline in the poverty ratio look place even when considering that these states spearheaded the "green revolution."

Both Alamgir's and Khan's study point to an increase in the incidence during this period is not similar in the two estimates. In Sri Lanka the logon poverty appears to have declined perceptibly between 1969-70

5, p. 69. rounds pects of embay).

KHERII

f land ries we ors who

E.L.H. mdless-

d All condings

antly n the those ie in-

nesia,

Table IV tion Relow Poverty Line in South-Asian-Countries

Country	Year	Source	Percent of Population Definition of Pow		
			Rural	Urban	
India	1956-57	Minhas	65	)	
India	1960-61		59		
	1964-65		52		
	1967-68		51		Rs. 15 per capita p
	1960-61	Bardhan	38		month at 1960-61 pric
	1964-65		45		(weighted average
	1967-68		53		states) to meet norm
	1961-62 D	andekar and Ra	ath 40	50  -	2250 calories per da
	1968-69	Dutta	50.3		
	1969-70		49.1		TELEPINA TO A TOTAL
	1970-71		45.4	}	
	1973-74		44.3		
	1957-58	Ahluwalia	42		
	1959-60	Amuwana	48.7		
	1960-61				
			53.4		
	1964-65		50.4		
	1966-67		57.4		
	1968-69		53.4		
	1970-71		49.1		
D 1 1 1	1973-74		47.6	J	
Bangladesh	1963-64	M. Alamgir	88	82	Take 252 and 298 p
					annum at 1966 pric
	1966-67		62	72	for rural and urb
	1968-69		79	70	areas respectively
	1973-74		94		purchase minimum co
					sumption bundle
					2100 calories and
					gram protein per da
	1963-64	A.R. Khan	40		Take 23.61 per capi
	1968-69		76		per month at 1963-
	1973-74		74		
	1975(I Qd.	)	62		prices to meet 193
			02		calories per day of the "I
D-12					ner cent of the
Pakistan	1963-64		70		commended" intake.
	1968-69		72		Rupees 27.53 per capit
	1969-70		64		per month at 1959-6
	1970-71		68		mericae to ensure
	1971-72		71		and arios or 45 Del
	Part Land		74		of the "recommended
Sri Lanka	1969-70				
	1973		72		Rs. 200 per household
Source: (i)			40		per month

- (i) UN/ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 1978.

  Table 76.
- (ii) M. Alamgir, The Bangladesh Development Studies (Dacca), October, 1974.
  (iii) Bhaskar Dutta "On the Martin Development Studies", Indian.
- (iii) Bhaskar Dutta, "On the Measurement of Poverty in Rural India", Indian Economic Review (Delhi) Economic Review (Delhi), April, 1978.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Real

ECON

Ag decile

asses:

to as In of Inc

State

Andhra Assam Bihar Gujarat Kerala Madhya Mysore

Orissa. Punjab Tamil N Uttar P

Source:

It wi cultural decline and Ma Punjab very ma The e

and Sri In Ba carly 'fif

downwa Sri Lank HERJI

verty

a per prices e of rni of

day.

8 per prices urban 1 10

conof d 45 day. apita 63-64 1935

r 90 "reapita

59-60 1995 cent ded"

hold

1978, 1974.

ndian

Real Wages of Agricultural Labourers

Agricultural labourers may be deemed to constitute among the lowest deciles or quintiles of a frequency distribution of personal income. An assessment of the real income of this poorest group may be made in order to assess the incidence of poverty.

In Table V(a) the variations in money and real wages in different states of India covering the years 1960-61 and 1969-70 has been presented.

Table V (a) Variation in Money and Real Wage Rates in States of India 1960/61-1969/70

State	Money Wages		Real Wages	Change in Real
	1960-61	1969-70	1969-70	Wages Over 1961
Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Gujarat Kerala Madhya Pradesh Mysore Orissa Punjab Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh	1.46 2.29 1.30 1.97 2.10 1.32 1.67 1.26 2.81 1.43 1.31	2.46 3.80 2.70 2.94 4.67 2.11 2.35 2.15 6.34 2.65 2.61	1.40 2.04 1,34 1.73 2.31 1.02 1.34 1.01 3.24 1.39 1.32	- 0.06 - 0.25 + 0.04 - 0.24 + 0.21 - 0.30 - 0.33 - 0.25 + 0.43 - 0.04 + 0.01

Source: S.M. Pandey, "Pattern of Wages, Income and Consumer Expenditure of Agricultural Labourers in India: Problems and Policy Perspectives" in Rural Labour in India by S.M. Pandey (Ed.), Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources (New Delhi, 1976), p. 93.

It will be seen that when adjusted for the cost of living index of agricultural labourers, the wage rates declined in 8 out of 11 states. The absolute decline was much more pronounced in Gujarat, Mysore, Assam, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Among the States showing increases in real earnings, Punjab and Kerala stand at the top. The increases in UP and Bihar were

The experience of other South Asian countries, notably Bangladesh In p. Lanka, is similar as may be seen in Table V (b).

In Bangladesh real wages declined sharply during the late 'forties and lifty' for: tarly fifties, they rose for a decade thereafter, but since 1964 a pronounced that the real wage index in downward trend is visible. Also to be seen is that the real wage index in \$11 Lanka in estate agriculture declined.

Table V(b) Index in agriculture in Sri Louis

Year	Bangladesh (Rs./Takas)	Sri Lanka (1952 = 100)	
	2.20		
1949	2.36		
1950	2.13		
1951	2.00		
1952	1.97		
1953	1.71		
1954	n.a.		
1955	1.92		
1956	n.a.		
1957	1.99		
1958	1.93		
1959	1.94		
1960	2.06		
1961	2.27		
1962	2.21		
1963	2.36	104.2	
1964	2.66	103.5	
1965	2.22	103.4	
1966	1.90	103.5	
1967	1.92	104.9	
1968	2.04	114.3	
1969	2.22	106.3	
1970	2.24	101.5	
1971	n.a.	99.8	
1972	1.60	98.4	
1973	1.59	101.5	
1974	1.42		
1975 (First half)	1.28		

Source: 1 A.R. Khan, "Poverty and Inequality in Rural Bangladesh," and E.L.H. Lee, "Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka," both published in ILO, Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia (Geneva, 1977), Tables 50 and 63 respectively. Note: (a) Here agriculture refers to estate agriculture only.

## III INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL DATA

Interpretation of empirical data, particularly those relating to distributive justice is by no means a simple task given the inconsistencies in empirical

Ojha and Bhatt's findings reveal a decline in income inequality in the rural sector during the period mid-'fifties to mid-'sixties, although inequalities in the urban sector got accentuated during this period. This may well have resulted from the d well have resulted from the heavy emphasis put on industrialization.

Estimates of poverty in India are based on various rounds of National Sample Surveys (NSS) on consumer expenditure. We have earlier observed

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

that di by Mir deflato uses th hers fo of agri the 'six rose at weight likely 1 deflato rural p laboure evaluat index a and Du 1968-69 penditu placed in a de provem corresp seems t tural cl

CONON

followe period Alhuwa as a w expend

say. W

conside examine distribu moveme

indices remain exagger in the ri

rary. Th fations clearly 1

terms n The e

persister source c

that during the period 1960-61 to 1967-68 the estimates of poverty ratios Minhas and Bardhan differ. This arises from the use of different price deflators to measure changes in real consumer expenditure. Whereas Minhas

LERII

κa 100)

ika

uses the national income deflator, Bardhan uses consumer price index numbers for agricultural labourers. The national income deflator covers prices of agricultural products, manufactured commodities and services. During the 'sixties the prices of agricultural commodities, particularly coarse cereals, rose at a much sharper rate than those of finished manufactures. Since the weight of manufactured consumables in the budget of the rural poor is likely to be much lower than the national average, the national income deflator is very likely to have understated the rise in the prices paid by the rural poor. The use of consumer price index numbers for agricultural labourers used by Bardhan on the other hand, is a more appropriate index to evaluate the cost of living index of the rural poor. 11 Ahluwalia also uses this index and his findings conform to those of Bardhan. Again both Ahluwalia's and Dutta's findings reveal some decline in the incidence of poverty since 1968-69 to 1973-76. Since Dutta uses a separate price index for each expenditure class on the basis of its expenditure pattern, some reliance may be placed on his findings. Further corroboration of this trend is to be found in a decrease in consumption expenditure, inequalities and marginal improvement in the distribution of land. Although asset distribution does not correspond to this trend, on the whole, some improvement in social welfare seems to have taken place. Whether this change reflects a permanent structural change, or is transient, subject to status quo ante, it is too early to say. What would happen, for instance, if a series of good harvests were followed by bad ones in succession? This calls for observation over a long period of time. When however this is attempted (as for instance by Alhuwalia), no significant trend in the poverty ratio emerges for the country 4s a whole. Ahluwalia's attempt at examining the trend in consumption expenditure inequalities over a long period in nominal terms cannot be considered to be conclusive. As he himself mentions, "ideally we should examine trends in the distribution of real consumption since changes in the distribution of nominal consumption may reflect no more than differential Movements in the price indices. In the absence of fractile specific price indices we can only compare inequality in nominal terms. Such comparisons lemain of interest since the available evidence suggests that while they may exaggerate the extent of the change in inequality, they nevertheless point in the right direction." The available evidence however suggests the cont-The Minhas-Bardhan controversy examined earlier, as well as illustrations. rations from other South Asian countries (which we shall presently examine), clearly room other south Asian countries (which we shall presently examine),

itive rical the

L.H.

y and

ively.

inmay

onal rved nay be highly misleading. The evidence available for Sri Lanka tends to support the argument of a trisistent Persistent and significant decline in the CR over the period 1953-73. The main source of 1963 and 1973, source of data is the Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finances, 1963 and 1973,

clearly reveal how the use of CR over different points of time in nominal

published by the Central Bank of Ceylon. Lee attempts, for the first time, to cross check the shift in the income distribution with that of the shift in consumer expenditure. In his view where a reduction in income inequality of the magnitude described earlier occurred, data on changes in consumption levels should show corresponding change. The available evidence from the same source however points to greater inequality in consumer expenditure over the period. Moreover the per capita consumption of rice per two months in the rural sector fell both in the rural and estate sector. This fall is overwhelmingly concentrated among the lowest income classes. Thus the two types of data from Consumer Finance Surveys are internally inconsistent. Again given the magnitude of change in income distribution, one would expect an improvement in real wages of workers. No such trend however is to be noticed.<sup>13</sup>

An explanation of the inconsistency referred to above is provided by Lee. In his view "the crux of the problem lies in the fact that the period spanned by the Consumer Finance Surveys was one of rapid inflation and in which, in particular, the price of staple food, rice, increased sharply relative to other commodities." This is likely to have increased the imputed value of money incomes of the poor relative to the more affluent. Since food consumption, particularly rice, constitutes a much larger proportion of the budget of the poor, the deflation of all money incomes in the later year by an overall consumer price index is unlikely to mitigate the illusion of an improvement in income distribution. The correct procedure, as Lee justly points out, would be to use income-group-specific cost of living indices or to look at actual quantities consumed. Further the introduction of an income ceiling of Rs. 2000 per month in 1972 could also have induced the rich to understate their incomes in the 1973 survey contributing further to a deceptive decline in income inequality. 15 Another evidence casting suspicion on an improvement in income distribution in Sri Lanka is the trend towards increasing concentration of land holdings in the island.

In case of Pakistan also, we have observed consistent decline in inequality in income distribution during the 'sixties. This was also the period in spite of this, the poverty ratio, staggering as it is, has remained totally unaffected. This again raises doubts as to the validity of CR as depicting improvement in income distribution. Since the CRs have been compared in nominal terms, the limitations of this approach which was relevant for Sri Lanka would apply equally in the case of Pakistan. The United Nations ECAFE study points out thus: "To what extent these results truly reflect the degree of income inequality and changes therein is difficult to state. The data base of the entire study is extremely weak. Besides, these results trelate to the income at current prices. There is evidence elsewhere to suggest that price changes have affected various income groups differently. It is therefore likely that this decline reflects only changes in process, while real income distribution was not changed at all. Furthermore, the survey data

show period increase result fact."

study

ECONO

(CSO) analysture be index year's that to made to the

the po the C The c nomin in suc sump

Ala

menti Alama specifi have given betwe labou during Alama indica

not go poor. 1968-0 in soc

The reveal

D

HERJI

time. nift in ity of ption n the

diture onths overtwo stent.

vever d by eriod and

vould

arply outed Since rtion later ision

Lee dices of an 1 the to a

rend inriod that

sus-

tally ting d in for

ions flect atę.

ults gest t is

real lata

show a decline in per capita income and per household income over the period, whereas, according to national income data, there has been a marked increase. It is difficult to say which of the two trends is correct, but the results on income inequality obtained above may be entirely due to this fact."16 The data used by Naseem is the same as that used in the United Nations

study referred to above. It is based on the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) Quarterly Survey of Current Economic Conditions (QSCEC). His analysis lends itself to greater credibility since he deflates household expenditure by group specific cost of living indices. He constructs a Laspeyre price index for each of the all income groups in the 1963-64 Survey by using that year's expenditure weights for each group.17 Naseem's study clearly reveals that the high rate of economic growth in Pakistan during the 'sixties has made no dent in the staggering level of poverty in the country lending support to the contention that inequality in Pakistan, far from declining, must have increased considerably during this period.

Alamgir's estimate of CR in income distribution for Bangladesh during the period 1963-64 to 1968-69 reveals some decline. 18 Like Naseem, he uses the QSCEC 1963-64 as benchmark household income and expenditure. The deficiency of the study lies in that comparisons in CR are made in nominal terms. As he admits, "in terms of welfare implication one problem in such comparison arises due to differences in family size, prices, age, consumption patterns and other personal circumstances."19

A.R. Khan estimates poverty ratio in Bangladesh by using the aforementioned data source. However his methodology is more sound than Alamgir's because he deflates consumer expenditure on the basis of income specific price indices. Accordingly, the rise in the prices of the goods which have a heavier weight in the budget of the low income groups has been given due consideration. Thus, given the growing incidence of poverty between 1963-64 and 1968-69, stagnation in real earnings of agricultural labourers since the mid-'sixties, and growing concentration of land holdings during the 'sixties generally, one would have some hesitation in accepting Alamgir's finding of a decline in inequality in Bangladesh over the period indicated by him.

It thus appears that in the South Asian countries economic growth has not generally been associated with an improvement in the well being of the poor. A possible exception to this may be in case of India for the period 1968-69 to 1973-74 during which there is some evidence to suggest gains in social welfare.

#### IV

# DETERMINANTS OF INEQUALITY AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

The historical experience of presently developed capitalist countries reveals growing inequality in the initial phase of development followed by

of pov

displac

CONON

some levelling up of incomes at a later stage.<sup>20</sup> Cross-sectional studies also tend to confirm an U-shaped relationship with inequalities widening from low income group of countries to middle income group and finally flattening out with high income group of countries.<sup>21</sup> Drawing from the aforementioned analysis, conventional theorists, well versed in neo-classical analysis, tend to give primacy to economic growth asserting that its effects are bound to "trickle down" and percolate to the society at large.

The experience of South Asian countries however reveals that there need not be any automacity in the "trickle down" effect of economic growth. The rich in low income countries are well known for their conspicuous consumption. On the other hand, the poor in these countries are abysmally poor such that a further reduction in their consumption cannot but adversely affect their capacity to work. What is in fact necessary in these countries is to reduce the consumption of the rich and increase that of the poor. In the practical context in which productive potential is more broadly conceived, the dichotomy between consumption and investment loses its edge because some consumption, like investment, can also be productive. Thus the blind application of "stage theories" of economic growth and income distribution to the developing countries is likely to be inappropriate, misleading and dangerous.

As to the determinants of inequality, reference may be made to a cross-section study by Ahluwalia. Using regression analysis, the study reveals that the level of primary school enrolment has a positive bearing on the income share of the lowest 40 per cent. Again, a high rate of population growth bears a significant inverse relationship with the share of the lowest 40 per cent. The study also reveals that the share of the lowest 40 per cent is significantly higher in socialist countries. Thus the spread of primary and secondary education, control over population growth, and adoption of socialist policies is likely to promote greater equality in income distribution.

K.N. Raj's analysis of inter-state variations in levels of per capita income and per capita food consumption in India shows that per capita consumption of food does not depend on per capita income alone; it is higher the higher the per capita output of food-grains is within each state, and lower follows that raising levels of food intake requires not only increasing the distribution of land.<sup>23</sup>

Ahluwalia's study of poverty and agricultural performance in India establishes relationships which are similar to those of Raj. He finds a close inverse association between growth in agricultural output per head and the poverty ratio at the all-India level. At the level of states a similar association of the rural population in India and about three-fourths of the rural population in goverty. However the nature of data reveals that in many of these states other factors are also at work which tend to increase the incidence

growth Thus best w

undert

tribute

May 1

diffic 2 The (Yi-

incor 1, th tively Effect 3 Mon of D

Tabl
4 See A
nomi
5 Moh
and

6 A.R. lessne 7 S.M. 8 Bhas

9 M. A 10 S.M. Labo

S.M. (New 11 P.K. and

12 Ahlu 13 E.L.1 14 Ibid.

15 Ibid. 16 Unit

17 Nase 18 M. A Pove

p. 7

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA

of poverty. These factors may relate to the land tenure system or tenant displacement—factors which may not be independent of agricultural growth.24

Thus the lesson to be drawn from both Raj and Ahluwalia is that the best way of reducing poverty and improving consumption of the poor is to concentrate food production in regions where food is deficient and to undertake at the same time suitable land reform measures designed to distribute assets in favour of the poor.

May 1981.

TERJI

also rom

ning

ion-

ysis.

und

here wth. ious

ally selv

ries . In on-

dge

hus

ome

nis-

oss-

eals

the

ion

est

ent

ary

of

on.

me

m-

he

er

it

he

he

ia

se

1e

n

nt

U-

e

e

#### NOTES

Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (Middlesex 1968), Vol. I, p. 483. For a discussion of difficulties in international comparisons of income see pp. 474-82.

2 The Gini co-efficient of concentration is estimated by the following formula: 1- (fi-fi-1) (Yi+Yi-I) where fi is cumulative of households or population and Yi is cumulative of income shares. The value of the concentration ratio so derived will vary between 0 and l, these being the limiting values of perfect equality and perfect inequality ... respectively. For details of estimation see UN/ECAFE, Intra-regional Trade Projections, Effective Protection and Income Distribution, Part I, Vol. III (Bangkok, 1972).

3 Montek Ahluwalia, "Rural Poverty and Agricultural Performance in India," Journal of Development Studies (London, 1977); World Bank Reprint Series: Number Sixty,

Table 8, p. 317.

4 See A.C. Minocha, "Some Aspects of Income Distribution in India," the Indian Economic Journal (Bombay), October-December 1973, p. 5.

5 Mohiuddin Alamgir, "Poverty, Inequality and Social Welfare: Measurement, Evidence and Policies," The Bangladesh Development Studies (Dacca), April 1975, p. 171.

6 A.R. Khan, "Poverty and Inequality in Rural Bangladesh" in ILO, Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia (Geneva, 1977), Table 48.

7 S.M. Naseem, "Poverty and Landlessness in Pakistan," ILO, n.6.

Bhaskar Dutta, "On the Measurement of Poverty in Rural India," Indian Economic Review (Delhi), April 1978.

9 M. Ahluwalia, n. 3, Table III(a), p. 305. 10 S.M. Pandey, "Pattern of Wages, Income and Consumer Expenditure of Agricultural Labour in India by Labourers in India: Problems and Policy Perspective" in Rural Labour in India by S.M. Pandey (Ed.), Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources (New Delhi, 1976), p. 93.

P.K. Bardhan, "On the Incidence of Poverty in Rural India of the Sixties," Economic

Ahm. All Weekly (Bombay), Annual Number, 1973. 12 Ahluwalia, n. 3, p. 319.

13 E.L.H. Lee, "Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka" in ILO, n. 6, Table 63.

14 Ibid.; p. 178. 15 Ibid., p. 172.

16 United Nations, ECAFE, n.2, pp. 108-9.

<sup>17</sup> Naseem, n. 7. p. 45.

18 M. Alamgir, "Some Analysis of Distribution of Income, Consumption, Saving and Poverty, "Some Analysis of Distribution of Income, Consumption, Saving and Poverty, Dacca), October 1974, Poverty in Bangladesh," The Bangladesh Development Review (Dacca), October 1974, p. 775

19 Ibid., p. 785.

20 See Simon Kuznet, Modern Economic Growth (New Delhi, 1972), p. 218.

- 20 See Sinton Ruzhet, Income Inquality: Some Dimensions of the Problem" in Redistribution with Growth (Ed.), Chenery et al, Oxford University Press, (London, 1974), p. 15.
- 22 Ibid., pp. 16-18.
- 23 See K.N. Raj, Poverty, Unemployment and Development Policy: A Case Study of Selected Issues with Reference to Kerala. (Delhi, 1977), p. 1.
- 24 M. Ahluwalia, n. 3, pp. 308-16.

NOT

IN

This is Affair. on 11

> DAI 1 na as Pri that " to my of ou concer The

the wl

Natur stages emerg contro quick the cre ciliatio off of in gen

meany It m

tion o entirel among that m petual unplea countr proble Partiti impen brothe

the cas PRA

an issu depend

Fur and ag

## NOTES AND COMMENTS

HERII

m" in

ondon,

ly of

## INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE

This is the text of an Address by Shri P.V. Narsimha Rao, Minister of External Affairs, delivered at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi on 11 June 1981.

DAKISTAN and India met their tryst with destiny as independent Pnations within twenty-four hours of each other. In his very first statement as Prime Minister of independent India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declared that "we look upon the world with clear and friendly eyes." I bring today to my friends in Pakistan that same message. I also bring to you the message of our Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi-"We have common concerns and friendship is the basic necessity."

There can be no doubt that while our fight for freedom was on, it was for the whole country as such and generally understood and felt on that basis. Naturally, therefore, as the struggle advanced to more and more decisive stages and as more and more signs of success appeared on the horizon, the emerging two-dimensional concept of freedom came to be attended with controversy, whose intensity increased correspondingly with the overall quick tempo of the phase immediately preceding independence. Yet, after the crescendo, when freedom came as a fact, controversy gave place to conciliation. To be sure, it was gradual, even painful, this process of tapering off of tensions; yet it brought about a new atmosphere of normalcy in general, barring of course the specific problems that had surfaced meanwhile.

It may not be out of place to point out here that, in many ways, the partition of the country was debated and implemented in a manner which was entirely familiar to the common people of India. The concept of partition among co-sharers or co-inheritors was and is so much a part of our tradition that many persons from outside the sub-continent, who had wanted a perpetual attrition at the people's level between the two countries, were rather unpleasantly surprised at the comparative ease and speed with which both countries, soon after the fact plunged headlong into their respective internal problems barring the specific issues that had been thrown up between them. Partition no longer remained an issue as such, just as in the face of the impending monsoon, partition of the ancestral land between two farmerbrothers concluded during the preceding summer months no longer remains an issue. Their hopes and efforts are directed to the future. Their efforts are dependent on the monsoon, not against each other. So was, by and large, the case with the people of India and Pakistan.

# PRAGMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS

Further, it is not our practice in this part of the world to hark back again and again to the circumstances of one's birth. Millions of people cannot

even remember the dates of their birth accurately. No authentic data is available about the dates and places of birth of almost any of our saints, savants, kings, heroes and others held in the highest esteem in our history. We are essentially a forward-looking kind whose mind is conditioned to thinking of the hereafter. Therefore, there seems to be no reason whatever why, in our mutual relations also, we should not come to concentrate on the future, instead of the past. And, in any event, those whose memories are still entangled in the Partition are fast disappearing from the scene. For the new generations emerging and to emerge hereafter, India and Pakistan are two distinct and separate entities, totally independent, completely at liberty to attain whatever destinies they choose for themselves, deliberately and unfettered by any of the features of the past, taking it or leaving it, or any of it, as they wish to. Points of commonality need not in any way bind either country down to any particular relationship, other than what both consciously and in their respective interests choose to make of them. The pre-partition generation, with its admixture of nostalgic and bitter sentimentality, has no right to condemn the coming generations to adhere to unwanted identities. In a word, the future on both sides must be free and based on interest and reason—and not on emotion.

I wish to reiterate, that these new premises of our existence are already being tacitly accepted, and I am absolutely certain that a new and fresh relationship is emerging between the two countries, based on objective realities, and not on notions. Even notions have begun to be conditioned by realities. It is not difficult to see that both countries can and should now co-exist, since in the world of today that is the only way to exist. It is high time that a clear-minded awareness of this new future is heralded and fostered continuously between India and Pakistan.

May I, therefore, submit very sincerely that those who are still trying to see, or make others see, sinister designs in our two countries, aimed at each other's existence are, to say the least, wasting their time. India should at problem which will come anywhere near solution by the undoing of Pakistan. And as for the fantastic fear that India wants to gobble up Pakistan, I can only say that those who are plugging this line are doing injustice to Pakistan and India both.

Nothing is farther from India's mind than this course. Alarmists and opponents of Indo-Pak friendship will have to concoct something more We, on our part, are fully convinced that we have an abiding interest, even with some justification, that this picture of India depicted in acquisitive But that is all the more reason why we should shun it with greater deterother should freely evolve on the basis of our direct and clear perception of

each excha capa elem

Co

and 1

NOTE

this e in an of the respe of Pa I hop resolvall m and v puttin

gener with gamu relati of im mutu Let of rel

Th

bias.

achiev wise. their for so forego time. terms

I sh country the sir It is during ally ur become a varie

these 1

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TURE

ta is aints. tory. ed to

tever n the s are For

istan ly at ately , or bind

both The enti-

e to and

eady resh ctive d by

now nigh ster-

g to ach d at igle

an. can tan

and ore re. /en

ut, ive es.

erch of

each others' interests and motivations based on direct contacts and direct exchange of views. We should develop an individual and, if necessary, a joint capacity to resist the negative impact on us by external trends, external elements and extraneous factors.

Coming back to the point about India acknowledging Pakistan's separate and permanent identity as an abiding interest of ours, I do not think that this elite audience would expect me to catalogue the reasons for this interest in any great detail. I would, therefore, like to state categorically, on behalf of the Indian people that India has, and will always continue to have, full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, stability and independence of Pakistan. When this is stated by our Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. I hope it will be realized that there is no voice louder and clearer and no resolve more dependable. It would be my first and foremost concern to set all minds at rest on this score. Our respective successes and failures are, and will continue to be, entirely our own. We could profit a lot by not putting the blame for them no each other.

Thus, having disposed of this basic aspect, and unmoved by sentiments or bias, if we approach our problems as well as the scene around us and generally in the contemporary world, as two independent sovereign states with the given geo-political situation, I am sure we can work out a whole gamut of sensible relationships based on our respective perceptions. Such relationships alone would endure and we shall have a pragmatic framework of improving upon them, to the extent we both consider such improvement mutually beneficial.

Let me repeat, quite candidly, that between sovereign states, improvement of relations has to stem from a mutuality of desire; it is not possible to achieve this unilaterally in a vacuum, howsoever desirable it may be otherwise. States should be mature enough to absorb possible ups and downs in their relations and nothing should prevent them co-existing peacefully for some time on a low profile of relations, meanwhile working silently for foregoing a framework of better relations, to emerge at a propitious future time. It is not unusual to find next door neighbours not being on talking terms for a while; but neighbourliness in the end is the experience.

## SOUTH ASIA EMERGES AS AN IMPORTANT "POLE"

I shall now briefly advert to the geopolitical situation which both our countries find themselves in. The extent to which they share perceptions on the situation, is again a matter of their compulsions.

It is said quite emphatically that the world has travelled from bi-polarism during the past three decades. This trend is indeed unmistakable; but equally up to the past three decades. ally unmistakable is another trend, namely that the world, while tending to become become multi-polar, is at the same time being subjected to bi-polar pulls in a variety a variety of ways. I shall not go into the details of the methodology of these part of ways. these pulls and the intricate and subtle motivations induced; they are all

well known. It so happened that almost from the beginning of the bi-polar race, some prominent leaders like Nehru, Tito, Nasser, etc. strongly felt the illogic and irrelevance of the emerging polarisation from the standpoint of a vast majority of mankind, just freed from the shackles of imperalism and colonialism, and found itself faced with their accumulated needs and problems hungering for urgent solutions. They had the vision to speak up for this dumb chunk of humanity called the Third World and conceived of the Non-Aligned Movement. Since then, more and more "poles", major and minor, have appeared on the horizon from time to time. Despite the short-term question-marks about their viability, independence and effectiveness, no one doubts the conclusion that they have come to stay and that a return to the classic bi-polarism of the late forties and early fifties is quite unlikely. The present scenario is, therefore, one of a painful, even perilous transition.

### SOUTH ASIAN "POLE" MUST MOVE TOWARDS SELF-RELIANCE

Where do India and Pakistan stand in this crucial transition? It seems to me, that in the emerging multi-polar situation, South Asia is bound to be an important "pole". Its size, location, resources and over-all potential compel it to play a no lesser role. There is no running away from it. This role, naturally and inevitably, entails the fulfilment of certain pre-requisite conditions. In the first place, any "pole", properly so-called, in a multipolar system, should make conscious and strenuous efforts to minimise the spectre of dependence behind and move in the direction of self-reliance. Obviously this self-reliance would not be absolute; it would be viewed in a new context of interdependence and complementarity. Can a new relationship of this kind be forged in South Asia? We need to examine this not from the limited standpoint of individual or even collective gains of the countries in the region, but in the truly global context of real multi-polarity. To the extent this new relationship is strengthened, multi-polarity, and along with it the political substance of Non-alignment, is promoted, at least in the negative sense of making the old type of bi-polar blocism more difficult and less meaningful. I suggest that India and Pakistan could seriously think of their role—joint or separate, as they may choose—in this emerging context. I emphasise joint or separate because I think both are conceivable in a framework of accepted objectives and co-ordinated actions. What is important is that a beginning be made in the process of understanding the new context in all its ramifications. We have recently witnessed an important and interesting phanements. ting phenomenon of countries of our region manifesting their desire to work together for their common good. I refer to the meeting of the seven Foreign Secretaries of the South Asian countries in Colombo to consider the proposal of the late President of David in the late Pres of the late President of Bangladesh to establish a framework for regional economic co-operation. economic co-operation. Perhaps we should expect to see more such initiatives being considered and in the second expect to see more such initiatives being considered and in the second expect to see more such initiatives being considered and in the second expect to see more such initiatives being considered and in the second expect to see more such initiatives being considered and in the second expect to see more such initiatives being considered and initiative and initiatives being considered and initiative and initiativ tives being considered and it is in this context that I invite the attention of one and all, especially intellectually intellectual to the context that I invite the attention of one and all, especially intellectuals, to this issue. The matter has become

NOTES

particu This ha

India,

I no among Develo past or countri New In Decade close co at indepthey did diversiff both co importaries to I them.

Areas o

On is several of with the that in the that in the close colose colose colose in the measure consider

Political

I start

as India.
thick of
Governm
we inher
General
of foreig

NOTES AND COMMENTS .

URE

olar t the of a and

profor the and

ortless, turn

cely. ion,

ems o be ntial This

isite ultithe nce. in a

ionnot unt-To

ong the and of

ext. neant ext

resork igní

iaof me

sal nal

particularly relevant after Pakistan has joined the Non-Aligned Movement. This has come as a happy augury.

India, Pakistan must work for Close Economic Co-operation

I now come to another, but allied topic of Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries (ECDC) and Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC). It has been my happy experience during the past one and half years, that on matters concerning the future of developing countries, both inter se and vis-a-vis the developed world, as also on the New International Economic Order and the strategies for the Development Decade, India and Pakistan have held almost identical views and worked in close co-operation. This, again, was no doubt the result of decisions arrived atindependently; what is important is that the decisions coincided in the way they did. It is possible to pursue this modus operandi further and in more diversified fields of endeavour. I propose that deeper thought be given in both countries to this activity which will perhaps outstrip everything else in importance in the near future. It will be mutually beneficial for both countties to play, and be seen to play, the role which must legitimately belong to

#### INDO-PAK ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Areas of Consensus and Disagreement

On issues like those of the Middle East, South Africa, Namibia and several others, India and Pakistan are already in tune with each other and with the general consensus of the Non-Aligned Movement. I have no doubt that in the years to come, both our countries will be called upon to become more active on such vital issues. This is yet another opportunity to work in close co-operation in world affairs, given the will to do so.

I shall now touch upon a few issues on which our countries have not been in total agreement, although this phenomenon has been depicted as a Measure of difference which is hardly justified by the factual position. I do consider it important to put these issues in proper perspective.

Political Solution Only Answer to the Afghan Issue

Istart with Afghanistan, in view of its importance for Pakistan as well It all started on 27 December 1979, when we in India were in the high of elections to Parliament. Following the results on 10 January, the Government was sworn in on 15 January. It was during this interregnum that We inherited this problem. A resolution was tabled in the United Nations General Assembly calling for immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal foreign troops from Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union however indicated that they had been invited by the leadership in Afghanistan and that they would not remain there longer than necessary. They also made accusations of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan from across the borders and for fomenting of insurgency. This was the scenario three or four days before our government was formally sworn in.

We took stock of the situation and concluded that there was no hope of implementing the resolution in the terms in which it was couched. At the same time, we reiterated, inter-alia, our stand that we were opposed to the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would not violate the independence of Afghanistan. Ever since then India has urged a political solution with all the other concomitants clearly spelt out, including of course, withdrawal of foreign forces.

During the past sixteen months, we have doggedly stuck to that line, in the face of insufferable calumny, misrepresentation, distortion and a vicious smear campaign. The public statements, of the Prime Minister and my own speak for themselves. In particular, it may be noted that while in the initial stages we were subjected to the treatment I have just described, our consistent stand did result in the gradual acceptance of the need for some kind of dialogue to resolve the problem. This is evident from the progressive modificatory resolutions adopted and statements made over the last year.

On this occasion, I thought I owed it to myself and the cause, to bring out the above essential facts concerning India's stand on Afghanistan. However, I have desisted from mentioning many other aspects and subsequent facts because I do not intend to ruffle feathers and I want the issue to be settled under any of the initiatives known to have been taken already. ever the agency, it is the result that matters. While it is encouraging that a political solution is now apparently favoured all round, it is regrettable that the time taken ostensibly in the quest for the solution is being promptly and assiduously utilized for purposes such as escalation of Greet Power presence in the region on a permanent basis, leading to a vicious circle which no one seems to know how and where to break. I invite your pointed attention to this aspect which on no account should be swept under the carpet. The views of India and Pakistan on this issue, while not being identical throughout, have not been diametrically opposed either and have in fact tended to come elose to each other as time passed and events unfolded. They eventually converged on the New Delhi Declaration which, as you know, was based on consensus like all such declaration which, as you know, was based on attitude should be indeed to the country's attitude should be judged by its commitment to that Declaration. For my part, I am prepared to state part, I am prepared to state categorically that India reaffirms its support for the relevant paragraph of the the relevant paragraph of the Declaration of the Non-Aligned Foreign Mini-ster's Conference held in N ster's Conference held in New Delhi in February 1981, and I am glad to add that both Agha Shahi and I have gentlement that both Agha Shahi and I have reaffirmed this in our Joint Press Statement issued vesterday issued yesterday.

Kampi

At t

NOTES

puche Kamp beyone ssion t I have doing the sar concer of the I technic some d ments central people well bei be deal strategi argume ments a led us to This is t the 1980 favour c fulfilmer stood ur national the cred admitted politics a some sta 10 Kamp firmed by UN expe different and the lask of t ference, events, tl whole re Of cou drawal o

be obtain

JTURE

y the r than affairs gency. mally

pe of At the to the hope istan. r conoreign

ne, in icious y own initial sistent of diaodifi-

bring Howquent to be Whatthat a e that ly and esence

10 one on to views , have elose

coned on ntry's or my ert for

Minio add ement

Kampuchean Problem should be Resolved in the Interests of the People

At this point, I would also like to briefly touch upon the issue of Kampuchea. It has been a tense and a troubled country. The travails of the Kampuchean people over the last two decades and especially in the 1970's go beyond human imagination and were too ghastly for normal human compassion to remedy or to provide succour. Every leader and foreign minister I have come across so far has categorically expressed abhorrence of the doing of the Pol Pot regime. Yet the irony is that in the United Nations. the same regime is allowed to represent its own victims, as it were, and no concern seems to be felt about this phenomenon. The anomalous position of the Pol Pot regime is that no one favours it; many continue to recognise it technically while voicing their opposition to it; some have de-recognised it; some do not seem to know what to do or say and wait for further developments but meanwhile the people of Kampuchea continue to suffer. The central concern of all countries should have been to bring to the Kumpuchean people some hope of stability, some sense of peace, some propspect for their well being. In spite of this, the whole issue was dealt with and continues to be dealt with in many quarters and by many countries in terms of their own strategic and national interests under the umbrella of technical and legalistic arguments. India's approach was and is to be responsive to the predicaments and the needs of the Kampuchean people. It is this approach which led us to recognise the present Government of Kampuchea—of Heng Samrin. This is the national consensus which emerged in India both before and after the 1980 elections to Parliament and all political parties, except one, are in favour of the decision. In fact, when I announced this in Parliament as the fulfilment of the election pledge of our Party, all leaders of opposition parties stood up and protested; they said that this was a matter on which there was national consensus and that the Foreign Minister could not, therefore, claim the credit entirely as his own or as of his Party! I then corrected myself and admitted that this was a question of national consensus. Leaving aside the politics and polemics of tactical and strategic competition and confrontation, ome stability and order, some measure of peace and calm have come back Kampuchea under its present Government. These facts have been con-In the by many persons who visited the country, including some non-political Nexperts and a delegation of Indian Members of Parliament, belonging to different political parties. It is therefore our assessment that if the people and the Country themselves to the the Government of Kampuchea are allowed to devote themselves to the lask of their national reconstruction and well-being without external interleasure, without the imposition of extraneous interests on the course of thents, then the issue will resolve itself and pave the way for stability in the

Of course, if these objectives are to be achieved it would involve withtawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. In our view that can best boots ained by quiet diplomacy between the countries directly concerned and

by a regional dialogue which was urged by the recent Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in Delhi, and generally accepted by the parties directly concerned. It is our hope that they will continue along this constructive path.

## INTERACTION AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED

These, then, are the issues on which India and Pakistan have somewhat different perceptions. No one can say they are too many, nor too deep. Nevertheless, there seems to be an unfortunate tendency all the time in both countries to play up the differences rather disproportionately.

I have often wondered why this should be so. Could it be a part of the overall effort to establish separate identities? Could it be a bundle of complexes developed on both sides, to the effect that any emphasis on similarities may prove unpopular? In that case how and why did such emphasis become unpopular? Could it be merely a hangover we are not able to get over? It is possible, that it may be a combination of all these and several other factors which have led to the playing up of these differences. Be that as it may, I think it is time to realise that just like differences, similarities too cannot be wished away; so also complementarities. It is of course open to us to ignore them and go our separate ways, regardless of the cost of duplication, avoidable wastage, inconvenience of fixing up alternatives, etc. Such a cost is known to have been accepted by sovereign States at times for countervailing reasons. What I wish to submit, for the consideration of the people of Pakistan is that in our case there are no such countervailing reasons. The logic is overwhelmingly in favour of coming closer.

The stark reality which confronts the two of us is that we are both poor, and that for both countries, poverty is the main enemy. Hence our shared interest in the new International Economic Order. Hence too, the interest in our countries in the adaptation and application of scientific knowledge and technological know-how is the essential task before us: the betterment of our living conditions and the augmentation of the welfare of our peoples. I would, therefore suggest that we move towards free exchanges in the economic field. I also believe that if we were to promote thorough going academic exchanges, the greater cross fertilisation of ideas would gradually and irreversibly lead to a more sympathetic and mutual understanding, at a deeper and more profound level

We have in fact been attempting to do this since the commencement of the Simla process. The process of normalization envisaged in the Simla Agreement means—and can only mean—the intensification of interaction at all levels between our peoples and Governments and with a view to evolving an integrated, realistic and mature relationship.

We are happy to note that in the field of intellectual and cultural contacts, we have received in India scores of Pakistani writers and poets, journalists and commentators, musicians and other artistes. I would like to express

my gra have in visiting Indi a realis popula 160 co twelve. natura valuab progres strengt experie ment c industr that thi contrib

NOTES

It is on the nity what tell The and the Pakista

share it

In confuture of future of Both ou expandi and state endeavors varying bonds of mutual in tion and genuine cious trabea grace

under p

and wor

UTURE

oreign irectly uctive

ewhat deep. 1 both

of the idle of in simiphasis to get several se that ies too pen to oost of atives, it times ion of

poor, shared erest in ge and of our oles. I nomic demic

ent of Simla ion at olving

y and

l con-

my gratitude for the warm and enthusiastic welcome which you, in turn, have invariably reserved for Indian artistes and intellectuals and sportsmen visiting your country.

India's desire for close and friendly relations with Pakistan is founded on a realistic appreciation in India of Pakistan's inherent strength. In terms of population, Pakistan is one of the big countries in the world. Out of the 160 countries or so of the world, Pakistan comes in among the first ten or twelve. Apart from a large and skilled population, Pakistan has impressive natural resources, ranging from some of the most fertile land in the world to valuable mineral deposits. There is also much to admire in the economic progress you have made in the past three decades. These potentialities strengthen prospects of co-operation between Pakistan and India. Our own experiences and experiments in the spheres of agricultural research, development of new sources of energy including solar energy, and intermediate industrial technology have been satisfactory and useful. If you are persuaded that this Indian experience is relevant to your needs and conditions and could contribute to strengthening your economy, we would be only too ready to share it with you.

It is our belief that the countries of the sub-continent constitute a fraternity whose destinies are interlinked. This is what led our Prime Minister to tell *The Muslim* newspaper the other day: "We feel that a stable Pakistan and the progress of its people is as much in India's interest as it is in Pakistan's."

#### VISION FOR THE FUTURE

In conclusion, I would venture a few words about my vision for the future of Indo-Pakistan relations. I have referred to the Simla Agreement. Both our countries acknowledge that it provides a framework, a basis for expanding our relations, for encouraging our common endeavour for peace and stability so essential for the well-being of our peoples. It would be our endeavour that attitudes and actions flowing therefrom contribute through varying vicissitudes, to the process of normalisation; to strengthening the bonds of friendship; to adding positive and creative dimensions to our mutual understanding. I am trying to look beyond the stage of normalization and aim at positive friendship based on active co-operation born of genuine mutual trust. I think we have to undertake a deliberate and constitue transformation of our respective psyches. I am conscious that this will under pressure, empathy in adversity and a capacity to discern the positive work for it in the face of limitations.

P.V. NARSIMHA RAO

## PARTY SYSTEM UNDER SADAT — CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

A lot has changed in Egypt since Sadat came to power in October 1970. In the first few months, at least till the May 1971 showdown with his leftist colleague, Ali Sabri, Sadat repeatedly vowed to follow Nasser's objectives and to respect his legacy. In fact, the over-riding consideration in the choice of Anwar al-Sadat by the political leadership and the committees of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was undoubtedly his closeness to Nasser and his willingness to follow Nasser's policies. In its unanimous vote for the nomination of Sadat on 7 October 1970, the National Assembly stressed the fact that he was "a comrade of Nasser in all stages of his struggle." It expected Sadat to follow Nasser's path towards socialism, anti-imperialism, ties with the Arab states and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Even the men in the street indicated the popular will to carry on Nasser's tradition as they shouted "Sadat, Sadat, do not think that Nasser is dead."

As soon as Sadat found himself firmly saddled in power after eliminating his rival Nasserite group led by Ali Sabri, he forgot his promises to follow the Nasserite path. He very discretely stopped mentioning Nasser and the Nasserite path. The expulsion of the Soviet experts from Egypt in July 1972, only a little more than a year after the Egypt-Soviet Union Friendship Treaty of May 1971, clearly indicated a major shift in the foreign policy of Egypt. On the domestic front, a soft line was taken right from the beginning so far as state-enterprise was concerned. Capitalism no more remained a sin, rather, it was said, the sectors of the economy which effectively could be managed by private enterprise in a mixed economy would be given sufficient protection.

But in one sphere of general policy — and this he never admitted—Sadat really followed Nasser. This was the Nasser style of politics, especially the use of the party system to perpetuate personal rule while creating a semblance of popular participation. Sadat liberalized his regime and created a multi-party system of sorts. The endeavour here is to examine how the points of convergence and divergence; in short, to see whether the changes brought about by Sadat in the party system represented change or continuity.

## SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE NASSER AND SADAT ERAS

The similarities between the initial years of Nasser and Sadat are striking. It took two years for Nasser to eliminate his rivals within and outside the "Junta"; Sadat took around nine months. The challenge to Nasser came from the Right, chiefly from the Muslim Brotherhood which apparently had the sympathies of General Neguib; Sadat faced the challenge from the pro-Nasser leftist group led by Sabri. Both Nasser and Sadat, having once eliminated their rivals consolidated their power—Nasser

NOTE

elimin in 19 experdid t

The I

The

Saddle

Israel
person
gical r
seemee
Nasser
Sadat
legitim
whelm
ged by
selves

Nas:

tution certain innova govern heavily dure w the Mi suppor the fact Sabri a had bed fact tha They al which h of pow to forge them in With Li Commi measur ment at

he dism

ASU's

eliminated his rivals in 1954 and consolidated power till 1956; Sadat eliminated his rivals in 1971 and consolidated power till the October War in 1973. Only then did they think of affecting structural changes and experimenting with them. But it was always a controlled experiment—never did they allow the experiments to endanger their position and hold on power.

The Legitimacy Problem: A Common Feature

The basic problem for both Nasser and Sadat was that of legitimacy. Saddled with the bitter and seemingly permanent legacy of the 1967 Arab-Israel War and burdened by mounting economic problems, lacking the personal magnetism of his predecessor and unable to maintain the ideological momentum of the Nasser regime, Egypt at the time Sadat took over, seemed headed for a legitimacy crisis. Even the inevitable—inevitable because Nasser had left little or no institutional legacy—struggle for power between Sadat and Ali Sabri should be taken as a conflict arising out of a crisis of legitimacy. Although Sadat legally succeeded Nasser and was later overwhelmingly confirmed as President by a national referendum, he was challenged by some of Nasser's men, especially Ali Sabri, who considered themselves equally legitimate and qualified to fill Nasser's place.

Nasser had never vested political power in any Egyptian political institution and though he did prefer some institutions over others, the ASU certainly was not his favourite political instrument. The ASU was his own innovation, yet he did not trust it. But after his death, outside the formal governmental, bureaucratic and military structures on which Nasser had heavily relied, the only arena for political debate and constitutional procedure was the ASU. Sabri and his aides, Sami Sharaf and Sharawi Goum'ah, the Minister of the Interior, with the ASU as their source of power<sup>1</sup> and supported by the leftist al-Tali'ah intellectuals and the managerial class in the factories, appeared poised to win against Sadat and his group. However, Sabri and his ASU associates made a mistake in assuming that the union had become the powerful party that they wanted it to be. They ignored the fact that the Army was powerful and they could not be sure of its support. They also ignored the fact that the people saw them as a tyrannical group which the same that the people saw them as a tyrannical group which the same that the people saw them as a tyrannical group which the same that the same which had turned itself, after Nasser's death, from the status of "instruments of power of power and attempt." of power" to one of "holders of power." Besides, they made no attempt to forge close links with the people, a relationship which could have stood them in good stead. Sadat realized, after his proposal for an Egyptian merger with 1: Libya, Syria and the Sudan was voted down by the ASU Executive Committee that a coup against him was in the making. It was as a defensive measure, therefore, that he proceeded to purge the party and the government act. he discovery of a conspiracy; in a matter of days, he dismissed Ali Sabri and four other members of the Committee from the ASU's Sharawi Goum'ah, ASU's Supreme Executive Committee. One of them, Sharawi Goum'ah,

TY?

eftist tives the

ttees asser e for essed

i." It lism, Even

ition

ating w the l the 1972,

reaty gypt. ar as ther, aged

ed—
peciating
and
how

ntify nges onti-

cing. tside asser ppaenge

idat, isser was a Cabinet Minister. Five other Cabinet Ministers, including the Minister of War, General Mohammed Fawzi, were also fired. In one stroke then Sadat had eliminated almost everyone who could pose a threat to him and in the process, had crippled the ASU. He abolished whole time work in the party and dissolved all the old party committees in the provinces. The ASU was virtually dissolved and ordered to be recreated in May 1971 through elections from the base to the apex. The explanation given was not new. Nasser had ordered election in 1968 because the ASU at that time, he said. was not built on free elections; Sadat, alleged that the whole organization as it existed then was based on elections rigged by the "centres of power."3

What is really striking is not that both Nasser and Sadat had to face a legitimacy crisis but that they used more or less the same themes to gain legitimacy-pan-Arabism, economic policy, Islamism and so on. Nasser relied heavily on sources of legitimacy other than the political party. So did Sadat in the beginning of his presidency.

Sadat embarked upon a policy, rather a show, of pan-Arabism, one which Nasser had so successfully used to gain legitimacy. Like Nasser again, Sadat resorted to what has already been referred to as a traditional legitimacy device—Islamic orthodoxy. There was a strong trend towards Islamic revivalism and political conservatism. In a definite shift to the right Sadat "abandoned the middle position in ideological affairs" and came "to rely increasingly on a mixture of elements from the liberal bourgeois and the Islamic right."4 If Nasser enforced land reforms, confiscated foreign property and later nationalized private enterprise in a bid to win support and legitimize his rule, Sadat attempted to undo this while the object remained the same. He found small presents to placate each class. As early as December 1970, Sadat ordered the review of expropriation measures and the restoration of sequestrated property to its original owners. Even before this was done, price cuts in consumer goods like grain and rice and non-consumer goods had been affected and imports liberalized. The wholesale promotion of about 150,000 government employees with promises of a pay-rise<sup>5</sup>, new schemes for better health, housing and transport and the release of around 3,000 prisoners within a few weeks of coming into power were all measures taken to give the impession that a new era had begun—more liberal than the previous one, in which Egyptians could hope to improve their lot.

After May 1971, Sadat went further with these policies; while the pan-Arab slogan was played down in favour of a policy which can be described as "Egypt first," the role of Islam was stepped up. Article 2 of the new Constitution of September 1971 stated: "Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation." Along with a crack-down on the Left, Sadat adopted a policy of progressively easing pressure on the Right. As if in a bid for support, he granted amnesty and rehabilitated hundreds of those who had suffered during the Nicola and rehabilitated hundreds of those who had suffered during the Nasser era—the beneficiaries were elements of the Farooq regime,

the Muslim Brotherhood, landlords and expelled judges.8

The ( enough of its d own leg released Mustafa conside Genera A' High Nasser for the An ope

NOTES A

The Lib

econom

Lack carry o had ha near fu took o in the the vac rather t ever, be people zations policy. clear fr dent) b Zakaria rightist least of in the 1 posals Some

Assem Govern when A for it s Mohier ment r after S In Feb

demon

ter en, nd the

TY

gh ew. id, ion

e a ain ser So

one
in,
itinic
dat
ely
the

erty itithe ber ion ne,

ods of ew ind res

aned ew

ew ate rce icy

rt, ed ne, The October 1973 War was a crowning success for Sadat. He felt strong enough to claim that the former regime had lost all its legitimacy as a result of its defeat in 1967, implying thereby that his regime had established its own legitimacy by its successes. The new group of journalists who were released or allowed to return from exile included the Amin brothers—Mustafa Amin and Ali Amin—Ahmed Abu al-Fath and top army officers considered responsible for the defeat in 1967 and also some of those like General Fawzi who had been implicated in the leftist plot in May 1971.9 A High Court order in May 1971 declared that all expropriation under Nasser was illegal and must be returned. The huge public sector was blamed for the visible deterioration of the Egyptian economy and infrastructure. An open door policy was then openly accepted as the cure for the country's economic ills.

#### The Liberalization

Lacking Nasser's overwhelming charisma, Sadat was in no position to carry on in the same tradition as the former. Between 1967 and 1970 enough had happened to raise expectations of a new, more liberal system in the near future. After Nasser's death it appeared that any Egyptian leader who took over would have to become "a broker among the emergent interests in the country and less of a patrimonial autocrat."11 It was expected that the vacuum created would be filled by some kind of a collective leadership rather than by the sole political organization, the ASU, which would however, be called upon to play an increasingly important role. At the same time people hoped that the National Assembly and the various mass organizations would be more closely associated with the elaboration of general policy.12 That a certain amount of liberalization was expected/desired is clear from certain proposals presented to Sadat (after he was elected President) by three of Nasser's prominent associates and fellow RCC members— Zakaria Mohieddin, Abdul Latif Boghdadi and Kamal ed-din Hussein (all rightists)—which demanded inter-alia, an open political system with at least one opposition party, a free Press and collective authority to reside in the head of the government instead of a single strong man. 18 These proposals had to be rejected because it was not an opportune moment.

Some liberalization did take place. For instance, debates in the National Assembly<sup>14</sup> became more free. The 1964 Constitution stipulated that the Government submit its programme of action to the Parliament. In 1964, when Ali Sabri was Prime Minister, the programme was not even discussed for it "covered everything." During the 1966–67 session when Zakaria Mohieddin was Prime Minister till the death of Nasser, no debate on governant programmes took place; there was only unanimous approval. But In February 1972, the debate was mild. In 1973, the People's Assembly demonstrated that it was not after all entirely impotent. The Press, too,

NOTES

was permitted to write and criticize much more freely. For the first time since the coup d'etat, the Egyptian Press afforded a rather reliable picture of the nation's economic and social problems.

#### CHANGES IN THE PARTY SYSTEM

Perhaps it was as a result of this freedom that for the first time in March 1972, there was an admission by Syad Marei, First Secretary of the ASU Central Committee, that Egypt's hopes of building a sound political party had not been realized, that democracy was limited inside the party, superficial political flattery was widespread, the institution considered itself an organ for producing excuses and justifications for government action and reports were drawn up to please the leaders rather than represent the true feelings of the people. 16

But it was only after the positive outcome of the October War of 1973 that Sadat felt strong enough to take steps to modify the party system. He touched off a debate when in August 1974 he issued a 7,000 word "working paper" to reform the ASU. Egyptians engaged in a spirited debate on the return of political parties. In newspaper columns and meeting halls all over the country politicians, intellectuals, students, workers and peasants mulled over the reform proposals. The views expressed ranged from the abolition of the 50 per cent quota system for peasants and workers to the abolition of the ASU and the setting up of a second political party. 17 However, when the Egyptian Parliamentary Commission, set up to study the reorganization of political parties, recommended the maintenance of the one party system, it became clear that Sadat had settled for breathing a new life into the ASU rather than forming a new party. All that he seemed to want was that the ASU be a centre for healthy dialogue and a focal point for opposing views rather than rigidly endorse conformism. Accordingly, a year later, Sadat announced the creation of a new political grouping within the ASU to be called the "Free Socialists."18

Then, in January 1976, Sadat formed the Commission on the Future of Political Action of the People's Assembly. And on 14 March 1976, he announced that on the basis of the report of the Commission and in the implementation of his policy of liberalizing the country's political and economic or "platforms"—a liberal right wing, a governmental center and a Marxist left. He ruled out an early return to a multi-party system adding that there were "no solid foundations at present for the formation of parties." ASU

The 1953 ban on political parties remained. However, within the ASUchtree permanent "platforms" representing the right, the center and the left were permitted. Each platform could lobby for its ideas, disseminate dates for election. All platforms were to work under the legitimizing formula of the ASU; none was to impose its opinion upon others. The ASU was

thus to of the se the act and prothe Pecdent his arbitra

Thropressur to fund useful in 197 The

Gover

Union

masses

closer reliand Social key ci nuanc democ ment Social to cap

Seei one w three was to least for it did future

forces

partie establications of the Cover

(i

(ii

time cture

UITY

arch ASU. arty per-

fan and true

973 em. orkon all ants the

the ver, aniirty

nto was ing ter, SU

ure he lenic

igs ist ere 19

Us he ite

lila

as

thus to provide a framework "to safeguard national unity, the inevitability of the socialist solution and social peace,"20 while the platforms were to be the actual political organizations to carry out all their political activities and programmes in full freedom and submit candidates who, if they reached the People's Assembly, were to exercise full constitutional rights. The President himself declined to belong to any platform stating that he would be an arbitrator among all authorities, unbiased and a "safety valve protecting the masses."21

Through these legitimizing "platforms",22 Sadat hoped to deflect the pressure for a multi-party system and to encourage the People's Assembly to function as a representative body capable of constructive criticism and useful legislative initiative and oversight e.g., modification of the budget in 1976.

The three "platforms", represented very different sectors of the Egyptian Government spectrum. The Left group was called the National Progressive Unionist Rally. Led by the "Red Colonel", Khaled Moheiddin, it was for closer ties with the Soviet Union, stress on public sector investment and reliance on class struggle. The Centre "platform" was the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization and included the Prime Minister, Cabinet members, key civil servants and heads of the 26 governorates. It was for the continuance of the government policy—a theme of gradualism and guided democracy, a mixed economy with a healthy dose of private sector investment and closer ties with the West. The third "platform", was named the Socialist Liberals. It "was neither socialist nor liberal"23 and was for a return to capitalism, greater private enterprise and a heavy reliance on market forces to solve Egypt's economic problems.

Seeing that the trial balloon was doing well, Sadat, in November 1976, one week after elections to the People's Assembly, announced that the three "platforms" were to be called political parties. Though the ASU was to continue supervisory and financial controls over the parties and at least for the time being, only the three parties were to be allowed to function, it did appear that the way was set for a multi-party system in the near

future. Hopes, however, were soon to be belied.

On 29 June 1977, the Egyptian Parliament adopted a new law on political parties which for the first time since their abolition in 1953, permitted the establishment of political parties subject to certain conditions. The conditions tions are important for it was because of these conditions that the members of the opposition Right and the Left boycotted the vote on the new law. The conditions meant that the ASU would continue to maintain control over the formation and life of parties. They were:

(i) Any new party must have the authorization of the ASU.

(ii) It must include at least 20 members of the Egyptian Parliament.24

(iii) It should not have been in existence at the time of the Monarchy,

i.e., parties which had been dissolved in 1953 could not be revived in their former form.

- (iv) Any new party must support national unity and acknowledge that Egypt's problems could only be solved by "socialist" means.
- (v) The aims and principles of any new party must be different from those of the groups affiliated to the ASU.

The third condition had the clear implication that the Egyptian Communist Party, the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood could not be legally reconstituted.<sup>25</sup> And it was from these three organizations that opposition to Sadat could come.

The Muslim Brotherhood was not much of a challenge. With the release from prison of most of the Muslim Brothers in the 1960's and after Sadat came to power in the 1970's, the message went around: "the Brotherhood has arisen." The Muslim Brotherhood reorganized itself in small secret cells in villages to begin with and then in religious schools, towns and cities. The pressure on the regime from the Brotherhood was for a further movement towards Islam. Sadat went out of his way to court the conservative, religiously directed Brotherhood in proclaiming the Arab Republic of Egypt as an Islamic state. Limiting the sale of alcoholic beverages in May 1976 and the adoption of certain legislation based on the Sharia were also placatory gestures. When the platforms in the ASU were formed, the Muslim Brotherhood with a following of about 50,000, perhaps more, was reported to have decided to reconstitute itself not as a political party but as a religious organization, pending the official restoration of the right to form political parties under two former free officers—Kamal-ed-din Hussein and Hussein Shafie without joining any of the three platforms.

But the Left<sup>26</sup> was taken as a real threat even when it had never enjoyed any significant political power in the past. Sadat's attitude towards the Left was clearly reflected in the manner in which he attacked the National Progressive Union Rally while discussion for legalizing political parties were in wanted a left wing that "was Egyptian and not Soviet." The Progressive better relations with the USSR as that was in Egypt's interests. But they were cautious; they accepted that there were nationalist groups and elements have to work within the system... there can be points beyond which we cannot go. They can finish us off. But what will be the use of that." This a communict plot to overthrow Sadat was said to have been discovered. Fver since it was in the past of the past o

Ever since it was banned in 1953, the Wafd remained "no more than the throbbing of the city's inner life, the great elusive murmer which serves as a barometer if not a guide to the ups and downs of public opinion." All through, it is said, it remained the strongest electoral force in Egypt

wherein when the The 1953. He in the I less that the government of the potential when the

NOTES A

How revolut was superents rather in their Wafdis in the A w

The first organ of 1977. but was al-Ahad of the from 5 again, publish until t it star because the Ut

The arouse become was fe admin referen

govern 1952 e

was cl

ived

VITY

rom

that

omgally tion

ease adat ood cret ties.

veive, ypt and

ory nerave gaties

e— /ed eft es-

in he ive ed ey

its Ve ve iis

n

29

8,0

ot

wherein lay its role as a potential threat to the regime. 31 This was proved when the New Wafd was officially registered as a party on 4 February 1978.

The New Wafd<sup>32</sup> came up as the first freely created political party since 1953. Having 24 members<sup>33</sup> in the Assembly, it was the second largest party in the Egyptian Parliament. It was an instant success. For the student, no less than for the peasants, Serageddin's party represented an alternative to the government and a chance for genuine political expression. It claimed a membership of 50,000 which was believed to represent only a fraction of the potential membership. The party indicated that their numbers in the Assembly would have been more had it not been for the stage management of their re-emergence by the ASU.

However, it can be said, that the New Wafd did overestimate its prerevolutionary support. For one reason, the following of the young people was superficial; they attended the Monday night gatherings because their parents used to vote for the Old Wafd. For another, its appeal was not real, rather it was the result of the all-inclusive character it had come to assume. It had members both from the extreme Left and the extreme Right. Finally, in their enthusiasm to embarrass the government, the approach of the New Wafdists was naive. For example, one of them—Sheikh Ashur Nasr—shouted in the Assembly "down with Sadat," and was expelled.34

A word about the state of the Press here would not be out of place.35 The first opposition newspaper, the weekly al-Ahra (The Liberals), was the organ of the Liberal Socialists and made its appearance on 14 November 1977. It did criticize the government for its game of Cabinet reshuffles but was on the whole mild and cautious in its attack. It was the leftist al-Ahali (the People), an organ of the Unionist Party, that was really critical of the government. For the same reason perhaps its circulation shot up from 50,000 to 135,000 in only four months. 36 And it was for the same reason again, that its 11 April 1976 issue was seized by the authorities for in it was published an interview with Heikal. 37 The party had to halt its publication until the newspaper could publish the views of the Party freely. However, it started publication again in July 1978 but was banned in August 1978 because it had criticised the peace initiative. In the place of the al-Ahali the Unionist Party launched a new paper, al Tuqaddam (Progress) which was closed down by the authorities in January when it protested against Sadat playing host to the exiled Shah of Iran. 38

The popularity of the New Wafd, as also open criticism by the Left, aroused concern in the ruling circles. The government felt that they were becoming serious opposition groups which were bound to affect their hold the system. It even instilled fear in the privileged Armed Forces which was fearful of being swept our of power and influence by a genuinely civilian administration. Thus to prevent the opposition from going out of hand, a referendum to decide whether to allow Communists to hold key posts in the government or the press, whether those who served the system of the pre-1952 era be allowed to participate in political life, whether all former political

a.

422

And s

NOTES

two st

follow

enterp

parties be allowed to return to political life, and whether the condition of working within the national unity framework, social peace and the inevitability of the socialist solution be imposed was ordered on 15 May 1978. The referendum, the result of the fear of Nasserism (as many Nasserites had been released from prison and were thinking of forming a party), 39 was generally opposed but as could be expected 98.29 per cent of the people voted "yes." 40

The "yes" vote affected two parties—the New Wafd and the Unionists. A thirteen-point bill in accordance with the referendum verdict was to purge at least three top New Wafd leaders—Chairman Serageddin, its Secretary-General, Ibrahim Farag and its Deputy Chairman Abdel Fattah Hassan. The latter two had held posts in governments of the old Wafd before 1952. Similarly, it was to ban the Marxists and pro-Moscow officials who had served Nasser because they supported an ideology "incompatible with religion." The result was that on 2 June 1978, the New Wafd dissolved itself rather than submit to the political restrictions imposed by Sadat which rendered political parties a "mere facade." Three days later, the Unionist Party announced that it was suspending all political activity to protest against the new law. A week later it, however, postponed a decision to dissolve itself for another two months and decided to contest the constitutionality of the law in court. 42

This left only two political parties—the governing Egyptian Arab Socialist Party with 300 of the 360 seats in the Assembly and the Right Wing Liberal Socialist Party which supported the government on important issues.

Sadat announced on 22 July 1978 that after a lot of hesitation and thought, he had decided to set up his own political party. This step was aimed at countering criticism about the repressive measures after the recent referendum. The new party, modelled on lines of social-democratic parties of Western Europe and named the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed in August 1978.43 The Party headed by Sadat44 set prosperity for Egyptian citizens as its chief goal. A 10,000 word policy document released in August stressed the "need to build a modern state on science and faith in which every citizen can realize his legitimate ambition, free from fear and hunger."45 To strike a balance between the interests of the individual and the community, the programme provided for the adoption of Democratic Socialism based on Islamic and Christian values and the principles of the 1952 Revolution and the corrective Revolution of May 1971. Referring to the absence of the word "socialist" from the party's name, Fikry Mahram Ebeid, the Secretary-General of the Party, said that this was not a slight on socialism for the Constitution for the Constitution mentions the word many times and there is no need for repetition. 46 Obviously, the NDP was to be more positive than the former ruling party towards private enterprise.

What was new about the NDP? First, Sadat himself became its leader. This lent it a weight which the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party did not have.

In C the for Assem Parties Social popula Gover

Sada thing questic in Egy past? Whato be e

party s dient f conditi and re: face of extrem. Arabisi assistan necessi that of of Wes Liberal

shadow
Then
Past. L
tion wo
the righ
heavil
balanci
become
Sadat's
outlet f

time no

compan

NOTES AND COMMENTS

on of inevi-1978.

YTIŲM

erites 9 was eople nists. es to

1, its

ttah

Vafd ' cials tible lved hich nist test

tiociaing ant

ht,

dis-

unım. ern in an ıst ch

11m 0ce 1e

,45

110

d 1

And second, the new party brazenly tried to take the ideologies of the the suppressed parties; while it took the populist tone of the Left, the NDP. following the Ward, declared that it would be more positive towards private enterprise than the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party.

In order to preserve the democratic image of the regime and facilitate the formation of an "honest" opposition, Sadat called on some of the People's Assembly members to form a new "honest" opposition according to the Parties Law. Soon two very small opposition parties were formed—the Socialist Labour Party and the National Front. The two enjoyed very little popular support and did not indulge in any outspoken criticism of the Government.

#### CONCLUSION

Sadat's continuing experiment with the party system meant at least one thing—that the problem of legitimacy for his regime was not solved. Two questions remain; what made Sadat change the very form of the party system in Egypt and to what extent was he making a break with the Nasserite

What Sadat had said long back in 1958 about the National Union appears to be equally relevant twenty years later for his own experiments with the party system. In 1958 he had said: "It (the National Union) is not an expedient freely adopted, but a necessity forced upon us, dictated by our new condition and our new responsibilities."47 What were these new conditions and responsibilities? First, there was need for legitimacy especially in the face of the re-emergence of organized opposition at the right and left of extremes of the political spectrum. Second, Sadat's turn-about on pan-Arabism and his moderation toward Israel, and more important, the massive assistance from the Arab-Gulf states and the United States of America necessitated a show of liberalism and political structures comparable to that of the democratic West. So strong was this urge to present a semblance of Western political structures that in December 1976 Sadat allowed the Liberal Socialist Party which had only 12 members in the Assembly (as compared to 280 of the ruling Egyptian Arab Socialist Party), to form a shadow cabinet headed by Ahmed Sayed Darwich.

Then again, President Sadat never made a clear break with the Nasserite Past. Like Nasser he wanted to have an ideal democracy where the opposition would be neither "insolent" nor "impertinent." He proposed to reserve the right not to allow "anti-national" parties to grow. When he came down heavil, heav heavily on the Left and formed his own party, he was playing Nasser's old balancing act, balancing the Right and the Left and never allowing either to become a danger to his rule. His role was one of an arbitrator. Basically Sadat's actions were aimed at giving the Right a deserved but contained outlet for the same outlet for its grievances after years of enforced silence, while at the same lime not completely alienating the Left. Sadat offered himself as "as symbol

of continuity with a difference."48 In the same way he also sought to reassure

the Egyptian Center.

The pluralist regime he tried to set up was rotten at the base in as much as the opposition was merely tolerated. That the primary aim of all these exercises had been to strengthen Sadat's own position is apparent from the sharp criticism levelled against him by the former Egyptian Ambassador in Lisbon and former Armed Forces Chief, Said Shazly. After the Referendum in May 1978 he denounced the government as a dictatorship "hiding behind a face of powerless democratic institutions."

PRADEEP SEN\*

NOT

15 F E

16 4

h

u

A

q

i

iv

18 St

19 Ce

20 Ke

21 Ibi

22 Th ha

be

niz

nu

196

Jan

sea

The form new

23 A.Z

24 Thi

16 II

17 S

#### NOTES

- 1 Since 1967, the ASU had been in the ascendancy. Sabri who was reappointed (he was replaced by Nasser himself immediately after the Six Day War), the Secretary-General of the ASU in 1968, grabbed the opportunity, when Nasser needed his support. He purged the Army, recruited cadres from the technocratic-industrial sections, organized leadership groups in the rival areas, increased the general membership and spread the wide network of the ASU. Further, the militia and guardsmen were also organized into the ASU network. After Nasser's death, the ASU leftist paper, al-Tali'ah emerged from obscurity and became the stronghold of extreme leftist-oriented intellectuals and journalists. The al-Goumhuriyah was infiltrated by Sabri loyalists. Both publications launched a bitter journalistic war against al-Ahram's Heikal and, indirectly, against the Sadat regime.
- 2 Per Gahrton, "President Sadat's New Brand of Egyptian Nationalism," New Middle East (London), No. 40, January 1970, p.11.

3 Indian Express (Delhi), 24 April 1972.

4 John Waterbury, "A Note on Egypt: 1973," Field Staff Reports North East Africa Series American Universities Field Staff (New York), XVIII, No. 4, July 1973, p. 4.

5 The Guardian (Manchester), 13 March 1971.

- 6 Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics-The Search for Legitimacy (London, 1977), p.
- 7 Ninety leftist intellectuals, charged with causing tension, spreading false information and undermining national unity, were expelled from the ASU in January 1973. Arab Report and Record (London), 15 January 1973.

8 Najib E. Saliba, "Decline of Nasserism in Sadat's Egypt," World Affairs (Washington), Vol. 138, no 1, Summer 1975, p. 52.

9 The Guardian, 16 March 1974.

- 10 New York Times, 25 May 1974.
- 11 Shahrough Akhavi, "Egypt's New Patrimonial Elite," in Frank Tachau, (Ed.), Political Elites and Political David Elites and Political Development in the Middle East (Massachusetts, 1975), pp. 86-87.

12 Le Monde (Paris), 7 October 1970.

13 New York Times, 10 October 1970. 14 The Egyptian Parliament according to the September 1971 Constitution was to be called the People's Assarching called the People's Assembly.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

<sup>\*</sup>Mr. Pradeep Sen is Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Lucknow, Lucknow.

YTIU

ssure

much these 1 the

or in idum hind

SEN\*

ie was eneral t. He nized pread nized

erged ctuals tions gainst

1iddle

(frica . 4. ), p.

ation Arab ton),

itical \_87.

, be

OW,

15 Fuad Mater, "After the Deluge: Egypt's Parliament Finds Its Voice," New Middle East (London), Nos. 52/53, January/February 1973, p. 45. 16 Al-Ahram reported the comment of one People's Assembly member that "People

have heard so much about preparations for the battle that they are fed up with slogans uttered here and there without result." Al-Ahram (Cairo), 11 December 1972.

Again, government ministers who reported to the Assembly were subjected to harsh questioning.

16 Indian Express, 24 April 1972.

17 Some of the prominent views that emerged during the debate were:

- i) Hafez Badawy, Speaker of the Assembly, echoed the views of Sadat, who was not against political parties but believed that confrontation with Israel was to be resolved first. Badawy said: "We object to parties as long as war continues. We also object to any encroachment of 50 per cent minimum representation of workers and farmers in all political institutions."
- ii) Mohammed Abdel Shafie, a member of the Assembly, called for the abolition of the quota system. He said that the return of political parties would be the only safeguard against a return of "centers of power."
- iii) Many saw the ASU as designed to blur issues and soften political confrontation.
- iv) Youssef Idris, a Marxist, said that the ASU was "artificial" and should not be reformed but abandoned. "We should be fully socialist or fully capitalist and not a mixture of both as we are-now," was his comment.
- v) Ali Amin, Chairman of Al-Akhbar said: "We need socialism with freedom" along European lines.
- International Herald Tribune (Paris), 11 September 1974. vi) There were at the same time some attempts to found a second political party in addition to the ASU. Certain Egyptians had wanted to name the new party to be formed as "October 6", the date of crossing the Suez Canal. The new party was to support Sadat's leadership more firmly.

B.K. Narayan, Anwar el-Sadat—Man with a Mission (New Delhi, 1977), pp. 97-98.

18 Statesman (Delhi), 27 October 1975.

19 Ceylon Daily News, 16 March 1976.

20 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London) Vol. 22, 1976, p. 27810.

22 This was not the first time that such an idea had come up. Way back in 1964, Nasser had reportedly attempted to supplement the ASU with yet another group of 4000 members which would function as the "Government Party" within the ASU. The new organization nization was designed by Nasser "to enforce a peaceful transfer of power and a continuation of his policies if anything happened to him." Washington Post, 9 February 1964.

23 A.Z. Rubinstein, "Egypt of Sadat", Current History (Philadelphia), Vol. 72, no. 423, January 1977, p. 20.

24 This condition did not apply to the three parties already existing. The distribution of seats in the Assembly among these three was:

Liberal Socialist—12 Egyptian Arab Socialist Organisation-280 National Progressive Union-2 Independents—48

The minimum number of members in the Assembly required for a new party to be formed a new party to be formed. formed was reduced according to an announcement made by Sadat in July 1978. The new number, however, was not given.

NOTE

47 Qu Pr

48 Ra

(M

West Asia Diary (New Delhi), Vol. 3, no. 36, 1978, p. 1220.

25 However, the Wafd was reported to have decided at a meeting in May 1977, to reconstitute itself, Le Monde, 1 June 1977.

- 26 The debate for the reactivation of the Egyptian Communist Party which voluntarily disbanded itself in 1965, had started as early as 1966. The 1967 debacle and Nasser's inclination towards compromise solutions strengthened the trend. The death of Nasser and the purge of the Sabri group forced the pace. So did the Egyptian help to General Nimiery of the Sudan to crush the Communists and the expulsion of Soviet experts from Egypt in 1972. They paused a little, to detract any accusation of a Soviet plot, till de-Nasserization was well underway. Then seeing the poor economic conditions, the Communist Party thought of harnessing the disaffections and rumblings among the people and on May Day, 1975, revived itself. Times of India (Delhi), 18 August 1975.
- 27 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 23, 1977, p. 28516.
- 28 Hindustan Times (Delhi), 3 February 1977.
- 29 West Asia Diary (New Delhi), Vol. 3, no. 25, 1978, p. 1104.
- 30 Jeanne and Simone Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York, 1958), p. 242.
- 31 It is alleged that the Wafd had planned to export the student demonstrations in 1968 to overthrow Nasser's regime but withdrew when it found that another party was competing with it to exploit the situation. A leading Wafd member had admitted to organizing demonstrations at the funeral of Nahas Pasha in 1965. Daily Telegraph (London), 18 September 1968.
- 32 The New Wafd was accepted because it declared its allegiance to the 1952 revolution and principles of socialism, democracy and the rights of workers and peasants. More important, it supported Sadat's peace initiative. Domestically, it said, it would prefer a more capitalist economy and would like to see more power in the hands of the Government than the President.
- 33 The biggest loser was the Right—out of its 12 members in the Assembly, 9 joined the New Wafd. An equal number left the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party to join the New Wafd. The rest were independents.
- 34 Times of India, 3 June 1978.
- 35 The Press was nationalized in the 1960s. The ASU owned all the publications. But after the three parties had been formed within the ASU framework the question was: Who owns what? There were calls for the ASU to renounce its ownership of the Press and for shareholder companies to be set up to run the newspapers. Others suggested that each of the principal dailies be assigned to one of the three parties. The matter was, however, left to the Higher Council of the Press to decide. Kuwait Times, 5 January 1977.
- 36 Times of India, 3 June 1978.
- 37 West Asia Diary, Vol. 3, no. 22, 1978, p. 1076.
- 38 New Statesman (London), 16 February 1979.
- 39 Indian Express, 26 May 1978.
- 40 It is to be noted that the opposition was never allowed to voice its opinion. The last edition of the weekly, al-Ahali which called on the people to vote "no" was seized
- before it could reach the streets. West Asia Diary, Vol. 3, no. 32, 1978, p. 1176. 41 The Times (London), 3 June 1978.
- 42 The Unionist Party held that the new law violated article 40 of the 1971 Constitution prohibiting discrimination prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, origin or language. West Asia Diary, Vol. 3, no. 20, 1079, m. 1147 Diary, Vol. 3, no. 29, 1978, p. 1147.
- 43 The ASU announced that it would merge with the National Democratic Party.
- 44 Sadat had remained out of the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party. 45 Cairo Bulletin (Press Bureau of the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party.

  1978, \* August 1978, \* Au
- 46 Ibid., 16 August 1978.

o re-

YTIU

tarily sser's lasser

neral perts

plot, tions, nong

ugust

1968 comganidon),

ution More orefer vern-

the New

But was: Press ested

atter

last

ition Asiq

gust

- 47 Qaidah Shah' biyyah (Cairo), June 1958. Quoted in Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: The Praetorian State (New Jersey, 1974), p. 145.
- 48 Raymond William Baker, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat (Massachusetts, 1978), p. 156.

## BOOK REVIEWS

# DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY AND TECHNOCRACY: INTERACTION OF THEIR ROLES

### A Review Article

WRITING early in this century Max Weber had argued that bureaucracy is the most rational and efficient mode of group activity to achieve chosen goals. But the spread of bureaucratic organizational styles to all nations, not just to governments but to business houses, banks and even universities, so fully discussed in Henry Jacoby's recent book The Bureaucratisation of the World, has also coincided with a growing resentment against the bureaucratic style of functioning. All over the the world and particularly in India today, the bureaucracy's ways and attitudes, the budgetary burden which its proliferation imposes, the muddles which add misery to the life of the people, have made it a target of criticism not only by the public, but also by politicians, including those who as Ministers exercise authority over them, as well as by those who play a technical rather than an administrative role in government, engineers, doctors, teachers, scientists and others.

Nevertheless, we simply cannot do away with the bureaucracy. The civil service, the more acceptable name for it, plays a key role in the running of governments. Ministers keep changing; the civil service provides them with the support and assistance they need to fulfil the popular mandate with which they have come to power, harnessing for the purpose such technical expertise as may be needed. Also, whenever there is a malfunctioning or breakdown of the political system, it is on the civil service that the responsibility of carrying on the administration devolves — as a rule on a caretaker basis, though instances are not wanting when, for example in France at certain times, even without a stable government the bureaucracy has been able to provide a stable, competent administration.

Against this background, the crucial question which has to be asked is—What can be done to ensure that the country has an honest, efficient and capable civil service, free from red tapism and other failings which bureaucracies are prone to develop? In any consideration of this problem there are two possible approaches. The focus may be on the kind of relationship which should exist between the political chiefs, the civil service and the technical experts, whose collective functioning and mutual interaction determine the quality of the administration as a whole, or attention may be given to the recruitment, training, working methods and the like, which influence the functioning of the civil service. Prof. Muttalib's book,\* as its title implies, is primarily concerned with an examination of the ways in which the three different elements work or fail to work together, though in the latter half of the book he discusses some more specific functional issues.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

BOOK

The

or add different theories Theories tion F stilted chara

much

debat

And he ha remove consider theory stand for s minis comm

gener trium techn by the The

realis

for th

to be

what contri of a contri the air ween prescri

mode: industriction elector broad it is en

The the de task of serving

anoth

<sup>\*</sup>M.A. Muttalib: Democracy, Bureaucracy and Technocracy: Assumptions of Public Management Theory (Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1980), ix, 132 p., Rs. 50.

BOOK REVIEWS

The book is essentially a compilation of separate, self-contained articles or addresses. As a result there is often a repetition of the same thought in different places. The author also seems to have a passion for propounding theories, as is evident from the captions of the different pieces "The LGS Theory," "The Triad Theory of Organization," "The Theory of Co-ordination Rediscovered and Reformulated" and so on—resulting in a somewhat stilted style which detracts from the readability of the book, giving it the character of a textbook; while the issues discussed and points made have a much wider readership interest because of their relevance to some hotly debated present day issues.

Another weakness which stems from his anxiety to evolve theories is that he has had to have recourse to abstractions and prototypes which are far removed from the concrete realities of life. The point is best illustrated by considering his LGS theory which as he says in the Introduction "is the core theory with 'L' standing for layman—that represents Politocracy; with 'G' standing for generalist—that represents Bureaucracy; and with 'S' standing for specialist—that represents Technocracy." Muttalib considers the minister to be a layman who is concerned with diagnosing the needs of the community, the bureaucracy to be a bunch of generalists who are responsible for the prescription of the ways and means to deal with them, the specialists to be the people who actually handle the fulfilment of the needs following the generalists' prescription. Summing up he says; "The philosophy of the triumvirate of functions is akin to the keeping of the ship afloat by the technocrats, being steered by the generalists towards the destination chosen by the lay functionaries."

The question which arises is whether what the author has presented is a realistic picture of what is or an idealistic projection of what should be. To look upon the political leadership merely as a group of laymen who know what hurts the people and diagnose their ailments is to ignore the basic contribution which the ministers make or are expected to make in the running of a democratic government. Different political parties often agree about the ailments which afflict society and have to be removed; the difference between them usually arises in the choice of the remedy which they propose to prescribe. All political parties agree that unemployment is bad. But to deal with it some may emphasize the role of cottage industries and decry modern technology, some may urge greater attention to agriculture than to industry, some may argue for greater scope to the private sector. The electoral manifesto of the party which comes to power contains, at least in broad general terms, the prescription for dealing with the identified ailments; it is erroneous to suggest that the bureacracy does the prescribing.

The ministers have also the power and the responsibility to decide upon the detailed steps that are to be taken to fulfil their electroal pledges. The task of drawing up a blue print for the purpose devolves on the professionals under them, but the final choice between one set of proposals and another rests with the minister. He has to judge for himself which of the

acy is nosen s, not es, so of the cratic

oolitis well overne civil

oday,

proli-

eople,

ing of them e with inical ing or e rescarence at

l is t and eaucre are nship techmine

been

e the plies, three half

o the

Mana-

possible courses of action presented to him would be most effective in terms of achieving the objective and also—this is most important—be acceptable to those whose political support has brought him to power. Thus when a democractic government takes a decision on the size of a programme, the resources for which have to be found through higher taxation, it not only considers how big a programme would achieve the objective in the minimum time, it also takes into account how much additional taxation for the purpose the people would put up with.

To be able to discharge this function, the minister must be a man capable of exercising the right judgment. Now it is true that in order to do so he need not himself be an expert in the field of his responsibilities. In this sense he can be said to be a layman. But lack of expertise is not a qualification for political responsibility. It is the capacity to form a judgment on the issues arising in a particular area which determine the suitability of a person for a particular political assignment. In allocating portfolios to different ministers the Prime Minister tries to take into account the special qualities and capabilities of each. The Law Ministers of India, starting from Dr. Ambedkar, have been men of legal eminence. Finance Ministers, beginning with Dr. John Mathai, have as a rule—though there have been exceptions—been selected with special regard to their understanding of economic problems. Proved administrative ability has been another factor which has influenced the choice of ministers.

In considering the bureaucrat to be a generalist the author endorses a popular misconception which has been at the root of much confused thinking on the role of the administrators in the machinery of government. Recruitment to administrative services is done on the basis of tests which pertain to the general ability of the candidate rather than specialized knowledge or study of subjects germane to administration. Such a policy is justified on the consideration that it widens the field of choice to the maximum possible extent. If recruitment were to be confined to those whohad obtained degrees in public administration or allied fields of study, many brilliant youngmen having an aptitude for, say, mathematics or science would be confronted at a young age with a choice between not studying the subject in which they are interested or ruling out the possibility of competing for entry into the administrative strative services. What the present policy aims at is the induction of the brightest and best young men out of those who desire to enter an administrative service and thereafter to train them for the fulfilment of their responsibilities. Much of the training is on the job itself: working, at first under the supervision and guidance of more seasoned administrators and then, over the years assuming the years, assuming greater responsibilities; the man who started his career as a generalist matures to be a specialist in administration.

The image of the administrator as a generalist is sometimes created in the public mind because of transfers from one department to another. Actually there is much in common between different departments in regard to the administrative skills which they need. In business and industry we often

And mic for Commission of the Market Market

activ

advio

of p

agro

equip

fulfil

depa

Raili

by a

in so

Mini

BOO!

with

one.

men

plan

tion

the I

men

in ex

some

cracy
talen
Mu
or, to
crat o
No de
large
distri

In the

Ween

thesc

BOOK REVIEWS

able en a the only num pose

EWS

able o he ense in for sues or a sters babi-lkar, with

ses a king ruitin to e or

been

ems.

nced

the sible rees men at a

the strasibithe

reer d in

over

the ften witness managers moving from one line of production to a totally different one. This is not because the manager is a generalist but because management techniques are essentially the same whether in a steel plant or a fertilizer plant. A good case can of course be made out for much greater specialisation within the broad field of administration. Even in the British days, when the ICS was considered to be omni-competent, after a few initial years each member of the service began to specialise, some spending most of their time in executive field work, some being permanently assigned to judicial work, some being used most often in the Secretariat where policies were made. And when in the thirties it became clear that administration in certain economic fields needed more of expertise and a higher degree of specialisation, the Commerce and Finanace Pool was created drawing upon members of different services who were continuously engaged thereafter in economic administration, both in an executive capacity and in the policy sector.

The role of the technocrat in administration has also been changing with times. Before Independence, they were primarily used in executive assignments—engineers formed a service to look after the execution of public works, there were cadres of doctors for providing medical services to the people. Occasionally some members of the technical services also held high posts in the Secretariat, e.g. in some provinces, the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department was also Secretary of the same department. After Independence with the enlargement of the scope of governmental activities there has been a tremendous increase in the need to draw upon the advice of specialists in fields other than administration, not in the execution of projects but in policy fields, to determine priorities-e.g. economics agronomy, engineering and science—to select the best technology and equipment for particular purposes, to create the necessary environment for fulfilling the plan targets of development in different sectors. In certain departments and Ministries, like Science and Technology, Economic Affairs, Railways etc., the post of Secretary is being filled not by an administrator but by a technocrat. On the other hand, the old hierarchical system also exists in some departments where the technocrats do not have direct access to the Minister; their views have to percolate through different levels of the bureaucracy before they get to the top. Much of the frustration of men of technical talent is attributable to this out-moded system wherever it still survives.

Muttalib's view that the role of the technocrat is to do the executive jobs or, to use his metaphor, to administer the medicine prescribed by the bureaucrat corresponds neither to reality nor would it be a desirable arrangement. No doubt some technical men are needed for field work. But equally quite a large number of administrators are engaged in executive assignments at the ween posts in the Secretariat and posts outside, it is difficult to maintain that the former is the preserve of the bureaucracy and the latter of the technocracy. Voice and views felt before the ultimate decisions are taken at the political

level. In some areas, for example law and order, the administrator may be able to provide all the specialised knowledge which may be necessary for the decision-making process. But for more complex issues the views of experts in different fields may have to be drawn upon. Thus in deciding what the support price for a particular agricultural crop should be the advice of agricultural experts, economists and administrators may have equal relevance, to which the ultimate decision-makers must add political considerations of which they are the best judges. Once policy decisions have been taken their implementation is left to executives who could be men with technical qualifications or administrative ability, depending on the nature of the job to be done. Building of roads would be entrusted to engineers, running of hospitals to doctors, rationing of sugar to administrators. In this way no, jealousies would be aroused at the implementation level.

It is in respect of the role of the technical expert in shaping policies, as distinct from his role in executing them, that conflicts arise. In his general exposition of a three-tier organisational framework, Prof. Muttalib suggests that the technocracy has no direct contact with the political masters; it is the bureaucracy which serves as "the hyphen that joins, the buckle that binds" the lay functionary and the specialists together. But in his lecture entitled "The Theory of Specialism and Generalism", he comes round to support the view advanced above that the administrator as well as the other concerned experts should participate in policy formulation. He says: "With the increasing relevance of science and technology to development administration, neither specialists nor generalists can be the servants of the other since there must be a thorough mixing of scientific and political considerations in the determination of policy. Accordingly the Fulton Committee has favoured the idea of allowing the specialists to have direct access to the Minister.... In development administration, the pressure for increased specialisation on the one hand, and the pressure for greater co-ordination on the other, are to be accommodated with a view to replacing the present superior subordinate relationship with a new concept of partnership."

Far more complex issues arise when considering the relationship between the political heads and the services, administrative or technical, on whom they depend for the fulfilment of their electoral promises. Muttalib rightly touches upon their different socio-economic backgrounds as well as their different approaches to dealing with problems—politicians relying on because of his assumption that the man at the top is a "lay functionary", has not discussed the question whether any thing can be done to improve the offices carrying executive responsibility which must be filled from the elected to Independence, with little hope of forming a government which would their lives to politics, participating in the struggle for Independence, spending

long y Cabine becaus With differen

BOOK F

and ob author The da who cl in harr loping being want t appoin but pr repose Minis

with t short-But derati demod techno to eye impul turn c questi cracy of thi the F tive F Amer -me to be the M of ob in the the k

> \*Mr. J Comr

begin

Octob

BOOK REVIEWS

EWS

y be the

erts

the

cul-

, to

hich ple-

ions

one.

s to

isies

s, as

eral '

ests

it is

ıds"

tled

the

rned

rea-

ion,

here the

ured

1 on

e to

nate

bet-

on alib

ll as

on

ver,

the

ica!

ted

rior uld ited

ling

long years in prison; but three decades after Independence the filling of Cabinet posts is proving difficult, not because of a plethora of talent but because of its paucity.

Within the parameters of the things as they are, scattered through the different pieces in this compilation. Muttalib has many worthwhile thoughts and observations. He draws attention to the continuous "interaction between authority of ideas and authority of office or between knowledge and power." The danger that Ministers, who have the authority of office, and the services, who claim the authority of knowledge and experience, fail to work together in harmony is real. There are increasing signs of distrust and tensions developing between the two and some ineffective and undesirable answers are being attempted to deal with them. One such trend is for the Minister to want to be surrounded by men of his own choice. When it comes to the appointment of Private Secretaries, as Muttalib rightly points out, it is but proper that Ministers should be free to select people in whom they can repose full confidence. But when it comes to Secretaries of Departments or Ministries, their role and utility would get vitiated if they kept changing with the Ministers, become their yes-men, or, in the alternative, they were short-circuited by the Ministers' Private Secretary or special Assistant.

But a deeper issue than of personal equation also arises in any consideration of the relationship between the political leadership, which in a democracy comes to power through elections, and the bureaucracy and technocracy, which are not affected by the ballot box. Will the latter see eye to eye with the former, be responsive in an adequate measure to the new impulses which the democratic process has brought to the fore, or will they turn out to be a negative, obstrauctive factor? The answer one gives to this question would determine one's response to the issue whether the bureaucracy should be neutral or "committed". Muttalib provides a useful analysis of this problem. His broad conclusion in line with the recommendations of the Fulton Committee in Britain and the thinking of our own Administrative Reforms Commission, which has also the support of the French and American practice, is that it might be advisable for some supporting staff men of competence and commitment— to be provided to Ministers, not to be a part of the permanent establishment but to hold office as long as the Ministers do. The introduction of such an element, provided the dangers of obvious abuse are guarded against, can be helpful to political leaders in the discharge of their onerous responsibilities. It can also help overcome the kind of insularity which bureaucrats develop and even technocrats begin to acquire once they form part of a service cadre.

October 1980

L.K. JHA\*

Mr. Jha, an eminent economist, is Chairman of the Economic Administrative Reforms Commission.

### ORIENTALISM—A CRITIQUE

#### A Review Article

DWARD W. Said, Parr Professor of English and Comparative Lite-E rature at Columbia University, New York and a Visiting Professor of Comparative Literature at Harvard, has been known in the Western academic world pre-eminently as a knowledgeable and perceptive literary critic of sharp insight and profound wisdom. In this latest publication\* of his he however presents himself in a somewhat different role; in that of a brilliant historian of ideas, visions and attitudes spread over for more than three hundred years of Western confrontation with the East, but a role which a sharply imaginative and perceptive student of literature and art alone could play. Consisting of three long well-documented and well-argued chapters, this book is in brief, a subtle and penetrating analysis of the attitudes and approaches that the West adopted and cutivated towards discovering the Orient for themselves, not as a geographical aggregate alone, but to "designate a people, a landscape, even a spirit" which the West was afraid of and yet at the same time was dangerously attracted to because of its romantic charm!

Edward Said's academic adroitness lies in showing how, from the eighteenth century onwards, politicians, creative and descriptive writers, painters and later, photographers, all shared in the discovery and conquest of the mysterious East. Almost with unerring insight Said shows how, caught between knowledge and racism, between colonialism and post-Reformation Western systems of thought, Orientalism voices more about the West than about the East. This book which I consider to be a very significant one, is a fine, sophisticated study of an intellectual phenomenon in which "power and politics play crucial roles in the production of culture and knowledge."

By about the middle of the eighteenth century, India, a part, almost the core part of the 'mysterious' East or Orient, had emerged from the fables and fairy tales, medieval romances and adventure stories of European travellers and merchant-men, stories that were full of truths, half-truths and untruths and were imaginatively more thrilling than romances. The Orient was now being confronted by more than a couple of European Powers with colonial visits and property and the colonial visits are colonial visits and the colonial visits are colonial visits. with colonial visions, ambitions and aspirations which slowly but surely translated themselves, a century or so later, in terms of actual imperial experiences. These visions and experiences comprised Egypt and parts of Africa in the West and all but practically the whole of what is called Asia. Indeed, the eighteenth and it practically the whole of what is called Asia. Indeed, the eighteenth and the nineteenth century witnessed the discovery and control—political, economic, intellectual and cultural—of that part of the contemporary would be intellectual and cultural—of that part of the contemporary world which the "Occident" or the West came to know as the "Orient" or the Transfer of the Contemporary world which the "Occident" or the West came to know as the "Orient" or the East. The leading European Powers that achieved

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

BOOK

this t and I grew of "C regio riolog

these

own. unde. activi tual b socie found notat

the d geogi prima In

be us

again the sa uses quen an in which

indee varies ricall Of to Eu

and F as pe anima ture, and c

and f teenth hence Were

an inc also t Euror but th

lead i Dutch

<sup>\*</sup>Edward W. Said: Orientalism (Pantheon Books, New York, 1978), xi, 368 p., \$ 15.

this unique phenomenon in history were the French, the English, the Dutch and last but not the least, the Americans. It was in this context that there grew up the intellectual quests which are referred to under the blanket term of "Orientology," broken up, for the sake of convenience and following the regional interests of the respective colonial Powers, into Egyptology, Assyriology, Indology, Sinology and the like. Over the decades of two centuries these terms tended to build up respective images and connotations of their own. What these connotations and images are can best be perceived and understood by a study and analysis of the articulated objectives and actual activities of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century scholastic and intellecfual bodies that came to be know all theworld over as "Oriental" or "Asiatic" societies, institutes or academies; the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, founded in 1784 being the oldest of them. But whatever the images and connotations the greatest common determinant and denominator of each of the disciplines mentioned above, is the language or languages of the given geographical area, and since this was so the basic general approach was primarily philological and linguistic.

In common usage when one refers to the Orient or the East one seems to be using nothing more than a geographical term which is counterpoised against another geographical term, namely, the Occident or the West. But the same terms may, in fact, do acquire a different connotation when one uses them in the historical context of the seventeenth and the two subsequent centuries when the Orient or the Wast became, for historical reasons an integral part of European (mainly West-European) consciousness. Terms which were once more or less geographically descriptive, tended to and did indeed become significantly connotative with various meanings in their variegated shades, nuances and suggestions which, one knows, were historically conditioned and determined.

Of the continents of the world, Asia and northern Africa were the nearest to Europe. From the remote days of antiquity this vast area of which Egypt and Ethiopia, India and China were the pivots, was known to the Europeans as peopled by exotic men and women and still more exotic and monstrous animals of fact and fancy, of soft and tender romance and riotous adventure, of breath-taking landscapes warmed by the sun, washed by the rains and cooled by the snow. There was indeed no end to this experience of fact and fiction of antiquity. But to the people of Western Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth century these were all things of a remote past, and hence somewhat unreal. Contemporary Europeans west of the Danube, were products of a mature mercantile age followed steadily but surely by an industrial one. One who knows anything about European history knows also that this was the beginning of the colonial experience of the West-European Powers in north Africa and in India, to begin with, and later all but throughout in Africa and Asia, the French and the British taking the lead in the accumulation and utilization of this experience, followed by the Dutch and the Belgians, the Germans and the Russians, the Spaniards and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

fessor estern terary n\* of nat of more a role nd art rgued attidisco-

alone,

st was

cause

Lite-

eighinters f the aught ation than one, ower

dge." t the ables pean ruths The wers

urely erial s of Isia. very

e to eved

part

the Italians, all but marginally. The Americans followed too, and in a big way, in China, Korea and Japan primarily, but secondarily, to Southeast Asia as well, but at a time when the configuration and lineaments of this experience had already been outlined.

It follows therefore that what is called the "Orient" or the East is not just a geographically descriptive term, but an area of the then known world which lay to the east of Europe and which was the field of altogether a new European experience, namely, a colonial one, of the more dominant Powers of Western Europe, the French and the English, who came eventually to conquer and occupy Egypt and India respectively as their possessions. It was this European colonial experience that discovered, invented and made "real" what we call the "East" or the "Orient." Indeed, this Orient, pregnant with meaning, was the discovery and invention of the French and the English, which other West-European nation-states and the Americans eventually adopted.

If the Orient is not merely a geographic but a significantly connotative term in the historical context of the eighteenth and the two centuries that followed, Orientalism, then, must also have a connotation, no less significant, in the same context. What is this connotation?

The eighteenth and nineteenth century discovery and the slow and steady but eventual conquest of the Orient by West-European Powers helped Europe build up a new material culture. In the process which is well-known to any student of modern European history, the Orient became an integral part of the psyche and consciousness of contemporary Europe, more particularly of the nation-states of Western Europe. It also helped Europe to re-define the Occident and Occidental culture by contrasting its own ideas and institutions, facts and experiences, images and visions, designs and patterns of life etc., with those of the Orient, of course as the collective mind and psyche of Europe perceived, understood and interpreted them. From this point of view Orientalism is but a cultural and ideational mode, or by researched ideas and institutions, facts and experiences, images and visions, designs and patterns of life, beliefs and practices etc. which scholar-ravel.

The first and the most significant meaning of Orientalism is therefore a scholastic and academic one, which is manifest in the aims and objectives as much as in the activities of all such institutions that describe themselves as "Oriental" or "Asiatic" or "Indological," for instance. It matters but little in philology or historical linguistics, in anthropology or sociology, in history or political science of any one or more regions of the East or the Orient, an Orientalist, was indeed the thrust of the entire argument. "Compared with Oriental Studies or Area Studies, it is true that the term Orientalism

and and even

Bu

by it

histo

BOOK

novel show was betwee becausehold or the rity to inter was auther

of th

speak

India

The c

orier not to any co wove spok Ye

compof no teent clearl as a coulc was

alone
in wh
self-in
exotic
schol

ledge emoti a big

VIEWS

theast of this

s not world a new owers lly to sions. d and drient, rench

tative that signi-

ricans

teady elped nown egral partipe to

and mind From e, or

orted and olarun-

fore tives little

tory ient, ed is

ared lism

is less preferred by specialists today, both because it is too vague and general and because it connotes the high-handed executive attitude of nineteenth and early twentieth century European colonialism.... The point is that even if it does not survive as it once did, Orientalism lives on academically through its doctrines and thesis about the Oriental and the Orient...."

But this scholastic and academic meaning of Orientalism does not stand by itself. A close analysis of the writing of European philosophers and historians, economists and political scientists, politicians and statesmen, novelists and administrators of the eighteenth and nineteenth century would show very clearly that there was also a general meaning of Orientalism which was based on a readily accepted and widely believed fundamental distinction between the Orient and the Occident, the latter occupying a superior position because of its superiority in power relationship with the Orient. The European scholar or the scientist, the soldier or the merchant man, the missionary or the administrator was there in the Orient bacause he had earned his authority to be there, and along with this right he had also acquired his right to interpret the Orient and to build up its image as he liked to see it. But it was not merely the superior power relationship that gave him the right and authority to do so. Heir to the rich legacy of the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment, the West European bourgeoisie of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were, intellectually and culturally speaking, in a superior position in the context of the contemporary educated Indian elite of a socially, economically and politically disintegrating India. The comparison was inept, intellectually unfair, but in their flush of power the Europeans did not seem to have perceived it even, while his Indian or Oriental counterpart simply acquiesced in it, even accepted it since he had not built up an alternative image that he could offer to the European. In any case the fact remains that this general meaning of Orientalism got interwoven with the specific academic meaning of the term that I have already spoken of.

Yet there is, I believe, a third meaning of the term, a very subtle and complex one, which is reflected in the writings of French and British authors of novels, histories, travel accounts, diaries, reminiscences, etc. of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. An analysis of such writings reveal very clearly that Orientalism was slowly and steadily developed in Western Europe as a systematic intellectual discipline by which the Occident or the West could know and interpret and control the Orient or the East. Orientalism was not therefore a purely disinterested, objective quest for knowledge alone, but was a product of a mixed, and hence a complex human situation in which intellectual quest, ideational explorations, individual and collective self-interest, quest for political and economic power, hunger and thirst for exotic and romantic experiences, etc., all had their role to play. The European scholar or intellectual who found himself launched in a quest for knowledge of the Orient, could not help being influenced by these ideas and emotions in varying degrees of intensity. That Indian scholars of a later

date, obliged to follow the models and methods evolved by their European predecessors, would inherit or imbibe quite a few of these imperatives, was only in the nature of things.

Seemingly unrelated to the point I am seeking to make is a fact which I would like to mention here somewhat in parenthesis. In 1832 the Asiatic Society of Bengal completed 47 years of its life; it seems somewhat strange that till then there was not even one Indian on the roll of its members, not even men like Raja Rammohun Roy or Raja Radhakanta Deb, both well-versed in more than one Oriental language, vastly learned in Indian religions and sacred lore and in socio-religious texts, in Indian traditions, rituals and practices. One feels curious to know why the Society for its first well-nigh half-a-century remained an exclusively European association as if it were and no Indian felt called upon to join it and get involved in its activities.

The eighteenth and nineteenth century discovery, conquest and demands of administration of the colonies, in our case, of India, called for the acquisition of more and more knowledge of the land and its people through the ages. For effective administration the first thing necessary for the colonial rulers, the army and the merchant-men as much as for the colonial Christian missionary was a close knowledge of the languages of the land, and here while modern languages were indispensable for day-today transactions of business and pleasure the ancient and medieval ones were no less for the acquisition of knowledge of the history and culture of the land and its people, their literature, religion, myths and legends laws and customs, beliefs and practices, ideas and institutions, behavioural patterns, and traditions, etc., indeed for the total funded knowledge and experience of the Indians of the past. All but simultaneously the need was also felt for a gathering of further knowledge on the same items of life and culture as far as possible from actual field study and observation on the spot. Thus was set in motion a long intellectual quest on the part of a small but knowledgeable segment of contemporary European bourgeoisie for more and more knowledge of and above the Orient, in our case, of and about India. For the Europeans, particularly for the French and the English, the Germans and the Dutch it was indeed another age of enlightenment which enabled Europe to know themselves better and from a different personal in the control of t pective and this, in the light of the new knowledge they came to acquired in and about India.

The story of the widening and deepening of Oriental studies in regard to India is a fascinating one. Besides the three disciplines, autonomous and yet at the same time allied, inter-related and inter-dependent, namely, Comparative Philology and Historical Linguistics, Comparative Religion, Myths and Legends and Social and Cultural Anthropology, Indology branched off, with the passage of time and change in ideas, in more than one direction. Late in the nineteenth century attention of European scholars started shifting from purely sacred, scriptural and socio-religious texts to genealogical

accour on pol archite minero simulta mather

BOOK

to whi remain to rela archae Thes

of Pro

I have

sweep (

such b

Beside: Orient: led inv could s of Indi of Indi studies Wester Profe

Ossider century

Decem

my mi

still do

to the s

The late of the countries,

BOOK REVIEWS

opean , was

VIEWS

which siatic range s, not wellituals wells if it

the d for cople y for the es of y-to-

in its

ones lture laws oural and

was and the nall

for and lish, nent

ers-din ard and on;

ths hed on. ing cal

accounts and historical chronicles on the one hand and to technical treatises on political economy, civil and military administration, or arts, and crafts, architecture and icon-making, on astrology, agriculture, metallurgy and minerology etc., that is to the material aspects of life on the other. Almost simultaneously attention was also being drawn to texts on astronomy and mathematics, botany and chemistry, medicine and surgery, that is, to the achievements of Indians in the field of science and technology. But in all such branches of knowledge and experience, texts laid down the boundaries to which an Indologist could travel, and since it was so, Oriental Studies remained language-based throughout. There has not been much of an attempt to relate textual knowledge and experience with the actual realities of archaeology and history.

These are but a few of the responses which were evoked in me by a reading of Professor Said's book. Indeed, I felt that he has said what, in essence, I have been wanting to say for a number of years, but without his wide sweep of perception and scholarship in the area of Western art and literature. Besides what he has covered in the book, his analysis and interpretation of Orientalism lead to a chain of other ideas and themes which still await detailed investigation, analysis and interpretation. Limiting oneself to India one could suggest, for instance, the theme of the all but for-all-times fixed images of India or as a matter of fact, the relative historical and cultural position of India vis-a-vis the East and the West, which two centuries of Oriental studies have generated and reared up in the minds and imagination of the Western and Indian educated elite.

Professor Said's indictment of Orientalism is a revealing critique, to my mind, of the system that obtained for more than two centuries, and still does so in a good measure. I would strongly recommend the volume to the serious notice of all those who want to understand the Orient and the Orient in the eighteenth, nineteenth and first quarter of the twentieth century.

December 1980

NIHARRANJAN RAY\*

The late Professor Ray, Professor Emeritus, was one of the most eminent art historian of the country, a Member of Parliament, the founder Director of the Institute of Advanced and the Chairman of the Indian Council of Historical Research.

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

G.H. Jansen: Militant Islam. Pan Books, London. 1979, 224 p., £1.25.

THIS book is mainly addressed to the Western reader to whom the several different manifestations of "militant Islam" in recent years have given cause for "alarm and despondency." Jansen attributes these Western reactions to the atavistic stereotypes inherited from a hoary past going back to the Arab conquest of Spain, the Crusades and the Ottoman siege of Vienna. He counsels the West that if "it keeps its head and does not allow primitive hatred and fear of Islam to cloud its judgement, there is no real reason why its encounter with militant Islam should be unpleasant."

Why is Islam militant today? Well, it has always been so because it is young (just 1400 years old as compared to Christianity and Buddhism which are much older); because it is rigid (the doors of ijtihad or doctrinal adaptation through reasoning having been closed in the 10th century); and because it has no priesthood (hence no visible targets of criticism on account of "the inevitable and inescapable gap between lofty preaching and worldy practice)." Despite its innate militancy Islam could "very well have relaxed into torpidity" but for the challenges posed by the Christian West to its spiritual, political and cultural existence. Did not the Muslim world, located as it is at the crossroads of three continents, become the prime target of the aggressive thrust of Europe's missionaries, merchants and military adventurers? For over 150 years since Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798), there was scarcely a five-year period without some Muslim area somewhere in Asia or Africa being lost to the Western Powers or when Muslims were not fighting against the encroachment of these Powers. Jansen maintains that the number of Muslims converted to Christianity during this period was negligible, which is true; but he also asserts that "as a rule the struggle against the West was for Islam and by Islam," which is only partly true. The fact is that while Islamic inspiration played the dominant role in the nineteenth century it increasingly yielded ground to nationalism. Moreover, in many countries including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Palestine, secular nationalism proved to be the sole effective antidote to communal strife.

Jansen is all the more unconvincing when he traces the contemporary responses of militant Islam to the Arab defeat in the June 1967 War against Israel and the bifurcation of Pakistan in 1971. The two events are described as "major hammerblows" to the world of Islam. True, the outcome of the 1967 War had a traumatic effect on the Arab mind. But does this hold good for the non-Arab Muslim countries also? Besides, when the Jordanian mercenaries literally massacred thousands of Palestinians in 1970-71 the Muslim world hardly raised its voice. On the contrary, General Zia-ul-Haq, whom the author designates as a "militant Muslim", is known to have been

person in Jor

BOOK

Move First

of mil Asic is mili Islam —whit "more treme

Even A

toward

Hav militar begin range of He dis profess harnes ones in Necent of the l occasion are per worse

momen rule. The barring It is Include

ulema

a very a

e-Islam Khalq label of especial tively o

compris

teform

EVIEWS

25.

om the rs have Vestern g back ege of allow no real

se it is which adapecause f "the pracd into ritual, it is at essive ? For arcely Africa gainst per of which t was while ury it ntries red to

orary.
gainst
ribed
of the
goo'i
nnie,n

the Haq, been

personally involved in the physical liquidation of the Palestinian commandos in Jordan. As for the birth of Bangladesh, the attitude of the Muslim world towards this event was not much different from that of the Indian Khilafat Movement towards the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Caliph during the First World War. Incidentally, in both cases nationalism won. The author also makes a brief reference to the role of "oil money" in fuelling the engine of militant Islam but dismisses it as a "smaller and not so reputable reason."

Aside from the sources of its inspiration and sustenance what exactly is militant Islam up against? We are told that what really offends militant Islam so much is not the "over-arching civilizational challenge of the West"—which at any event "will continue for generations to come"—but the "more penetrating" one of "youth culture" and pop music, "which poses tremendous problems to Islamic society in this post-Beatles age of ours." Even Ayatollah Khomeini's opposition to the West is rooted in his hostility towards the "world-wide culture of pop and jeans."

Having identified the arch foe of Islam the author sets out to show how militant Islam meets this and other challenges of the modern world. To begin with, its responses are far from being uniform because of "the varied range of Muslim countries" which produces a wide variety of Muslim leaders. He distinguishes three types. First, there is the "exploiting" type comprising professional politicians, essentially secular and Westernized, who simply harness Islam to achieve their own un-Islamic political goals. The notorious ones in this category are Jinnah, Ayub Khan and Bhutto of Pakistan and Necemettin Erbakan of the National Salvation Party and Alparslan Turkes of the National Action Party in Turkey. Numeiry of the Sudan, King Hassan II of Morocco and even the Shah of Iran qualify as runners-up for having occasionally indulged in exploiting Islam for political ends. These, then, are people who "give Islam a bad name and give militant Islam an even worse name." The second type consists of religious leaders—the orthodox ulema as well as the unorthodox mystic brotherhoods. Neither have played avery activist or dynamic role in militant Islam. But the ulema are "a strong, silent pressure group" ready to join the battle for Islam at the opportune moment—as they in fact did in Pakistan during the last phase of Bhutto's The mystic orders on the other hand are less prone to political activism. barring notable exceptions such as the Mahdiya in the Sudan.

It is the third type for which Jansen reserves his highest admiration. Included in this category are the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), the Jamaat-Islami (Pakistan), the Masjumi Party (Indonesia) and the Mujahidin-e-Khalq (Iran). Curiously enough, they are all clubbed together under the abel of "modernist reformers." In fact, the word "reform" is an anathema. Invely of the Brotherhood and Maulana Maududi, the founders respectively of the Brotherhood and the Jamaat. What they frankly demand is not comprise "tough, realistic operators who have not shrunk from using the author credits them with "trying the very difficult task of

'rethinking Islam in modern times.'" On what lines? By insisting that politics and religion are parts of the single totality of Islam; by claiming that 'the Koran is our constitution;" by asserting that the party system is fundamentally incompatible with the Islamic spirit; and by declaring that all social inequities will vanish with the abolition of usury and imposition of zakat (alms tax). That there is no explicit basis for these claims in Islamic theory and practice or in common sense, is no concern of these "rethinkers."

Jansen is quite right in saying at the very outset that militant Islam "is really no new thing." It has long been there. What he does not say is that the West had indeed learnt to live with it, even tamed it. For more than a quarter century after the Second World War many in the West had come to view Islam, militant or otherwise, as a dependable ally in their quest for economic gains and political influence in the Third World. But this perception now stands shattered. And the blow has been struck not by Banna's Brotherhood or Maududi's Jamaat but by Khomeini's revolution. The book under review takes only a cursory note of the specific causes and probable effects of this most momentous event in the recent history of Islam.

Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi M.S. AGWANI

ROGER D. SPEED: Strategic Deterrence in the 1980's. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1979, 174 p., \$ 7.95.

NUCLEAR weapons have modified traditional national security perceptions. Effective defence against nuclear attack being virtually impossible, deterrence gains ascendancy. Mutual assured destruction capabilities of the two Super Powers has thus far preserved the central strategic balance. This requires survivability of nuclear forces after a nuclear blitzkrieg, so that residual nuclear weapons remain to annihilate the adversary.

The author postulates that the Soviet Union, having reached a situation of nuclear parity apropos the United States, would proceed to achieve nuclear superiority in the eighties. The Soviet Union may not reach its political objectives thereby in the Third World. But, a Soviet "damage-limiting, first-strike capability against the United States or its overwhelming military superiority in the European theatre coupled with a massive second-strike capability" could neutralize US strategic forces.

Speed contends that the American triad-land-based missiles, long-range bombers and nuclear missile armed submarines are increasingly becoming vulnerable as the accuracy, yield and reliability of Soviet missiles increase. He believes that multiple missile attacks upon individual missile silos could destroy the US I.C.B.M. force on the ground. The United States long-range bomber force could similarly be annihilated by a depressed-trajectory, saturating SLBM attack on strategic airbases. US submarines are also becoming

vulner the pr

aim P

BOOK

force vulner missil-Soviet Beside 6,000be im: Natur deploy of det

only t

of We

Pro

Since invasi He ad Pact of The W Further with F defended

United

conflic option The a tact Germa confed nation highlig Warsa fire po defenc conflic only en defenc Stre system

greater

uncert

Beside

VIEWS

that iming tem is hat all ion of slamic kers." anm "is pat the quarter o view phononic n now erhood

GWANI

review of this

itution

ty perimposbilities alance. rieg, so

tuation nuclear solitical miting, military d-strike

g-range coming ncrease. s could g-range saturacoming vulnerable to Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities, seriously degrading the present invulnerability of the American undersea deterrent.

The author comes up with predictable solutions. He favours a multipleaim point ICBM deployment—akin to the shell game-developing counterforce nuclear weapons, and MX deployment in a mobile mode. Bomber vulnerability could be reduced by establishing additional bases. Cruise missiles should be deployed in land, air, sea and underwater modes to saturate Soviet air defences, and allow penetrability by American long-range bombers. Besides, SSBNs should be deployed under the Arctic ice-cap, equipped with 6,000-mile range Trident-II missiles; submarine communications should be improved by setting up ELF (extremely low frequency) ground stations. Naturally, arms control agreements affecting these weapons systems or deployment modes are reprehensible for: "Treaties concluded for the sake of detente rather than for security are likely in the long run to threaten not only true detente but international peace as well."

Proceeding further, Speed believes it unrealistic that the nuclear defence of West Europe and United States would remain coupled as heretofore. Since nuclear parity obtains, the United States is unlikely to stem a Soviet invasion of West Europe by escalating conflict to stragetic nuclear levels. He advises strengthening of border defences between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to delay and contain a Soviet offensive across the border. The West Europeans are urged to develop their own independent deterrent. Further, linkages should be established between nuclear weapons available with France and United Kingdom, and a political confederation formed to defend West Europe giving limited veto powers to West Germany. The United States is advised to strengthen its conterforce option-limiting nuclear conflict to primarily military targets by developing appropriate weapons options, and, lastly, to ensure the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces.

There is much to cavil at here. The Warsaw Pact may not be deterred by a tactical nuclear defence confined to the European theatre. And West Germany would be destroyed in the process of being saved. A political confederation of Europe is a myth. West Europe's reactions to recent international crises in the monetary, energy, economic and political spheres highlight the inherent parochial approaches of West European nations. Warsaw Pact conventional forces being superior in strength, mobility and defence with the United States, hoping that the threat of strategic nuclear conflict might deter Soviet adventurism in Europe. Speed's thesis would defence.

Strengthening the military option and developing more esoteric weapon systems might serve counterforce strategy objectives; it might also ensure treater survivability of the American triad. But, this would create greater heridanity, instability and difficulties in future arms' control negotiations. herides, every technological advance made by the United States can be

reached by the Soviet Union. The net effect of strengthening military options would be to generate an action-reaction phenomena and inexorably propel the nuclear arms race onwards.

That apart, Speed has written a lucid, persuasive thesis embodying the convictions of an influential body of conservative American opinion. A physicist by training his book optimally moulds technical data to illuminate strategic theory.

Bhopal

P.R. CHARI

KARL BRUNNER, Ed.: The First World and the Third World: Essays on the New International Economic Order. University of Rochester, New York, 1978, 270p., \$ 9.95.

THE New International Economic Order," says Prof H G Johnson, "is neither new, nor international, nor economic, nor an order." This conclusion characterises the point of view of most of the contributors to this collection of essays. Although published in 1978, they have obviously been written during an earlier period and reflect the reactions of the "neoconservative" school of observers to the demand by the developing countries for an NIEO formulated in the early 70s. One could, of course, note that since little significant progress has taken place in the succeeding period, the observations of these authors continue to have interest. Indeed, this school may well have gained in influence in a number of major developed countries due to the results of recent elections.

While one cannot generalise about the differing views and perspectives of half a dozen different authors, by and large, all of them are animated by the same ideological stand-point; M/s Brunner and Bauer, perhaps more so than McCulloch, who demonstrates a greater openness to the factual under-pinnings, behind the demands of the developing countries, and Prof Johnson coming somewhere in between. The well-known article of Moynihan is in a class by itself and merits reading, if for no more than his vituperative wit. No attempt can be made in the space available to try and either sum up, or assess the individual contributions. Some general remarks are, however, in order

There are many levels at which one could approach the task of examining their arguments and conclusions. At one extreme it would, of course, be quite simple to observe that these authors, by and large, are no less guilty of the ideological bias, which they decry in such forthright terms amongst the proponents of the NIEO. This, while true, is not conclusive, for economics does rest on ideological premises. It is, therefore, useful to be clear about these implicit and explicit value premises in appraising the views of any of the authors

By and large, apart from their hostility to what they consider to be the

ideol
autho
order
for co
stand
world
autho

Th

for the

BOOK

based some that a pende apart are al clude from are n only point

like to cours leads discus For ses, w

term t

group

New I

essays

cause

Foreig

AMERIC WILLIA

Car

democr

BOOK REVIEWS

ptions propel

VIEWS

ng the on. A ninate

CHARI

on the York,

hnson,
"This
ors to
riously
"neountries
te that
period,
d, this
eloped

ectives ted by more actual s, and cle of an his y and marks

nining
se, be
guilty
nongst
nomics
about
ny of

be the

ideological slant of the proponents of the NIEO, at the analytical level the authors, by and large, consider that the present international economic order has deserved well of mankind. They, therefore, feel that the demands for change reflect either political motivation or demonstrate lack of understanding of the merits of the present system. This broadly neo-classical world view, of course, can and has been successfully impeached by many authors of other schools.

There is, of course, no question that an important part of the rationale for the NIEO demands is based on ethical, not to say political precepts hased on the idea of human fraternity, and the hope that what is good for some should also be available to the many. But it is important to appreciate that apart from these specifically ethical foundations, there is also an indenendent set of justifications which most of the authors totally ignore. For apart from the demand for change on grounds of equity, the NIEO demands are also based on an objective assessment of the present order, which concludes that it is sub-optimal even from the view-point of those who benefit from it today. To put the point briefly, many, if not all, of the NIEO demands are non-zero sum in nature, so that conceding to them would benefit not only the recipients, but also the donors. Of course, one could legitimately point out that while this may be so in the long run, in the short and medium term there may be substantial differences in gains and losses amongst different groups of countries. Such an objection, however, is not available to those, like the authors, who reject the validity of the very concept itself. It is, of course, this class of criticism which can truly be called constructive since it leads immediately, having accepted the premises of an NIEO, to fruitful discussion of its operational implications over time.

For students in India, who take for granted entirely different value premises, which make the NIEO concept a self-evident one, the present volume of essays may be useful, if not for illumination, to provide thought and to cause them to re-examine the foundations of their own value premises.

New Delhi

A.N. ABHYANKAR

Foreign Policy

AMERICA

William Shawcross: Side-show: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. Fontana Paperbacks, Suffolk, England, 1980, 467 p., £1.95.

SIDE-SHOW is a remarkable study on two counts. It is a direct, compelling story of the tragedy of a nation and a merciless account of how normal processes were subverted in the United States to add up to the

full horrors of the tragedy. The main point Shawcross makes hardly needs reiteration today, that Cambodia was a mere appendage to American objectives in Vietnam. He had the benefit of Nixon's memoirs, but Kissinger's White House Years had not yet appeared. It is a tribute to the thoroughness with which Shawcross has researched his material (using the liberal US Freedom of Information Act) and his ability to marshal the facts that Kissinger was forced to revise the Cambodia chapter of his brilliant, if self-serving, work to answer the charges.

I was a frequent visitor to Cambodia in the happy days of the early sixties when Prince Sihanouk was performing the remarkable feat of keeping his country out of the Vietnam War, then raging with increasing ferocity. To be sure, he was not a democratic ruler in the accepted sense of the word; but though eccentric, his tight-rope walking secured for the country what no one else could have given it—a decade of peace. Sihanouk had to turn a blind eye to North Vietnamese and Vietcong incursions and their use of Cambodian territory for prosecuting the war in South Vietnam. After his overthrow and a depeer American involvement in supporting the Lon Nol regime and bringing the full ferocity of their air power to Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge victory was inevitable although few had then anticipated the fury of doctrinaire communism. The North Vietnamese installation of the Heng Samrin regime was a tragic culmination of events for a tortured country.

Kissinger's defence is that Cambodia was unwilling or unable to defend its neutral status (although he concedes that the first United States raid on Cambodia on 18 March was followed by another strike in April 1969, largely because of Nixon's desire to demonstrate his anger at the shooting down of an unarmed American reconnaissance plane in North Korea), that the original objective in keeping US strikes secret was to avoid *forcing* the North Vietnamese, Prince Sihanouk and the Soviets and the Chinese into public reactions, that Sihanouk did not object, that the Pentagon's "double bookkeeping" on the raids was less sinister than made out to be and that the situation changed dramatically with Sihanouk seeking refuge in Beijing and espousing the communist cause

Kissinger gives a philosophical twist to his defence by suggesting that "...statesmen get no rewards for failing with restraint. Once committed they must prevail. If they are not prepared to prevail, they should not commit their nation's power." Even in Kissinger's own account, not to speak of Shawcross's searing version, the subsidiary role Cambodia played in being chosen for destruction is clear.

Shawcross is most concerned with demonstrating the perfidy of Kissinger and Nixon in the destruction of Cambodia. But in India and the Third World, the account will strike many as a crowning justification for non-alignment by showing what happens to a small country which is forced to align itself with a Super Power, either one. Americans were first obsessed by winning the war in Vietnam and then by leaving Vietnam with as little loss of face

as P tives Pr Beiji

BOOK

to co a sim can a Heng land

New

R.P.

flict,

Mos

by the The alread and into surging the sur

Worl

Was 1

Th

Chin ther victin by C is the regio the quest

Vice Pot's tion to tige in a Vie BOOK REVIEWS

EVIEWS

needs objecinger's ghness ral US Kissinerving,

early eeping rocity. word; what turn a use of ter his on Nol ia, the

ed the

of the

rtured

defend aid on argely down at the North public bookat the ag and g that I they

being
singer
forld,
ment
itself
nning
face

ak of

as possible. Cambodia became a mere plaything for achieving these objectives, which proved unattainable in the end.

Prince Sihanouk, who remains the symbol of Cambodia, told me in Beijing in April 1979, that the Chinese and the Russians wished the fight to continue "till the last Cambodian." In his picturesque way, he was making a simple point, that after the Khmer Rouge genocide, the deaths in the American air strikes and the continuing guerrilla war against the Hanoi-installed Heng Samrin regime, there would be few Cambodians left in their homeland.

New Delhi

S. NIHAL SINGH

R.P. KAUSHIK AND SUSHEELA KAUSHIK: Back to the Front: The Unfinished Story in Vietnam. Orient Longman Ltd., New Delhi, 1979, vi, 120 p., Rs. 35.

A S stated in the Preface, the book under review is an attempt to trace the historical and psychological background of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, its cause and course, and to point out the broad outlines of future trends. Most of the book deals with the history of Vietnam, particularly with its liberation struggle against France and the United States and the role played by the socialist giants—the USSR and China.

The book was written in July 1979 when the Vietnamese forces had already entered Kampuchea but there was still a lot of hope among friends and well-wishers of Kampuchea that the intervention would not turn into occupation and that Vietnam would withdraw its forces after a painless surgical operation to eliminate the cancer of Pol Pot. Vietnam still enjoyed world sympathy.

The conflict between China and Vietnam has its roots in history. It was natural that when Vietnam came into its own, it would refuse to accept Chinese tutulege or become its satellite. It is of academic interest now whether the Vietnamese of Chinese origin, the Hoa people, were the innocent victims of an inevitable tragedy or whether they were invited and exploited by China, or in a pre-emptory bid persecuted by Vietnam. What is natural is that Vietnam would have liked to get rid of them, particularly from the regions adjacent to China and perhaps, for economic reasons as well. But the writers take the Vietnamese line on this as on other controversial questions.

Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea, the increasing pressure on Pol Pot's client state, the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Vietnam and the USSR, China's perception of a fall in its prestige in Southeast Asia, the loss of face in replacement of a Chinese client by a Vietnamese lackey in Kampuchea and the growing convergence of interest

BOO

LAT

in I

as v

the

ratl

wha

Mu

evo

Am

twe

afte

med

trac

of t

grat

may

a fa

awa

and

the

Con

of i

Ene

(SE)

cons

moo

was !

ing ;

differ

tion

earli

In

whice devel able and

E

between the United States and China, all no doubt accelerated the process of polarisation and precipitated the Chinese invasion. But indeed it is another glorious chapter in Vietnamese history to have resisted Chinese invasion successfully without compromising its position in Kampuchea.

The USSR extended verbal support to Vietnam, threatened but never attacked China in order to open a second front. The authors have tried to rationalize this restraint. The fact is that the Super Powers in the nuclear age would always hesitate to involve themselves directly in such regional wars. The United States took advantage of this conflict to strengthen its geo-political position in the region, used China to put a brake on Vietnam's expansion beyond Indo-China as well as stirred fear psychosis among the Southeast Asian states. The ASEAN objective became the neutralisation of Kampuchea but so far this remains unrealized.

In retrospect, the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam appears to be an eipsode in the long history of Sino-Vietnamese conflict with little impact on the contemporary balance of power in the region. Indeed it has not deterred Vietnam from consolidating its primacy in Indo-China. By giving little in subsequent negotiations, Vietnam has earned the grudging respect, of the ASEAN countries. They fear yet admire Vietnam on the whole, look upon it as the sentinal of the region, the bulwark against Chinese thrust. However normalisation of relations with the United States, Japan and Western Europe has been delayed because of Vietnam's tactical proximity to the USSR.

This book has been written from the Vietnamese angle and naturally suffers from the limitation that while Chinese motives have been interpreted negatively, Vietnam and the USSR always receive the benefit of doubt and their policies and actions are projected in a favourable light.

The most interesting part of the book is the admirable delineation of the Vietnamese character steeled in ceaseless conflict, always ready to pay a price in blood, sweat and tears for independence and for the pursuit of national interest. Vietnam in modern parlance is a hard not a soft state, is a strong not a weak state, with a leadership capable of hard decisions ignoring international repercussions or reactions, such as its continued occupation of Kampuchea for which the authors do not have a single critical word. Perhaps it was too early to do it in July 1979.

The book under review, though clearly partisan in approach, brings together a host of historical facts which would serve well any student of Southeast Asia in understanding the Vietnamese mind and evaluating its likely response.

New Delhi

SYED SHAHABUDDIN

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

BOOK REVIEWS

LATIN AMERICA

VASANT KUMAR BAWA: Latin American Integration. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 244p., Rs. 60.

THE basic objectives of Bawa's Latin American Integration, as the author himself claims, are "to take an overview of the Latin American integration movement . . . to analyse. . . the complexity of the integration process in Latin America, and thus enable policy-makers to learn from the success as well as the failures ... and to arrive at tentative findings to help shape the process of integration in developing areas generally." Against these rather too ambitious objectives, the author has gone at length, though somewhat superficially, delineating the integration processes in Latin America. Much of what Bawa has written—as many as six chapters—describing the evolution of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM) is, by and large, confined to the initial twelve years after their inception. No doubt, even during this period and after, neither LAFTA nor CACM proved any success as institutionalised mechanisms for integrating the diverse economies of Latin America. Contradictory ideological stances and disparate levels of economic development of the countries of Latin America have been the major obstacles to the integration efforts. In the process, the movement towards integration, whatever may have been the impulses and compulsions that catalysed them, have been a failure.

Even so, the integration process in Latin America has now moved away from a continent-wide trade integration process to a more meaningful and limited process of economic integration as reflected in the examples of the Andean Common Market (ANCOM), La Plata region, Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), and the Amazon Pact, as well as instances of integration for limited economic objectives, such as Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) and Latin American Economic System (SELA). Whether the fragmented forms of economic integration are the consequences of the failure of the continent-wide integration process is a moot question. In fact, the major objectives of LAFTA at a time when it was launched in the early 1960's and the basic objectives of the newly emerging fragmented and limited efforts such as ANCOM and SELA are very different. Also, the circumstances and the compulsions explaining the evolution of ANCOM and like movements are very different from that of the earlier efforts towards integration.

Instead of devoting more attention importantly to the efforts of integration that the Latin American countries have launched in the decade of 1970's, which in fact are meaningful and are of considerable significance to the developing countries of Asia and Africa, the author has covered at considerable length the earlier desultory free trade movement. In fact, ANCOM and SELA are of tremendous significance to the Third World countries in

ess of other asion

VIEWS

never led to liclear gional en its hant's g the ation

ct on erred the in of the upon Howstern of the

reted and of the ay a

it of tate, sions nued tical

ings at of g its

DÍN

BO

all

the

ou

EU

Ro

in in

We

iro Spa aut

fro

Fo

a r

Eu

it is

as y

Thi

An

rap

Wer

ove

. I

tair

in 1 fica

the

Wh

ther

pres imp

terms of their relations with the industrially advanced countries. Their efforts in the realm of foreign investments, import of advanced technology and management of multinational corporations are greatly relevant to the countries of Asia as well as of Africa which are presently grappling with such problems as foreign investments and advanced technology. The serious lapse of Bawa's otherwise readable book, is in its scanty, in fact, little or no attention whatsoever to the questions of meaningful integration relevant for developing countries of the world.

Most of the statistical tables as well as the bibliographical notations in the book are somewhat dated and the book, in addition, contains a number of typographical and factual errors which could have been carefully eliminated before publishing. Even as a general book on Latin American integration, given that a number of similar books have already been published, Bawa's Latin American Integration breaks no new grounds. Despite these shortcomings, the book should be welcomed as evidence of growing Indian interest in inter-American affairs.

Sri Venkateswara College Delhi University.

V. SHIVKUMAR

NADER ENTESSAR: Political Development in Chile: From Democratic Socialism to Dictatorship. K.P. Bagchi and Co., Calcutta, 1980, vii, 206p., Rs. 45.

Many of the recently published books on Allende's Chile reflect a polarity, primarily based on theoretical predilections and ideological preoccupations of the analysts and consequently, veer away from objectivity. In this respect Nader Entessar's book is no exception. It may however, be said that his treatment of the subject is both systematic and analytical. Entessar treats the socio-political and economic conditions of the pre-Allende period as dependent variables. The independent variables, according to him, are the massive land reforms, nationalisation of monopolies and other progressive measures initiated by the Popular Unity Government of Allende. How these efforts to dismantle the pyramidal economic structures and the dependency situation were frustrated by the United States through economic sanctions, manipulation of copper prices, overt and covert activities of the CIA and other US-based multinationals and above all, thanks to the disunity within the Popular Unity are systematically analysed.

The book abounds with facts and arguments to show how the 1973 tragedy had been deliberately engineered by the internal and external opponents to the progressive regime. A postscript appended to Entessar's dissertation describes the post-Allende Chile experiencing the reverse process of denationalisation and counter-reforms initiated by Pinochet's military junta with its avowed adherence to "authoritarian democracy" (!) The

BOOK REVIEWS

heir logy the

IEWS

ious or no t for

nber fully ican been nds.

MAR

ocia-6p.,

olaprey. In said ntende

her ide. the mic the

973 pota-

dis-

ess ary he author sees little possibility for a right-centre-left alliance as it heppened in the 1930s in Chile when the military government of General Ibenez was ousted.

R. MARIA SALETH

EUROPE

ROBERT HARVEY: Portugal: Birth of a Democracy. Macmillan Co., New Delhi, 1978, viii, 151p., £ 3.95.

THE long-lasting military dictatorships in the Iberian Peninsula and their 1 almost simultaneous disappearance raise certain unusual questions in one's mind. After all, the Portuguese and the Spaniards earned renown in world history as extraordinary adventurers in those times when the other West Europeans were more or less in a state of slumber. But then equally ironical is the fact that in the twentieth century both the Portuguese and the Spaniards suffered for so long under the humiliating and de-humanizing authoritarian dictatorships that the West Europeans nearly exorcized them from their endeavours of raising a trans-national European Community. For political reasons and strategic considerations however, Portugal became a member not only of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but also of various European organizations, such as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the Council of Europe and later on of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Now, of course, it is making efforts to enter into the European Economic Community (EEC) as well.

Out of two Iberian states, Portugal became more accursed in the Third World because of its suppressive and barbaric colonial regimes in Angola and Mozambique. With India itself, Portugal ceased its diplomatic rapport since mid-1950s because of the liberation struggle in Goa; these were restored only after the Socialist Government led by Mario Soares took over in Portugal in 1975.

The story of the revolution master-minded by the young military captains and skilfully carried forward by them to herald an era of democracy in 1974 is indeed fascinating. This was a truly historic change and a significant political transformation. It is altogether a different matter whether the socialists could or could not bring about affective stability in Portugal. What is of basic value to the world in general is that it has got rid of an inhuman authoritarian dictatorship. In a young nascent democratic setting, there has to be the inter-play of forces, sometimes under the over-weaning pressures of the international environment. Yet, it is under the democratic impulse provided by the political parties that Portugal is laying the roots

for political democracy. Indeed, the extremists, both at the Right and Left, have found their designs defeated.

The work under review gives an in-depth detailed study of the coups and the counter-coups by various political forces, invariably influenced by different army factions. The author of Portugal and its Future, General Spinola. the first President of the Portuguese Republic was ousted only a year after the revolution and his place was filled by de Costa Gomes, another military General, who had clearly identified himself with the Portuguese Communists. He too could not hold on for long. Very soon after, General Ramalho Eanes, an apolitical "professional soldier", assumed the Presidency of the Republic. (p. 93) It must be said to the credit of the new Portuguese regime that despite its links with the military, it is oriented towards political democracy, with a penchant for social democracy. And this seems to be in accord with the young Republic's state of political economy, which despite gargantuan efforts, continues to be in a shambles. Whether Portugal would succeed in finding roots in a stabilized political democracy, cannot but be a brave conjecture. However, the new political orientation imparted to it by the political forces is positivist.

In a nut-shell, the present study gives a lucid and absorbing account of how Portugal moved on from dictatorship to democracy. It is indeed a valuable addition to any library on the area.

Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi.

H.S. CHOPRA

CHINA

RAM K. VEPA: Mao's China—A Nation in Transition. Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1979, 220p., Rs. 60.

PR Ram K. Vepa, a senior official of the Government of India visited China in October-November 1978 as a member of the United Nations Group. The book under review is a product of the trip. Vepa has given us his impressions of China and of the great effort at economic reconstruction and building of a new socialist society that the Chinese Communisty Party is carrying on in China. The account is straightforward and very informative indeed.

Those who write on contemporary China in this country usually project either of the two views. One of them consists in very reluctant admission that the Chinese might have made some progress over the last thrity years. A characteristic statement which exponents of this view make is the following "May be, an average Chinese eats better than an average Indian. But apart from that they have achieved precious little of any significance." The point is usually to insist that we have not done worse. The other view is to adopt a "socialist", "progressive" pose and argue how the Chinese have moved

awa of v

BOO

of the first of th

H the t to In are o not 1958 his ' betw one over add does ing t fact did. It and

(pp. Vepa for 'plans now. expe

advo

philo work

with

Jawa New is.

r

3.

0

1

n

d

away from the "correct" Soviet path and therefore suffered. The two points of view are but two sides of the same coin. They reject the Chinese experience as either relevant or meaningful.

Fortunately, Vepa avoids both these positions. Consequently, his account of the "nation in transition" is sympathetic, straightforward and factual. In short, the first two parts of this book are rather useful as a first hand report on contemporary China which is both good reading and also full of useful information and statistics.

However, one encounters quite a few problems when one starts reading the third and the last part of the book in which Vepa discusses the relevance to India of whatever he had observed in China. Interpretation and theory are obviously not his strong points. Had that not been the case he would not have blandly asserted that "what has happened in Mao's China since 1958 owes its inspiration to the teachings of Gandhi." (p. 178) No wonder his "Chinese hosts were surprised." This enthusiasm for establishing links between Mao and Gandhi has taken him at times, to absured lengths. At one place he says: "A revolution is an act of violence by which one class overthrows another." Now, this is obviously not wrong. But he goes on to add "Gandhi accepted the goal but rejected the violence." (p.182) Where does Vepa get it from that Gandhi accepted the goal of one class overthrowing the other? Most Gandhians would be shocked. That apart, the plain fact is that such statements have no basis in anything that Gandhi wrote or did.

It is confusion like this which makes Vepa see the tussle between Mao and his opponents in China as between following "a path similar to that advocated by Gandhi" and wanting "a Soviet style of economic growth," (pp. 185-6), it is difficult to say where such naive absurdity springs from. Vepa gives its best example when he compliments the Government of India for "seeking new solutions that are closer to Sarvodaya than centralised planning and the emphasis on heavy industry that India had followed till now." (p. 212) To describe either the Janata experiment or the Congress experiment later as being closer to Sarvodaya is using terms and concepts with absolutely no regard for their meaning. In short, if Vepa had the philosopher in him under check this could have been a good and significant work.

Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi

G.P. DESHPANDE

IRELAND

J. Bowyer Bell: The Secret Army—The IRA 1916-1979. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, xiv, 481 p., \$ 30.00

As the author states in his Foreword, this is a book about a particular organization, a secret army—and not about Irish political history. Nevertheless, it is a pity that he did not include even a brief account of Britain's sordid record in Ireland—seven centuries of brutal exploitation and the continuous land-grab that motivated successive rulers of Britain; the great Cromwelliam repression; the first Irish Constitution at the end of the 18th century that deprived the Irish of most personal rights; the Great Famine of 1846 that Britain did little to alleviate and the subsequent Irish "diaspora"; the rise of Fenianism and the intense nationalist movement after the start of World War I. Without a knowledge of Ireland's tragic past it would be difficult to understand the phenomenon of the IRA. Few readers, even in England, would be aware of the extreme injustices that had been perpetrated on the Irish people—from which stems the vehemence of IRA terrorism throughout most of this century.

Bowyer's book starts with the intensive conflict (which in Ireland is called "the Anglo-Irish War"), that took place during and after World War I. This ended with the peace agreement of December 1921 and eventually resulted in the Irish Free State (1922)—a sort of dominion status for Ireland. The author carefully records the line-up between those Irish nationalists who accepted this sop and the extremists, the Sinn Fein, the party which declared an Irish Republic. Eamon de Valera was declared the president but he resigned even before he took office and chose to lead the extremists. (It is to be noted that another provision of the agreement with the British which the extremists rejected was that the six countries of the north, the stronghold of the Protestants, were to be excluded from the Irish Free State). The IRA became the central force in Republicanism during the next two decades, declining in importance only during the Second World War and in the 1950s—before spreading out its tentacles to attain its present fame (or notoriety, depending on how you look at it).

From the earliest days of the Free State the IRA had held that the "Republic" was always in existence, and repudiated the authority of any other form of government. Faced with middle-of-the-road liberals it soon took the law in its own hands and large areas in the south and west came under its control. Acts of violence by both sides (and executions, lawful and otherwise); became frequent, with De Valera openly supporting the insurgents.

During the Second World War, the IRA established a link with Berlin "to fight the common British enemy." A certain amount of sabotage work, both in Northern Ireland and in Britain, was carried out and agents exchanged with Germany. However, at no time did the sum total of it amount to much more than mere nuisance value: and by the closing years of the war

the la nution Cou

BOOL

IRA by p grad Arm

In bring been Repu IRA Cath secon Unice and Briting to re-

The Heat down and The situa Ulste from no rophase

with

New

Histo

BANI

 $S^{\scriptscriptstyle \mathrm{U}}$ 

8

the IRA was entering its leanest period. The British were able to liquidate a number of their leaders and for the first time in generations the organisation was badly disrupted—there was no GHQ, no Chief of Staff, no Army Council.

It was the shift of focus to Northern Ireland in the 1950s that revived the IRA; it aimed at ending partition and freeing the six northern counties by physical force. From a small cell the northern IRA organisation was gradually built up till it became the most important branch of the Secret Army.

In Part VI of the book, a recent addition to an older edition, the author brings the story up to date with an account of the "war" in the north that has been waged since 1968, drawing the British Army into the fight. The whole Republican movement became deeply involved in the events in Ulster. The IRA felt that there were two major considerations: the first, to protect the Catholics against sectarian assault and British police injustice; and the second, to co-operate with the civil rights movement in dismantling the Unionist machine. It was in the degree of emphasis and the priorities to be allotted between these two factors that brought about the split in the IRA and the birth of the Provos. Following large-scale guerilla activities and British repressive measures of August 1969, moderates in the IRA decided to recognise de facto that Ireland had two governments. The dissenters withdrew and formed the Provisional Army Council to continue the "war".

The Provos may have for ever remained thin on the ground but for Edward Heath's Conservative government that came to power in 1970. A crackdown was ordered in Ulster. Then followed massive repressive measures and organized, widespread police brutality—just what the Provos needed. The polarisation of the two religious communities was almost total—a situation in which sympathy and support for the Provos increased ten-fold. Ulster became more and more deeply embedded in a continuing insurgency from which, to this day, there has been little respite. There seems to be no room left for political manoeuvres as the author rightly feels, the present phase is still one of continuing violence and attrition.

New Delhi

D.K. PALIT

## INDIA

History of Modern India

BANI BANERJEE: Surendranath Banerjea and the History of Modern India 1848–1925. Metropolitan Book Co., New Delhi, 1979, viii, 256 p., Rs. 80.

SURENDRANATH Banerjea was one of our nation-builders. He lived through the rise of Indian nationalism and exercised a major influence

on its early growth. Before the close of the nineteenth century he had emerged as one of the foremost liberals who dominated the early phase of the Indian national movement. He derived his political philosophy from Western liberalism and shared with his compeers a profound, almost a touching, faith in the British sense of justice and a deep appreciation of the 'benefits' of British rule to India. His ideal for the country was a liberal, democratic polity patterned on Western liberalism. This he strove to achieve gradually by constitutional means under the "benevolent" tutelage of the Raj. He was irrevocably committed to constitutionalism and abhorred violence and revolutionary methods. Throughout his long, eventful political career he strenuously endeavoured to strengthen the foundations of Indian nationalism and fought to secure a respectable place for his countrymen under the Raj. Through his journalistic, organisational and other activities he fostered political awakening and national consciousness among the people and campaigned ceaselessly for the political rights and social privileges denied to them by the British. He openly blamed their misery, privation and political degradation on British rule and spearheaded numerous campaigns and movements for constitutional and political reforms. He was unsparing in his criticism of British policies that perpetuated economic backwardness and brought industrial stagnation in the country. In a nutshell, he played a major role in the history of modern India and made his mark in the annals of the Indian national movement.

Unfortunately, however, the nationalism which Surendranath Banerjea had helped to rear and sustain left him behind and forged ahead under the banner of "nationalists"—a new generation of political activists who emerged at the turn of the century and came to dominate the national movement after the First World War. He failed to move fast enough to catch up with the growing dimensions of a maturing nationalism in a colonial country which could no longer be contained within the shibboleths of the Western liberal creed. He did not seem to have fully grasped the inner dynamics of Indian nationalism which now increasingly exposed the growing contradictions of colonialism and rendered obsolete the kind of political set-up that he had envisaged for the country. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms marked a turning point in his political career. Owing to his deepening differences with the dominant leadership and growing alienation from the mass-oriented phase of the national struggle he left the Congress and became a founder member of the Liberal Federation of India, a refuge of unrepentant liberals. Under the new constitutional scheme he was appointed a minister and was knighted by His Majesty's Government. But all this was a poor substitute for the fall from grace which he suffered when he dissociated himself from the mainstream of national politics.

Surendranath Banerjea nevertheless remains a major force in our national movement by virtue of his manifold sacrifices and selfless devotion to the national cause. Such an eminent personality deserves a truly critical appreciation of his life and work. What, however, has been presented in this

wor anal tatic and the of n doc of n criti to t

BOO

Uni Dell

S. th

the a under nistra apati

admi for t lines hand

The brown culturesul successanot linguilished 25-7.

Re educa publi mani bour S

d

n

e

d

work is a mere catalogue of his political activities without any attempt to analyze and understand them in proper perspective. It is a raw Ph.D. dissertation full of ill-digested stuff completely devoid of balanced judgement, and hence generally to be classed as a panegyric. Apart from its poor content, the book suffers from countless stylistic and grammatical lapses and is full of misprints. What is even more egregious is the system (or lack of it) of documentation followed in it and the undue liberty taken with the spelling of names of well-known national leaders. Far from giving a detailed and critical account of the ideas and contributions of Surendranath Banerjea to the cause of nationalism as claimed in the blurb, the book is, frankly speaking, a measly tribute to an outstanding national leader.

University of Delhi, Delhi

R.L. SHUKLA

S.C. Patra: The Formation of the Province of Orissa: The Success of the First Linguistic Movement in India. Punthi Pustak, Calcutta, 1979, xxv, 292p., Rs. 100.

ORISSA emerged as a province in 1936—the result of an agitation by the Oriyas who feared the loss of their cultural identity on account of the administrative disintegration of Oriya-speaking tracts. The tracts were under the Bengal, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar and Madras administration where the official reaction to the Oriya cultural aspirations was apathetic if not disdainful.

The Oriya Movement established the potency of language as more a culturally unifying force than a politically explosive issue. It caused the administration some embarrassment and a little sense of guilt, but no fear; for the Movement was entirely peaceful, being carried on constitutional lines, fervently appealing to the government, never seeking to force its hands.

The book traces the Oriya feeling, that all the Oriya-speaking tracts be brought under one administration as a vital measure for keeping the Oriya culture alive. The territorial dismemberment of Orissa was as much the result of historical forces (pp. 1–24), as that of administrative measures of successive rulers—the Mughals, Marathas and British. This point and another—the survival of Oriya culture under pressure of other dominant linguistic groups in neighbouring provinces—have been convincingly established by a mass of data—historical, literary, linguistic and statistical. (pp. 25–74)

Renaissance in Orissa had the same character as that elsewhere: expanding education, developing communication links, a strident Press and vociferous public associations. All this fostered the emerging spirit of Oriya unity as manifested in a language agitation in Oriya-speaking tracts of the neighbouring provinces. (pp. 75-117) The new Oriya elite, led by Madhusudan

Das and supported by the Oriya landed gentry launched the Oriya Movement obliging the Government to enquire into the genuineness of the simmering Oriya grievances. The result of the enquiry was the birth of the new Province of Orissa. It was indeed "an achievement of a particular area without support from any all-India organisation." (p. xxi)

Interestingly enough, the Oriya grievances caused common concern and sympathy in two Englishmen, who perhaps had nothing else in common-Curzon and Attlee; both helped in the realisation of the Oriya dream of a

culturally integrated province.

The book is welcome as an excellent reference work, and perhaps only as that; for it is just a compendium of facts and figures with hardly any discussion or analysis of issues. It is a plain, dull-reading narrative of events as set out in the many memoranda submitted by the aggrieved Oriyas and as presented to the Government by enquiry commissions. Even in the conclusion the author makes no remark or observation of his own.

A few statements made by the author call for comment. Do the Oriyas really constitute "one of the major linguistic communities of the Indian sub-continent?" (p. xvi) The author should have provided statistical support to his contention that there were "tales of woes of the scattered Oriyas under other neighbouring peoples" (p. xx); the alleged discrimination against the Oriyas has to be viewed alongside the tardy growth of English education. The remark that "on the British era no English historian wrote anything," (p. xxii) is rather a sweeping one, for the author has himself drawn on the works of English civilians-Stirling, Beames. Hunter and Toynbee—as anyone else would have done for data on the early British administration of Orissa. The author found no "immediate results" produced by Wood's Educational Despatch, dated 1854 (p. 80), but in 1856 the Commissioner of Orissa reported that "there were no less than 2074 schools attended by 15,547 in the Cuttack district, and 839 attended by 8,224 boys in that of Balasore," and so he wanted a "separate agency for the educational development of Orissa." (pp. 80-81) This is again contradicted by his observation that the "progress of education was not satisfactory before the Naanka famine of 1866.... There were few schools and number of students was very small." (p. 85)

A word about the sources. Consultations bear dates, but many a time no number. Some books occur in their abbreviated form in the "References," but not in the bibliography—e.g. Richard Temple, Report, (pp. 23, 24), and A. Basu. (Ed.), Report (p. 62) The records cited give no clue to where to find them. Private papers of Curzon, Hardinge and others have not been con-

There are some excellent maps reproduced from well-known works. But then the price of the book, considering its content and size, is rather high.

Nagpur University, Nagpur.

KANCHANMOY MOJUMDAR

Polit T.S.

My

BOOK

by pe bookstout a Stat the m polici bee'sin My extens combi manus 1975 8

> The basis o as a so and as to exp his cor have b There of cons

Demo

opport which party s there is foreign between scruting Iyeng a Rajaj the Jan

The

and tha the gene Prime N Which, as much EWS

ovesim-

new

ith-

and

n—
of a

as

any

nts

as

the

yas

ian

ort

der

nst

ca-

ote

elf

nd

sh

ed

n-

ols

ys

al

r-

ca

15

0

d

d

1.

Political Institutions

T.S. RAJAGOPAL IYENGAR: Indian Democracy Speaks. University of Mysore, Mysore, 1979, xviii, 445 p., Rs. 40.

THERE have been some books by academics, Indian and foreign, on the functioning of our political institutions. But far fewer are books by persons who have been active in politics. The title of Rajagopal Iyengar's book—with its overtones of approval and authority—makes one expect a stout defence of Indian Democracy by a practitioner, as the author has been a State legislator for long years. The book, however, turns out to be one of the more conventional legalistic evaluations of the Constitution and political policies of the country. It is neither a national bird's-eye view nor a provincial bee's-eye view of Indian politics in practice. Developed out of lectures given in Mysore University for laymen, the book suffers from the dilemma that extension lectures face—how much of explanation and appraisement to combine. Another of the author's problems is that while preparing the manuscript he had to take note of the political events that occured between 1975 and 1977 which involved many cardinal assumptions about Indian Democracy.

The scheme of the book is ambitious. After a discussion of the conceptual basis of democracy, it purports to assess its record as a political arrangement, as a social and economic technique, as an approach to international relations, and as a way of life. The first section manages in some measure to live up to expectations, because of the author's knowledge of law. In support of his conclusions he cites as many as fifty major legal cases, some of which have been benchmark decisions. Students will find this section valuable. There are other portions, such as the discussion of rigidity and flexibility of constitutions (pages 214–215), which have wider usefulness.

The part dealing with economic policies, in contrast, is thin fare. The opportunity to examine in depth the compulsions and constraints under which democratic planning operates (as distinct from planning in one-party systems) has not been availed of. As for the section on foreign policy, there is little effort to explain the democratic element in the conduct of foreign policy. The author has not taken the trouble to unravel the interplay between public opinion, pressures of special interest groups, parliamentary scrutiny and the executive's response.

Iyengar makes no secret of his own political affiliations. Hs is basically a Rajaji-ite and, when he revised the book, he was very much in tune with the Janata philosophy. His attitude towards Jawaharlal Nehru is lukewarm and that towards Indira Gandhi overtly hostile. (It is noteworthy that under the general heading Crisis of Democracy the first sectional heading is "Women Prime Ministers.") His disapproval is directed against the emergency during which, he says caustically, "constitutional amendments were effected with as much ease as amendments were made to the Village Panchayat Act or

the Maternity Act." (page 222)

The following lines from page 82 are a fair indication of the author's view of democracy in India: "The weakness of Indian Democracy is that it runs on the wheels of an illiterate electorate. Pandit Nehru and Mrs. Indira Gandhi ruled the country for over a quarter of a century because the illiterate masses did not cast their vote on the basis of even an elementary grasp of the issues and values involved but were rather swung by charisma, demagoguery and herdpsychology."

While the table of contents sketches out a comprehensive scheme, the treatment is uneven. For example a whole chapter entitled the Vice President of India consists of a single page of 14 lines of text and 7 lines of footnotes.

The author cannot be blamed (but sympathised with) for the patchy index and the disastrous proof-reading. Many universities in our country do not take as much care about their publications as they should.

New Delhi

H.Y. SHARADA PRASAD

G.G. MIRCHANDANI: The People's Verdict: DCM Computer-based Study. Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1980, ix, 194p., Rs. 45.

THE Election Commission takes almost two years after a general election to publish the kind of data which students of Indian elections and politics so avidly want. But it is now possible, by turning to computers for storing and processing large volumes of data, to drastically reduce such a lag-time. Whether and when the Election Commission will move in this direction remains to be seen; others have already made a beginning. I am, of course, referring to the teaming-up of the United News of India (UNI) with DCM Data Products and Press Trust of India (PTI) with International Data Management Pvt. Ltd. (IDM) for covering the elections to the Seventh Lok Sabha held earlier this year. It is for the first time in India that computers have been used for quick processing and instant analyses of election results. Both teams need to be commended for taking the lead in this.

The book under review by G.G. Mirchandani is based on one such effort. The data for it was collected by UNI reporters spread all over the country and processed on DCM's Spectrum/7 Computer. Although the blurb claims that the book provides "in depth" analyses of the Lok Sabha Elections of 1977 and 1980, it does nothing of the sort. Perhaps it is too much to expect this of a book which was published, as the author informs us, "within about a fortnight of the receipt of the last official results."

The book does reflect though Mirchandani's experience and skills as a journalist of long-standing. Well over two-thirds of the text provides what journalists would, I imagine, call a "backgrounder." The first chapter, for instance, describes the conditions and events leading to the dissolution of the Sixth Lok Sabha. The second summarises useful information on rules, regulations and procedures relating to general elections in India. The third

chapte like ch to wri will, to old ne

BOOK

Who chapte 8-11 1 in the effect Party, State contes Birenc (pp. 1 Dhillo more t (p.161)to tho inforn and C tuenci

> based The to Mi other withou Tripu One h nately which of the tables done are the

> For have ( Electi data whate than :

Hindi

Cente Delhi EWS

iew uns dira rate

gothe

lent tes. chy try

SAD

dy.

on nd or 1 a

his of ith ita

th uon

rt. ry ns of ct

at or

d

of of

ut

ne

Center for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.

chapter highlights some of the electoral trends since 1977. Chapters 4-7, like chapter one, are based on "headlines of yesterday." Anyone wishing to write about the 1980 Election will find these chapters a great help; they will, to a large extent, save him the trouble of plodding through piles of old newspapers.

When it comes to data on the 1980 Election one begins to get it only from chapter eight onwards. There is indeed a lot of information in chapters 8-11 but unfortunately not presented systematically. One gets it basically in the form of tantalizing snippets which perhaps can be used with great effect as single bits of information on the cocktail circuit. "The Janata Party." we are informed, "suffered its worst defeat in Sonepat where the State Party Chief, Mukhtiar Singh Malik, emerged third in a 11-cornered contest. The Congress (I) was at its best in Mahendargarh, where... Rao Birendra Singh wrested the seat from Janata by a margin of 91,347 votes." (pp. 144-45) Take another example: "A computer analysis showed that Dhillon polled 44.84 per cent votes in Tarn Taran, which was 3.91 per cent more than the poll of the winning Congress (I) candidate in Bhatinda." (p. 161) Both bits of information are interesting but obviously not of much use to those who want to do serious electoral research. The latter can use such information for systematic research only if they also have data on how Janata and Congress (I) candidates fared, in terms of votes, in the other 9 constituencies in Haryana and 12 in Punjab. Researchers do not want observations based on data but the data itself.

The tabular form of presenting data obviously does not recommend itself to Mirchandani except for chapter eight; there are no tables at all in the other three data-based chapters. But even in chapter eight most tables are without a heading and sometimes incomplete in the information they provide. Tripura and Manipur, for instance, are left out of the table on pp. 120-121. One has to go to the Appendix to find data in a tabular form. But unfortunately there is precious little of it even in the Appendix. Of the 28 tables which appear there only 16 give data which is of some use for an analysis of the 1980 Elections. I say "some use" advisedly, for in all these relevant tables data is presented in the form of aggregates, with aggregation being done in almost all cases at state and the national level. The only exception are the last three tables where data on party performance is given by regions— Hindi belt, North-East and the South.

For the research scholars this is truly disappointing. UNI-DCM would have done them great service and, in the bargain, stolen a march over the Election Commission had they also given in this book constituency-wise data which must have obviously been collected by them. In its absence, whatever appeal the book may have for the general reader it has no more than a marginal value for serious scholars of Indian politics and elections.

BASHIRUDDIN AHMED

J.R. Siwach: Politics of President's Rule in India. Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1979, xvi, 533p., Rs. 80.

THE findings of this well documented study tries to prove that "whoever goes to Lanka becomes a Ravana." The study was undertaken during the 1973--75 period when the author was a Visting Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study, Simla.

President's rule in the States as a result of the failure of constitutional machinery under Article 356 of the Constitution of India is a weapon of great power placed at the disposal of the Union Government by the fathers of the Constitution to discipline the States. This weapon has been used many times by the Union Government ever since the inauguration of the Constitution in 1950. By the end of 1980, during a thirty-year period, President's rule was imposed sixty-five times in all, an unflattering record indeed of a country wedded to democracy under a liberal democratic constitution.

During Nehru's prime ministership, the longest period so far (fourteen years and four months), the Article was invoked only on seven occasions. During Lal Bahadur Sastri's brief tenure of one year and seven months, President's rule was imposed twice. But under Morarji Desai's prime ministership lasting just two years and three months, constitutional emergency was declared in the States fourteen times. During a total period of over twelve years so far of Mrs. Gandhi's prime ministership, President's rule has been imposed thirty-nine times. Charan Singh was Prime Minister only for a little over five months. Yet the Article was invoked as many as four times! There is hardly a state which has escaped President's rule. Meghalaya is the only exception! Orissa leads the table with a record of President's rule seven times closely followed by Punjab and Uttar Pradesh (six times), Kerala and Bihar (five times), West Bengal, Gujarat, Manipur and Pondicherry (four times), Tripura, Rajasthan and Goa (three times), Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh (twice), and the rest once.

The book is divided into 28 chapters under two parts. Part I consists of six chapters which form the author's analysis of different aspects of the failure of the constitutional machinery and what happens after the declaration of President's "rule. Of these, the chapters on "Politics of Suspended Animation" and "Concept of Stable Government and President's Rule" are of special interest since they show the working of the party system in India and how the party in power at the Centre misused its authority to gain political advantage in the States. Chapters 7 to 25 of Part II deal with the different states where President's rule was imposed, one chapter for each state. Chapter 26 deals with the dissolution of nine State Assemblies at one stroke under the Janeta Government and Chapter 27 on Governor's Rule in Jammu and Kashmir. Chapter 28 is the concluding chapter which briefly embodies the author's main findings of the study.

The author's conclusion is that President's rule in various states has been imposed on various "untenable" grounds such as: a stable government is

not p the c activi withc used havin party when conde action (Con writte dismi alone in thi Cong in the would dismi would

BOOK

It is betray know situate many which Cong others than a rela

Centr

admin

one comember members in the offer

proble

If c

of

WS

ver ing ute

nal eat the

in vas try

ns. hs, me

erver nas r a

es! the

nd our na,

of ire of

ial he

ge ere als ta

ir. r's

en is

not possible, the government is misusing its powers; the government has lost the confidence of the people; the government is indulging in secessionist activities; and the Chief Minister has refused to resign when the major partner withdrew support. According to him, "these were some of the false pretexts used by the party in power at the Centre either to dismiss the state ministry having the confidence of the assembly or to prevent the largest opposition party from forming the government either immediately after the election or when a vote of no-confidence was passed against the government." After condomning the action of the Centre in such sweeping terms he justifies the action of the Janata Government in dismissing the nine State Governments (Congress) on moral, legal and constitutional grounds. (This was of course written when the Janata was still in power!) Obviously, according to him the dismissal of state governments by the Centre, ruled by the Congress party alone was morally, legally and constitutionally unjustified every time. And in this type of wholesale condemnation he forgets the fact that it was a Congress government at the Centre which dismissed Congress governments in the States on many occasions. We do not know from the book whether he would have justified the so-called caretaker government of Charan Singh dismissing four state governments in a period of four months. Perhaps he would have justified it, although the whole thesis of the book is against the Centre dismissing any state government, because he appears to be an ardent admirer of Charan Singh.

It is unfortunate that studies of this type while professing objectivity betray the very lack of it. Any student of constitutional government in India knows that politicians as a class have always taken advantage of every possible situation to keep themselves in power. In this process they have indulged in many morally undesirable activities and have taken many political decisions which are indefensible. But this has never been the monopoly of the Congress Party. Because that Party was in power for a longer period than others, both at the Centre and in the States, its record appears to be worse than that of others. But this is only one aspect of the problem and perhaps a relatively less significant one.

If one were to look back and survey the working of state governments, one could see the evil effects of the pernicious practice of defection among members of the legislatures. There was hardly a state where this evil phenomenon did not manifest itself. In Haryana defection reached the most ludicrous limits imaginable. In 1967, in the State Assembly, members crossed and recrossed the floor many times in a single week. It was estimated that within a single year after the General Elections of 1967, there were as many as 448 defections in the legislatures of the country taken as a whole. If many state governments had to be dismissed by the Centre which, fortunately for the country was stable, who is to be blamed more, the Centre or those in power in the states. Siwach's ponderous volume does not probe deep enough and offer a convincing answer to the most vexing constitutional and political problem that confronted this country all these years. He has no constructive

suggestions either. On the whole, a disappointing work.

The real problem is the absence of a high political standard in the country as a whole. There is no political or constitutional morality which is the essential ingredient for the success of democratic government. We must remember that constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated among the people as a whole. Then it will be reflected in the politics of the country and the governments both at the Centre and in the States. The words of Ambedkar thirty-two years ago are still true: "Democracy in India is only a top dressing on an Indian soil which is essentially undemocratic."

University of Cochin, Tripunithura.

M.V. PYLEE

V.K. VARADACHARI: Governor in the Indian Constitution, Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, vii, 171 p., Rs. 50.

THE office of the Governor has been the subject of considerable controversy ever since our Constitution came into being. Till 1966 the post from all appearances looked to be redundant, to be utilized principally as a sinecure for old and decrepit politicians or to put out of mischief's way inconvenient and trobulesome political colleagues. It was only in the post 1966 era that the Governor came into his own when many state governments had political parties other than the one ruling at the Centre. Large scale defections and coalition governments during this period added to the necessity of having experienced and wise Governors as Heads of the States.

Much has been said lately about the role of the Governor in our Constitution but so far I have not seen any authoritative book on the subject. Shri V.K. Varadachari has very ably gone into and analyzed the functioning of a Governor over various facets of his task—as a constitutional head, as a link between the Centre and the State, as an executive head, as one acting in his discretion and as a guide and protector of the services, etc. He has gone into very great details and in the process must have had to do considerable painstaking research and study. One thing that struck me greatly is his objectivity of approach which makes this book very valuable for the students of our Constitution.

Generally speaking the Governor is expected to act on the advice of his Council of Ministers, but in many matters he can and is expected to exercise his discretion. It is noteworthy that whilst the Governor in our Constitution has been given considerable powers of discretion, the president has not been clothed with any such powers. For this one would presumably have to go back to the history of the formation of our Federation. Before the coming into being of the Constitution, there were no states in British India. There were some convenient administrative areas called Provinces and ruled directly

Ger the fede mos ary ratii of the suc! our cour obse Cen Gov beca titut stroi and thou

BOO

by (

in vi
To
it is
W
seem

with

of h called W ever j ing w would the n state follow finds

to sur to bri of the or to lives. adher

gover to have to sav

intere

WS

try

SS-

lti-

ics

es.

cy

le-

EE

b-

sy

ıll

re nt

at

al

ıd

ĸ-

гi

k

by Governors under the control and supervision of the Viceroy and Governor General of India. The Provinces had no autonomous sovereign status. All the powers were centred in the Centre. In normal federations when the federating states come together to form the federation, the states shed most of their sovereign powers in favour of the Centre and retain the residuary powers in their own hands. In the Indian Federation the process of federating was a reverse process, viz., the Centre shed a lot of its powers in favour of the States to clothe them with the authority of a state, and naturally in such circumstances, retain the residuary powers in its own hands. Moreover our Constitution-makers were also influenced by the past history of our country. If one goes through the past history of India one cannot fail to observe that the brightest periods in our long history were those when the Central Government of our country was strong. Whenever the Central Government of India became weak the country invariably fell to pieces and became so weak as to become easy prey to invaders and outsiders. Our Constitution-makers therefore not only deliberately made the Centre in India strong and clothed it with all the residuary powers to enable it to maintain and safeguard the interest of the country against divisive forces, but also thought it fit to clothe the Governor as an independent statutory authority with considerable discretionary and statutory powers, with the same object in view.

To understand correctly the position of the Governor in our Constitution it is important to keep the above backrgound in mind.

Whilst the task of a Governor as a constitutional Head of the State seems to be simple and easy, it is when he is faced with the exercise of his discretion that the greatest caution, patience and wisdom are called for.

Whilst there can be no disagreement with Varadachari's view that whenever possible the Governor should avoid assuming the responsibility for deciding whether a government in office has lost its majority or not and that it would be safer and more appropriate to get the assembly to give its verdict in the matter, yet there may be occasions when in the overall interests of the state and the constitutional proprieties this may not be the best course to follow. For example, what should be the duty of the Governor when he finds that the Chief Minister is deliberately delaying his advise to the Governor to summon the assembly, in order to gain time to utilise the interim period to bring to bear extra constitutional and coercive pressures on the members of the opposition, either to terrorise them not to vote against the Government or to absent themselves from the assembly when summoned for fear of their lives. Should the Governor allow things to drift to such a situation or in adherence to his oath of office as the protector of the Constitution and the interests of the people placed in his charge, proceed to act and dismiss the government of the recalcitrant Chief Minister? At present he would appear to have no option but to act on his own, in these circumstances. Therefore to save him from such a predicament it would appear to be advisable to

enable him to summon the assembly himself, under certain specified circumstances, without the obligation of doing so only on the advice of the Council of his Ministers.

During the period a state is under the President's rule, there is no elected government and the Governor as the President's representative governs the state directly. He is in fact the Governor and the Council of Ministers rolled into one during this period. With the elected government of the state out of office the burden of what the elected government would have done to safeguard the interests of the state and its people falls on the Governor during the period of President's rule. What is his duty in such a situation? If he feels that the Centre is treating the state unjustly should he protest and resist, as the elected government would have done, or should he keep quiet and allow the Centre to get away with the injustice? I wish Varadachari would have thrown some light on this aspect of the Governor's duties.

Another matter which seems to have escaped the author's attention is the qualifications of the persons to be appointed as Governors. If the office of the Governor has come into some disrepute it is mainly because of the casual manner in which successive governments at the Centre have advised the President to appint Governors. To enable a Governor to discharge his multifarious duties, constitutional, discretionary and executive, he should be completely fit both in body and mind, should possess considerable experience of men and matters, should have inexhaustible patience and possess considerable tact, wisdom and integrity. Times have gone when any old and decrepit person could be appointed a Governor. Today only those who possess the qualities enumerated above can do justice to the job. Only such people can inspire confidence in the people entrusted to their charge, can be objective and fearless in their approach to problems and situations, and if need be even stand up to the Centre to safeguard and protect the interests of the Constitution and the State and the people entrusted to their charge.

New Delhi

DHARMA VIRA

SHRIRAM MAHESHWARI: State Governments in India. Macmillan, New Delhi, 1979, xi, 328p., Rs. 58.

To one will disagree with the author's observation that the central government receives the major attention of scholars who write on the Indian government system and the state government is either conveniently skipped over or gets scant notice. The present work is the outcome of the author's attempt to fill this gap, and he has done it admirably well.

The book is divided into 19 chapters, dealing with various parts of the machinery of government in the states and union territories. The introductory chapter rightly emphasizes the importance of the states in our governmental system. It is followed by a compact historical account of the evolution of the

ano are stat ceri acti stuc the imp

P

The

· BOO

stat

Min

whe

clai

to it disc or p in th cou of ig ferri serio the 1 tion. also unio estic of th quei cial state tive

TI loca endi Incic Whic To

of 30 on h tials the n chap

· BOOK REVIEWS

ile

f

f

e

d

467

states since early British times. The roles of the Governor, the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, the executive departments, the Board of Revenue where it exists, are then brought out. Divisional and district administration claim two separate chapters. Union territories likewise, form the subject of another chapter. The organisation of the services and the vigilance machinery are then dealt with followed by a review of administrative reforms in the states. But these are not mere descriptive accounts of the structures concerned and their functions. The author also provides an evaluation of their actual working by bringing to bear on them his mature judgement and deep study of constitutional and political proprieties. Thus the wide gap between the accepted recommendations of the various reforms committees and their implementation by the governments concerned is very well brought out.

Perhaps the best chapter in the book is the one dealing with regionalism. The present turmoil in the North-eastern states lends topical importance to it. The author's reasoned conclusion that "it is highly necessary that we discard, once for all, the notion of regionalism as being somewhat unpatriotic or posing a threat to national integrity," deserves to be widely appreciated in the perspective of various national pluralities. His plea for a balanced course of action in building up regional institutions in place of the extremes of ignoring regional differences and aspirations on the one hand, and conferring statehood on each and every vocal region on the other, is worthy of serious consideration. Similary on Centre-State relations he has emphasized the need to treat the states with the respect due to them under the Constitution, especially in the Centre's exercise of the powers under Article 356. He also draws attention to the present disparity in the financial powers of the union and the states, having a crippling effect on the latter. Whether his suggestion to write off the huge debt of the states to the centre is feasible in view of the heavy burden of servicing the national debt which the Central Exchequer has to bear may be a debatable issue. But the need to improve the financial position of the states is certainly important in the present unsatisfactory state of Centre-State relations. In this context the plea he makes for the effective use of Article 263 is unexceptionable.

The book is brought to a close by setting out the variety and problems of local government institutions, both rural and urban, in the states. The appendix lists the districts in India with their respective areas and population. Incidentally, the list under Maharashtra (p. 31) begins with Rajanandgaon which should have figured under the preceding state.

To bring so may different aspects of state government within the compass of 300 odd pages is no mean achievement. The author must be complimented on his skill in thus compressing his material without losing sight of the essentials or presenting a disjointed discourse. It should not be a detraction from the merit of the book if one suggests that, for completeness of treatment, a chapter on the state legislatures in so far as they (and their committees) have

a bearing on policy-making and public administration—on which the book is focused—should have found a place in it.

Pune

468

S.V. KOGEKAR

Planning

P.B. DESAI: Planning in India—1951-78. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, 194p., Rs. 60.

M.L. Gujral: Economic Failures of Nehru and Indira Gandhi: A Study of Three Decades of Deprivation and Disillusionment. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xvi, 255p., Rs. 75.

THE two books under review purport to provide factual information regarding the process of economic development that has taken place in post-Independence India. It cannot be said in honesty that the purposes have been well achieved. The books however achieve a different purpose: that books produced with such superior quality of print, paper binding etc., and sold for prices as high as Rs. 60 and Rs. 75 can be so poor in content is a thought provoking reflection on the state of the publication industry in the country. The two books have not only their publisher and their poor standard in common; one more thing that they share is that they were both conceived and produced during the brief period of Janata euphoria. This brief period produced many bad harvests including a bad harvest of political economic literature. These two books belong to that motley collection of books written in haste, produced in haste and sold in haste to cash in on the euphoria. A second point that is common to them is a vague commitment to some woolly conceptions of Gandhian economics.

P.B. Desai's book on planning is not as bad as that of Gujral's. It attempts to provide "a connected chronological view of the course of development since independence;" according to the author himself his "comments in the text of this narration have been limited to an unavoidable minimum." This has meant the narration to be uncritical and non-analytical. Even as a non-analytic chronological narration of facts the book could have been useful if it had paid some attention to the sequence of changes in the economic policies pursued by the government. A student of the Indian economy who would like to test certain hypotheses regarding the class character of the State and the changes brought about in it by changes in alignments of classes would have been helped by such a historical documentation. To the best of the reviewer's knowledge, no such documentation of the evolution of economic policies along with their political economic contexts has been made by anybody. The author says in the Preface that what he has to say by way of comments is put together in the last chapter. However, in that chapter one

rep no inv tio

Na

ref

BO

fin

exe flo ob crilite of des self dar far nor resu

the cult on par all t

not

bre

spa

self call fails Gar ther econbe a that

patl iş n proc can

to s

fact

cou

finds not so much any considered views of the author himself but rather a reproduction of the views of a miscellaneous collection of well-known and not so well-known authors. The statistical tables relating to production, investment etc., are all taken from standard official publications, a compilation the likes of which are available in the country in plenty.

The writer of the second book, M.L. Gujral, is introduced by Jayaprakash Narayan as a "gifted writer." However, this gift does not in any way get reflected in the book under review. The author, unlike P.B. Desai, does not exercise any restraint over his views. The book is nothing but a continuous flow of comments, incorporating vague, woolly, shapeless, phony, unconnected ideas, all passing in the name of Gandhian economics. The author is obviously not a professional economist. Far from that being a matter of criticism, that could have been a point of advantage, given the state of the literature of economics. The author is entirely right about the "irrelevance of orthodox economics and economic education." And one does enjoy his description of the discipline of economics as one "conceived by thugs and self-seekers in their own self-interest." However the author does himself damage by mixing up his layman's observations, like the one above, with far too many quotations from and references to the same professional economists, thus exposing his lamentable ignorance of the subject. The same result is obtained by his mentioning several minor economists in the same breath as some of the profoundest thinkers on the subject (sometimes misspelt, like "Paulo" Sraffa!) The book lacks an integrated structure. Some of the chapters bear on certain sectors like education, health, population, agriculture, industry etc. Thrown in between are pseudo-theoretical discourses on neo-classical economics, development economics, Gandhian economics, paradigms and excursions in the history of socialism and planning. All in all the book is written in the style and standard of vulgar journalism.

The capacity for doing mischief and damage by such books is however not to be underestimated. A whole lot of nonsense is being propagated by self proclaimed "Gandhian economists." It requires to be stated categorically that there is not the slightest bit of substance in the argument that the failures of economic development in India arise because of a departure from Gandhian economics. Failures in the country's economic development are there for all to see. The causes for the failures also lie in pursuing wrong economic policies. These failures and these wrong policies do require to be analyzed, exposed and changed. It can however be confidently asserted that the fault of these policies do not lie with not following the Gandhian. path. It was simply not possible to follow Gandhian economics because there is no such economics. There is no coherent body of ideas regarding the process of development which could be ascribed to Gandhi. Industries simply cannot be done without. Small scale industries require large-scale industries to sustain them. Gandhi's own favourite sewing machine would call for steel, factories and factories to make machinery. It is simply not ture that one could produce "cloth, shoes, hair oils, combs, tooth brushes, tooth pastes,

mirrors, glass or plastic ware" in self-sufficient villages. Despite the charge that Nehru abandoned village industries, the fact is that he has made the nation pay heavily to subsidize a whole range of non-viable village industries as a token of his loyality to Gandhi. The ironic denouement of this cult of village industries is embodied in the glittering show-cases and the stylish salesgirls decorating the cottage industries emporia which have done little good to the villages while catering exclusively to the urban rich and foreign tourists. Finally, a nail has to be driven hard into the lie of agriculture having been neglected to benefit industries. Any serious intersectoral analysis will show that all along the course of development of post-Independence India, agriculture has been heavily subsidized by the State with the help of resources either mobilized from the non-agricultural sector or received from other countries.

Viswa Bharati, Santiniketan. ASHOK RUDRA

SURAJ B. GUPTA: Monetary Planning for India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979, xi, 240 p., Rs. 75.

ORD Robbins, the well-known British economist, relates in his book entitled *Political Economy: Past and Present*, the story of a senior offical of the British Treasury, who was expounding fiscal policy at an important meeting in the mid-forties of this century and thought, in his ignorance, that the appropriate use of the bank rate was to put it down, when prices were going up and to increase it, when prices were going down. There has been a considerable change since then in all countries, including India, and a growing awareness of the various issues in monetary policy, accompained by a great deal of concern about the debasement of currencies and the persistence of inflation. Even in India, the literature on monetary economics is already voluminous; and books and articles are being added every day. The relevance or utility of monetary theory, from the point of view of those who are required to take decisions, continues however, to be limited.

Prof. Suraj Gupta has tried to remedy this defect by writing a book not on abstract theory or economic or econometric models, but on practical issues with which the Reserve Bank of India and the Central Government are concerned. His objective is clear and lucidly stated in the opening pages. He distinguishes monetary policy, which deals with aggregates, from credit policy, which relates to sectoral allocations and the end use of money: After having analyzed the causes and consequences of inflation, he assigns a neutral role to monetary policy. This is justified, partly because there are dangers in the excessive creation of money, in the belief that a mild inflation may provide a continuing stimulus for growth, but partly also because the creation of excess money supply serves no real purpose and the excess is merely spent

in d real G

BOO

police med unit; affect thus long as to

the l Ha whice whice rather will level. the strin Go of Go mental ance, Reser

Ope condu ment's develor take t plus f should and sh The m in treat ensure

to tin

As f should banks money ance for quotas should statuto

of H w

WS

ge

he

es

of

S-

bd

S.

n

W

i-

es

er

in driving prices upwards all along the line, without affecting the demand for real money as a proportion of real income.

Gupta is a Monetarist and not a Keynesian; he prescribes for India a policy on the lines suggested by Friedman. The demand for money is assumed to be stable. The income elasticity of this demand is presumed to be unity. The rate of interest on non-monetary assets is not important as affecting the demand for real money balance. There is hardly any scope left for the further monetisation of the Indian economy. Real income is thus statistically the only significant determinant of real money; and the long-term trend rate of money supply should, therefore, be so regulated as to leave the price level unchanged, while the economy operates at or near the level of the maximum possible output.

Having defined the objective, Gupta goes on to describe the manner in which it can be achieved. His main thesis is that high-powered money (H), which on being multiplied by the money multiplier leads to money supply, rather than the money supply itself, will have to be controlled. All policies will have to be adjusted or oriented towards maintaining H at the desirable level. For this purpose, deficit financing by the government, defined as the sum total of the Reserve Bank's credit to government plus the increase in Government currency, plus any net sales of old or previous year's issues of Government securities to the public, minus net purchases of such Government securities from the public and minus also that portion of the deficit-finance, which is met from the increase in the non-monetary liabilities of the Reserve Bank, will have to be carefully watched and regulated from time to time.

Open market operations by the Reserve Bank of India would have to be conducted, so as to offset the creation of high-powered money (H) by government's deficit financing. The market for treasury bills in India should be developed by creating a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of India to undertake this promotional role. This subsidiary would be expected to tap surplus funds belonging to companies, firms and others. The Reserve Bank should cease to deal in treasury bills as the agent of the Central Government and should not also discount treasury bills except for this new subsidiary. The mopping up of funds through treasury bills and open market operations in treasury bills, if necessary, supplementing those in dated securities, will ensure that notwithstanding deficit-financing by government, the creation of H will be restricted to the desired level.

As far as banks are concerned, Gupta suggests that the Reserve Bank should be free to increase the impounded reserve ratio of the commercial banks to any figure which may be necessary to offset the increase in H money beyond the safe or desirable limit. The special or discretionary refinance for commercial banks should be completely given up; and the basic quotas for borrowing by the commercial banks from the Reserve Bank should be reserved only for meeting unforeseen and temporary needs. The statutory liquidity ratio, which the banks are required to maintain, should be

BOOK

converted into a statutory ratio for investment in Government securites; and this in turn should be raised as much and as often as may be necessary to offset any increase or threatened increase in H.

Lastly, the development banks like the IDBI and the ARDC must be compelled to raise genuine resources in the market and to improve their working, so as to generate more funds internally, instead of drawing from the Reserve Bank of India, or tap funds, which at one further remove become transformed into H-money.

There is some logical consistency and tidiness in the methods suggested for controlling high powered money (H). But the value of the suggestions is very greatly reduced by a lack of appreciation, firstly, of the side effects and economic and social consequences of the suggested prescriptions and secondly, of the limitations within which the Reserve Bank has to work.

There are two attitudes towards money and monetary policy. One is to regard money as a sacred trust and as something, which is independent of human aspirations and efforts, to be respected merely because it is money. Governments controlling the use of money must be accountable according to this view for the consequences of their policies; and individuals should be free to escape from paternalism and restrictive authority, exercised through controlling the money supply. The alternative view is to regard money not as significant by itself, but merely as reflecting the desires and actions of human beings, in societies which can accept certain goals, results and adjustments, but not others. Governments and Central Banks have to act and cannot be mere idle spectators. As everything is uncertain, their guesses may be as good as any one else's; and they will have to be allowed to exercise their judgement. Professor Herbert Frankel of Oxford has written an entire book on these two rival philosophies.

Gupta seems to be inclined to accept the first rather than the second of these two rival approaches. It is not surprising, therefore, that he elevates neutral monetary policy to the status of a gospel and a dogma, regardless of the effects of following that policy, such as arrested development, human suffering as a result of steep doses of deflation, difficulties which may be created for industries, the abandonment of all attempts to provide for the needs of the neglected and backward sections of society and the consequences, from the point of view of the profitability of the banks, of reducing the total volume of their working funds below the level at which they may be able to earn some profits.

At a more mundane level, in criticizing the Reserve Bank of India, Gupta seems also to have been less than charitable. He appears to have ignored some relevant facts; on page 106, the theory of open market operations is correctly stated, but it is not clear why the net sale of securities by the Reserve Bank has been included as one of the component items in the definition of H--deficit finance on page 75. Equally, it is not clear why the expansionary effects of the purchase of securities by the Reserve Bank, leading to an additional reserve base of H money, for banks to expand the money supply,

have in th mark its of curre sayin as no It ha and i it is n is trea notice on wl posit that t devel there activi its his which growi they . stand Gove

> Mo cribin work Reser occasi more fied a avoid

institu

This In the as dan they a and or

Banki Madr BOOK REVIEWS 473

VS

S;

ry

n-

ve

S-

ed

is

ld

nd

to

of

у.

to

e gh

ot

u-

t-

ıd es

se

re

of

es

of

n

e

le

e

of

h

d

have been ignored. It is not true that considerations of debt management in the interests of the Government, have dominated the Reserve Bank's open market policies. The Bank has tried in fact to ensure that the net result of its open market policies, including transactions in "old" and not merely current or recently issued securities, will be neutral; and it has gone on record, saying this quite clearly. It is not also necessary for the Bank to provide. as now suggested, for an efficient arrangement for the quick transfer of funds. It has been offering this facility at subsidised rates for about forty years; and it incurs a great deal of expenditure in doing so. As another example, it is no longer correct to say that the portion of a savings bank deposit, which is treated as a demand deposit, is the amount, which is withdrawable without notice (a different formula, namely, that the excess over the average amount on which interest has been paid in the past should be treated as a demand deposit was introduced, with effect from 16 August 1978). It is true again that the treasury bill market in India is thin and artificial. But if it has not developed, this is not because the Reserve Bank has been indifferent. In fact, there is hardly any suggestion regarding any promotional or development activity which the Bank has not explored at some time or the other in its history. It is true that there are surplus floating funds. In a country, in which there is a parallel black market, which is already very large and is also growing every year, it will be idle to deny the existence of such funds. But they are not available to the treasury bill market, which, as matters now stand, provides an outlet mainly for the surplus unspent funds of the State Governments, foreign quasi-government banks, other banks and a few other institutions. There is no reason for thinking that a new institution is going to succeed, where the Reserve Bank has failed.

Monetary problems and issues are complex and often baffling. In prescribing or criticising any policies, the environment and institutional framework within which they are to operate cannot in any case by ignored. The Reserve Bank of India provides plenty of information in its monthly bulletin, occasional papers and annual reports. If they had been consulted a little more carefully, some criticism, which seems to have been based on unverified assumptions and statements, and a few minor errors could have been avoided.

This does not however detract on the whole from the merits of this book. In the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, soft options are as dangerous as a rigid theology or an uncompromising attitude. Perhaps, they are even more dangerous. In drawing the attention of the authorities and others to this, Gupta has done some service.

Banking Service Recruitment Board, Madras.

R.K. SESHADRI

K.S. SASTRY: Performance Budgeting for Planned Development. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1979, xv, 220p., Rs. 50.

In a developing country, such as India, the need to develop and utilise scarce available resources within a planned framework to achieve pre-set goals of development is obvious and generally accepted. Further, in our situation, it is recognised that the State has, of necessity, to assume the primary responsibility for economic development, and that too, largely, through public expenditure programmes. At the same time, it is important that the techniques and models employed in framing the Plan match the socioeconomic culture and environment and that its implementation is effective. Achievements have to be measured against the targets set and the assumptions made at the time a project or programme was approved for being financed out of public funds. This is possible through careful "Performance Budgeting" where the emphasis is on explicit specification of objectives, detailed analysis of programmes including their time schedule and an obligatory evaluation of their success.

K.S. Sastry's book Performance Budgeting for Planned Development, is a useful addition to the reference literature on the subject. The author has drawn on his rich and varied experience of budgeting, accounting and audit of public expenditure in writing this book. "The theme of the book is that efficiency in budgeting is a question not of mere magnitudes of resources and outlays but of defining the objectives and priorities and that, at any given level of resources, efficiency can be improved through a more explicit definition of goals and objectives, through greater clarity and consistency in ordering the priorities, through a thorough-going analysis of the end benefits of programmes, and indeed through proper management of programmes, attending to the nuts and bolts as it were." The author has pointed out that performance budgeting is not a mere catalogue of physical targets and achievements and has to be viewed as a total management system defining targets in the different sectors reflecting governments' order of priorities in terms of their declared political goals, providing for allocation of scarce resources to achieve such targets, monitoring progress of implementation from time to time and appraising performance in terms of norms pre-set and easily understood.

The book describes the different stages of performance budgeting. The selection of "objectives" has been discussed in two chapters, with appropriate illustrations. The difficulties faced in the quantification of objectives and in relating them to the long term goals of government policies have been listed. There are two chapters on "Analysis" where the various criteria presently, adopted for the selection of programmes/projects to be financed out of public funds, namely, cost benefit analysis, discounting techniques, internal rate of return, return on investment etc., are cirtically examined. The author has suggested a criterion which he calls "value added to capital employed" (VACE), for the selection and evaluation of public investment

program gramm apital agency revenue It has be ready a facilitate planned costs of the act of the view of

BOOK I

The ne based of tion of require tion of should

propos

The cussed. criteria phasise of publ audit c interna ral's or efficient

The of geting a Accordannual demand than a Implemation, in the o

The a sentation procedu cerned geting c BOOK REVIEWS

WS

ant

lise

-set

our

the

ely,

ant

cio-

ive.

np-

fin-

nce

ves, bli-

, is has

idit

hat

and

ven

ini-

Or-

fits

ies,

hat

nie-

gets

ms

ces

me

sily

The

ro-

ves

een

ria

ced

ies,

ed.

tal

ent

475

programmes. He is of the view that in the case of public investment programmes, it is appropriate to compare the value added with the aggregate apital employed and not merely the capital invested by the sponsoring igency. The relevance of this ratio in the analysis and evaluation both of revenue programmes and capital projects has been discussed at some length. It has been argued that the VACE criterion is a simple one, which admits of ready application even by the lower echelons of public adminstration thus facilitating decentralised decision-making, planning and speedy execution of planned schemes. The possibility of discounting the flow of benefits and costs over a time period and use of shadow prices for foreign exchange in the actual application of the ratio have also been discussed. The author is of the view that the use of the VACE will help in taking a community-wide view of costs and benefits. With regard to continuing programmes it has been proposed that "Zero base budgeting" could be adopted.

There are useful chapters on classification, organisation and evaluation. The new classification now adopted for the Plan and the Budget, which is based on the purpose of expenditure, was introduced on the recommendation of an expert team with which the author was closely associated. The role of organisation and the importance of its being tailored to subserve the requirements of the objectives have been highlighted. The need for delegation of financial and other powers based on the principle that authority should match responsibility has been stressed.

The different criteria generally made use of in evaluation have been discussed. For meaningful evaluation, the need to keep in focus the norms and criteria by which the project was initially judged and cleared has been emphasised. Discussing the importance of efficiency-cum-performance audit of public expenditure, the author suggests that the responsibility for regular audit check of individual transactions should progressively devolve on the internal accounting organisation leaving the Comptroller and Auditor General's organisation to devote its attention to a review of performance and efficiency.

The Government of India have accepted the need for performance budgeting and decided that it should be adopted by all the Economic Ministries. Accordingly, most of the economic ministries have been presenting their annual Performance Budget to Parliament before the discussion on their demands for grants. However, at present these documents are little more than a collection of data on financial expenditure and physical targets. Implementation of meaningful performance budgeting, as envisaged by the author, would require several steps to be taken and these have been detailed in the concluding chapter of the book.

The author has largely succeeded in his effort to be objective in his presentation without at the same time being too critical of existing practices and procedures. The book will enable civil servants and managers who are concerned with economic administration to understand the problems of budgeting of public expenditure in the proper perspective. The language of the

book is simple and direct. The presentation is precise and lucid. It is handy and well got up. One cannot however, wholly agree with all the comments and suggestions of the author. The merits of VACE as a better evaluation tool remains to be tested in actual practice. There are some typographical errors which will have to be corrected in the subsequent editions.

New Delhi.

R.V. SUBRAHMANIAN

Economic Development and Social Change

C.H. HANGMANTHA RAO and P.C. JOSHI, Eds: Reflections on Economic Development and Social Change: Essays in Honour of V.K.R.V. RAO. Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xiv, 486 p., Rs. 100.

THIS book brings together 26 essays by economists and social scientists (five of them foreign), in honour of Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao who in a career spanning over forty years has distinguished himself as an economist, educationist, parliamentarian, administrator and institution-builder. The essays are grouped in five parts, namely, rethinking on development, economic structure and policy, the demographic dimension, development as a social process, and perspectives in social sciences. As Hanumantha Rao has remarked in his foreword, "the fact that the contributors belong to many disciplines is an indication of the position enjoyed by Dr. Rao not only in economics but in social sciences as a whole." The last part of the book lists Dr. Rao's writings which give some idea of his prodigious output and versatility of mind.

In the opening essay, A.K. Das Gupta writes on the limitations of economic theory and draws attention to how the euphoria of the Keynesian analysis is all but gone. Hayek was one of the earliest to point out the weakness of the analysis forty years ago, while Hicks systematically exposed it in 1974 with reference to scarcity and choice in the contemporary free market economy which does not look upon socially planned investment as inconsistent with a free market. Das Gupta warns that "supercession of the principle of scarcity in India's planned investment in the past 20-25 years has brought trouble to the economy." Jan Tinbergen examines in econometric terms the doomsday forebodings of the Club of Rome and their like, and concludes that there is no need to fear slow growth rates in advanced countries if it became inevitable owing to physical and biological constraints. He advocates in fact their going slow on their growth, but only upto the point that does not hurt developing countries. The difficulty about this thesis, however, is that the "hurt point" varies widely among developing countries.

In a dozen pages, H.W. Singer brings out lucidly how the "trickle down" model, followed by most Third World countries for their development in

the pa of dev of the daya s much GNP taggreg

BOOK

Thei hamoy P.R. B attentic plannin relevan and inf are sor develop Keynes few wo Sraffa, ful for ing in one sho market the san equilibi "their u of agra ing a gr

colinate Col

nataka s sengago

the past 20-25 years, has failed to trickle down to the last man, and the fruits of development, such as they are, have been unduly tapped at various points of the pipeline by socially powerful intermediate classes. Our own Antyodaya scheme is a belated recognition of this fact. The ILO has also done much in recent years to shift some emphasis of growth, but not all, from GNP to employment. The employment emphasis paves the way for a less aggregated and dispersed view of planning.

There are two essays specifically on Keynesian economics, one by Sukhamoy Chakravarty and another by K.N. Raj, and a mathematical one by P.R. Brahmananda which also touches on Keynesianism. Chakravarty draws attention to a problem that is assuming more importance in development planning, viz., distribution of incomes, and concludes that Keynes is still relevant to developing economies for planning their investment judiciously and influencing their consumption. This is the same as a saying that there are some economic phenomena that are unrelated to stages of economic development (that is, unrelated to economic time and place), and to see in Keynesianism an immanence and universality, a view with which probably few would agree, least of all Brahmananda. (Whoever overlooks his hero, Sraffa, does so at his own risk). Even Raj who sees Keynesian analysis useful for gaining insight into "the phenomenon of high rates of interest prevailing in agrarian economies," cautions that in applying Keynesian economics one should bear in mind differences in structure, function and interaction of markets in the different phases of historical evolution and different regions of the same agrarian economy. "While Keynesian economics, as also general equilibrium economics, have some insights and clues to offer," he says, "their uncritical use without paying adequate attention to these vital features of agrarian economies is still unfortunately all too common today, concealing a great deal of superficiality behind a facade of theoretical elegance and sophistication."

Colin Clark has written an interesting essay on a subject that normally leceives meagre treatment in economic literature, viz., output and prices in the service industries, and brings out the difficulties of computing them. There is in fact a problem of classifying service industries and their products hotel rooms, sports and beauty parlours for example). How much of mathenatical calculation, and how many pitfalls, lie behind the index numbers of Prices to which the public is treated day after day is brought out in M. Mukherjee's paper on the subject, while J.N. Sinha writes on national wage policy on which price indices make such a quick impact. P.N. Dhar answers he criticism in detail that India's heavy industry oriented planning model leglected small-scale industry. C.H. Hanumantha Rao analyses data on eld work done in respect of employment and new technology on land in U.P. with some comparisons from Japan and Korea. V.M. Rao's paper on rural planning is also based on field data from Tumkur district in Karataka where the Institute for Social and Economic Change (Bangalore) sengaged on a major project.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

indy ents tion nical

EWS

MAIN

omic RAO.

itists areer lucassays omic ocial s redis-0110-

lists and onuic

lysis ss of 1974 omy with

scarught s the udes if it

cates s not that

wn" it in

478

The last essay in the section on economic structure and policy is contributed by R.J. Chelliah who writes on what in recent years has become a hardy annual-merger of sales taxes with Union excise duties. The essay is well argued and comprehensive, covering the constitutional and political aspects as well as the economic. The combined burden of the two taxes is now 53 per cent of the total Central and States revenues. Instead of shifting the whole of it to the production stage (mostly industrial), which almost certainly will provoke large scale evasion, Chelliah suggests the burden be shared partly by agriculture through some form of higher taxation on agricultural income (presumbly levied as a Central tax). This is an explosive political question as everyone knows, but Chelliah also questions its constitutional wisdom. In course of time the combined Central excises and Central agricultural income-tax would give the Union such an over-whelming share of the total tax revenues of the country as to make the States financial mendicants of the Centre. Such a result must tend to undermine the stability of the federal systmem.

Several experts discuss the demographic problem in the third part of the book. While much of the literature on population revolves round the rate of natural increase in population, Rati Ram and Theodore Schultz point out the improvement in the life span of males and females in the reproductive age groups 15-40, which, in respect of females, must naturally increase the net reproduction rate unless it is otherwise checked. Asok Mitra has added that the proportion of the population in the age groups 15-34 "will reach new peaks in the next 20 years." If his forecast comes true, it must rather shake his assumption that a norm of two children per family ensure a net reproduction rate of 1 (or "unity", at which a population stabilizes itself). Both Schultz and Mitra stress the importance of investing in human capital through health and education so that these age groups can contribute to faster development through their knowledge and skilled work. Mitra rejects the Malthusian view and accepts the neo-Marxian view that "fertility is a function ultimately of social organisation," of ownership of the means of production and social relationships arising therefrom. It is his unstated assumption, of course, that socialist production is conducive to keeping down the net reproduction rate.

There are two essays bearing on Political Science, one by Rasheeduddin Khan on political culture and another by T.N. Madan on the role of language in Indian polity. Khan has brought out forcefully how the heritage of Indian nationalism is becoming untraceable in our latter-day politics. "Today this heritage provides only the background but not the content of political functioning in sovereign India." Our consitutional pundits who argue from textual perception fail to see, in Khan's words, that democracy has been "reduced to the formal political and legal-structural level" and is in effect "an apparatus devised for obtaining mass support for elite ends." Khan indeed suggests with much force that Hindu society is not compatible with modern democracy at all. "Operational Hinduism," he writes," distinct from the

philo of so To a overo

BOOK

Whan Wha more in the lopm but I disas in la

unfo Marz throu philo gler day i socio

in In

Th

There textu socia He a "bure Their can be in ex-cive

one of This intell

well a

New

philosophical and mystical level, perpetuates norms, values and institutions of social life that negate the prerequisites of democracy and modernity." To an extent this is true of Islam also. The only eastern people who have overcome this operational handicap of religion for democracy and modernity are the Japanese. The Chinese could do it only by going communist.

Whether or not elite rule is desirable (in communist dictatorships no less than in democracies), it may be unavoidable in most Third World countries. What is more disconcerting is that the ruling elite in the latter is becoming more and more *mindless*, not just unintellectual, as P.C. Joshi points out in the concluding essay of the book on social science research in India. Developmental effort in these countries is adding large numbers to the intelligentsia but fewer of them are entering the ruling elite. The result is a potentially disastrous vacuum in the evolution of organized society, especially in large countries like India.

This is a manifestation of mobility and class circulation or lack of them, unforeseen by India's formalistic constitutionalists. It was not foreseen by Marx whose philosophy of history was related to societies which had gone through a religious reformation as well as an industrial revolution. The philosophers of history who had in a way foreseen this were Hegel and Spengler whose historical frame of reference was Prussian militarism and latterday fascism respectively. This is not a happy thought for Indian political sociologists.

Joshi has some very pertinent things to say about social science research in India. It needed saying by academics like him rather than by those whom they are apt to look upon as the flotsam and jetsam of the intelligentsia. There is increasing polarisation in social science research in India between textual perception and field perception, and Joshi rightly pleads that Indian social development requires that they be brought closer, if not synthesised. He also rightly draws attention to the role of foreign money and growing "bureaucratization and commercialisation" in Indian social science research. Their influence on the *methodology* and end-product of social science research can be insidious and the countervailing power of Indian social science may be insufficient to meet it. On the contrary, newer groups (ex-ambassadors, ex-civil servants, etc.) are being sucked into the knowledge industry, now well endowed with foreign and domestic capital.

Few books from academe combine scholarship with readability. This one does. The inexpert but intelligent layman can also profit by reading it. This is a special tribute to Dr. Rao who has written a great deal to inform the irtelligent layman and not confined himself to olympian heights.

New Delhi.

EWS

ntsi-

ne a

ssay

tical

es is

inly

red

ural

ical

onal

gri-

e of

ndi-

the

the

rate

out

tive

the

ded

ach

her

net

elf).

ital

to

ects

s a

of

ISS-

wn

lin

ige

an

his

nc-

ex-

ra-

sts rn he H. VENKATASUBBIAH

K.K. Verma: Changing Role of Caste Associations. National Publishing House, Delhi, 1979, viii, 104 p., Rs. 35.

A LTHOUGH caste association has been a popular theme of investigation among Social Anthropologists and Sociologists, given the essentially regional-linguistic character of caste structures and the consequent multiplicity and variety involved, it still remains a potent area of analysis. Viewed against this backdrop we should welcome many more studies on caste associations. However, the reader expects—both in terms of descriptions and explanations—a few new things from a full-length study of a single caste association. Unfortunately, the book under review disappoints us on both these counts.

That the caste associations have been channels of upward ritual and social mobility, instruments of social reforms and caste welfare, agencies of modernisation and change, vehicles of politicisation and mobilisation, are all well-documented facts by several researchers and known to the author. Further, caste associations are variously viewed as "intermediate structures" linking tradition and modernity accelerating the process of social transformation, as "counter-vailing powers" moderating the authoritarian tendencies emanating from the state apparatus, as "voluntary associations" providing an opportunity for citizen-participation in political affairs, as "mere extensions of state authority" constantly being manipulated by those in power for their personal and political ends, as "cultural platforms" facilitating the crystallization of social identities. Viewed in the context of the known facts and theory, the book under review does not offer us any fresh insights or novel facts about the phenomenon under analysis.

Given the present state of our knowledge regarding caste associations what needs to be undertaken is either an intensive or an extensive analysis of this phenomenon. An intensive analysis in this case would mean a study of caste associations functioning at the local, supra-local and supra-ethnic levels in terms of their inter-linkages. When the author anounces that his is a microsociological analysis this is precisely what the reader expects; but disappointment sets in soon when he discovers that much of the data and analysis relate only to the supra-local level leaving out both the local and supraethnic caste associations, save occasional perfunctory references to them. An extensive analysis in the present case should involve working out the inter-relationships between other structures and processes—political parties, economic organizations, electoral behaviour, capital accumulation and investment, etc. Notwithstanding occasional references to these structures and processes no systematic attempt is made to interlink them with caste associations in terms of the dialectics and dynamics involved.

An interesting point that Verma touches upon is the changing goal orientations of the Kurmi Sabha over a period of time. In the early phase the goal was to achieve higher ritual status through sanskritization; gradually

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

it ch this the the even ovei proc cend trad "out an " men caste Sche and poli agai invo

ROO

the and indicate theo caste case dimetrans tions prim that under of control o

care

N

in bi In fa its pi nal j

Jawa New

it changed to the attainment of secular status—economic and political. In this process the reference groups of the caste have changed, a pattern the Kurmis share with several other similarly placed caste groups. But the pertinent question, "Why this shift in orientation," is not answered, not even raised. To understand this one should link it up with the changing over-all ethos of the society itself. Similarly, references are made to the process of caste fission and fusion. Not only that the Kurmis have transcended their "ethnic boundaries" to encapsulate castes following similar traditional occupations from other cultural regions, thereby indicating an "outer directed" orientation, but they also have shown tendencies towards an "inner-directed" orientation by insulating themselves with fellow-castemen from the same region. Further, the Kurmis have claimed not only castes with Kshatriya status into their fold but also those with the status of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the first for enhancing ritual status and political prestige, the second for augmenting numerical strength and political prowess. All these point to an "identity crisis" among the Kurmis, again a trait they share with several similar caste groups. The dilemmas involved here—those between status and power—are real and need to be carefully investigated and explained, a task from which Verma shies.

Not only that adequate data are not presented in the book in terms of the inter-linkages between caste associations of Kurmis at different levels and the inter-relationships between other structures and processes as I have indicated above, but even the scanty data presented are not "situated" in a theoretical framework. There are two major possibilities here: analysing caste associations as the "organizational core" of caste movements, in which case the focus of attention should be on mobilizational (that is processual) dimension, or viewing caste associations as "voluntary associations" in a transitional society, structures which combine the characteristics of traditional and modern sectors in society or which encapsulate the traits of primary and secondary groups. While the data presented by Verma indicate that the adoption of either of these frameworks would have illuminated our understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, he opts out of it, of course for unstated reasons.

Finally, a non-academic point. The text of the "book" has 86 pages in big print and it costs Rs. 35. This smacks of crass commercialisation. In fact, the text could have been neatly summarized to about 60 per cent of its present length and published as a research paper in one of the professional journals in social sciences.

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

/S

ıg

n

ly

i-

V-

te

15

le

IS

d

25

n,

le

te

of

)-

21

d

t-

t

r

S

f

S

S

e

;,

d s

e

T.K. OOMMEN

Role of Women

KHAWAJA AHMAD ABBAS: Sarojini Naidu: An Introduction to a Fascinating Personality. Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1980, 114 p., Rs. 60.

A. ABBAS has, like some others, tried to relate the story of Sarojini Naidu. Writing her life story is not such a difficult task; in fact, probably, many today must be familiar with the important events of her life. But I do not suppose it is ever possible to really lay bare all the important events or describe the multifarious forces that move a personality or the variety of factors which make up the sum total of her life.

To really depict Sarojini in her true personality is indeed a difficult task. The closer one got to her, the more one saw her, the more bewildered one felt. There were many conflicting and contradictory forces working within her that nobody so far has delineated. This may not be unusual, it is probably true of most outstanding personalities who have within themselves complex components. Almost everybody who has written or talked about her has stressed that she was most unique, a person apart, the only one of her kind. Yet nobody has really analysed the chemistry of all the elements which made up this unique personality.

Author Abbas has gathered together many more little pieces for his grand composition, even though his book is very small. There is in it a directness, simplicity and sincerity in the unfolding of his tale which I found very moving. All he has said can now be compressed into a few telling characteristics of hers. Her ancestry and background provided her with the essence of our tradition, the spirit, with its solemnity and deep experience, to create the synthesis from a blending of various trends to weave into a harmonious pattern. This obviously provided her both the background and the vision for an easy communion with humanity. She had no doubt many rare gifts and talents but this was the bed-rock from which she rose and dominated her scene. This explains how she struck a new note that seemed like an echo of an India struggling to regain its identity. One could catch in her ringing tones the call of the silent moving millions and in her lilting cadence, the compassion and large heartedness which has distinguished the Indian people. This is why Sarojini could not only appeal to people of all faiths, colour and languages but move them to warm response.

It was this heritage so richly embodied in her that made Sarojini a genuinely cosmopolitan personality. She was remarkably at home everywhere, among the lowliest and the poorest as amongst the affluent elites. She could become a companion to a child just as she could spell out ancient wisdom. That is why she was true to the several roles she played in her life, from a poet to a soldier, from a rebel to a governor of a state.

Above all she brought a new quality to womanhood and a new tone to her sphere. For the world in which she was born and grew up, women were still rather dim figures. She also belonged to a wider span of time and was

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

not a period character; therefore too big to be circumscribed by the boundary of an age. Her poetry and the delicate lilting verses seemed like an echo to all that she was and she stood for. Abbas's precious book makes one nostalgic for the exhilaration of idealism and the colour of romance with which she and her times filled our nostrils and our eyes. It was this which transformed the humblest task into a heroic deed.

New Delhi

ni

e

S

 $\mathbf{f}$ 

1

KAMALADEVI CHATTOPADHYAY

Jamila Verghese: Her Gold and Her Body. Vikas Publishing House, Sahibabad, 1980, xi, 228 p., Rs. 60.

THE spate of literature on women that started during the International Women's Year has not receded yet. The book market still continues to be flooded with works in the area of women. Their quality and contents vary and these studies range from systematic accounts of empirical investigations to free lance but pedestrian journalism. Some of them are, of course, welcome additions. Even on a fair assessment, it is difficult to include the book under review in that category.

The recent books on women may be broadly classified into three categories, viz., (i) those written within an historical perspective; (ii) those based on findings of empirical investigations and (iii) those whose contents have strong streaks of affective orientation and which are full of intuitive or wild generalizations based on inadequate historical and contemporary evidences. Any careful reader of Verghese's book would place it in the last category.

Verghese has discussed the hackneyed theme of women's oppression and exploitation by man. The supporting evidence, as she has said, was collected from the various secondary sources, viz., books, research papers, periodicals, newspaper reports, in addition to some random personal interviews of the commuters on buses and trains.

The discussion in the book centres mainly around two themes i.e., the exploitation of woman, firstly, as human being and secondly, as means of extortion. Her main thesis is a trite; that the woman had always been a non-entity, tyrannized and exploited, in all the societies, at all the times, and the situation still continues to be the same, particularly in India. The argument is neither new nor innovative. She presents a heap of evidence mainly from historical records, religious scriptures, epics, etc. She also uses newspaper cuttings, and available statistics in support of her argument. However, her disinclination to use the numerous empirical studies on women made recently is rather shocking. It is also a pity that she makes no attempt to analyze her material in a proper sociological perspective. At no place, any effort is made to relate the position of woman in different historical stages of development or in different societies to the socio-economic CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

B

W

q

variables characteristic of those periods or of the structures of those societies. Obsessed as she is with her thesis, she is totally oblivious to the changes in the women's status resulting from the spread of modern education among women which facilitated their entry into the occupational world and to the impact of various social reform movements.

The book does not seem to have a thoughtfully planned out scheme for either the presentation of the material or its analysis. There is considerable lack of a logical order or coherence. One would hardly find any historical sequence or thematic continuity in the narrative; at many places it shifts suddenly from a tale in the old Testament to a report in the Pravada, before jumping back to a social practice in Kerala or to what Manu had said? (e.g. pp. 57-60 and pp. 83 passim). Accounts of certain happenings and reportages on her personal interviews with respondents are interspersed throughout the book, sometime very oddly and also in their ludicrous details. What strikes the reader most is her irresistible temptation to use colloquial words and terms from the vernacular languages, for which she provides English translations sometimes promptly in the foot notes and sometimes in the notes at the end of the book. Not only is there no systematic order but it is also very irritating for the reader. Moreover she does not come forward with any initiating or concluding statements in the chapters; as such, readers get lost about the central ideas or thrust of the chapters. Consequently, it is always a challenge for the reader to find the relevance of the titles of chapters to their contents. The last two chapters, "What Went Wrong" and "Travellers", and also the "Epilogue" offer nothing new to add to whatever has been said in the earlier chapters.

Perhaps anticipating a lot of criticism on the lack of rigour, it was tactical on her part to have disarmed critics beforehand by conveying that she had "no claims to erudition and scholarship." (p. vii) However, the question that plagued this reviewer most was as to why at all a publisher like Vikas had ventured to publish this book, perhaps without proper editorial treatment.

University of Poona. Pune.

UTTAM BHOITE

A. RAMANAMMA: Graduate Employed Women in An Urban Setting. Dastane Ramachandra and Co., Poona, 1979, vi, 159p., Rs. 48.

THE present book is a revised version of the author's Ph. D. dissertation completed in 1969. The Indian Council of Social Science Research the book is an "attempt to assess the structural changes in the various institutions due to the changing position of women arising out of their education and employment." The book comprises the data analysis of 505 graduate

women of Poona city who were interviewed with the help of a scheduled questionnaire.

The questionnaire is comprehensive and the sample taken is of a cross-section of women with varying backgrounds. Due consideration is given to age, marital status, economic position, employed or unemployed etc. Women with six different occupations were chosen.

The responses show that while the women have advanced views on matters of education, employment and choice of partners, they are still sticking to traditional ideas about marriage and divorce. The vast majority thought that companionship is the first priority for marriage and sex satisfaction next in order of preference. Having children (because they are the support in old age) was much below on the list. Nearly 60 per cent were in favour of equality with the husband and not submissiveness and were not afraid to correct their husbands. The vast majority were in favour of family planning; 33.6 per cent had only two children while only 6.2 per cent had five or more. Those who had no children were not unhappy and some of them thought children were a bother.

While the majority were against giving dowry, their reasons were rather curious. Unmarried girls expressed the view that "dowry should not be given for educated girls." Other women also felt that "injustice was done to them as money was held in greater esteem than their education."

The respondents views on marriage show that there is no change in their outlook on this question. The majority (68.7 per cent) thought it was a sacred samskar and 82.4 per cent wanted a traditional marriage as opposed to registration. On divorce also, they showed no change in the value system and the vast majority opposed it.

Thus we see that no clearcut pattern emerges and one cannot say whether education and employment of women has brought about a structural change in society. Even the fact that educated women specially if they are employed want nuclear families does not prove that they are instrumental in the breakdown of the joint family system.

There seems some confusion in the chapter heading "Education of Women". Table 6.2 dealing with "Reasons for Not Taking Higher Education" (primary reasons) and 6.2A dealing with "Reasons for Not Taking Higher Education" (secondary reasons) gives the impression that some of the women did not go in for higher education. In the beginning however, it is made clear that all the 505 women were graduates. If by higher education is meant post-graduation, then some of the answers do not make sense. As for example one respondent says "even though I got very good marks, I was not sent to college, but just to get my brother admitted to college, they gave a donation to the college."

Micro studies have their place but one cannot generalize on the basis of such studies. Maharashtra State as such and Poona city, in particular, cannot be representative of India. Poona has been far more advanced specially in the context of women's education. And the only women's university that exists

in India is in Maharashtra. Therefore, generalization on the basis of this book would be misleading.

New Delhi

URMILA HAKSAR

S.P. Jain and Krishnamuri Hy Reddy: Role of Women in Rural Development: A Study of Mahila Mandals. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, iii, 93 p., Rs. 16.

A Ta time when the United Nations Decade for Women is in progress and the global strategy is to reinforce the concept of full participation of women in national development programmes, it is indeed gratifying to find that the National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad has brought out an empirical evaluation study of the working of the Mahila Mandals.

In reviewing the historical growth and development of Mahila Mandals in the total perspective of community development and Panchayati Raj organizations in India, a commendable job has been accomplished. While all the Development Commissioners' Conferences right from 1955 till 1965 recommended gradual quantitative extension of Mahila Mandals, the 1976 Committee on Community Development and Panchayati Raj recommended the inclusion of home economics components of the programme so as to be beneficial to the weaker sections of the society. The working group in 1978 went a step further in recommending that the Mahila Mandals should draw rural women in the mainstream of development so as to enable them to function as instruments of social change by providing them with programmes in which they would have a stake of a sustained interest such as "improving their income or productivity and employability or employment." A Mahila Mandal for 500 people, with a block grant of Rs. 1,500 and Rs. 7,500 for administrative and development purposes respectively was recommended. Field level workers-five per block and one officer each at the block, district and state levels, training of workers, representation in the local Panchayat and formation of a federation of Mahila Mandals at the block and district level etc., were the suggested structure for organisation.

With a descriptive review, the Report identifies the strong and weak points of the functioning of mandals. The methodology adopted was random sampling and documentary analysis. However, it could have been better analyzed and reviewed if certain critieria or a yardstick of success could have been developed to ascertain the effectiveness of the functioning of these Mahila-Mandals. Like any other governmental report of T.E.O. or National Commission of Agriculture, this study, even though it identified the lack of appropriate policy as one of the reasons for the poor performance of these Mahila Mandals, never went to the extent of studying the a target of these Mandals. Women members could have been closely interviewed to analyze their

pe

loc

HO

ran has and of t

par

1

bor mo lim ber ech Par ind

dev cier the the tior

of o

T

led

Mari vati app Ker role fror

that

effo

WOI

fina
of a
satio

Mah hum

T

perception about the objective and working of these mandals. This would have helped in further framing out the policy.

As regards their structure and functioning, two points emerged: (a) location of the mandals; and (b) the existing social structure acting as deterrant factors in proper participation of different sections of women. It has been very rightly observed that the functioning of social organizations and institutions cannot possibly be in isolation from the total environment of the society. "Unless these barriers are broken, the concept of community participation can hardly be realized."

The study has brought out a very relevant sociological point, which collaborates other earlier well known facts, that all these activities were oriented more for the well-to-do sections of the community and that there was a limited interaction of extension staff with women of lower castes. The membership of the mandals, by and large, is limited to those belonging to higher echelons of the society in terms of caste, occupation and financial status. Participation of the younger generation in Mahila Mandals is a promising indicator of the process of social change.

The study reveals that due to lack of managerial skill and technical know-ledge the mandals never tried to build up any cumulative assets to spend on development programmes: the result is that hardly any of them is self sufficient in finance. Thus, the absence of a regular source of income and the capacity to mobilise resources locally are two major constraints against the efficient implementation of the women organisations in rural reconstruction programme.

Activities of different mandals indicate that besides the traditional concept of child care, nutrition education, home craft, family welfare only a few mandals are practising kitchen gardening, poultry-keeping, fruit preservation and compost preparation.

Besides, associating themselves with government sponsored programmes, applied nutrition and family welfare and adult education (most effective in Kerala and Tamilnadu), the mandals appeared to have played an important role in nutrition education, child-care, sewing and embroidery classes apart from building up awareness. It has provided a forum for village women to associate themselves with development activities. All these go to indicate that activities are mainly oriented to social welfare programmes and very little effort has been made to strengthen the skills of economic productivity of women.

Among certain adminstrative shortfalls identified are: (1) lack of regular financial assistance; (2) non-availability of guidance from officials; (3) lack of accommodation and equipment; (4) lack of proper orientation in organisational arrangment and activities to be taken up; and (5) lack of proper policy approach. All these need careful analysis for future corrective measures.

The study has correctly suggested that despite the success and failure of Mahila Mandals in India, they have to be viewed from the perspective of humane resources development. Therefore, it is necessary to view the

total investment of this programme as a step towards the development of the traditional woman from traditional to modern society with all new values and attitudes towards life, this will ultimately contribute towards the economic development of the country.

It has been correctly indicated that with regular financial support from the government and development of an organisational structure, based on an appropriate policy framework in each state and at the national level, the Mahila Mandals could fulfill the promotional objectives, which they are intended to achieve in the process of rural development.

This book will fill up a need for all who are concerned with women's development programmes and rural development programmes in India.

National Service Scheme, University of Delhi, Delhi. USHA BANJRJEE

Drafting of Laws

488 -

G.R. RAJAGOPAUL: The Drafting of Laws. N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1980, x, 229 p., Rs. 50.

G. R. Rajagopaul has brought out an excellent book on the drafting of laws. He has brought to bear on his work his vast experience as Secretary, Legislative Department of the Government of India, in which capacity he was associated with the drafting of many statutes. As a member of the Law Commission he was in charge of the implementation of the legislative proposals of that body.

After the attainment of Independence there had been an urgent need for legislation bearing on all branches of law for declaring and defining the constitutional rights of the citizens. During a very short space of time various statutes were passed affecting the people, keeping in view the Indian angle. There were several Bills on social and economic reform. In all these we had to rely a great deal on the British laws as applicable to British India as an aid to drafting. The proliferation of new Acts in quick succession and the dearth ofmaterials on legal drafting made the task of our draftsmen difficult. Several books on interpretation of statutes were the only guide. Only Ilberthad in the past produced a book on drafting, and Odger's book on interpretation of laws and documents showed the way to precise language.

A statute is the will of the legislature. The words in it have to be precise and unambiguous and should clearly declare the intention of the legislature. The difficulty in interpretation of laws is beacuse of the limitations of language. Language is not infallible and different meanings can be attributed to the

you just po ince La is

dra

tive

BO

pri diff the A in Rei in at o

by

fun Lis of S latu to p becany ma

Nev

Ih

car

Me Gas

ing to i each

proc

words of the enactment. There is not much attention paid in India to drafting. Judges have often remarked that a book on drafting of laws from the Indian point of view has become very necessary. Some of these remarks have been included in the book in the chapter, "The Draftsman and his Equipment." Laws like judgments must be precise and clear so that "a linguistic game" is not set on foot in either.

Unfortunately no book published so far has laid down clear guidelines to draftsmen. This book will now serve that purpose. It analyses in an exhaustive way "the qualifications and training that the draftsman should have, principles of drafting, the pitfalls that he should avoid, the structure and different parts of an Act, the legislative process in the enactment of an Act, the General Clauses Act, rules of interpretation and delegated legislation." A number of statutory forms in common use has been added as a chapter. References to case law and precedents from other countries also find place in the book. The author has dealt with the subject of drafting of the Bills at different stages from the introduction of the Bill in Parliament to the assent by the President.

We have a written Constitution which guarantees to the citizens certain fundamental rights and freedoms. It has three Lists, the Central List, the State List and the Concurrent List. It also lays down certain Directive Principles of State Policy. The responsibility for enacting laws rests solely on the legislatures. In its eagerness to effect social change, a legislature may be tempted to pass enactments in a hurry. The draftsman has thus a heavy responsibility because he must bear in mind the constitutional provisions while drafting any legislative measure and he must avoid any language or expression which may make the legislative measure ultra vires the Constitution. This book, I have no doubt, will be of great use to persons who wish to shape their career as draftsmen.

New Delhi.

M. HIDAYATULLAH

Media and Society

GASTON ROBERGE: Mediation: The Action of the Media in our Society. Manohar Book Service, New Delhi, 1978, xi, 210 p., Rs. 100.

SINCE the dawn of civilisation, every medium of communication, beginning with the human voice, has primarily served the purpose of mediating between the individual and society. From sound symbols and pictographs to ideographs and the alphabet, through printing to films, radio and TV, each and every development has widened the reach of the media. In the process, the potential of access to information for the masses has also increased tremendously. At the same time, because of the structure of the

world economic and information systems the so-called mass media remain under the control of a few. Thus the contradiction between the socialisation of production and individual ownership of the means of production duplicates itself in the area of mass media as well.

While discussing how communication media work in our society, Mediation uncovers this ugly truth and its disastrous consequences. Gaston Roberge, however, does not do so in a direct fashion. He is somewhat unconventional in his approach; his probings into the interaction between media and society are built round nine main images. They seem ill-assorted to the reader. As one goes through the book their relevance becomes evident. The alphabetical arrangement of these images and the comments on them leave the reader free to pick and choose as his fancy or interest wills. The discussion of any one subject under different heads may, however, seem confusing at times.

In the process, the reader does achieve an understanding of the media. Within this framework the author attempts to create a state of mind for an understanding of the mediation of the media between the individual and society. And this, as he rightly points out at the very outset, is most important because "the manner in which the media are allowed to 'mediate' shapes both the world and the mind."

At another level, *Mediation* is a media workbook. Many issues are posed which the author does not always answer. These are presented in a particular perspective to open up further discussions. Very liberally and imaginatively illustrated, the examples and arguments provided are thought provoking. They help to stimulate a student of media, who may find it worthwhile to attempt the exercises suggested at the bottom of each page.

ir

a

0

h

·to

ec

ca

ar

th

an

an

nie

in

it

ua

roa

bil

to

tha me

The first subject treated is advertising. This quite naturally leads on to a multi-dimensional understanding of mass media today. Gaston Roberge correctly questions the validity of a consumer society advertising environment for India. This is inevitable when, as he points out, advertising as it exists today is "important to the consumer society advertising as it exists".

today, is "irretrievably wedded to capitalism."

In such a situation the masses are encouraged to emulate an image of a way of life far beyond their means. They are compelled to live in two worlds, of reality and illusion, of what they are and what they would be. All this is justified in the name of equality of opportunities, which remains an illusion for the majority of the population.

The author repeatedly emphasizes the new realities created by the recent revolution in communication technology. It has become so powerful that today we live in a media-dominated society. Even our privacy is no longer sacred. In this context, Gaston Roberge shows a highly senstive understanding of the interaction not only between man and the world around him, but also between his own spaceship earth and the surrounding universe, now being unravelled by human probings into limitless space. This, in turn, has considerably increased the potential of the iconosphere or the world of images to envelop us totally and change our life patterns.

491

The latest communication technology can open up every single source of information for the widest section of the people all over the world. It bridges the gulf of time and space and even of illiteracy. It can thus unite mankind through common understanding. Thus mass media today cannot merely "inform, educate and entertain;" they are instruments of democratisation of society. The question is, can such a process be achieved through the existing structure of the international communication and information system?

About this the author has serious doubts and misgivings and not without reason. Mass media function, not in isolation, but within the framewok of a particular power structure and economic relations among people in society. Modern communication technology is controlled by a handful of owners. In a market economy, information is also a commodity, marketed on the basis of a philosophy that supply will determine the need. In such a situation information cannot obviously be value neutral.

Gaston Roberge effectively establishes how communication technology is manipulated by a handful in their political and economic interests through both misinformation and disinformation. His comments about the world of fantasy conjured up by the mass media, especially cinema and TV, assume particular relevance in this context. He calls this the "secondary reality," used as an instrument of advertising and even of politics. He explains how images instilling prejudices, entertainment glorifying negative attitudes towards change, advertising appealing to unconscious drives, education and various media of communication mediating for the preservation of obscurantist and retarding value systems, condition the mass mind.

In this context, the author quotes Cess Hamelink's Perspectives to emphasize the reality of the socialization function of public media being utilized to orient attitudes towards an ideology that legitimises the present socioeconomic and political structures. One might add that, as modern communication technology is mainly controlled by transnationals, mass communication is used by them to subvert men's minds in order to prevent the development of an independent national economy and a modern society in the countries that have shed the chains of political dependence. There would seem to be an inseparable link between domestic cultural and information domination and cultural and informaion imperialism.

e

a

1,

This is further aggravated by the contradiction created by modern communication technology between the socialization of the mass media and their individualization. The video cassette is the most recent example. In a sense it withdraws an individual from society and breaks the natural bonds of mutual obligation. This brings about a cultural alienation. This is really the road to the self-destruction of man. Gaston Roberge only hints at this possibility, which seems to be the inevitable logic of such developments.

In this background, the author's call for a national cultural policy related to development needs is very relevant. Equally relevant is his suggestion that we should conduct our own experiments for the most effective use of media and not depend on foreign models. This involves the establishment

of a logical and balanced relationship between human as well as natural and economic ecology. Gaston Roberge feels that TV, which extends to the human subconscious by bringing the viewers into close proximity with the image, can play an important role. At the same time mass produced images can cause alienation and institutionalized media do not really belong to the masses. Hence he would rely on existing areas of public communication to which the masses have ready access.

Traditional cultural forms could well serve this purpose. The author is, however, concerned lest these media should be repressed and distorted in the process. They could themselves get alienated from the masses by taking on the features of institutionalised media. This could have political implications as well. These dangers could be eliminated if one accepted the strategy of group media advocated by Gaston Roberge. In such a situation traditional media could come into its own, reflecting new realities and new values brought about by economic, technological and political change.

Group media is conceived as stimulating discussion and providing opportunities for systematic self-education. What the author does not discuss in this context is the possibility of creation of communication packages through group media. Traditional media could thus be used together with modern technology without the danger of institutionalization and alienation. This has already been tried successfully by different organizations in India, especially by the Space Applications Centre at Ahemdabad and the Centre for Development of Instructional Technology at Delhi.

This point is reinforced by what Gaston Roberge has himself to say about group media as opposed to mass media. He considers the latter repressive because they are centrally controlled by property-owners and bureaucrats and passively received. Group media on the other hand are emancipatory. They are decentralized. Each recepient is a potential transmitter, interacting with each other and providing instant feedback, with opportunities of self-organisation for collective production of communication programmes relevant to the situational context and providing an impetus to action.

At the same time, the author admits that media are repressive only in a certain societal context. Hence the importance of horizontal communication at the village level. He probably has a point when he maintains that this is more important than even the creation of international standards of mass media availability. He also admits however, that the basic parameters of massive investment and mass distribution can create popular mythology conducive to national development. Of course, this will not be possible as long as mass media remains a commercial commodity. One wonders, however, if a serious attempt can be made to use media for development needs, in a situation like ours, where, as the author puts it, market and command economies, interpenetrate one another?

This is very relevant to films. Parallel cinema in this situation can survive only if it works for certain human values relevant to the creation of a new society. Discussing Indian cinema further, Gaston Roberge suggests that

fc

ex

ha

violence and sex in films do not necessarily encourage these vices. On the contrary they may help defuse such tendencies, especially in a society in which so many causes for violence exist. This seems an oversimplification. His criticism of theatre, which next to the cinema, has great communication potential with instant interaction, as elitist and unrelated to the poor, is quite valid.

The author's suggestion about the application of the ancient Indian theory of rasa for Indian arts, especially popular cinema, instead of the western theories of drama evolved from Aristotle's poetics, deserves serious consideration. This should also help refute the artificial contradiction he himself raises between the concepts of art and mass communication. Here he falls victim to the western concept of art considered as individual self-expression. On the other hand a dialectical relationship between lokachar and sastrachar or the popular and elitist stream of art, as discussed by the author, could certainly seek expression of relevant social reality and act as an instrument of social change.

The author rightly emphasizes the value of comics as carriers of myths, so essential to social life; myths that express many attitudes and beliefs underlying social organization and values. He however, fails to follow his thoughts up with suggestions about how comics could also be used for creating counter myths suitable for inculcating new social values and attitudes.

Gaston Roberge's appropriate last word is on violence, in a society in which mass media often commits violence on the masses. One would, however, like to end on a more positive note. In course of a thought-provoking discussion on art as communication and its relation to politics, Gaston Roberge quotes Kropotkin to point out that "it is hope not despair, which makes successful revolutions." This should be the attitude of those concerned with mass media as instruments of social change.

Indian Institute of Mass Communication, New Delhi.

SUBRATA BANERJEE

#### Terrorism

SHAILESHWAR NATH: Terrorism in India. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, viii, 350p., Rs. 100.

THIS book was started as a research project and it still retains the character of a thesis. Nevertheless, the author deserves credit for his stupendous labour in collecting so much material. This is undoubtedly useful for writers on Indian history, who should welcome this book based on exceedingly reliable and mostly unpublished source material. The author has extensively quoted official files of the Government of India, files of the

BC

de

in

an

fre

an

ha

mo

Bi

fro

he

act

ab

mc

etc

ver

in

Ne

Political Department of the Government of Bihar, CID Bihar and judicial files. The author was given financial help by the University Grants Commission and the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi; one of his patrons was Pandit Binodanand Jha, Chief Minister of Bihar.

However, the thesis has hardly been shaped into a book suitable for a general reader—even one who is genuinely keen to know the activities of our terrorist patriots. The treatment is jerky and the composition is more suitable for official reports. A general reader's interest cannot be sustained by a long narration of factual data; he is likely to find the book too repetitive of similar facts. There is also repetition of ideas; the deeds speak for themselves and no emphasis of language is needed to add to the heroism. This book with its appendices and index runs into 350 pages. One wishes that either the author or someone else would produce another book one-third the size out of the very material in this book; if the price of the new book could also be nearly one-third it is likely to attract a wider circle of readers.

The author has given a background of the revolutionary movement throughout India in the first two chapters. He has proved conclusively that in terms of sheer patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice the terrorists were head and shoulders above many great ones, who flourished under Gandhiji's umbrella. The secret methods adopted by the revolutionaries show that several of them were first-class brains and, if they so desired, they could have led fairly comfortable lives by getting good employment in those days when the number of highly educated Indians was not very large. One has to agree with the author that "the revolutionary movement has a philosophical basis, notions of high idealism...." (page 8) Most of the Hindu revolutionaries were devotees of the Gita. They were above caste and territorial barriers. A large number of specific cases of revolutionary murders, dacoities, robberies, conspiracy cases etc. have been discussed with a careful attention to exactitude in dates, names, places, legal terminology, etc.

This book should dispel a few common beliefs. The Judiciary in British India was only objective as long as the British empire was not threatened. When there was a threat to its very existence the Judiciary could depart from the elementary principles of justice. Even with the flexible conscience of the Judiciary the British Government was not able to cope with the movement and therefore the need was felt for the Bihar and Orissa Public Safety Act of 1933, which gave powers to the Executive to intern and extern individuals. The then Deputy Inspector General CID, of Bihar gave reasons. He observed, "Revolutionary activities have taken a firm hold on the youths of the province for some years past.... It has not been possible to deal with a number of individuals who continue to organise and instigate others, while they themselves are careful to remain in the background, well outside the clutches of the ordinary law. This type of individual is beyond doubt the most dangerous of all. In addition to organising and instigating, he overawes by threats those who wish to break away and turn over a new leaf and menaces the lives of others who assist the police in any way. The only remedy for

dealing with this class of persons is the externment and internment provided in the Act." (Pages 207-8)

The main objective of the author is served by two chapters, namely six and seven. Chapter Six deals with the revolutionary movement in Bihar. from 1919 to 1935 while Chapter Seven deals with Important Overt Acts and Cases from 1919 and 1935. The reader should not forget that the author has set out to prove that Bihar was second only to Bengal in patriotic terrorist movement from 1902 to 1935. The treatment is really from 1912, when Bihar was separated from Bengal, and ends in 1935, when Orissa was separated from Bihar. To be fair to the author he has not concealed his motives and he has done his job well.

From an all-India angle, Bengal's pre-eminence in patriotic terrorist activity is well-known. The author's efforts prove that there was considerable movement in Bihar also. However, unless the author studies terrorist movements in other states, like Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and Maharashtra, etc., the reader may have his reservations and may feel that no decisive verdict can be given as to which state should be deemed to be runners-up in this race for national honours.

New Delhi.

N.S. SAKSENA.

# INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and studen's as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—Managing Editor.)

BANSAL, Ramgopal. In the Land of Taimur and Babur. Navyug, Delhi, 1978, 95 p., Rs. 6. (Paper)

An account of changes which have taken place in Uzbekistan, a part of Soviet Central Asia. It attempts to assess their practical relevance for India.

BHARGAVA, B.S. Grass Roots Leadership: A Study of Leadership in Panchayati Raj Institutions. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, viii 88p. Rs. 30.

Analysis of important aspects and problems related to leadership in Panchayati Raj institutions on the basis of theoretical and empirical considerations, with special reference to leadership in Panchayati Raj system in Jhunjhunu district of Rajasthan.

BHARGAVA, B.S. Minor Irrigation Development Administration: A Study in an Indian State. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980, viii, 128p., Rs. 50.

Problem-oriented diagonistic study identifies key organisational deficiencies and project management problems. Participation of Panchayati Raj institutions in minor irrigation programmes is suggested as one of the remedial measures. Case of Karnataka state is discussed.

BHARGAVA, B.S. Panchayati Raj Institutions: An Analysis of Issues Problems and Recommendations of Asoka Mehta Committee. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, 79p., Rs. 30.

Contains revised version of the author's four papers presented in the seminar on "Asoka Mehta Committee Report on Panchayati Raj Institutions," jointly organized by the Bangalore University and the Institute for Social and Economic Change at Bangalore in 1979. Papers discuss the issues and problems in regard to Panchayati Raj Movement in the country in general and Karnataka in particular, and the basic approach of Asoka Mehta Committee and its major recommendations.

BHARGAVA, B.S. Panchayati Raj System and Political Parties. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, 536p. Rs. 130.

Empirical study of Panchayati Raj system as an experiment in political institution-building in a developing nation like ours, based on study of Jhunjhunu district in Rajasthan, contains a comprehensive bibliography; Ph. D. Thesis.

BHARGAVA, B.S. Politico-Administrative Dynamics in Panchayati Raj System. Ashish, New Delhi, 1978, 77p. Rs. 30.

Deals with behavioural aspects of the political and administrative actors. Based on the data collected by the author in connection with his doctoral dissertation entitled "The role of Political Parties in Panchayati Raj System: A Case Study of Jhunjhunu District in Rajasthan."

BHUYAN, Arun Chandra and D.E. Sibopada, Eds., Political History of Assam 3 Vols. V2: 1920-1939; V.3: 1940-47. Department for Preparation of Political History of Assam, Government of Assam, Gauhati, 1980.

Volume two focuses on the political aspects in Assam's contribution to the liberation of the country and assesses how the national movement in turn brought about a healthy metamorphosis of the socio-economic structure of the province. Local even's, like the role of militant nationalists, socio-cultural issues which strained relations between various communities, the significance in the province of the arrival of international

as

ial

im

of

rs

ls.

iet

Ruj

laj

fe-

an

nd

or

ka

111-

on

ed

at

ati

sic

ıi,

n-

in

h,

วท

ed

nu

ls.

of

on

hy

he

en

nal

currents of thought like communism and trade unionism are dealt with elaborately in this volume.

The third and final volume gives an account of Assam's great march to the golden gates of freedom. This volume also discusses in details the various local issues peculiar and pertinent to the state alone.

In this three volume project of the history, the period from 1826-1919 has been covered in the first volume.

The project was initiated in 1973 by the Karmavir Deshabhakta Centenary Committee with the purpose of systematically presenting history of the political trends and developments in Assam from 1826 to 1947.

BOXER, C.R. Portuguese India in The Mid-Seventeenth Century. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1980, x, 57p., Rs. 15. (Paper)

Deriving the theme from the Portuguese claim, first formulated in 1499, that their crown was 'Lord of the Conquest', Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia Persia, India, etc., these Heras Memorial Lectures delivered in Bombay in 1978, examine three aspects of Portuguese rule in India during the years 1640–68. Conquest, Navigation and Commerce, Lectures were sponsored by the Heras Society and organised by Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture.

JORDENS, J.T.F. Swami Shraddhananda: His Life and Causes. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1981, xv, 210p., Rs. 90.

Biographical study of the eminent leader of Arya Samaj, whose influence ranged far beyond the ambit of the Arya Samaj into national Hindu movements and national politics. Basing the study on English and vernacular sources and Swami's writings and messages, the author discusses his youth, position as the most revered leader of the Arya Samaj, leadership in Delhi of Gandhiji's satyagraha campaign of 1919 to protest against the Rowlatt Acts, Pan-Hindu Shuddhi and Sangathan movements, Gurukul Kangri, contribution to the causes of untouchables, championship of inter-caste marriages, opposition to child marriage and consumption of meat.

KAMBLE, N.D. Rural Growth and Decline: A Case Study of Selected Villages. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979. vii, 143p., Rs. 40.

Discusses the causes of migration of able-bodied working males and females taking place from rural areas to urban areas and from underdeveloped areas to developed areas even within rural areas resulting in decline in growth rate of backward areas. The author contends that the areas grow with the increase in employment opportunities leading to immigration and decline with the lack of employment opportunities leading to migration. Study is based on data collected from selected villages in the Karnataka State.

KAMBLE, N.D. Structure and Determination of Manpower Resources. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980., 240p. Rs. 65.

Study of spatial variation in population, population densities, level of manpower utilization, structure of immigration, and its distribution among different economic activities, and the degree of influence of industrial complex of the immigrated region on structure of immigration and their absorption in various economic activities. It is conducted in Maharashtra and data for the purpose has been collected from the reports of the Census of India 1961. The author concludes that given resource endowments the type and nature of economic activities determine the size of manpower in a region and the level of local and immigrated manpower utilization in it.

OSBORNE, Arthur. Ramana Maharishi and the Path of Self-Knowledge. B.I. Publications, Bombay, 1979, xii, 207p., Rs. 10.50. (Paper)

PETHE, Vasant Prabhakar. Population Policy and Compulsion in Family Planning. Continental Prakashan, Poona, 1981, 188p. Rs. 45.

interdisciplinary study of the issue of compulsory family planning encompassing the economic, political, cultural, ethical and philosophical aspects. The book not only describes Indian experience but also the experience of the less developed countries

IND

of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It also contains commentary and texts of some policy statements of the Government of India and the text of the Maharashtra Bill, 1976 regarding compulsory sterilization.

RAGHAVA RAO, D.V. Panchayats and Rural Development. Studies in Integrated Rural Development. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980., xii, 96p., Rs. 35.

Main focus of the study is on Gram Panchayats. It analyses, in theoretical perspective, among others, the significance of "dominant caste" and class in the emerging power structure in Gram Panchayats which influences the role of these bodies in administering rural development with social justice. Analysis has been based on data collected from 172 Gram Panchayats constituting 34 per cent of such units in the Tumkur district. The study suggests that a Gram Panchayat should have a minimum population of 4000 to make them economically viable and that such a 'unit area' should have similar rural development institutions to usher in integrated rural development.

RAJCHANDRA, I. Shrimad. Atma-Siddhi: Self-Realisation tr. by D.C. Mehta (Bhavan's Book University, 211). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bpmbay 1976, vi, 98p., Rs. 4. (Paper)

The author an atma-gnani par excellence and a leading world philosopher in this sacred book has propounded the ways and means to attain the ultimate goal of liberation. Mahatma Gandhi acknowledged the author as his spiritual master and said that his influence on him was deeper than even that of Tolstoy and Ruskin.

RAO, V.G. and MALYA, Paramjit. Agricultural Finance by Commercial Banks. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980, xv, 220p., Rs. 65.

Nationalisation of banks in July 1969, among other policies, laid down a policy of ensuring bank finances to the productive needs of all sections of the population, irrespective of the size and social status of a beneficiary. The study in the light of this objective examines the structural changes in the credit patterns of commercial banks in terms of securities, disbursement methods etc; impact of bank loans on the recipients' business operations and income structure, and attitudes of borrowers and lending agents towards the evolved schemes of farm financing. It also identifies the expectations of the farmers and the means of meeting them. These aspects are analysed on the basis of field level data collected from selected bank branches and borrower farmers spread across the South Kanara district of Karnataka state.

SEETHARAMU, A.S. Education and Rural Development. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980, 303p., Rs. 85.

Study about the responsiveness of people in rural areas with different levels of education or no education at all to development programmes of the Karnataka state; sponsored by the Planning Department of the Government of Karnataka. Development programmes covered in the study are mainly production-oriented taken up by the Department of Agriculture, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services, Industry and Commerce, Health and Family Welfare, Power, Irrigation, etc. Apart from these the "Free Distribution of Sites" and "Janatha Housing Schemes" programmes have also been dealt with.

SINGH, Sundra Rani. Urban Planning in India: A Case Study of Urban Improvement Trusts. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, xii, 432 p. Rs. 95.

Empirical and behavioural study of the organisation, administration and working of five Urban Improvement Trusts in Ajmer, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Udaipur. The data has been collected from official records as well as through interviews of the trustee personnel and prominent citizens associated with these Trusts. The author concludes that despite many structural, procedural and functional flaws, the Urban Improvement Trusts have responded fairly well to meet the challenges of urbanisation.

A small public opinion survey is included in the study to indicate that although the trusts have made efforts to develop cities, yet they have failed to provide civic amenities to the desired extent.

VIVEKANANDA, M. Planning Unit Areas for Integrated Rural Development. Studies in Integrated Rural Development. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980, Ix, 74p. Rs. 35.

Deals with the prevailing pattern of amenities and services and the contact pattern of villages on other places for marketing and employment with a view to judge the minimal planning unit without resorting to a large scale expansion of the present basic amenities and services, keeping in view the norms for providing them. Further, in view of the non-feasibility of providing other rural amenities and services to the "minimal units" at the present level of development, an attempt is made to identify an area for providing some of these at a reasonable distance from the "Minimal units." The results of the study are given in four sections—the first deals with amenities and services, the second marketing, the third employment and the fourth strategy.

V&AS, N.N. MANN, R.S. Disease Culture Contact and Tribals. The MLV Tribal Research and Training Institute, Tribal Area Development Department, Udaipur, 1981, 13p.,

Special number of journal TRIBE, deals with the problems of tuberculosis and evenereal disease among the tribals of Rajasthan, and analyses the socio-cultural and other factors vis-a-vis disease. Recommendations for eradication of the diseases have also been made.

#### **ENCOUNTERS**

The Westerly Trade of the Harappa Civilization SHEREEN RATNAGAR

This study provides an overall view of the bronze age cultures, including those of Sumer, Akkad, Elam, Barbar and Umm an Nar, Yahya and Helmand cultures, spreading from the Lower Mesopatamian plains to the Indus Valley, and the evidence for trade links between them and the Indus Valley civilization. The author draws on both archeological and literary sources for evidence of extensive trading patterns that existed in this period.

Rs 120

## PEASANT NATIONALISTS OF GUJARAT Kheda District 1917-1934 DAVID HARDIMAN

This book examines the peasant base to the nationalist movement in India, by concentrating on events in Kheda District of Gujarat, which was a major centre of rural nationalism in the early twentieth century. To understand the extent and nature of peasant involvement in the Gandhian movement, the author examines the complex local politics of Kheda at that time, analysing relations between the Congress, Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel and the peasants, as also between sections of the peasantry themselves.

Rs 110

## DOMESTIC ROOTS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 1947-1972 A. APPADORAI

The force with which independent India made her views on international affairs known and acted upon in the period 1947-72 deserves close and critical study. The author has isolated five specifically Indian elements: the traditional belief in non-violence; India being a secular state; the strongly socialist bias that the Indian National Congress has evinced from the 1930s onwards; the impact of federalism on the foreign policy of a state; and finally, and perhaps of greatest significance, the personality and ability of Jawaharlal Nehru himself. The book as a whole provides a comprehensive survey of Indian foreign policy.

A HISTORY OF SRI LANKA K.M. DE SILVA Rs 80

This book, the first comprehensive general survey of the island's history to appear since the middle of the nineteenth century, provides a synthesis of the major forces—political, economic, social and cultural—which have shaped her destiny from legendary origins over 2,500 years ago to the present day. It begins with her classical age when a Buddhist culture in combination with a complex irrigation system formed the basis of a vibrant civilization.

Rs 150



# OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110002

BOMBAY

CALCUTTA

MADRAS

# OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES...

Like encouraging music

nce

20

hi,

We believe commitment to social progress is an important measure of business achievement.

Mahindra and Mahindra Limited



# THE TECHNOLOGISTS' SUPERMARKET



That's one way of describing the broad spectrum of IOL's technologies.

The technologists' supermarket is IOL where under one roof a wide range of products and services are available.

IOL's technological hamper includes gases for anaesthesia, welding, cutting, inerting, cryogenic applications and furnace enrichment; special gases for the electronics industry, for diving and off-shore operations, for metallurgy, calibration of instruments and research; anaesthetic equipment, welding and cutting equipment and consumables of every kind to meet needs as

diverse as those from the wayside welder to the shipbuilder, the small tool manufacturer, the giant heavy engineering sector, petrochemical, fertiliser and refinery complexes plus entire gas plants, associated cryogenic equipment; and liquid oxygen explosives for mining.



Backing this hardware is a package of services—consultancy and advisory, after-sales, and training.

IOL's leadership in all its activities is the leadership of technology. Cross-fertilising latest trends with existing knowledge to breed a new generation of products and services. For progress.



IOL offers the best in technology

ICSS Subse India Subse ICSS Subse (insti

(indi ICSS Sabs (indi ICSS Subs

· Subs

Vol. Tran

And Insti

Maj

NO Bhu BO

BIB

# Indian Council of Social \* Science Research Journals

078714

ICSSR Research Abstracts Quarterly

Subscription: Single copy: Rs. 3, £0.30, \$ 0.75. Annual: £1.00 or \$2.50.

Indian Dissertation Abstracts (Quarterly)

Subscription: Single copy: Rs.5, \$1. Annual: Rs. 15, \$3.

Indian Psychological Abstracts (Quarterly)

Subscription: Annual Rs.20, \$6 (individuals).: Rs. 30, \$8 (institutions).

ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews: Sociology and Social Anthropology (half yearly)

Subscription: Single copy: Rs.10, \$2, Rs. 15 (individuals). Annual: Rs.20, \$4 (institutions).

HCSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews: Economics (Quarterly)

· Subscription: Single copy: Rs. 8, \$2.50. Annual: Rs. 30, \$8.00 (institutions), Rs. 25 (individuals).

ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews: Geography (half yearly)

Sabscription: Single copy: Rs. 10, \$2, Annual: Rs. 20, \$4 (institutions) Rs. 15 (individuals.)

ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews: Political Science (balf yearly)

Subscription: Single copy: Rs. 10, \$2, Annual: Rs. 20, \$4 (institutions). Rs. 15 (individuals).

For details contact: Director (Documentation)
INDIAN COUNCIL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Social Science Documentation Centre
35, Ferozshah Road,
New Delhi 110 001.

## JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

CONTENTS

Vol. 20, No. 3

July-September 1981

Transfer of Power: British Policy-Making Processes and Their Parts in the Shaping of Events

Anomaly of Growth: Brazil's Foreign-Debt-Fed Economic Development

Institutionalization of the Non-Aligned Movenmet
Foreign Aid and Rural Development in Ethiopia: A
Study of the Role of International Donor Organizations in Agricultural Development Programmes

Major Developments in India's Foreign Policy and Relations, July-December 1979

NOTES AND MEMORANDA

Bhutan's International Position

BOOK REVIEWS BIBLIOGRAPHY

îndia and World Affairs: An Annual Bibliography,

Nicholas Mansergh

R. Narayanan and R.L. Chawla Malabika Banerjee

Seleshi Sisaye

B. Vivekanandan

Srikant K. Dutt

Shyamala Moorthy and Neena Kapoor

# PUBLISHERS AND DISTRIBUTORS VIKAS PUBLISHING HOUSE PRIVIATE LIMITED

Vikas House, 20/4 Industrial Area, Sahibabad, Distt Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.

TOX/CAS-7/8

a tancy

nđ

## IDSA JOURNAL

Quarterly Journal of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Vol. XIII April-June 1981

No. 4

Restraint As A Factor in Strategy:

Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit

A Re-examination of Napoleonic Concepts

(Retd.)

Use of Nuclear Weapons

Inder Khosla

The Western Sahara Ouestion

K.R. Singh

The Arab Lobby in the US

A.G. Naidu

Indian Ocean Islands:

Bahrain, Masirah and Socotra

J.P. Anand

The Emergence of Independent Zimbabwe

H.M.L. Beri

Orders from: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Sapru House, Barakhamba Road,

New Delhi-110001.

Subscription Annual: India Rs. 20/-

Overseas: \$ 5 (including surface postage).

# DOCUMENTATION ON ASIA

Vol. 5.

Prepared under the auspices of the INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS (Ed. by V. Machwe and Ashok Jambhekar).

Documentation on Asia, which is an annual publication, attempts to bring together systematically the vast periodical literature on Asian studies. This is the fifth volume in the series covering the year 1964 and arranged in six parts: Asia, East Asia, South-East Asia. South Asia, West Asia (including Egypt) and Central literature surveyed clearly manifests the political, economic and social developments national relations of Asian countries. and inter-

The 'Documentation on Asia' is a unique bibliography because it covers speeches, statements, resolutions, official and non-official reports, etc.

Besides the main part, the bibliography consists of an alphabetical list of sources, documents, an alphabetical subject index, alphabetical author index, who's who in brief and a list of abbreviations used.



## A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Some significant Articles published recently:

The Afghan Crisis and Super Power Strategies: Implications for India's Foreign Policy

Parvathi Vasudevan

Dynamics of Confrontation: Tarapur and Indo-US Relations

Sanjukta Banerjee

US Policy Towards India: A National Interest Model

A.G. Naidu

Indian Writings on India's Foreign Policy and the Promotion of International Understanding

Iabella Khathing

Food Policy and Politics in Bangladesh

Marcus Franda

Japan and the Indian Ocean Basin

P.A. Narsimha Murthy

The European Economic Community: Unity and Solidarity a Distant Dream

B. Vivekanandan

Dragon Kingdom's Urge for an International Role

Manorama Kohli

Annual Subscription: Rs. 60/- \$ 24.00 • Single Copy: Rs. 16/- \$ 7.00

Orders to:

The Assistant Secretary, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi-110001, India.

Printed by Navchetan Press (P) Ltd. at the Navjeevan Printers, 1-E/2, J. andewalan, New Delhi; Mg. Editor Uma Vasudev. Published and printed by V.K. Arora for the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi (India).

## Articles from

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPORTS 1980-81

1980

Cuba's External Economic Relations: November

Their Implications for its Role in

World Affairs

The Iran-Iraq War: A Preliminary December

Assessment

R. Narayanan

Sreedhar

1981

January

February

Ronald Reagan and His America

The Independent Polities of the

Pacific:

March Nigeria and the Organization of

Petroleum Exporting Countries

April The World Bank and the Global

Economy in the Seventies'

June Poland in Turmoil: A Survey

July Multinational Corporations in

Zimbabwe: A Study of the

Constraints of Independence

August General Elections in Nepal

Processes and Pointers

September Bangladesh Under Ziaur Rahman:

An Analytical Survey

M.S. Venkataramani Stephen Levine & Raj Vasil

Remi Anifowose Ashutosh Varshney &

Satish Jha O.N. Chawla

Neera Chandhoke

Navin Chandra Joshi

Mehendra Ved

Annual Subscription: Rs. 30/- \$ 16.00/-Single Copy:

Rs. 3/- \$ 2.00/-

Orders to:

The Assistant Secretary, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi-110001, India.

Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers for India under No. R.N. 14276/57

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri Completed 20.2001 CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

